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====Benardete & Davis====
On Poetics<ref>"Poetics" translates ''poiêtikê''; it is the art of ''poiein'', which means first to make or do and secondarily to make poetry. ''Poiêsis'', the product of ''poiein'', frequently takes on the narrower meaning of poetry. Articulating the full meaning of ''poiêtikê'' is the task that Aristotle sets himself in the book that comes down to us in the English tradition as ''On Poetics''. Because of the weight of this tradition and the obvious concern of the book with poetry and especially tragedy, we have retained this translation. However it should be kept in mind that ''poiein'' is a very common verb in Greek, and that in principle the art dealing with it could have as much to do with making or action as with poetry in the narrower sense. Where an ambiguity of meaning seems possibly intentional, the Greek verb will be placed in brackets after the translation. Virtually every occurrence in the translation of any form of the verb "to make" is a rendering of the Greek ''poiein'', and all appearances of English words cognate with "poet" are translations of words cognate with ''poiein''. It is perhaps significant that the only time ''poiêtikê'' is coupled with ''technê'' (art or craft) is at the end (1460b14), for it is precisely there that Aristotle distinguishes ''poiêtikê'' from any other art. At 1447a19-20 Aristotle indicates that imitation comes to be not only by art but also by habit.</ref>

1.

[1447a] [8] Concerning poetics, both itself and its kinds,<ref>The word is ''eidos''. In Plato it is used for "form" or "idea." Elsewhere in Aristotle it is used for "species," especially as opposed to ''genos'', genus. ''Eidos'' is regularly translated as "kind." Where the context demands another translation, ''eidos'' follows in parentheses. Its cognate and almost synonym, ''idea'', will be translated as "form."</ref> what particular power each has, and how stories should be put together [10] if the ''poiêsis''<ref>The meaning of ''poiêsis'' ranges from "making" or "something made" to "poetry." We have transliterated it to avoid prematurely narrowing this range. See footnote 1 above.</ref> is to be beautiful<ref>The Greek word here is ''kalôs''. In its adjectival form, ''kalon'', it means both beautiful and noble. We will translate it by both; sometimes together, sometimes, where the context demands, we will choose one or the other. Wherever another word is translated by "noble," the Greek term will follow the translation in brackets; "beautiful" will always translate ''kalon''. The opposite of ''kalon'', ''aischron'', means both shameful and ugly; it will be translated similarly either by the conjunction of the two terms or as context demands by one or the other. "Ugly" will always translate ''aischron''; wherever "shameful" translates another Greek word, the original will follow in brackets. The adverb ''aischrôs'' will be translated similarly.</ref>, and further from how many and from what sort of proper parts<ref>''Morion'' will be translated as "proper part." ''Meros'' will be translated as "part" although when "part" occurs in the translation it need not mean that ''meros'' occurs in the Greek text. Aristotle discusses the difference between the two terms in ''The Parts of Animals'', which might be translated more accurately as ''The Proper Parts of Animals''.</ref> it is, and likewise also concerning whatever else belongs to the same inquiry, let us speak, beginning first according to nature from the first things.

Now epic poetry<ref>The Greek ''epopoiia'' combines ''epos'', epic, and a word cognate with the verb ''poiein''.</ref> and the ''poiêsis'' of tragedy, and further comedy and the art of making dithyrambs,<ref>The Greek ''dithurambopoiêtikê'' once again combines the word for dithyramb with a cognate of ''poiein''.</ref> and [15] most of the art of the flute and of the cithara are all in general imitations.<ref>"Imitation" translates ''mimêsis''; "to imitate" translates the verb ''mimeisthai''. The entirety of ''On Poetics'' could be understood as an attempt to articulate the importance of ''mimêsis'' for understanding human nature. Of the approximately 115 occurrences of the term in Aristotle, some 80 are in ''On Poetics''. ''Mimêsis'', ''mimêma'', and ''mimeisthai'' occur about 300 times in Plato.</ref> But imitations differ from one another in three ways, for they differ either by being imitations in different things, of different things, or differently and not in the same way. For just as some who make images imitate many things by colors and figures [20] (some through art and some through habit) and others through the voice, so also in the case of the arts mentioned, all make the imitation in rhythm and speech<ref>''Logos'' will ordinarily be rendered by "speech" and ''legein'' by "to speak"; where it is necessary to translate them otherwise, the transliterated Greek text will be supplied in brackets.</ref> and harmony, but these either apart or mixed together. For example, both the art of the flute and the art of the cithara [25] (and whatever others are of this sort with respect to their power, such as the art of the pipes) use only harmony and rhythm. But the art of dancers uses rhythm by itself apart from harmony (for they too through the rhythms of the shape of their movements imitate characters, sufferings,<ref>"Suffering" translates ''pathos'' throughout; however it has a range of meaning from "experiencing" or "undergoing" to "suffering."</ref> and actions). On the other hand, the art using bare speeches<ref>Bare, or ''psiloi'', speeches are those that are unmetrical.</ref> alone and the one using meters, [1447b] whether mixing them with one another or using some one family of meters, are in fact until now nameless. For we would not be able to give any name in common to the mimes<ref>''Mimos'', while apparently restricted here to a specific type of ''mimêsis'', or imitation, would be the most obvious name for the entire class. Sophron wrote male and female mimes.</ref> of Sophron and Xenarchus and the Socratic speeches, any more than if someone should make the imitation through trimeters or elegiacs or any other meters of that sort.<ref>Athenaeus alludes to this passage at 11.112 (505C): "Aristotle in his ''About the Poets'' writes as follows: 'Are we not to assert that the completely unmetrical mimes of Sophron are stories (''logoi'') and imitations, or those of Alexamenus the Tean written before the Socratic dialogues?'"</ref> Human beings, however, in connecting the making with the meter, do name some elegiac poets and [15] other epic poets, not addressing them as poets with regard to the imitation, but with regard to the meter they have in common; for even if they publish something in meter about medicine or natural science, men are accustomed to call it by its meter. Hence it is just to call the one poet, but to call the other, rather than poet, one who gives an account of nature.<ref>The Greek is ''phusiologos''.</ref> [20] And similarly, even if someone should make an imitation by mixing together all the meters, as Chaeremon made the ''Centaur'' a rhapsody mixed from all meters, one would also have to address him as poet. 

Now, concerning these things, then, let them have been distinguished [25] in this way. For there are some which use all the things mentioned -- I mean [''legô''], for example, rhythm, song, and meter -- such as the ''poiêsis'' of dithyrambics and of nomes<ref>''Nomos'' initially means "melody" and later comes to mean "song," including both words and music. It also means law or custom.</ref> and both tragedy and comedy. But they differ because some use all at the same time and others use them part by part. Now, among the arts I say [''legô''] the differences in what they make the imitation are these.

2.

[1448a] Since imitators imitate those acting, and since it is necessary for them to be either of stature<ref>''Spoudaios'' has a range of meanings: good, earnest, serious, weighty, etc. It is an important term in ''On Poetics'' and will be translated throughout by "of stature."</ref> or inferior<ref>''Phaulos'' means low, base, paltry, trivial, etc. It will be translated throughout by "inferior."</ref> (characters are pretty nearly always consequences of these alone, for everyone differs in point of character by vice or by virtue<ref>See Aristotle's ''Nicomachean Ethics'' 1145a15-33 and 1148b15-34 in Appendix 6 [in the book].</ref>), they imitate either those better than what is on [5] our level or worse or even the sort that are on our level, just as painters do. For Polygnotos used to make images of the better, while Pauson of the worse, and Dionysius of the similar.<ref>See Aristotle's ''Politics'' 1340a14-b17 in Appendix 5 [in the book].</ref> And it is also clear that each of the aforesaid imitations will have these differences, and each will be different by imitating what is different in this way (for, as a matter [10] of fact, even in dance, in flute playing, and in cithara playing it is possible for these dissimilarities to occur as well as in the case of speeches and bare meter). Homer, for example, made them better, Cleophon similar, and Hegemon the Thasian, who first made parodies, and Nicochares, who made the ''Delias'', worse. And in the case of [15] dithyrambs and nomes, someone might likewise imitate just as Timotheos and Philoxenus did the ''Cyclopes.''<ref>We have omitted ''gas'' at 1448a15.</ref> And by this very difference<ref>We have accepted Casaubon's addition so that the text reads ''autêi de tautêi têi diaphorai.''</ref> tragedy too stands apart from comedy: the one wants to imitate those worse and the other those better than those now.

3.

Further, how someone might imitate each of these is a third difference of these. For even if the imitation is in the same things and of the same things, it is possible sometimes to imitate when reporting (either becoming some other as Homer does [''poiei''] as the same and not changing) or else to imitate with all those imitating<ref>Some editors believe that the phrase "those imitating" is either corrupt or interpolated. Aristotle seems to be bringing out the curious fact that, if one disregards exits and entrances, despite being an "imitation of action," tragedy contains no action in the literal sense. The definition thus refers to the plot as an action.</ref> acting [''prattontas''] and [25] being in action [''energountas''].<ref>Aristotle uses the verb ''energein'' here; its cognate noun, ''energeia'', is an important term in Aristotle, literally indicating something that has its ''ergon'' (work, deed, function) within itself, that is, something complete and at the same time at work or in motion. See, for example, ''Metaphysics'' 9.1-6.</ref> As we said at the beginning, imitation, then, consists in these three differences: in which, what, and how. So in one sense as imitator Sophocles would be the same as Homer, for both imitate those of stature, while, in another, he would be the same as Aristophanes, for both imitate those acting [''prattontas''] and doing [''drôntas'']. From whence some say they are also called ''dramata''<ref>''Dramata'' are in the broad sense "doings" and in the narrower sense "dramas."</ref> because they imitate those doing [''drôntas'']. It is [30] for this reason that the Dorians also make a claim<ref>The word is ''antipoiountai'', again a compound of the verb ''poiein''. It can also mean "to exert oneself over" or "to have something done in return to one"; etymologically it might be construed as "antipoetize."</ref> to tragedy and comedy (For the local Megarians make a claim to comedy as having emerged at the time of their democracy.<ref>Aristotle discusses Megarian comedy at ''Nicomachean Ethics'' 1123a20-24: "The vulgar man spends a lot in small expenditures and strikes a false note in making a brilliant display, in feasting, for example, his picnic-guests on the lavish scale of a wedding, and in underwriting a comic chorus introduces purple in the parodos, as those in Megara do." The scholium on this passage runs: "It was usual to make leather skins as the screens in comedy and not purple. ... The Megarians are ridiculed in comedy, since they also claim that comedy was first discovered by them, inasmuch as the one who started comedy was Susarion the Megarian. They are disparaged as vulgar and tasteless and for using purple in the parodos. Aristophanes, at any rate, in mocking them, says somewhere, 'No stolen joke from Megara.' Ecphantides the oldest poet of old comedy says, 'I shall not go through a song of Megarian comedy; I am ashamed to make a Megarian drama.' It is shown on all sides that the Megarians are the inventors of comedy."</ref> And those in Sicily make a claim to it, for Epicharmus, the poet, was from there; he was much earlier than [35] Chionides and Magnes.<ref>Epicharmus is mentioned in Plato's ''Theaetetus'' (152e1-5); Socrates is speaking about the Heraclitean thesis: "Nothing ever is, but everything is always becoming. All of the wise, with the exception of Parmenides, occur about this, Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles, and of the poets, those who are tip-top in each kind of poetry, Epicharmus of comedy, and Homer, of tragedy." He is also mentioned in Iamblichus's ''Life of Pythagoras'' (36.266): "Epicharmus too was one of the external auditors [of the Pythagoreans], but he did not belong to the inner circle. On his arrival in Syracuse, he abstained from philosophizing openly on account of the tyranny of Hiero, but he put into meter the thoughts of the Pythagoreans, making known their secret doctrines playfully."</ref> And some of those in the Peloponnese make a claim to tragedy.) The Dorians make names the sign. For they say that they call their outlying district villages [''kômai''], while the Athenians call them demes, as if comedians or revel singers [''kômôdoi''] were so called not from reveling [''kômazein''] but by wandering from village to village [''kata kômas''], and driven in dishonor from [1448b] the town. And they say they name doing [''poiein''] ''dran'', but that the Athenians name it ''prattein''.<ref>The verb ''dran'' is common in Aristotle and in Attic authors generally. This passage is the only evidence we have that it is of Doric origin.</ref> About the differences of imitation, then, both how many they are and of what they are, let these things have been said. (2002:1-8)
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====Benardete & Davis====
6.

[..] Tragedy 
[25] is an imitation of an action that is of stature and complete, 
with magnitude, that, by means of sweetened speech,<ref>We have followed the suggestion Professor Gregory Sifakis in a lecture at New York University that ''hêdusmenôi logoi'' is an instrumental dative.</ref> but 
with each of its kinds separate in its proper parts, is of people 
acting<ref>The word is ''drôntôn'', the present genitive plural participle of the verb ''dran''.</ref> and not through report, and accomplishes 
through pity and fear the cleansing<ref>"Cleansing" is ''katharsis''; Aristotle treats it at somewhat more length at ''Politics'' 1342a5-16. See Appendix 1f. Many believe that its definition dropped out after "through song" below.</ref> of experiences of this 
sort.<ref>"Experiences" translates ''pathêmata'', which has the same root as ''pathos'', translated as "suffering." ''Pathêmata'' also occurs at 1459b11, where, however, it has the same meaning as ''pathos''.</ref> I mean [''legô''] by "sweetened speech" that which has
[30] rhythm, harmony, and song, and by "separate in its kinds"
sometimes through meters alone accomplishing its task and
again at other times through song. And (1) since they do
[''poiountai''] the imitation by acting [''prattontes''], the ordered
arrangement of the ''opsis''<ref>The Greek is ''ho tês opseôs kosmos. Kosmos'' means "order" or "the order" -- i.e., the cosmos. It may also mean "adornment." ''Opsis'' (plural ''opseis'') means primarily "spectacle" here, but may also refer to the faculty of sight or even to the visage (we have transliterated it throughout to preserve this range of meaning). ''Ho tês opseôs kosmos'' clearly refers, in the first instance, to the way in which the visible features of drama are arranged on the stage and includes such things as scenery and costumes but also the entrances and exits of the actors.</ref> would in the first place be of
necessity some proper part of tragedy. Next, (2) song-making 
and (3) talk would be as well, for they do [''poiouontai''] 
the imitation in these. By the putting together of the
[35] meters, I mean [''legô''] talk in the strict sense, and by 
song-making I mean what has an altogether evident power. But,
since imitation is of action, and it is acted by some who
are acting who necessarily are of a certain sort with respect
to (4) character and (5) thought<ref>"Character" is ''êthos'', and "thought" is ''dianoia''; these terms are introduced by Aristotle at the beginning of ''Nicomachean Ethics'' Book 2 to designate respectively moral and intellectual virtue.</ref> (for it is through these
[1450a] that we say actions also are of a certain sort, and it is
according to these that all are either fortunate or unfortunate),
and (6) since the story is the imitation of the action,
and thought and character are by nature the two causes of
[5] actions<ref>Following tentative suggestion of Vahlen we have moved this clause -- "and thought and character are by nature the two causes of actions" - here from 1450a1; this requires emending ''pephuken'' to read ''pephuked'.'' This change solves the puzzle of the strangely repetitive character of the text from 1449b6 to 1450a3 and also avoids a ''men solitarium'' at 1450d3. In addition it has interesting consequences for the way the argument builds toward the primacy of story among the proper parts of tragedy.</ref> (for I mean [''legô''] this by story,<ref>The word is muthos; Aristotle uses it in a distinctive way here, for
it means not only story or tale but also its composition. ''Muthos'' originally means "word," "speech," or "something said." Later it comes to mean "story" or "tale" and is opposed to ''logos'' -- "rational account." It is significant that it is used to describe stories that deal with the gods. In ''On Poetics'', Aristotle gives it the more technical meaning of "plot," while at the same time he diminishes the role of the divine in tragedy almost to the point of its disappearance. We have translated ''muthos'' as "story" throughout as a reminder of how radical an innovation Aristotle's understanding of plot is. ''Muthos'' as "plot" occurs nowhere prior to Aristotle. Elsewhere in Aristotle ''muthos'' has one of two meanings: either something remarkable or of a divine cause. On the relation of ''muthos'' to ''logos'' with respect to the divine and to tragedy consider the following excerpt from Plato's ''Cratylus'' (408b8-d2):<blockquote>Socrates: And the likely, my comrade, holds Pan to be the double-natured son of Hermes.<br>Hermogenes: How is that?<br>Socrates: You know that ''logos'' signifies everything and is always circling and revolving around everything, and is double, true and false.<br>Hermogenes: Yes, of course.<br>Socrates: Isn't the case that the true part of it is smooth, divine, and dwells above among the gods; but the false dwells below among the many of human beings and is rough and tragic; for most ''muthoi'' and falsehoods are there, about the tragic life.<br>Hermogeries: Yes, of course.<br>Socrates: Then rightly would he who reveals everything (''pan'') and is always (''aei'') revolving (''polôn'') be Pan goatherd (''aipolos''), the double-natured son of Hermes, whose upper part is smooth, the lower rough and goatlike (''tragoeidês'').</blockquote></ref> the putting 
together of events,<ref>"Event" is ''pragma''. ''Pragmata'' is "the business at hand," but the word, like ''praxis'', derives from the verb "to act" -- ''prattein''. ''Pragmata'' therefore in some sense stand to ''praxis'' as do things done to the doing of them.</ref> and I mean by characters that according
to which we say those acting ar:e of a certain sort, and I
mean by thoug ht that by which, while speaking, they
demonstrate something or declare their judgment), it is
necessary for there to be six parts of all tragedy according
to which tragedy is of a certain sort. And these are story,
[10] characters, talk, thought, ''opsis'', and song-making. Two parts 
are those in which they imitate, one is how they imitate,
and three are what they imitate, and besides these there are
none. [..] (2002:17-20)
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====Benardete & Davis====
25.

Concerning problems and solutions;<ref>"Solution" translates ''lusis'', previously rendered as "unraveling."</ref> it should
become apparent by contemplating them in the following
way both out of how many and out of what kinds they are.
For, since the poet [''ποιητής''] is an imitator [''μιμητής''], just as if he were a picture
painter [''ζώγραφος''] or some other maker of images [''εἰκονοποιός''], it is necessary that
[10] he always imitate [''μιμέομαι''] some one of three things in number; for
he must imitate either: 1. what sort it was or is [''οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν''], or 2. what
sort they say it to be or it seems to be [''οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ''], or 3. what sort it
should be [''οἷα εἶναι δεῖ'']. And these are reported in a talk in which there
are foreign words, metaphors, and many modifications<ref>''Pathos'' is translated as "modification" here; it is a technical
rhetorical term. Elsewhere it has been translated in its more general sense of "suffering."</ref> of
talk. For we allow these things to the poets. In addition to 
this, the same rightness [''ὀρθότης''] does not belong to the art of 
[15] politics and poetics anymore than to any other art and poetics.
But there is a double mistake that belongs to poetics itself —
one is in itself and the other is the accidental [''συμβαίνω'']. If his choice
was right, but he fell short in the imitation on account of
incapacity [''ἀδυναμία''], the mistake [''ἁμαρτία''] belongs to poetics itself; but if his
choice was not right, and a horse has at once thrown both
right legs forward at once, the mistake has occurred in a
[20] particular art [''τέχνη''], for example, in medicine or any other art
whatsoever, and then it is not a mistake of poetics in
itself.<ref>There is a gap in the text in this sentence. We are translating
Kassel's text with Vahlen's addition.</ref> Hence one should solve<ref>The verb is ''luein'', elsewhere translated as "unravel."</ref> the problems the 
criticisms involve by looking at them on this basis. First, there
are the criticisms directed against the art itself: "If it has
made impossible things, it has made a mistake."<ref>We are translating Vahlen's emendation here.</ref> But it is
[25] right if it achieves its own end [''τέλος''] (for the end has been stated),
if in this way it makes this or another part more astounding [''ἐκπληκτικός''].
The pursuit of Hector is an example. If, however, it was
either more, or not less, possible for the end to exist even in 
accordance with the art about these things, then it has not
rightly made a mistake. For it ought, if it is possible, 
generally to be without any mistakes. Further, to which of the
[30] two does the mistake belong? Is it according to art or
according to something else accidental? For it is less if he
did not know that a female deer does not have horns than if
he depicted non-imitatively.<ref>Aelian in his ''de natura animalium'' 7.39 cites several poets
(Sophocles, Sophillus, Euripides, Pindar, Anacreon) who
assigned horns to a female deer, and he goes on to remark that
the grammarian Aristophanes of Byzantium weighed in on the
side of the poets. [...]</ref>
(2002:64-65)
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