METHOD

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Je mehr der Nagel auf den Kopf…
— L. Wittgenstein

MOVER

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

I. PLAN

THIS AND THAT **1**

There's this and that.
This is here —
that is there.

'Here' is the world of this —
'there' is the world of that.
(This and that are separated.)

THIS AT THAT **2**

A plan is
this-at-that.
An operation is
this-to-that.
This plans this-to-that
for this-at-that.

For this-at-that
this leaves its world.
(It's for this
either here or there:
one of both.)

3

THIS TOUCHES THAT

If this is at that,
this touches that
This had planned to touch.
(Hence this wanted to be at that.)

If this touches that,
this touches for the second time:
the first time in its thoughts,
the second time in the world of that.
This repeats the touching.

A plan is:
a touching executed in thought
before effectively touching.
(Considered thus, a plan is
a thought operation.)

4

THIS BESIDE THAT

If this touches that,
this is beside that.

This is not just this-beside-that,
but forms a relation with that.
By touching the relation becomes manifest.

The manifest relation this-beside-that is a connection.
A connection is a contraction of this and that
executed according to plan.

The visible and tangible result of
the contraction this-that is a construction.

The construction this-that is
the 'confirmed' plan of this
to touch that.
(Viewed thus, a plan is
a 'weak construction' in the head of this.)

5

THE WORLD

A completed construction this-beside-that
is literally charged with plan.
The plan renders the construction
sense and direction.
(Without plan, the construction is 'nowhere'.)

This has a reason to touch that.
This touches that
to touch the big world with the construction this-that.
The world!
For that reason, this has put its plan
in the construction this-that.
(Not so much so in order to touch that,
but to touch the world.)

In case the construction this-that touches the big world,
history repeats itself.
An arrangement this-that-beside-the-world emerges.
Again, this arrangement is a connection.

If this connection is visible and tangible,
she is a construction too:
a construction this-that-world.

The construction this-that-world is of a higher order
than the construction this-that.
The former possesses more plan and content
(more sense and direction)
than the latter.
The former construction includes the latter
and renders her 'meaning'.

6 **THE REHEARSED PLAN**

This touches that first in thought
and then in the world.
This repeats the touching.

Repetition requires practice.
This practices the repetition
in thought.

Practicing the repetition of the touching
means literally:
rehearsing the touching.

By rehearsing the touching,
this exercises its plan in thought
until it is formed.
(This exercises its plan
until in its thoughts a firm view arises
of a firm touching in the world.)

Rehearsing usually means:
staging an action
before actually performing this action.
The objective of staging is
— while rehearsing — testing the action.
To test an action
she is slowed down, disassembled, fragmented,
and where necessary
brought to a standstill.

(All actions of importance, like
robberies, medical surgeries,
theatre performances and concerts
are always rehearsed and tested
in this way
— beforehand and in detail.)

If the action has been rehearsed enough,
one can proceed to effective touching.
(And what else can this effective touching be
than the execution of a construction in the world:
a construction that, literally as 'performance',

is the crowning glory of all the rehearsals invested
in the effective touching!)

7 **THE CONSTRUCTED PLAN**

This — thinking —
constructs its plan
in thought.

This — constructing —
orders the building blocks,
ties up the connections between them,
determines the constructive value for each connection,
rehearses the working for each detail,
and compares the outcome thereof with the conception
it had made of the working.
(Initially in its head,
only later through interaction with the world.)

This — doing thus —
creates a full-fledged 'thought' version of a construction
such as the one which, in a moment,
will technically appear in the world.
Technically:
for confirmed, visible and tangible.

8 **THE CONSTRUCTION SHOWS PLAN**

A plan in the head of this becomes visible
at the moment this-here actually touches that-there.

Then, the construction this-that becomes real and firm
and shows her plan.
She shows what she plans to do with world.
However, she doesn't show this for the world to see,
but keeps it veiled.

The firm construction keeps her plan
in her interior secret and weak
until she touches the world.
Her plan goes without saying,
although with her appearance she repeats the view
of the plan confined to her.
This repetition however is not literal
but a 'translation' of the plan.
(And this translation one needs to know —
or guess of course.)

'Clear' constructions as it were anticipate
in their manifestation the touching of the world.
For example, the manifestation of a hunter
with his gun at the ready
(a true touching-construction!)
plenteously anticipates the lethal shot.
The view of the construction hunter-gun
points to nothing but firing.

But for most constructions, the plan is veiled.
Hence a detective takes the necessary trouble
to retrace from the construction 'turned-over-room'
the plan of its causer — the robber.

His genius is to picture that plan
and see what the robber was up to.

9

REPEATED THINKING

No touching without repetition
no repetition without plan
no plan without thinking.

So many times touching —
so many times thinking.

This repeats its thinking
to both learn
and unlearn.
(To progress thus bit by bit.)

This progresses,
when plans arise in its thoughts
of a better 'construction'
and with a larger content,
than the plans that have preceded her.
To that end however mere repetition-in-thought
is not enough:
this will have to repeat the touching in the world too
to gain the necessary experience.
In turn, this can add this experience to its thinking.
Thus, a chain of alternately
thinking, inventing and touching emerges.

The longer the chain,
the more this progresses.

10

EXPERIENCE

This gains experience
by comparing its touching-in-the-world
with touching-in-thought.
(Getting the difference between effective touching
and thought touching:
that's what experience is!)

This applies experience
by keeping from all its thought invested
in the construction this-that-world
what is useful and correct
and forgetting what is useless and incorrect.
This refreshes and renews its thought,
by adding what it has experienced
to its thought.
Thus, it stacks experience on experience.

The total of all experience this thereby gains
nestles in its very last thought.
Hence in its very last construction too!
(Unless of course, some of that experience
by accident — or on purpose —
has been lost 'along the way'.)

In the endless chain of repeated thinking and acting
each new 'very last' construction forms
a beacon expressing
all thinking devoted to her.

Each construction this-that-world documents
all the brainpower invested in her.
(Like a beacon, it keeps this thinking
as long as she is in the world.)

REST

A construction keeping a thought
rests.
But this rest is merely apparent.
For the thinking has not been invested
to rest the construction
('R.I.P…'),
on the contrary:
to set her into motion.

The thinking
embedded in the interior of the construction
charges her with sense and direction.
This charge —
that's what her certain position is!

That she will start to move
when the time is ready,
lends the charged construction

a certain rest.
And it is this certain rest
we see.
(Not the charge —
which is concealed, for embedded.)

THREE SITUATIONS

A construction resting now
and moving then
is on her way to completion and perfection.

Such a construction rests to be able to move
and moves to be able to rest.
She grows from situation to situation.

There are three situations:
the situation of the plan
(the construction fosters the plan put in her)
the situation of action
(the construction moves on her way to the target)
and the situation of the result
(the construction contracts with that or the world.)

Each third situation sticks to a successive first one.
In this sense, there are not three, only two situations.
But the construction herself experiences three.

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THREE STATIONS

The three situations are true stations.
Each construction on her way to completion
calls at these three stations.

At the third station (the terminal-result)
the very last construction generates the concept
for a next — successive — construction.
To her, she passes on her best properties.

The successive construction
(a next-generation construction)
in her turn travels from station-plan
via station-action
to station-result.
Safely embedded in her interior
she keeps the concept entrusted to her.

Generations of constructions travel uninterruptedly
along the three stations,
where they pass on to one another their best experiences
and properties.

II. MOVEMENT

THIS IS MOVED

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If this moves to that,
either this moves on its own
or a mover moves this:
one of both.

If this moves on its own,
this moves by itself.
Then this is the plan-possessing initiator of the
movement.
(This is the constructor of the construction this-that.)

If on the other hand the mover moves,
this is, so to say, surprised by the movement.
(This was not ready to be moved.)

This feels the power of the mover
and experiences his plan.
(This experiences the mover
as the initiator of the construction this-that.)

SETTING

A mover moving this
wants to go forwards.
Not literally forwards — in a topographical sense —
as this rushes forwards,
but in a potential sense
like a construction striving for completion.

A mover who wants to go forwards
travels.
He travels from phase to phase,
from situation to situation
and from station to station.
(Like this on the way to that,
yet unmoved.)

While the mover is making his way from station to station,
he keeps his place in the train mover-this-that-world.
(Unmoved himself, he retains his position of 'mover'.)

Yet his outlook on this, that and the world
the mover doesn't keep!
He does not only look different from station to station —
his complete setting changes.

The combination of retention and change —
that's what makes the mover into a true mover!

VISION

A mover moving this to that
eyes that.
The mover considers that his target.
(The target is what 'moves' the mover internally
to move forwards.)

Still, the mover doesn't only eye that
but also this.
He has to, if he wants to reach that.
(For he actually needs to move this
to touch that!)
Yet, there's seeing and seeing:
with the eye
and in thought.

The combination of seeing and 'seeing' —
that too makes the mover into a true mover.

FORMATION

If the mover moves this,
the mover is here,
the target there
and this in between.

These three:
mover, this and target
stand in line.

As long as the moving lasts
these three will not leave the line.

'Thus' standing in line:
that is the right formation to touch the world.
(In this formation the mover can enter the world,
as an expedition enters unknown territory.)

VIS-À-VIS

As long as this rests
the mover rests.

But this rest is mere pretence.
In his deepest interior, the mover touches this
to set this into motion —
destination: world.
The mover moves his plan.

While the mover is moving his plan
his eye rests.
His eye rests on this.
This feels that eye (that gaze)
but is unaware of the plan.

In this position
vis-à-vis its mover, this looks at him
…and waits.
(Like a hare looking at its hunter.)

The mover looks back.

The mover calls the side that this turns to him
the frontside of this.
Thus he determines and defines
the position of this
with regard to him
and the target.

THIS TURNS AROUND

At the moment the mover definitively
decides to move
(there's no way back)
this turns around.
(More or less like we,
when we bid farewell to our friends,
turn around.
For we too are moved to bid farewell.)

Still, it's not so much this turning around
but the functions of its sides:
one side with regard to the mover
and the other side with regard to the target.
These functions of its sides —
that's what lends this direction and sense!
(That's what we mean when we say
that this turns around!)

20 **VIS-À-DOS**

‘Turned-around’, this is close to its mover.
Closer is not thinkable.
(As if this were on the mover’s eye.)

In this reversed position, this shows the mover
its backside.
(Not its frontside —
vis-à-vis him,
but its backside directly stuck
to the eye of the mover —
‘vis-à-dos’ him.)

The other side — its frontside —
this points at the target
that the mover has in mind.
(Like spearheads, bullets, arrows, nails and needles
point their frontside at their movers’ targets.)

21 **THE MOVER MOVES**

With the frontside directed at the target
the mover’s gaze coincides with
the gaze of this.
(The mover looks over the shoulders of this
in the direction of the target.)
An extremely brief moment of deep rest
and concentration.

But that’s when the mover moves,
and this speeds away from him —
on its way to the target!

ZEN 22

The target of the Zen archer
is himself.
But — not there;
here.
And — not before or after the shot
but on the back of it.

THE PHOTOGRAPHER 23

‘I think beforehand and afterwards
but not at the moment
I take the picture.’

(That’s both correct and incorrect.
At that moment, the photo captures the view;
the photographer doesn’t take the picture.)

THIS ON ITS WAY TO THE TARGET 24

In case this rushes away to the target
this masks the target before touching it.
It masks it with its backside.
(At least, for the eye of the mover.)

As for the mover,
during the flight of this
the backside of this
and the frontside of the target
completely coincide.

The outcome of this apparent superposition is,
that the backside of this appears to the mover
just as motionless
but also as abstract
as the frontside of the target to which this moves:
an at most slowly shrinking,
but otherwise unshifting plane.
(And this, despite the speed with which the carrier of the plane speeds through the world.)

Because of this phenomenon
(that is more actuality than phenomenon)
the mover misses
how exactly this travels through the world:
what his path looks like
and with what speed this propels itself.
(The mover would have to give up his position within the formation
and arrange himself beside the line mover-this-target
to be able to perceive the flight of this.
Then however, he would be anything but a 'mover',
but rather a 'perceiver'!)

At the moment this reaches the target
the argument has been decided.
This forms with the target nothing but frontside.
(This becomes what it used to be before it moved:
exclusively frontside.)

Marksmen know how the coincidence of sides
of moving objects and targets
comes about!

How,
when they direct their guns at a target
the circular sight on the gun's barrel
not only represents
the frontside of the target before the shot,
but also the backside of the bullet afterward.

How,
when they fire
the sight, the bullet's backside and the target
for a very short moment
completely coincide.

How,
when the shot rings out
the bullet literally sinks into the target.

BACK- OR FRONTSIDE

The mover sees of this its backside.
He sees this (on its way to the target) from behind.

Yet does the mover see the back of this?
Does he know for sure that it is not the frontside of this he eyes?

For both interpretations — backside or frontside — there's something to say.
In favour of the version-backside,
because the position in which the mover launched this (i.e. this with its frontside clearly pointed towards the target)
is still fresh on his mind.
In favour of the version-frontside,
because the mover, at the moment this rushed away from him,
experienced the side turned towards him as a plane emitting about the same message as the plane of the target — namely:
frontside!

In fact, the frontside and the backside compete to show themselves to the mover in such a way that he experiences the other version as 'deceit'.

But then, does the object 'this' have no frontside or backside of its own at all?

Does 'this' possess no direction or identity of its own,
independently from the fact that it has or has not been set into motion,
is either close to the mover or close to the target,
is either visible and tangible,
or just a mere phenomenon?

(In other words:
to what extent is 'this' this-an-sich?)

THE TARGET AS SIGN

A target — any target — is not here but there.
Not just there but utmost there.
(Farther away than a target nothing can be.)

A mover sees his target there.
But:
there he doesn't see the full target (the target as fact)
but only its frontside.
The frontside represents the full target.
It is a frontside-sign.

The frontside-sign defines the position of the target with regard to the mover and the world.

(The sign tells the mover:
'Here's your target — hit me!')

28 THE TARGET AS VIEW

The frontside is also a view.
It is the view of the target
as it appears in the eye of the mover:
fictionally and apparently.

The mover aims for a fact
but meets a view.
(The fact is the view like that
is there in the world.)

Fact, sign, view:
the coherence between them —
that's what determines the mover's correct setting!

29 THE TARGET AS FRONTSIDE

For a mover — for any mover —
targets have no other sides
than frontsides.
(In no case they have flanks or backsides.)

A mover knowing better
yet trying to near the target from behind,
will experience how this target will turn with him

and follow him constantly with its frontside:
like a lion following the hunter with his head.

THE TARGET AS MOTIONLESSNESS 30

The target is not only nothing but frontside
but also nothing but motionlessness.
A target
— at least, the view that the mover forms of it —
never moves,
even if it moves!

Targets don't move
because the fronsides with which they represent
themselves
cannot move.
(Even better:
They can move
but the mover can't see that
because the frontsides turn with him
and follow his gaze.

If a mover finds a frontside moving nonetheless,
he calls this side not frontside
but flankside.
But in that case it is not as much
an issue of the frontside's movement,
but rather of the movement of the mover's position!
Indeed, a mover speaking of 'flankside'
obviously has left his position of mover

and changed it for the sideways observing
perceiver.
(Who just looks differently.)

III. PLACE

This beside that
takes place beside that.

Place is whence this sees, experiences, feels
and understands that.
Place is also what this imprints into the world
at the moment this relates to that.

One speaks of place
when this appears on that place
or disappears from it,
and not when this is there.
(Place is what this has before
or leaves behind him in the world,
and isn't something travelling with this
or that this possesses in one or the other way.)

Of its own, this possesses no place
but extent.
When this appears in the world,
this extent,
which belongs to this,

unites with the place
that from then on belongs to the world.

Where this appears
place is imprinted into the world.
(This spreads its extent over that place
and shields her.)

Place is what others considering this
retain from this
— indeed, literally maintain —
at the moment this moves to that.
Place is the motionless view
of this moving away
that others may point out and describe afterwards,
as if this were not at that
but rather here.
(Place is the descriptive evidence of this
once here,
now there.)

Place is neither this or that
nor of this or that
but rather of the world —
if for the eyes of others.

CAPACITY

One may only speak of 'place'
when a certain something begins to move

and leaves its place.
Here, place becomes available
and there, place becomes occupied.

Making place available here and occupying it there
is the capacity of that something.

As long as something finds itself at rest
and keeps its place,
this capacity is optimal.
But even if something just barely moves
it loses its capacity!
(Something 'uses up' its capacity while moving.)

We, who consider something at rest,
are certain about its rest
but uncertain about its movement.
Something hides from us its future movement.
Its extent conceals it from our eyes.
Yet, its capacity to move
— this quality —
is showing us something!
(Its physiognomy 'predicts' it to us.)

For example, the musculature of a weight lifter
'predicts' us long before he starts with his chore,
how and how high he will change the place
of this heavy barbell in a moment.
It is as if the muscles form the guarantee that

— when the time is there —
a lot of place will become available.

(And the quality of the weight lifter tells us
that place will become available for sure!)

For example, the physiognomy of a bow drawn
in which an arrow rests
'tells' us where the arrow will fly to
when the bow will have been unbent:
namely thereto —
right in the target!

Exactly similar, a pendulum construction
'tells' us where her pendulum will sweep to in a moment:
namely thereto —
charged with the capacity to return
to the place where he began swinging.

THE MEMORIAL

When a body leaves his place in the world
behind
he can keep her,
by marking the world there
— on that place — with a sign.
(An impression on the world is such a sign.)

The sign 'commemorates' the fact
that the body has once been on that place.

It forms the evidence of it.
(The sign commemorates the body.)

THE LINE

If a body speeds from here to there,
it passes many places.

By marking all places with signs
and threading these signs together,
the body can retain his route form here to there.
The thread of signs
is a line.

This line — any line — is motionless.
She doesn't move along with the speeding body
but stands still.
(Like smoke from a speeding steam locomotive
doesn't exert itself to move along with the chimney
but stands still.)

The line is the view
standing still and not moving by herself
of all places passed by through the body.
The line keeps the places.
She is their summation.

Despite the fact that lines stand still
and don't move,
they still cannot be grasped.

(They are phantoms.)
Even ways
in the way they are kept by lines
cannot be moved to come along with us.
(They are remainders on the skin of the world.)

35

THE TUMBLER

A tin tumbler tumbles on his tin
automaton floor.
Without any apparent stimulus,
he incessantly rolls from one place to the other —
wearing them down.
How on earth does he remember these places!
How does he find them again —
and why is he never mistaken!

Or take the sun:
whence does she have the knowledge
to surface precisely here
and disappear precisely there?

Or take the axe:
how does the lumberjack's axe find
time after time again
the same razor-sharp path through the air,
and why doesn't he at some point lose his direction
like a bird flapping about?

Do I actually look close enough?
Don't I see that the tumbler, the sun and axe
although they leave their places
don't leave their environments?
Don't I see that these environments are
a 'home' to them
offering room to these places?
How these environments never tire
to keep these places until the tumbler,
the sun and the axe have returned to them?

By the way:
our thoughts too are such a home.
When we 'commemorate' our dear deceased,
we house them in our thoughts.
Such a 'house-in-commemoration' offers to all our
deceased enough room to return from time to time.

THE CHAIR

36

I'm sitting in a room
watching.

A man is sitting on a chair.
The man gets up and looks out of the window.
I look at the chair, and it occurs to me
how well the chair keeps the man's place.
(The seat is warm.)

When the man was still sitting, there was so much man
and so little place,
that his place didn't really occur to me.
But the man was hardly standing
before the chair filled up with place.

Nobody in the room would dare
to sit on that chair
and take place — his place!
(Not even a little bit —
on the edge.)

I wonder
how long my chair
will keep my place
when I will have left the room
and also
what will happen to that place in the end.

THE HIDDEN ACCORD

When I observe the tumbler, the sun, the axe,
or the chair-man
and am amazed
that they are able to find their places so well
again and again,
I am forgetting the constructors!

It is they who
— to safeguard the movement back and forth —

constructed
accords on mutual rapports
between the movers and their environments,
for they, better than anyone else, foresaw this movement.
(Or doesn't this occur to me,
simply because the constructors would rather keep
these accords hidden from my eyes.)

Through these accords, the constructors guarantee
to the tumbler, the sun, the axe and the man each
a safe movement back-and-forth into and out of the tin
automaton, the solar system, the lumberjack's arm
and the chair.
They offer them a safe 'home'.

THE PUPPETS

Constructors of automatons from yore
speculate on my forgetfulness,
by coming out
to me — always me! —
with samples of simulated memory.

They wind up real-life dolls acting
as if they were working and living,
without anything visually distinguishable
urging them from time to time to do that work
or recalling that life.

The constructors have reached this astounding effect,
by carefully storing
the constructive accord between
everything that sticks out
and the system of bars that sets in motion all
in the deepest interior of the automatons.

(I sought it inside the puppets' brain
but it was located in their tin belly.
I could have known better,
yes, many times better than those deceivers!
Against my wonder
they presented the earnestness of their automatons —
I did not see it.)

THE PENDULUM AND HIS PLACE

In case a pendulum moves from here to there,
he relates himself to his environment
which stands still,
but also to himself,
who constantly moves.
This double relationship is a success,
for with the pendulum speeding thither
time is passing.

Indeed:
if the pendulum swings from here to there,
he relates himself — once there —
not with the thing pendulum-here

that's not here anymore,
but rather with the place-here
that's still there.
Things and places belong together.
(Time unites them.)

As long as the pendulum hasn't returned here
the place-here functions as a substitute
for the pendulum.
('Here' isn't the firm counterform of the pendulum
but rather a memory of him still being here.)

If the swinging would take no time
and the pendulum would be moving literally in no-time
from here
to there
(simultaneously here and there),
then here and there don't represent places
but one and the same pendulum!
(For the pendulum that would be a perfect chance
to for once relate to himself for real
and not to the empty place-here left behind,
even though that place might still be ready
— whenever necessary —
to act as the pendulum's placeholder.)

POSITION

This beside that doesn't exclusively hold place
but also position:

its position.
This acquires its position
by conquering its place beside that.

The difference between place and position
is the difference between fact and right.

That place beside that is not merely a place
but belongs to the territory (the world) of that.
(It requires a lot of effort to come into the world of that
and to occupy a place there.)

Once there, this has richly deserved that place.
This has the right to its position,
for it has invested in it the necessary motion energy
to get beside that.
(Indeed, without investing energy
the acquisition of position is unthinkable.
And otherwise the position hasn't been acquired rightfully:
either of both.)

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POTENTIAL

The longer the distance this
needs to move to reach that,
the more the position of this rises in value.
The potential of that position rises proportionally.
This potential gives the position the necessary charge.

At the moment this unifies with that,
this transfers the charge of its potential
to the construction this-that.
Thanks to this charge, the construction radiates
direction and sense.
(The potential provides the position with 'content'.)

(In daily social life,
many high officials hold positions that are 'empty'.
Only a few occupy positions charged with
an actually powerful potential.
They went to great lengths
to acquire this powerful position.
They radiate potential without having to do
any effort for it.)

TENSION

42

This in connection with that possesses a position
the potential of which is higher than the potential
of the position of that.
Indeed:
while that is resting within its territory
this — to come beside that —
needs to put in the necessary effort.
While that is waiting resignedly
this indefatigably supplies energy.
Thus the factual initiator of the connection this-that is
this, and not that.
(This has the right to a higher position than that.)

Owing to the difference in position and potential
the necessary tension exists between this and that.
And that tension will discharge — sooner or later!

FLOW

This is hardly there,
before a flow between both
targeted at adjustment and settlement
is established.

This flow just has one target:
cancelling and eliminating the difference-in-position
(the difference-in-potential)
between this and that.
The flow is a ‘reduction-flow’.

The more difference-in-potential between the positions
of this and that,
the more powerful the reduction-flow,
which exists as long as the difference in position
persists.

If the difference-in-potential is settled,
the flow stops.
At that moment, this has either completely broken loose
from that
or has become decisively one with that.
(There’s no compromise.)

PROFIT

It shows from the flow between this and that
that the relation between motion (from this to that)
and position (of this beside that)
is reversible.
For:
motion from this to that leads to position,
but this position in her turn leads no less to motion!
And this motion is a flow!

Motion and countermotion —
flow and counterflow
cancel each other out.
Neither anything is added
nor anything lost.

The sum of all motions and countermotions
and all flows and counterflows
within the closed system of multiple thises and thats
remains constant.
One may establish connections,
arrange positions,
combine flows,
increase tensions,
execute motions
as much as one likes:
winning the world without
losing the same one somewhere else
is not possible.

Some (thises) intending to exploit others (thats)
within the system of connections
manipulate the system.
It literally makes them a lot profit
to abuse, fight, conquer and exhaust each other.
It is they who benefit —
and the others suffer proportionally.
(The latter fight a bruising battle — for nothing.)

45

THE TOTAL WORLD

When this moves to that
and literally takes place there,
this enters the world of that.
But 'world' also means
the total of all worlds of all thises and thats!
(A total, in which all the subworlds both small and large
revolve.)

Subworlds form chains of worlds,
and those — and their turn —
form networks of chains.
Viewed thus, the total world is
one supernetwork of many interacting worlds.

The total world comes about,
because a certain this relates to a certain that
which in its turn relates to something else.
Like 'that' means the world to this,
'something-else' means the world to that.

(Thus the worlds of this, that and something else
are threaded like beads on a necklace.)

Examples of such chains of worlds
are abundant.
'World' means for example the rails to a locomotive,
the railroad ties to the rails
and the earth to the railroad ties.
To a water molecule it means the others around it,
to the molecules it means the kettle,
to the kettle it means the fire.
To the hammer the nail,
to the nail the plank,
to the plank the wall,
to the wall the room
and to the room it means the house.
To the hunter the bullet
and to the bullet the bird.

IV. CONSTRUCTION

THE TECHNICAL CONSTRUCTION

TECHNIQUE

The whole of this beside that in the world
is a construction in that world.

A construction serves to touch,
move and work the world.
If she is thereto taken in hand by us,
the construction is called technical.

One speaks of a technical construction
in case the plan for this — the construction plan —
has adopted an equipmental form.
(A technical construction is:
a confirmed construction plan)

An outsider eyeing
a technical construction
may read the construction plan and say:
'I see what the construction means
and how she soon will work the world.'

But he might be mistaken!
(The plan 'shelters' in the construction.)

47

GRIP

A mover taking a technical construction in hand
exerts grip on her.
He means to grasp the world,
but grabs the construction.
The mover shifts his grip
to the world by means of the construction.
He lengthens his arm
and broadens his grip.

With a technical construction the mover
not only broadens his grip,
but also strengthens it.
With his construction in hand the mover assures himself
of a grip on the world
many times firmer and stronger
than he would've been able to have without the
construction.

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DETAIL

With his construction the mover desires
to grasp not the entire world,
but only a detail of it.
By consciously limiting himself to the detail,
the mover assures himself of a firm grip.

(The more detail —
the firmer the grip)

A mover availing
himself of a technical construction
shows to have given up the entire world
for a single detail.
Yes, for this mere whole detail indeed!
(With that detail in mind
the mover has constructed his construction.)

FORMATION

49

If a mover desires to touch and grasp the world,
he places a construction between him and the world.

The formation is:
here the mover,
there the world
and in between the construction.
(The three parts stand in line.)

Standing in this formation
the mover keeps himself ready
to set the construction in motion:
direction-world.
With his gaze fixed on the construction
he points her to the world:
like an archer pointing his arrow to the target.

The mover comprehends why, what for,
to what effect, to what return —
and ponders and deliberates.
And then, he grabs!
Or more correctly:
he grabs his construction!

The mover feels his construction grasp the world.
That grasp itself however — this direct contact —
eludes him.
(He will have to believe what the construction
has to tell him about this grasping.)

The mover doesn't experience the indirect contact with
the world
as a lack.
On the contrary:
he desires precisely this lack.
For he desires not to feel by himself how the construction
touches the world.
(He wouldn't survive that feeling.)

The archer does feel the bow against his cheek
but not the point of the arrow —
the marksman the butt against his shoulder
but not the tip of the bullet.

SIGHT AND ROUNDSIGHT

A mover deploying a construction against the world
not only lacks personal grip,
but also a personal sight on that world.
The oversight — the roundsight —
on a round world escapes him.
(His arrangement is no good.)

Owing to the mover's position
in line with the construction and the world,
the construction takes the mover's sight on the world
away.
The construction literally stands in the mover's way.
(She masks the world.)

The mover fixing his gaze on 'his' side
of the construction
doesn't see the world itself,
but exclusively what the construction
has to show him of her.

What the construction shows to the mover
are views:
fragmented and tomographic slices of world-view:
technical substitutes that can be taken in hand
and collected by the mover,
but which are not the factual world.

The views are neither the factual
nor the total world.
The views are the world in detail.
That's why the mover peers at that detail.
(Without construction, the mover's gaze would
be able to inspect the world freely and unhamperedly.
With construction, his gaze is captured.)

The details are 'translations' of parts of the world.
(The construction is the 'translator'.)
The translations make the world larger than she is.
Larger, for sliced into numerous layers
and viewed from numerous perspectives.
The mover may hope that the sum of all details
— of all translations —
will yield him more in the long run
than the firm real round world as fact.

THE CONSTRUCTION PRESENT-AT-HAND

51

BRAINPOWER

We, movers, think of constructions.
We think up constructions —
down onto the world.
(We're thinking technically.)

Our thinking about technique precedes
the occurrence of that technique in the world:
never the other way around!

(This is the rule:
technique works in our thoughts first,
only then in the world.)

It's something else
in case we encounter technique in our world
that is present-at-hand:
technique in which we haven't invested any brainpower
and the working of which we cannot foresee.
Technique, in short, that is present in the world
outside our will and conception.
(We are strangers to each other.)

Face to face with technique present-at-hand
our thinking hurries after her:
never the other way around!

Viewed thus, our thinking finds itself stuck
between a constructed environment
already present-at-hand
and a technique still to be conceived by us.
We think accordingly in two directions:
in the direction of the past
and in the direction of the future.

PAST AND FUTURE

52

Technique present-at-hand knows no future.
Her future is her past.
Her products are rooted in her present,

yet gaze backwards.
Contrarily, our technique is rooted in history
and gazes forwards into the future.

If constructions present-at-hand would have a future,
we would be able,
in case we would cast our gaze on the future,
to forecast the working of those constructions.
But then the concrete results of those workings
(that is, new generations of constructions)
are not so much present-at-hand,
rather present-in-sight —
foreseen by us!

53

THE LAW (1)

A construction present-at-hand shows us no plan
but exclusively her working.
She shows herself to us
by working in front of our eyes.

When she repeats (rehearses) her working
we can compare her actions.
But not only that:
in our thoughts, a view present-at-hand
of actions expected takes shape.
(We expect the past —
but await the future.)

If we wait for an action present-at-hand,
and that action answers to the view we thought of her,
we experience that answer as the plan
of the construction present-at-hand.
We compare the mechanism
of the construction present-at-hand with the mechanism
of a thought construction in our head.

The symbolic form of a thought construction
we call ‘law’.

A law prescribes.
We ought to follow the law (a series of symbols)
with our work (a series of actions).
In essence however, the law does not prescribe,
but copies what is present-at-hand.
A law constitutes, viewed thus, the contrary of a plan.

When a plan precedes a specific working in the world;
a law hurries after her.
Only after the occurrence of what is present-at-hand
the law generates her expectations
about a next occurrence.
(As if it is she who occurs
and not the present-at-hand.)

A construction present-at-hand is unaware of our law.
She repeats her working before and after.
She confines our law between her past

and our future.
She literally leaves our law out of (her) consideration.

Contrarily, technique knows the law —
and considers her too.
Each time she advances in the direction of the future
she finds the law on her way.
The law, facing the past,
blocks the road for the technique.
Thus, in this position,
the law tests the technique
and the technique tests the law.
(They assess and test each other's constructions
on the point of consistency and reliability.)

THE APPLE

An apple is hanging from a tree.
That apple is just hanging there —
resting.

We look at the apple
and provide him in our thoughts
with a plan and a target.
We think that nothing stands in the way for the apple
to proceed to fall.
As if it were our falling law
urging the apple to fall
and not the world pulling on the apple.
(As if in doing so the apple answers to the brainpower

invested in him by us
and now wants to reward us with his fall!)

The apple doesn't fall for the first time
but repeats the falling,
even if the specimen we're eyeing
will only fall once in his life.
(The apple repeats what all apples did before him:
i.e. falling.)

Now, by looking at this one apple
and forgetting about all others,
it escapes our attention how typically this apple
repeats the falling of the other apples.
Therefore — not wanting to know of any repetition —
we encumber our apple with a want and desire
this apple neither wants nor desires.

THE LAW (2)

If we observe constructions present-at-hand,
we look over the shoulders of what is present-at-hand
in the direction of the past.
(We see what is present-at-hand from behind.)
In this position we draft our laws.

The more our law matches the behaviour
of what is present-at-hand,
the more her status grows.
(She admits no contradiction

until she is undercut by a stronger law
with more content and bigger authority.)

The situation changes
in case we desire to foresee the future behaviour
of what is present-at-hand.
We turn around what is present-at-hand
and look it in the face.
(We cast a glance into the future.)

The law turns with it.
(Its position has reversed.)

'Turned around', the law isn't apodeictic anymore
but rather full of expectations.
It seems as if the law wants to urge
what is present-at-hand
(against better judgment)
to an occurrence formulated and defined by her alone.
As if she desires with regard to what is present-at-hand
to hold the same position per se
as our 'thinking' holds vis-à-vis our 'technique':
conceiving and creating,
stimulating and correcting,
faced forwards
and definitely not backwards!
(The law deems herself a motive to such extent
that she forgets she is nothing more
than a verbal formula drafted and set aside!)

Apparently, we don't bear creations
with their backs turned towards the future
We don't know what they plan to do.
We feel insecure about creations
likewise deviating from our own technical products:
'creations' — not faced backwards
but faced forwards to the future.

FICTION

Constructions from the world of science fiction:
now those are real constructions present-at-hand!
In their appearance on this world we
didn't have the least hand.
They come and go whenever they want.
(We wait for them.)

Their most eye-catching quality is
that they are complete.
Nothing about them can still be improved.
(They are constructions without future.)

With regard to their quality, they are only surpassed
by constructions of yet again other worlds
that are exclusively seeking their destruction —
and thus advocate a sort of incorporation of quality.

The inhabitants and users of these completed
constructions
commute back and forth between their past

and our present.
They don't possess a future like ours.
(Their world is complete.)

In order to survive,
they sometimes appear in our world.
After having tried to feed themselves on us
they fall back to their past with great speed.
(They develop their sometimes astonishing speeds
exactly by falling.)
Even though their past still means for us
an unreachable future, thousands of years ahead,
this far future is strewn with beings
and codes of conduct from our past.
(They borrow what is finished and perfected
from our future,
but its users from our past.)

Strange:
When we observe the comings and goings
of these constructions
they show us —
even though they travel to the past and back —
almost never their back,
but always their face.
(They preferably look at us with eyes extended far.)

Yet maybe they're misleading us,
and is this way of looking rather a sign
that they're keeping their true face hidden from us.

(Who knows, their real face might well be
on the other side!
But do these constructions possess an 'other side'?)
Literally and metaphorically
we cannot get around them.
So we will never
be certain where facts end and fiction begins.)

THE INTENTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

A SITUATION

We, perceivers, find on our way this here and that there.
This and that are resting.
(Nothing points at a different relation between both
than that exactly we have encountered them on our way.)
They neither move, nor touch each other.
They are just 'present-at-hand'.
(It looks as if they are meant to lead an aimless
existence.)

How long this situation is already existing — and why —
is unclear to us.
It's even the question
whether one may speak of a 'situation',
for who has created it!

While we are resting our gaze on the couple,
we are busy in our thoughts.
We make connections, conceive of plans

and move this into the direction of that.
In our head, we execute a construction this-that
the working of which — doing thus —
becomes more and more clear to our mind.

This and that are oblivious
to all our concerns (true headaches) —
at least as long as we leave them at peace.
But at the moment we urge them
to act in the world in an actual and organized way
(to that end we touch them with our hand),
our thought plans take on the guise of a
real technical construction:
the construction this-that.

The intentional construction in our head makes room
for a technical equivalent in the world.
(We've mastered the situation.)

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BILLIARDS

A billiard ball rests.
A player appears.
The player looks at the ball,
pondering and deliberating.

In his thoughts, the player constructs a connection
between the ball, his cue, the other balls and the table.

He cogitates the best possible stroke
before executing the stroke technically
— and therefore really and firm —
in the world.
To do so, he repeats (rehearses) in thought
the working of the intentional construction
cue-ball-balls-table as many times as he deems
necessary.

At the moment the player decides actually to
strike a ball
he promotes the thought construction to a
well functioning technical shot.
(The thinking of the player has succeeded
in laying on the table really and firm the coherence
between the building blocks present-at-hand
which belonged to a construction disassembled
until now.)

Before our eyes, the player
performed an example of his 'technique'.
(We admire him for his capacity skillfully to transform
his intentions into beautiful 'constructions'.)

THE INSTRUCTED CONSTRUCTION

QUALITY

59

We, users,
taking a high quality technical construction

in hand for the first time,
don't discover that quality then and there,
but through practice.
Well-made constructions just possess long traditions
with a lot of 'plan'.
(Violin, wine, car.)
Therefore it takes the necessary time
before these constructions have divulged
all their qualities to their new users.

60

EXPERIENCE (1)

In a high-quality construction
an equal amount of experience has been invested.
Lengthy and repeated use by numerous masters
has brought her this experience.

A novice using a well-made construction
for the first time
comes into contact with this experience.
He can walk two roads to appropriate this experience:
either by trying to find the correct use by himself,
or by being instructed in that use by a master.

61

THE MASTER

A master instructing well,
doesn't show the novice the masterly features of a construction
then and there,

but 'acted out'.
He doesn't treat the construction for real,
he rather acts out the treatment for the novice.

The master doesn't do so masterly fast
but rather teacherly slow,
so that the student can follow the treatment well
with his hands and thoughts
and see through the plan behind it.

The master repeats his actions as long as needed
until the student can repeat what is repeated by himself
— without master.

But there's more.
When the master repeats his actions,
he doesn't repeat them integrally,
but rather in parts.
He demonstrates as it were his actions in fragments.
He isolates details,
slows them down,
reverses them in time
and turns them in all possible directions
before the eyes of the novice
until he comprehends the parts in relation to the whole.
Thus the teaching master 'acts':
as if he were a student
and not a master.

62

EXPERIENCE (2)

A master instructing the use of a construction
transfers experience.
All experience acquired by him is established in
his 'last actions'.
(Through his last actions one recognizes the master.)

Still, a novice can't become a master by exclusively
repeating the master's last actions.
On the contrary!
A master instructing his student well
doesn't as much show him his 'very last' action,
but rather his 'very first' ones — when he himself still
had to be instructed and possessed little or no
experience.

Playfully and scenically
the master demonstrates the student
how he — the master — has incorporated
in his very last actions all preceding ones:
how he has folded all his earlier and previous
achievements
into his very last action — fold onto fold —
(like leaves in a flower's bud.)

By demonstrating the actions integrally
the master shows in the blink of an eye
what he — the student — in the long run
will have to make his own:

actions which, although originating from
the last actions of the master,
eventually will surpass
these actions in quality.

All this holds equally for the construction of
constructions.
The experience of all the master's previous constructions
shelters in his last construction.
That construction incorporates all previous ones.
The master-constructor has, as it were,
stacked up all his experience
in his last construction.

(Parenthetically:
Without exception, all first and subsequent constructions
were once 'the last one'.)

THE APPLIED CONSTRUCTION

TWO PLANS

63

When a construction is put into practice
two 'plans' get in touch with each other:
the plan of the constructor and the plan of the user.
The first plan the constructor has put into his construction
when he was designing her.
The other plan nestles in the head of the user
and concerns the way in which he will apply
the construction.

The art of the construction's application is,
that the user sees to adjust his plan
as much as possible
to the constructor's plan.
That adjustment is what the user should experience,
and this experience he should make use of.

To apply the construction means:
touching her
and setting her into motion.

Without touching — without onset —
(without exerting any influence on it)
no construction can move.
She is 'dead'.
She hides her plan.
(Her function goes without saying.)

If a construction is touched and set into motion,
she follows in her movement
both the instruction of her constructor's plan
and the user's plan!

A well-made construction is designed in such a way
that she knows how constructively to incorporate
the movement of her user
and her own movement.
It is her task
to transform the pattern of movement the mover imposes
on her as efficiently as possible into her own.

(A well-made construction 'translates' the movements of
her user faithfully into her own.)

FRICTION 64

If a construction is put into practice,
the plan of the user
and the construction's plan 'rub' against each other.

If the user attunes his plan as well as possible
to the construction's plan,
the construction paves the way
for a correct actualisation of the plan.
If contrarily the user takes with his plan
the construction's plan into little or no account,
the construction breaks as a result of the friction
between both plans.

The sense of friction between both plans,
yields the user experience.
He can exploit this experience
during following encounters
through a masterly use of
the construction.

APPLICATION AND FUNCTION 65

One speaks of 'rubbing' in case
the application-plan is released onto
the function-plan.

Application and function:
two cases —
unifiable, but also discordant!
For if a high quality construction
is applied incorrectly,
the user destroys with his plan
the construction's plan,
and therefore the construction itself.

That is also the reason a user
who wants to apply a construction unknown to him,
would better first put this construction
to the test.
He needs to probe her.
He has to try to get to know her plan
without dominating her with his plan.
He has to see to it that he set her into motion
most prudently
without exerting too much needless power on her.
In no case he should force her
or impose motions on her she cannot follow —
at the risk of deforming her plan.
A game of cats and mice:
a battle between two plans.

THE SPADE

A user taking a new spade into use
first needs to come to an understanding with her 'plan'.
The plan shelters behind a façade of wood and metal

and unfolds from the moment the user
is taking the spade in hand.

Of course he may also try to guess her plan
by looking at the spade
— and if he has a lot of experience with other spades
a single glance is sometimes enough —
yet absolute certainty he will only have
when he grabs the spade
and imposes his motion-plan on her:
first carefully and in different positions,
later on resolutely and with a firm yet smooth grip.
He feels how the spade reacts and responds
to his motions.
(He feels how he succeeds in letting his plan
interact 'technically' with the spade's plan.)

After years of masterly use
the spade shows all signs of a correct application:
'skins' polished soft as silk both on the helve
and the razor-sharp edge of the blade.
(Through these skins as interfaces, the master-digger
finds himself intimately connected with the world —
intimately,
though no less firm.)

HAMMERING

The value of the correct interaction
of the two plans is denied,

when the spade is used by her user
as a type of hammer — which she is not,
and the user shows with his unfamiliar application-plan
that he hasn't understood the spade's
construction-plan.
This 'abuse' expresses itself through a spade
covered with dents and scratches.
(Inscriptions that will forever condemn
the improper user.)

The abuser doesn't only acquire any experience with the spade,
but he also desires not to do so.
He only desires to hammer.
(He hammers his plan onto the spade's 'plan'.)

Experience is the fruit of the friction between a thought
and an executed plan.
It's the trick to trace this friction
without turning to hammering.
Of this art the abuser has absolutely no clue.

THE ARTISTIC CONSTRUCTION

68

AESTHETIC APPLICATION

As one uses technical constructions exclusively
with the hand
(even though this hand is in many cases not at all about),
one 'uses' artistic constructions exclusively

with the eye.
('Don't touch!' museums request in every language of the world.)

For technical constructions it is a different matter.
Though one can watch them and use them with the eye
as if they were artworks,
they are nonetheless not designed to such use.
(The decoration of 'technique' with ornaments, inlays,
engravings, precious metals and gems tells us
what is the case:
the decorations are for the eye —
the technique for the hand.)

When one has derived the necessary aesthetic pleasure
from a sublimely actualized solution
to a technical problem,
and one deems the executed design fully worthy of the
status of 'artwork'
(one means in fact that the construction is
worthy to be used with the eye),
even then the same rules are to be respected
that have been created for her manual use.

According to these rules, the observer needs to attune
the construction's aesthetic application he desires
as optimally as possible to the instrumental
function of that construction —
if at least he wants to understand what he sees and feels.
Otherwise, the aesthetic sensibility he pursues so hard is

suspect.
(In that case, he apparently finds beautiful exactly what he doesn't understand — or doesn't feel the need for to understand.)

The more the application's adjustment to the function succeeds,
the more the technique's efficiency will impede the unprofitable experience of her beauty.
The aesthetic technique-observer will then be obliged to give up his intentions.
He'll need to reconsider his motives.
A vicious circle:
an unsolvable problem.
But then, what is he even doing?
(What is this observer after!)

69

TECHNICAL BEAUTY

Can a technical construction be 'beautiful'?
Does it possess any artistic value?
And whence does this value come?
What does an observer mean about a piece of technique when he says he finds this or that 'beautiful' about it?

Can the design of a technical construction
lead a life on its own — possess its own beauty —
independent from the use and purpose
of the construction?

The function of a Stradivarius is without a doubt to be 'violin'.
Yet an otherwise despicable application of it could be to hit someone on the head with it.
That would make two cases.
Such an abject application wouldn't damage the beauty of the design essentially —
even though that application is blameworthy.
And exactly so, the gruesomeness of the application of a firearm doesn't impede the experience of beauty of that piece of equipment.
But is this really the case?
Isn't it so that in every construction a set and meant application is enclosed that ought to be
the only correct one —
even if that application would be, in a social sense, blameworthy?

Moreover, isn't it so that the application of a technical construction
has everything to do with her profitable function
(the firm 'plan'),
and the application of an artistic construction everything with her unprofitable objective
(her planless 'plan')?
Isn't it so that the directions of both applications are completely opposite,
and that the directions both of these construction types radiate are so too?
Then how can technique be considered 'beautiful'?

VIOLIN VERSUS WEAPON

Isn't it so that the violin's design with her elegant lines
unequivocally evokes the only correct mode of
application
— i.e. 'bowing'?
Isn't it so that the firearm's design with his straight barrel
in a just as unequivocal mode evokes his only possible
application — i.e. 'firing'?

Does the elegant form of the violin's body mean anything
else
than that she wishes to be heard?
(A violin 'fits' in the human ear.)
Does the straight form of the firearm mean anything else
than that he wishes to be felt?
(A firearm penetrates the human body.)

Doesn't bowing have to do everything with
making the world sound,
and firing to do everything with tearing that same world
apart?

The difference is essential.
A violin can speak — but also listen.
Her whole shape is aimed at communication:
not in one direction
but back and forth.
(String quartet.)

Her sound carries language:
articulated language.

Contrarily, a firearm doesn't speak,
unless one would consider his blasting speech.
Also, one doesn't play it
one rather sets it up and fires it off:
not through keys like with musical instruments,
but through triggers.

The firearm communicates like an air valve:
exclusively in one direction.
(A monotonous instrument — at most.)

THE 'REVERSED' VIOLIN

Also in a formational sense, the violin
and the firearm differ from each other far and wide.

The violin's body ought to be driven:
that is her function.
This function is unambiguously connected with
the position of the violin with regard to her environment,
i.e. the driver (the violinist) here,
the listener there
and she in between.

As for the firearm, the formation is different.
He isn't driven, he drives on his own.
His position doesn't equal the position of the violin

but rather the position of the violinist,
i.e. the firearm here,
the target there
and the bullet driven by the firearm in between.

(Whereas the firearm literally thrusts his bullet into
his victim,
the violin never thrusts her sound into the human ear.
It is rather the listener thrusting himself onto the violin
than the other way around.)

Now, by striking on heads with violins,
one not only forces the function of the violin
but also her position.
With force one turns the position of the violin around,
and makes her a driver instead of a drivee.
The effect is that the plan,
such as it has been put into the violin by her maker,
doesn't support this inversion of position —
the violin breaks.

It is not without meaning that the inversion of the position
of the firearm — if one would wish to do so —
doesn't succeed.
Evidently one can kill with a violin,
but one cannot make music on a reversed firearm.
This phenomenon is related to the fact that the class
of firearms belongs to a lower order
than the class of violins.
A violin encompasses being-firearm,

yet a firearm doesn't encompass being-violin.
In a violin, the firearm has fully been incorporated
and conquered.
But in a firearm, nothing of a
musical instrument is to be found.
(It is not ready for it, and will never be.)
Indeed, everything in a firearm points
at death and killing —
however beautifully this might often be 'put'.
That explains the lower class.

BEAUTY VERSUS EFFICIENCY

Technical beauty an sich —
without anyone caring about the function or purpose
of the technical construction admired —
has no right to exist.

(Would this statement not be true, we could rightfully
be aesthetically pleased with a well organized
concentration camp and all its 'solutions'
without having to care for one moment about
their application.
Indeed, we could even forget them:
just look
how splendidly the problems have been solved!
Unfortunately, we could forget the application of
whichever technical construction, but never our own
personal position in relation to it.

And that position would be, in aforesaid case,
inexcusable.)

In case we do care about the function and purpose of technique,
'beautiful' is called
the way in which technique shows us her efficiency,
without emphatically aiming for this display of beauty.
(In this respect, really beautiful technique is never seductive, for exclusively efficient.)

But there's more.
A Bugatti is beautiful,
not only because of the efficiency of his design —
this also holds for other car designs,
but especially because of the way in which
this specimen of this type from that year
shows its coherence.
A Bugatti that is disassembled,
keeps his efficient properties in each of his details,
yet decreases in beauty as his coherence
is being undone step by step.
When there's nothing left to disassemble
mere technique without beauty remains.
(Yet — especially in case of a Bugatti even the last bolt is beautiful, it is after all a 'Bugatti'!)

The position of the observer watching technique
doesn't differ fundamentally from the position
he watches art from,
yet the mechanism of aesthetic satisfaction works
differently.

Socially speaking, technique is 'aimed' differently
than art.
Technique wants to move on —
stacking insight on insight.
(Technique is aimed at the solution of problems
that it helped create.)
For art that's different.
Art dissolves insight.
She aims for sight.

Art starts where the objective materiality of
the one unique artistic thing ceases to be 'thing'.
(Ceases to be linen, paint, music paper.)
Contrarily, technique begins where the objective thing
goes on as firm item.
(Goes on, for multiplying itself.)

Thus, the production of art leads to unique items that
in essence cannot be possessed.
(Unpossessable; that's why we try to
collect and acquire
these unique items so passionately.)

Contrarily, the production of technique leads to
large amounts of identical items that are
amply present-at-hand within the world.
(We don't collect technical items,
but use them,
and throw them away when used.)

An observer watching technique
needs to take the fundamental difference in aim
between technique and art into account.
(He who watches has a direction and plan too!)
Indeed:
If the observer wants to understand
a technical construction
he needs to overtake and literally 'grasp' her.
For the construction is ahead of him.
(The observer sees her from behind.)

At the moment the observer has
'caught up' with the construction
(he is on to her working)
a sort of feeling of beauty overtakes him
— the euphoria of the exclusive insight —
that has nothing to do with either feeling or beauty,
but everything with the privileged comfort
that puzzle solvers go for.

In short, watching technique means:
competing with it.

(Technique — the sum of all thinkable puzzles —
is the fruit of insight constantly caught-up with.)

WATCHING ART

When observing art:
not a trace of hunting, competing or catching up!
On the contrary.
In peace and quietness, the observer arranges himself
facing the artwork.
Face to face with the artwork
— at some distance —
he looks the centre in the face.
(Parenthetically:
the true observer of art always keeps some distance
from the artwork,
even though he might be poking his nose into it).

The spatial formation of the artistic perception
is as follows:
the artwork here
and over there — at some distance — the observer.
Within this formation, the artwork offers the observer
space.

In the way the artwork has been constructed
it anticipates a spatial formation within which
perception takes place.
It involves that space with its own.

The true work of art
— whether visual or musical —
is transparent.
(It is transparent in the sense that it has no ‘mantle’.)
It allows the attentive contemplator
to enter the artwork
without leaving his place.
Thus, true art unfolds space:
it creates space.

Technique cannot do anything of this sort.
She doesn’t create space, on the contrary:
she takes space!
The firm technique occupies space
and supplants the spacious, light world.
She obstructs our sight on that world.
(That is her opinion on spatiality…)

Differently from the artwork
the firm technique turns her back on us
and tempts us to compete with
and chase after her — into the world.
In the world she is ‘ahead’ of us.

THE INVENTED CONSTRUCTION

THE FIRST TECHNIQUE

Between what is explicitly technical
and explicitly artistic
we find the invention.

An invention is an idea not thought of before
which — incorporated in a technical form —
is delivered to the world.
(An invention is an attempt to make
a materialized idea visible
in the world.)

At the moment the invention steps
out of the inventor’s head like a duckling
and visibly appears before our eyes,
it can’t go back.
It has been seen and understood.
(Once in the world —
always in the world.)

No wonder that inventors hesitate at length whether, how
and when they will show their finds to the world.
They are justifiably secretive about it.
(They shield their finds
— every time there might be a threat
that we are getting too close —
from our curious eyes.)

76

THE FIRST TECHNIQUE AS PROTOTYPE

The first status of an invention in the world
is that of a prototype.

The prototype lays bare.
Nothing hints at decoration.
The attire it goes in
is most sober.
Each part — each detail — of the prototype
has been determined by a thought about it.
(The attire of the prototype expresses this.)

Bare as a prototype may be,
its inventor cannot have escaped composing
its construction from parts
preformed by tradition.
The result of this is
that in the prototype's attire the necessary traces
can be found of the battle between the
'traditional' and the 'novel'.
(Even the barest prototype connects
a certain tradition with a possible future —
and shows so too.)

A possible future!
For every prototype has to prove
whether it can maintain itself within our firm world
and is prepared for the battle with other, better, stronger
constructions.

It will have to show whether there exists enough need
for its presence in our world —
otherwise it is doomed to disappear.

If a prototype survives,
it will be superseded by designs
in which the best of the first setup has been retained
and everything incorrect has been removed.
(The strong prototype survives within those future
designs.)

THE FIRST TECHNIQUE AS ARTWORK

77

Once a first construction as 'prototype'
has been superseded by stronger constructions,
the moment will arrive when she won't be used anymore.
She will then be either forgotten or retained:
one of both.

If the protoconstruction is retained,
we handle her carefully.
We now only use her exclusively with the eye
and only rarely with the hand.
From now on we want to look at her
and admire her while watching.
(If we do use her with the hand,
then it is only to give her a little push
to demonstrate her working before the eye
of others — nothing more.)

Keeping the first construction means:
moving her to a museum.
There she will receive her second status — as artwork.
Her arrangement in the museum resembles the one
of a work of art.
(Showcase, pedestal, explanation, a sign 'don't touch',
respectful viewing distance, etcetera.)
She is kept safely.
A long future awaits her — that's for sure.

That exactly she — this very first construction —
with her sensitive, fragile and undecorated figure
works so well in a museum, is
because her appearance is most transparent
and sculptural.
(Her physique is more of a line than a body.)

78 **THE TECHNICAL PROTOTYPE IS OPEN**

Technical prototypes — especially in museums —
are most 'open'.
They can be easily entered by their observers.
They are hardly equipped with mantles.
(Also in that sense they are 'open'.)

The thinking the inventor invested into
his first construction
comes to light in a dramatically direct way.
(Sometimes it even seems child's play!)
Thanks to this directness, the observers can easily follow

the thinking of the inventor.
(With their eyes and thoughts they follow the visible
connections that keep the construction together.)

But they also follow his fallacies and hesitations!
(It's just that the observer sees the problems from a
more privileged position than the inventor.)
Each of the inventor's hesitations generates a
crossroads.
One way points forwards: towards technique.
That's the direction of the 'firm' thing.
The other way points backwards: towards art.
That's the direction of the 'weak' thing.
The observer sees the inventor's hesitation:
If he chooses technique —
then there's no way back.
If he chooses art —
then he'll keep on wandering, and how!

With her whole essence,
the protoconstruction finds herself
on the border between technique and art,
yet facing technique
and with her back to art!
Because that's just the position she has chosen.
(Otherwise we wouldn't stare at her like that right now.)

V. TC

THE TC PRESSES

THE TECHNICAL 79

A construction taken in hand
to touch the world with her
is called ‘technical’.

In a functional sense, the technical construction (TC)
is an effectively executed existence of the hand.

In an equipmental sense, the TC is a concrete
— for firm — thing.
(Being a thing, the TC is autonomous.)

In a positional sense, the TC is a contracting thing
between her user and the world.

PRESSURE 80

Although autonomous
the TC never touches the world by herself,
but exclusively under pressure of her user.

(She is literally moved by her user to press.)

A TC transmits the pressure of her user to the world.
She presses in the name of her user.
She delivers his pressure to the world.

When the user presses — the TC does so too,
when the user moves — the TC does so too,
when the user changes — the TC does so too.
A TC represents the user to the world.
(She is the intermedium between the user and the world.)

81

WORKING

The pressure emanating from a TC
leads to movements that are 'different'
from those executed by her user.
The TC works differently from her user.

The pressure emanating from a TC qua motion is
lengthier, briefer, deeper, more refined,
more fragmented, more periodical, etcetera,
than the pressure of a user.
Exactly because of that heterogeneous motion
— that different working —
a TC is deployed by the user against the world.
(Otherwise he would have done without a TC.)

CHARACTER

82

A TC not only transmits pressure —
she exchanges it for a different pressure.
A TC is an exchanger of pressure.

Exchanging one pressure for another implies
that the look of the pressure changes.
The look of a pressure is determined
by the way in which the factors power, length and form
interact at the moment the pressure
manifests itself.
The relation between these factors —
that's what renders the pressure character!

If the TC exchanges pressure for pressure,
she changes the look thereof
by changing the relation between the factors.
Thus the TC changes the character of the pressure.
A TC is an exchanger of character.

With this exchanged pressure
and a character adjusted to his target
the TC's user places a pressure
in position against the world —
better and more efficiently than would have been
possible without TC.
To this improvement and efficiency —
thereto serves the TC.

83 YIELD

A TC transmitting a pressure to the world
will seek to waste as little as possible of that pressure.
For the exchange and adjustment of pressure goes
hand in hand with loss.

Not all pressure the user exerts on a TC
comes to benefit the world.
One part of the pressure serves to keep the TC going,
another part to steer her.
These two parts
— however indispensable they may be —
are lost for the world.

The relation between the 'lost' pressure
and the pressure that the TC manages to keep
by a right adjustment of the pressure on the world
determines the TC's yield.

The combination of yield and character
renders each TC her own and unchangeable identity.
For that combination, the user chooses
precisely this TC and not that one.

FORMATION

IN LINE 84

A TC working
is stuck between her user
and the world.
She stands in line with both.
She never finds herself outside that line
or forms an angle with it.

In this formation the TC leads the pressure
of the user to the world.
(She leads the pressure through herself.)
She guides the pressure.

A TC working
guides the pressure of her user onto the world.
(As an arrow guides the pressure of its archer
onto the target.)

THE TC AS ARROW 85

The arrow as a vehicle of pressure!
Safely embedded within the speeding existence of the
arrow the pressure flows from the archer to the target.
There he is delivered —
there he is released.

This capacity to deliver pressure
the archer has put in his arrow
at the moment he shot him away.
Once at the target, this pressure becomes manifest
by way of how the arrow presses itself into the target.

86 **DIRECTION**

A TC not only transports pressure —
she also determines his direction.
A TC lends the pressure direction.
To this purpose she has been constructed.
(The constructor of the TC has meant and thought
this direction
this way.)

There are two possible directions
(for with direction it is one way or the other):
the pressure flows towards the world
of away from it.
In both cases the pressure flows through the TC.

87 **STATE**

A TC can be placed by a user
between himself and the world in two ways:
correctly,
or incorrectly.
This placement —
that is her state.

A user who wants to touch the world
always has to put his TC in the correct state.
The state is correct,
in case the direction in which the TC is working,
is the same
as the direction of the pressure of the user.

The direction in which the TC is working
is intended by her constructor this way —
and in no other way than this way.
This direction —
that is the function of the TC.

Through a correct usage,
function and state harmonize optimally.
If, conversely, the TC is used incorrectly,
because she has been put
by her user in the incorrect state,
the pressure is flowing through her
in the wrong direction.
Then, she breaks.
('The TC doesn't work well', the user says.
Yet he means he hasn't managed to adjust
function and state to each other in the right way.)

SIDES

88 EXTERIOR

A TC in line with her user and the world
finds herself in a perfect ‘position’.
With one side she touches the user
and with the other she touches the world.
(The sides are true interfaces.)

Both sides border the TC
and include her.
They border her at her farthest ends.
(With these ends the TC touches —
and is touched.)

89 INTERIOR

Both sides don’t only border the TC from the exterior
but also from the interior.
(Seen from the interior outwards, both sides are a sort of
firmament stretching above the TC’s interior work.)

Both sides stand with the interior (work)
of the TC in line
as the TC — on the exterior — stands in line
with her user and the world.
The TC repeats in her ‘interior’
the formation of the exterior.
Hence her position is ‘ideal’.

PLANE 90

Both sides of a TC separate
the interior from the exterior.
The sides function as separating planes
between two worlds:
the world of the TC’s interior
and the real external world.

There — on these separating planes —
pressure is exchanged for pressure
and world is exchanged for world.
There, the pressure is ‘changed’
qua look and working.
(Both sides are planes of transformation.)

PORT 91

Both sides of a TC
are not only separating planes,
but also open ports.

They are separating
for they separate two zones —
interior and exterior.
They are open
for they grant passage
to the — changed — pressure of the TC’s user.

The sides are the ‘city ports’ of the TC:
closing off —
however nonetheless open.

92

FACET

Like a port of a city
each side of a TC presents two aspects:
one viewed from the interior
and one from the exterior.
Both aspects are facets
of one and the same side.

Sides and facets are different.
A side is an entity —
no matter how much it borders.
A facet is not.
A facet is what a side mirrors to the perceiver.
(The facet represents the side.)

Differently put:
a facet is the perceiver’s business
and a side is the constructor’s business.
A side is substantial and can be taken in hand.
A facet on the other hand is a view —
not for the hand but for the eye.

Therefore, a constructor never thinks in terms of facets,
but solely in terms of sides.
(Unless he desires to imagine himself

in the position of the perceiver, to see whether his TC
‘looks well’.
But that makes him more of a ‘designer’
than a ‘constructor’.)

A facet of a limiting side says more about
the position of the perceiver
than about the position of the TC to which the side
belongs.
(The TC will also manage without perceiver —
but a perceiver without TC won’t.)

Thus, the facet of a city port on which
a tired traveller knocks tells
more about the position of that traveller,
than about the position of the city.
The latter will manage,
but the former: that’s still an open question.
If the traveller arrives at too late an hour,
the exterior facet of the port will express
a pure and uncompromising rejection.
(And this, while the traveller knows
that the other facet of that same port radiates
so much warmth, safety and security —
inwards that is!)

FACT AND SIGN

93

A side is a fact,
but also a sign.

He is a fact,
because he factually and really limits the TC.
(That's his instrumental faculty.)
He is a sign,
because the view of the side uncovers his function.
(That's his functional — a.k.a. operational —
faculty.)
Fact and sign are two features
of one and the same side.

Fact and sign can both be experienced.
One experiences
by using the TC.
One uses
by touching the TC with the hand or the eye.
If one uses the TC with the hand,
one experiences the sides foremost as fact.
If one uses the TC with the eye,
one experiences the sides foremost as sign.

94

FEELING AND SEEING

Elementary TCs are elementarily limited proportionally.
Their sides are elementarily executed accordingly.
Fact and sign correspond optimally.
(They cover each other.)

One can easily guess the function of the sides.
To that end it suffices to eye the elementary TC.

(Put a nail, screw, pin, hammer
on the table: look at them —
and it is clear how they have been 'thought'.
The sign leaps into the eye.)

The more composite a TC
the bigger the distance between fact and sign.
One cannot get to know the meaning of her manifold and
multiform sides
(joins, protrusions, holes and interfaces)
at a single glance.
Such a complex TC needs to be taken in hand.

In extreme cases, the mantle of very complex TCs
(computer components for example)
are equipped with texts, codes, diagrams and arrows
to reveal to the eye the meanings of their sides.
Thus furnished, these TCs step into the daylight
as bare sign.
(They carry their sign on the back.)

INSIDE AND OUTSIDE

95

The two sides of a TC are not equal.
Their functions differ.
The signs are opposed.

One side receives pressure
the other side releases pressure.

(On her one side, the TC functions as a receiver,
on her other side, as sender.)

The pressure-receiving side is the TC's inside,
the pressure-releasing side the outside.

Not only the signs are opposed,
but also the facts!
The inside and the outside are constructed differently
and differently 'confirmed'.

96

THE INSIDE IS SENSITIVE

The pressure-receiving inside of the TC serves
to feel pressure.
Feeling pressure implies:
following pressure.
(Obediently following the pressure.)

When the inside feels the pressure well,
he will follow the movement of the pressure
without notably resisting it.
(Without hampering, blocking, or otherwise deforming
the pressure in his movement.)
Such an inside is sensitive to pressure.

Only a sensitive inside can transmit
the motion-programme
of the pressure working on him from the exterior
to the interior of the TC

in an undistorted — hence faithful — way.
(As a sensitive arrow manages to transmit the pressure
from the stretched bow working on him in an undistorted
and faithful way — linea recta —
to the target.)

Such an inside feeling and following pressure
has been literally calculated by the constructor
for his task.
His appearance as fact
covers his appearance as sign.

In short:
a correctly executed and calculated inside,
'instrumentalised' in the correct way,
is sensitive.

THE OUTSIDE IS TOUGH

97

The function of the outside of a TC is:
exerting pressure on the world.
The outside should be able faithfully and undistortedly
to impose this pressure on the world —
without being obstructed by the resistance
with which the world literally presses back.
Only through a correct instrumentalisation of the outside
the TC is capable to overcome
this — sometimes heavy — resistance.

A well pressing outside is tough.
(In no case sensitive.)
Tough means,
that the outside qua 'construction' effects
a strong grip on the world
without losing contact with her for an instant.
Through this strong grip and continuous contact,
the TC can execute the motion-programme
of her user powerfully.
The tight contact guarantees
an undistorted and faithful execution of this programme.

In short:
a correctly executed and instrumentalised outside
is tough.
(The world yields to a tough outside.)

98

INSIDE AND OUTSIDE AS PORT

Insides and outsides of TCs are ports.
Through these ports, the TCs make
contact with the exterior (world).

In an operational sense ports are signs —
in a material sense they are mantles.

The real and tangible of a port
is a mantle.
The port mantles the flow of pressure
passing into and out of the TC.

The port needs faithfully to enclose
the flow of pressure with his mantle.
He may in no way whatsoever
deform the motion of the flow,
or hamper his passage.
On the contrary:
the shape of the port should as much as possible
take into account the conduct of
the flow (the 'type' of flow).

Perfect would be:
as many flows — as there are port-shapes!
(And indeed there are many flows!)
Practical would be:
as many classes of port shapes
as there are classes of flows.

Yet there are many classes too!
(For example, flows may be classified qua conduct as
powerful, sensitive, processing, bundling, spreading,
continuous, periodical, simultaneous, lengthy, brief,
etcetera.
They may also be divided qua type into solid,
liquid, gaseous, granular, monolithic, electrical,
chemical, optical, ceramic, acoustic and mechanical
flows together with all mixed and hybrid forms.)

99 **INSIDE AND OUTSIDE AS FRAME**

So many port shapes in practice —
so few port signs in theory!
For the sign of a port is:
either TC-in or TC-out.
(The flow of pressure passes a port
moving either back or forth:
there are no other possibilities.)

The sign 'TC-in' confirms the port's function
as inside,
and the sign 'TC-out' confirms its function as outside.
The inside sign is a rectangle: □
The outside sign is a circle: ○
Both signs are views of frames.
(They are operational signs.)

The choice between square and round is made
by the direction of the flow between the producer
and consumer.
(Parenthetically:
the direction is seen from out of the interior of the TC
and not from the exterior — from the world.)

100 **THE OUTSIDE IS ROUND**

If the pressure from a TC's interior treads outside,
that pressure originates in essence from a point —
and expands.

The outside is a pressure-causing exit
from where the pressure radially expands
into the exterior of the world.
(Lamp, sun, water jet, speaker,
stone-in-pond.)

The frame of the outside is circular by definition,
since this side functions as a 'round' source.
The sign of the outside is a circle.

THE INSIDE IS RECTANGULAR 101

The inside — different from the outside — doesn't emit any pressure,
but admits pressure from the exterior.
(The inside is a window
through which a part of the external pressure
works itself into the interior.)

In the space of the world, each pressure is a
sphere of pressure.
If a sphere of pressure enters the inside,
the sphere is flattened by the inside's frame.
(The inside cuts a slice from the sphere.)
The other side of the sphere gets lost in the space
and remains sphere.

(The circular and spherical world
presenting itself before the window of my room
is limited and flattened by that window.

Framed by my window, the spherical world hangs
like a painting against the wall of my room.)

The inside is a port
opened wide for the world and her pressure.
(Insides are sensitive:
that's why they are opened wide and free.)
However: the inside is a plane
and the world a space!
The world entering through the inside
is limited by the inside
for framed by it.

The frame of a gate, door or window is a rectangle
with the skyline as base.
(The rectangular frame unfurls the horizon
like a red carpet for the entering world.)

All viewing frames are rectangular by definition.
(Painting, photo, film screen, TV screen, shop window,
stage, the real aquarium — not the round one —
etcetera.)
The viewing frame regulates the direction of the flow
between us and the world.
(We are observing the world, and not
the other way around!)

If the frame is round nonetheless
then we are watched.
The round frame frames the outside of constructions

of third parties.
(Injection needle, binoculars, camera lens, peephole.)

INTERIOR

SUBINTERIOR 102

The interior of a TC forms a whole.
Yet this whole is not undivided.
The interior can be partitioned
and built from several partitions (subinteriors).

Each partition (each part) is limited by
its own inside and outside through which it
relates to other partitions.
Through these sides the partitions actualise
connections among one another.
The complete collection of all connections
that's what forms the partitioned TC.

The sum of all workings of all partitions
results in the working of that one
all-encompassing connection between the inside
and the outside of the TC.

A LITTLE AND A LOT OF INTERIOR 103

If the TC's interior consists of just a single partition
(the TC is monopartite),
the interior is uniform as fact

— but also as sign.
Such a TC contains a ‘little of interior’.
(String, needle, pen, lens, coin.)

Contrarily, when the TC’s interior
unifies many partitions,
it proportionally contains a ‘lot of interior’.
(A lot of interior work.)
A piano for example, contains more interior
than a single string,
a sewing machine more than a single needle,
a typewriter more than a single pen,
an electron microscope more than a single lens,
and a bank more than a single coin.

104

DISTANCE AND POTENTIAL

A partitioned TC literally spans more interior
than a monopartite TC.
The distance of this span tells us something about
the spanning capacity of the TC.
This spanning capacity forms the potential of the TC.

The span of a connection between this and that concerns
the distance between this and that
between which the connection prevails.
The measure of distance determines
the measure of potential of the connection.

THE POTENTIAL RESTS

105

As long as the TC rests
her potential slumbers.
At most, the complexity of her interior betrays
something of the quality to be expected from the TC.
(Of what she can do as soon as she is working.)

The resting TC divulges her hidden potential
to the probing gaze of the curious perceiver.
(She is aware of being used by his eyes.)

Such a perceiver appraises the TC’s potential
like an expert of racing motors:
at a distance,
hands in the pockets (hands ‘off’),
and the eye motionlessly fixed on the just as motionless
interior of the ‘secret’ construction.
He appraises, but isn’t sure yet.

THE POTENTIAL IS RELEASED

106

At the moment the resting TC ‘wakes up’
— and works —
the connections between the parts
in her deepest interior change instantly.
The TC releases like a spring.

At that moment the TC's potential appears outside
and the capacity of the recently released TC
becomes clear to the world.

The world experiences the TC's capacity.
(She experiences it
through the work — the working — of the TC.)

107

THE POTENTIAL OF MONOPARTITE TCS

In a monopartite TC, the inside and outside
are connected almost unhamperedly.
They form each other's immediate countersides.
They can 'feel' each other well.
(For example, both sides of a coin can feel each other
well through its monopartite interior.)

In a monopartite TC, the sensitive inside
is hardly inferior to the tough outside.
Both sides are as good as equal
both qua fact and qua sign.
(They're both almost equally tough.)

Monopartite TCs can, owing to the scant
difference in toughness between both sides,
show only little preference in direction.
Their position in the world remains equally 'vague'.
Their state can be this — but just as easily that.
(With monopartite TCs, one may be mistaken about their
state.)

The situation changes in case the difference in toughness
between both sides of a monopartite TC is increased —
for example in case of a nail, a needle and an arrow.
There, the inside is a most sensitive plane
the outside is an extremely tough point.
The position in the world isn't unclear anymore
but rather clear-cut — though univocal.

Thus, the capacity (the capability!) of a drawn arrow
to direct doesn't really reach the mark,
that is, when compared with an air traffic control centre.
For such a centre is a most complexly partitioned
mega-TC knowing how to give directions to anywhere.
The arrow doesn't.
It is barely partitioned, and points in just one direction.

Qua mobility, the air traffic control centre wins
from the arrow.
Qua clarity however, the arrow is in no way inferior
to the centre.
On the contrary:
there are moments, when a well-placed arrow
offers more certainty than any centre whatsoever.

THE POTENTIAL OF PARTITIONED TCS

108

The inside and outside of a partitioned TC
are separated from each other
proportionally to the complexity of the interior.
They don't 'feel' each other directly,

but only through the many interfaces of the
just as many partitions of the interior.
(They maintain contact with one another over a long
distance.)

Very complex TCs can develop very long distances
between inside and outside.
Thus, the difference in toughness between
the sensitive and the tough side increases proportionally
to the distance.
The potential of the TC rises.

TCs with a lot of distance and potential don't stand in an
undetermined way;
on the contrary —
they stand in the world extremely defined.
There's no possible doubt about their position.
And no doubt about their state either.

109

A 'PARTITIONED' PRESSURE

In case a pressure appears at the TC's inside
he changes in appearance.
(He changes his way of moving.)
But:
it's not the pressure changing, but the side!
The side yields pressure
under pressure of the impression.
The side transforms the impression into another.

(Hence, we say, the pressure behind the side is different
from the one in front of it.)

In a similar mode, every part of a partitioned TC
yields a pressure typical for him
in case pressure appears at his inside.
(Just as genes inside a cell 'yield' typical hereditary
behaviours under pressure of a certain
biological plan to procreate.)

Each pressure yielded by each part is added as a
part of the programme to the total motion programme
of the total TC.
The motion programme displays the pressure
as he departs from the TC on the outside.

The more partitions a pressure 'passes'
(he touches many sides)
the more motion features this pressure collects,
and the richer the motion programme will be
at the moment he departs from the TC.
The sum of all yielded features leads to a
proportionally complex behaviour of the pressure's
motion.
(Just as all genes together take care of a
final biological organism with a proportionally
elaborate motion behaviour.)
The final pressure is 'partitioned'.

Because of the capacity of pressure to change qua appearance
at the moment he passes a side,
the user uses a TC.
He puts a TC under (his) pressure,
hoping that she will change that pressure for him.
He chooses one TC from thousands of others,
because he has his eye on a specific motion programme with which he wants to work the world.
With the TC, the user hopes to work the world more efficiently
than would be possible without her.

Without TC the user only has his own pressure available.
His motion programme however is notably less 'partitioned' than the TC's.
(Although adequate enough properly to drive
the complex TC with it.)

STATE AND DIRECTION

110

THE ROD

An iron rod has an interior
and two sides.
Nothing more.

The interior is not partitioned
and nothing but iron.
(Nothing in her interior moves.)

The two sides separate the interior
from the exterior.
(The sides limit the interior.)

The interior forges the two sides
together back-to-back.
The sides form each other's direct opposite.
In toughness they are equals.

Owing to the tight connection
the distance between both sides is negligible.
The potential of the rod is proportionally nil.

The rod shows no 'direction'
because she is nothing but symmetry.
This means
that the rod with both her sides equally tough
expresses no preference about the direction in which she desires to work in the world.
(She doesn't care about her position.)

The situation changes
when pressure is exerted on one of both sides
from the exterior.
On the spot, that side is promoted to 'sensitive' side
and the other side to 'tough' side.
The rod now knows her direction,
just look how she moves forwards!
(The world —

differently from when the rod was still at rest —
will know this direction.)

111 THE NAIL

By constructing a point on one side of a resting rod
and on the other side a plane,
the undetermined rod changes into a determined nail.
(A nail with 'plan'.)

A nail with point and plane
shows direction — also when he rests.
Indeed:
through the point, the nail becomes potentially tough
at the point-side,
and through the plane, the nail becomes potentially
sensitive
at the opposite side.

In the way the nail is lying there,
on this side his point
on the other side his plane,
his direction in the world cannot be misunderstood.
This direction —
that's what his potential is.

The view of the nail articulates this direction.
'This point here is my tough side
and that plane there is my sensitive side.
Use me in the state that matches

my direction — and definitely not the other way around!
Only thus I can fulfil my function as 'nail'
well.'

This image is realistic,
for it is not the nail
but we who are responsible for his state.
It is we who need to bring the nail's state
in accordance with his direction —
that is, if we want to use the nail well.

At the moment we exert pressure from the exterior
on the flat side of the nail,
the potential toughness of the pointy side
coincides — thanks to the right state —
with the exerted firmness of our pressure —
powerfully, the nail shoots into the right direction
through the world.
('Je mehr der Nagel auf den Kopf getroffen ist…')

THE 'REVERSED' NAIL 112

If the nail is used against his direction —
and therefore in the wrong state,
then he receives pressure on his pointy side
and not on his flat side.
The result is that the pressure, being essentially firm,
and point, being potentially equally tough,
will be mainly counteracting.
The nail halts.

If the reversed use of the nail
is meant explicitly,
indeed the nail's state is reversed,
but not his function —
even though this function is different from what nails
are usually constructed for.

Simple TCs, like nails
allow themselves to be reversed.
Contrarily, complex and partitioned TCs
like cars, pianos, typewriters and such
don't allow for such an inversion,
for their constructors put too much 'direction'
and 'position' in them for that even to be possible.
(But even if,
then we're not speaking about the inversion of
constructions
but rather about the inversion of functions.)

For example, the claim
that a radio receiver is a TC the function whereof
is the inversion of a radio transmitter's function
is correct.
But the conclusion that a reversed radio receiver
would produce a radio transmitter
is incorrect.
A constructor of radio receivers and transmitters doesn't
invert electrical circuits,
but functions.
He is the one who determines in which direction his

circuits will be working:
towards the world, or turned away from it.
(That direction, that is the constructor's 'plan'.)

For example, a vacuum cleaner is a TC
the function whereof in one direction,
namely sucking,
is the inverse of the function in the other direction,
namely blowing.
Does the vacuum cleaner then effortlessly actualise what
a radio cannot?
No.
A vacuum cleaner is more than a mere receiver.
A vacuum cleaner is a combination of a receiver
and a transmitter — albeit of dust clouds and not of
ether waves.
(A vacuum cleaner too needs to be used
in the correct state.)

THE METER

When for once a TC doesn't serve to work the world,
but to measure her,
she is turned 180° qua state.
In this state she allows to be moved along with the world.

The measuring TC has to feel the world —
not the other way around.
(It is the world's turn to work the TC —
and not the other way around.)

A TC reversed as meter
turns her sensitive inside towards the world
and her tough outside towards her user.
In this state she stands with her back to the world
and with her face vis-à-vis her user.

If the TC wouldn't be turned around
and would be forced to measure the world,
the pressure of the world would flow through her
in the wrong direction.
(It would be a question
whether she would be resistant to that:
she might break!)

A measuring TC has been calculated to her task.
Her inside is calculated to be effortlessly set into
a fully synchronous co-motion by the relatively firm world.
(The meter wants to be faithfully informed about the
world's motion programme.)

Thus, the sensitive finger tip of a blind reader
has been 'equipped' as inside in such a way
that the minimal world of the firm braille
— notwithstanding her minimal proportions —
is capable of setting the relatively huge tip
effortlessly into a synchronous co-motion.

Thus, the guitar pickup, the microphone, the ear,
the eye, the barometer, the thermometer,
in fact all meters in physical setups,

the Geiger counter, the booby-trap, the mouse-trap,
etcetera,
are all examples of TCs that want to be informed
by their worlds.

(Especially the booby-trap and mouse-trap are good
examples for how a measuring and working TC
can be woven together into a single TC
under a single roof:
the information has hardly entered —
before the measuring TC turns her function around
at once,
and works on her informant — and how!)

THE SOUND FUNNEL

A sound funnel is a TC with two
sides lying at oppositely ends:
one big and the other small.
As long as the funnel finds itself at rest,
the small side is potentially tougher than the big side
because the latter is connected with the world in a way
relatively more sensitive
than the small side.
(The big side leans, as it were, lightly
against the world.)

In front of a sound source, the sound funnel can
occupy two states:
either with his big side or with his small side turned

towards the source.
In principle, both states are fine.
But their functions differ.
In both states the funnel will force —
(and in doing so proves to be a real TC!)
the vibrating sound motions
to flow into one direction.
The question however is:
which direction!

If the big sensitive side is directed at the vibrating source,
the funnel will force the vibration to thicken
and harden.
(With his sensitive side, the funnel catches the sound
just as a butterfly net catches a butterfly:
from some distance — and no way back.)
The funnel gathers the vibrations in his tough
point-shaped side —
and steels them there.
With this steeled air he can engrave, register
or otherwise work and inform the world.

If the funnel is turned around in the world
— i.e. with its small side directed at the source —
then that side touches the source.
Funnel point and point of origin coincide and become
one.
The firm source (human mouth, pickup needle) transfers
the vibrations loud and powerfully onto the funnel point.
The shape of the funnel withholds the vibrations

from spherically spreading through the world
which would be the case without funnel.
He forces the vibrations into a single direction:
namely in-the-direction-of-the-big-side.
There they appear — loud enough to set the world
to which that side is turned into vibration.

The two sides of a sound funnel being
on the one hand tough and on the other hand sensitive
says something
about the instrumental function of the funnel as
acoustical construction in the world.
But only if the funnel is placed
in the correct state!

VI. PRESSURE

PRESSURE AND THE WORLD

THE WORLD FEELS PRESSURE 115

A world feeling pressure
flows.
Not the whole world flows,
but the part the pressure works on.
That part flows from here to there
while the rest of the world is watching motionlessly.

The rest of the world surrounds the flowing part.
She keeps the place of the part
as long as the part flows.

To keep the place of the flowing part
the surrounding world offers resistance to the pressure.
The pressure feels this resistance.

THE PRESSURE PROPAGATES 116

If a part of the world
under influence of pressure
flows from here to there,

then that part takes that pressure
also there.
(As an arrow takes the archer's pressure
to the target.)

On the back of the flowing world-part
the pressure propagates in the world standing still,
expanding in it.
But:
while flowing the pressure changes!
(The world made the pressure feel her resistance.)

117

CONTENT AND APPEARANCE

The pressure propagating in the world
loses content and changes in appearance.
Content and appearance define the pressure.
(Content is the total pressure capacity a pressure
can yield —
appearance, the way in which the pressure presents his
content.)

If the world is firm and tight,
she manages to represent the pressure well.
(She manages literally to present the pressure again —
as if she were the one pressing, and not the pressure.)
If contrarily the world is weak, soft and volatile,
the pressure seems to have disappeared in her.
Because it wouldn't be clear how, where and when
the weak world would represent the pressure —

if she would represent him at all.
(Pressure on a weak world is untraceable in it.)

FAITHFUL PRESSURE

118

In a world that undergoes pressure here
but stagnates there,
pressure speeds from here to there.
Once there,
the pressure overcomes the stagnation.

The more instrumental the world
(nail, nerve, string, violin, billiard ball)
the more faithful the pressure proceeds in it.
If contrarily the world is 'loose' and inconsistent,
the pressure in it crumbles to dust and pieces.
(The pressure drops along the way.)
Such an inconsistent world is not calculated to feeling
pressure —
let alone flow.
(Although such a world spreads the pressure's content
it doesn't spread his appearance.)

THE WORLD KEEPS THE PRESSURE

119

Pressure on the world
doesn't immediately flow out of that world again,
but is stored and kept by the world
for a longer or shorter period.
(The world keeps the pressure for later.)

For example, a small world undergoing pressure flows
in the direction the pressure is showing her
with regard to the big world surrounding her —
until she stagnates, halts
or otherwise gets jammed in the big world.
Then, the pressure departs 'like new' and 'on its own'
from the small world
and enters the big world.

A tap with a hammer on a nail
exits sooner or later
from the other side of the nail
(the side turned towards the big world)
into the outside —
however soon 'soon' may be for nails.
The nail has kept the pressure for just a while
before passing him on to the big world.
(The pressure 'shot' through the nail —
and 'shooting' takes time.)

For example, a billiard ball rolling along keeps
the pressure exerted on him
until the moment he hits another ball.
The cue's blow has long been forgotten
when the ball passes that blow's content
to that other ball.
(As if the rolling ball got the idea to
bump into that other ball by himself —
through his own pressure, and not the cue's one.)

TWO TYPES OF PRESSURE

TWO MOTIVES 120

A TC serves
to exert pressure on the world.
There the pressure causes motion
and this motion in her turn causes change.

Motion is carried out —
change is brought about.

Motion is the mover's business —
the world's concern is change.

All thinkable reasons to exert pressure
on the world with a TC's help
can be reduced to two:
either the mover wants to work the world with pressure
or he wants to inform it through pressure.

WORKING AND INFORMING 121

A mover works the world
in case he changes the world's shape,
appearance, composition, function, position
or otherwise in such a way
that she — once altered —
can be used differently accordingly.

A mover informs the world
by touching her casually in passing
with extremely minimal pressure.
(He stimulates her
without moving her noticeably.)

The mover works the world
by putting her under heavy pressure.
She tilts.
She becomes deep here and high there.
Because of the heavy pressure the world yields.
A world wrought in such way serves the mover.
(The mover's hand fits around the receded world.)

Informing pressure is different.
He makes a print.
The world keeps the print on her surface
and not in her depths.
(She remembers the information on her face.)

The surface — the face — of the world
is her mantle.
The print is on the mantle of the world.

PRESSURE'S APPEARANCE

The difference between working and informing
doesn't as much concern the pressure himself,
for example his weight —
how much power he emits —

what thrust he might produce, etcetera,
but rather the way in which he is exerted:
how he moves —
how he repeats —
how he takes the time —
how he returns on his way, etcetera.

Therefore the difference doesn't concern what exerts
but how.
Not the pressure as a press package
but the mode in which this package is unfolded
and its content presented.
In other words:
not the pressure's content
but the pressure's appearance determines the difference
between working and informing.

HEAVY AND LIGHT PRESSURE

A working pressure is called heavy,
an informing pressure light.
Heavy and light aren't terms of weight
but of appearance.
(Literally how many times the pressure appears.)

A pressure appearing several times in a row
repeats his influence.
The world experiences that influence just as many times.
The world stacks up all these experiences.
(Experiences are stackable.)

In case a pressure repeats his influence
by appearing repeatedly
the world experiences that repeated pressure
as heavy.
And just as heavy
as the influence of one single heavy press!

But what is in this case 'a single heavy press'?
Where does such a single heavy press come from?
Isn't it the case that the exertion of a single heavy press
is preceded by a stacking of several light presses
in advance?
Or do we simply miss that stacking,
and settle with the lowest pressure of the stack:
the heaviest of the bunch?

By definition, a pressure appearing just once
is experienced by the world as light.
(The influence of a single pressure is superficial.)
Nonetheless, the world did experience the pressure:
that's enough!

Whatever the world experiences —
she remembers.
She remembers the single — passing — pressure
by keeping his print.

IMPRESSION

DEPTH 124

Pressure appearing in the world
makes in impression on the world.
(The pressure's influence is an impression.)

As a pressure repeats his influence
the impression in and on the world becomes deeper.
In that sense, the world keeps the heaviness of the
pressure
in the depth of the impression.

REPEATED PRESSURE 125

By repeating pressure
the effect of a single press on the world is
amplified.

Whereas the effect of a single press means
that the world has only changed superficially;
the effect of repeated pressure is
that the change proliferates into the depths.
The world yields to the repeated pressure —
in depth.
Thus an impression is shaped.

126 **REPEATED MOVEMENT**

In daily life, actions such as
drilling, sanding, cleaning, polishing, sawing, milling, hammering —
but also praying, breathing, walking, cooking
and making love,
are all examples of workings
founded on a periodically repeated movement.

As a result of the repeated movement,
the contact between the pressure and the world becomes
warmer and more intimate,
the change deeper and more intense accordingly,
and the result more profiled proportionally.
That is the sense of repetition.

The effect of none of these workings can
be equaled
by a single pull, hit, stroke or blow.
It simply takes time to work the world in her depths.
(However 'superficial' these depths sometimes might be.)

(For example,
a newspaper can never be printed fast enough.
As soon as the pressure has been exerted on the paper
it can be delivered —
the sooner the better!

Thence a newspaper doesn't possess any meaningful 'depth'.)

STEELING THE WORLD 127

A repeated pressure and movement
makes the world more intimate and deepens her.
But not only that:
it hones and hardens her too.
It steels the world!

One may say, that when something is tough
obviously a lot of 'depth' has been invested into it.
An intensely and intimately repeated movement
has been
its groundwork.
In its steeled appearance, the firm object reflects
the accumulation of all the pressures exerted on him.

THE SWORD 128

The repeated folding, hammering, honing and polishing
though which
a Japanese sword smith shapes a Samurai sword
doesn't lead to the further deepening of
the sword material (what we would expect),
but on the contrary, to a very shallow —
yes, even superficial firmness.
This firmness adorns the sword
and steels its edge.

Whereas the constant repetition of always
the same motions of the sword smith
apparently doesn't 'progress',
that same sword —
in the hand of a Samurai warrior —
rushes within one flash of a second
into the deep world.
The warrior literally changes the world with his sword
in an instance
and gains with one motion more depth
than the sword smith would ever be able to.

This contradiction however is resolved
when that single hit by the Samurai is understood as
the accumulated discharge of
all the movement and work
the sword smith has invested in the sword.
(Without all this movement of the sword smith
the warrior might as well forget
about the effect of his single motion.)

129

THE ARROW

An arrow flying towards a target
(a typical one-shot motion, you'd say!)
causes a change in depth there,
but especially one on the surface —
however deep the arrow may have penetrated the target!

Just see how his impact is 'read':
superficially and barely in depth!
(Whence archers are little interested in something like
'the art of deep-shooting'.)

THE ARCHER

130

In case an archer would be asked
why he — the archer —
uses an arrow with a lot of detours
and not immediately with his fist,
he would answer:

'If I would touch immediately —
first of all, I wouldn't be able
to turn myself around fast enough from planner to mover,
and second I wouldn't be able to hit the target
firm and deep enough.
For both I need time.
In the first case I need time
to prepare myself
in peace and quiet for the touching.
(I should be able to turn and tarry.)
In the second case I need time
to stack up all my touching-motions
to an extremely large power.
For both reasons I use an arrow.'

'I stack up all my motion-power
in my arrow.

I charge him with my pressure.
(I stretch my bow.)
When I shoot my arrow away
he keeps the power I bundled within him
until the moment that he
hits the target there —
on the other side of the world.
Only then it will show what I gained:
namely distance and depth
in exchange for time.'

'And invested a lot of time in this shot
— this single shot —
I have!
Just think about all my rehearsing and practicing
— also in my thoughts!
Or think about the time that has passed into making a masterly bow,
like the one I'm holding in my hand right here and now!
And don't forget about all the years I spent
to surpass my masters in the art of arching!
(And let me not forget that I have reached this level
thanks to all the experience and knowledge
they have passed on to me throughout those years!)'

'So: all that time and those times
I stack up in my arrow.
For without this stacked-up time
I would never be able to reach my target —
let alone hit it decently.'

PRINT

SINGLE MOVEMENT

Informing pressure
— contrary to working pressure —
is light, superficial and happens only once.
Here, no repetition but passing,
no grinding but engraving,
not in space but in time,
not in depth but on the surface.

The world undergoing informing pressure
has two available options
to process the information.
Either she fixes the pressure
and stores him in the form of a print,
or she lets the pressure pass
but remembers his message.

In the first case the world retains the form in which
the information is enwrapped.
The form concerns the print as notation.
In the second case she retains the information on her own.
The information concerns the print's content.

If the world retains the informing pressure's print,
the information is always present-at-hand.
Although one has — would one want to be informed —

to go to the print,
once one is there,
one can learn the information in peace and quiet
and one's 'own time'.
(Newspaper, book, letter, tombstone,
LP, painting, etcetera.)

In the other case,
when the world retains no prints from an
informing pressure
and the pressure passes along the world
without actually touching her,
one has to make sure to be present at the passing.
(Not sooner, not later, but right then!)

For example, one has to be present at all things that pass
— like speeches, theatre and music performances,
parades, talks, calamities, etcetera —
if one wants to retrieve
information from them.
For if the flow of what is passing stops,
the pressure that flowed along with the flow
disappears into the world literally without a trace.
(What remains at most is his message in our thoughts.)

132 **PRINT AND IMPRESSION BELONG TOGETHER**

Print is the result of a single
press aimed at information and communication.
Impression is so too,

but it is also and especially the result of a
pressure aimed at working and production.
That is the essential difference.

We may be mistaken about the difference,
but the pressure's mover
(a real presser!)
never confuses them.

'CHANGING' CHANGE

THE MOVER FEELS THE WORLD 133

A mover puts the world under pressure
to work her.
The target of the working is:
changing the world.

A mover changes the world
if he continuously repeats the movement of his pressure.
But he only changes the world for real
in case he hears from her after each movement
how the change is progressing.
Otherwise, the change has no 'direction'
and the repetition makes no sense.

The mover first has to feel change
and experience its progress,

to be able to persist in the change operation and
— where necessary — 'change' the change.

By feeling constantly
the mover experiences how his pressure
moves through the world little by little
and shifts a little with each motion.
He experiences how the resistance the world offers
decreases — or on the contrary increases — and
how the way of the moving and pressing pressure in the world deepens
— or rather broadens.

134

THE WORLD KEEPS THE EFFECT

Although the experience of the pressure's progress in the world
is gained by the user,
the external effect of the motion itself
is kept by the world in her depths.
That effect is her experience!
(In case the world would not keep the effect of the repeated movement
repeating as such would make no sense whatsoever.)

The sense of repeating a motion shelters
in the readiness of the world
to keep the first motion — the 'original' —
while the second motion is making itself ready to repeat.
(How else could the second motion legitimate itself

as 'repetition'
if the world wouldn't desire to keep the 'original'?)

THE WAVE

135

What would a wave of water, air or ether mean
without a second or a third?
But:
who are that second and that third?
Are they strange waves
which accidentally came rolling about
on the place of the first
and now form some sort of procession with it?
Or may we only speak of one wave
reappearing to us over and over again?

Could we count the waves washing ashore on the beach?
If so:
why can't we put them in a row
and collect them?
And if not:
Whatever are we to count?
A single wave?
And what about a church bell's rings:
are those twelve rings,
or is it just a single ring repeating itself twelve times?

A wave repeating itself
depends on our 'stacking'-capacity.
We retain of each wave

the impression she makes on us.
If the wave appears again
we stack the impression of the repeated wave
on top of the previous one.
(For impressions are stackable.)

In short:
we don't collect the wave,
but the number of times she appears.

What would the repeated wave, the repeated striking of
the clock, repeated breathing, the repeated day,
repeated acting, and repeated watching
still mean
in case we would constantly 'forget'
all previous waves,
strokes, breaths, days, exercises and impressions?
In case we wouldn't keep
all firsts, seconds and thirds
in one or the other way —
even if only as a mere image, impression, print,
memory or working?

136

THE MELODY

A melody is threaded together from tones.
No tone comes earlier than intended.
They wait for their turn.
They give way to one another.
A melody is a procession of tones.

Of tones?
Isn't a melody just one tone
repeating itself at different pitches according to plan?
Isn't that melody?

Compare a flute with a celesta.
When a flute produces a melody
the flute tube is lengthened or shortened.
The same tone breezes through that tube
time after time
and sounds now higher — then lower.
Contrarily, in the celesta one chime is reserved
for each pitch.
The chimes get a signal when they have to sound.
(They don't wait for one another, but for the signal.)
In fact, all chimes play at the same time —
even if they sound one after another.

While the flute and the chime are making themselves
ready to repeat their tone
we — we who listen — retain the pitch(es) already
released.
That we call 'melody'.
Yet it is in fact a procession of one and the same tone
appearing to us repeatedly.

A transcribed melody shows this procession:
a row of foot prints of that one tone
and not a row of tones.

By tracing the track of this one tone,
a melody sounds.

(Or does it?)

137

CHANGE AS MOVEMENT

A repeated movement
changes the world in depth.

A change propagating in depth
is on itself also a motion.
It is this motion through which we said
the world 'changes'.

A repetitive motion is composed of
two motions.
One motion changes the world on the surface
the other one does so in depth.

As the surface-motion transports her pressure in a
horizontal direction
over the surface of the earth,
the depth-motion imports and transports
the surface-motion (with pressure and all) in a
vertical direction
into the depths of the world:
literally into the world.

The repetition is directed by a motion
taking the repetitive face-motion onto her back:
in depth.
(The depth-motion doesn't carry along an objective
something,
but rather a living and lively motion.)

(Thus the depth-motion of a drilling machine imports
the drill's rotating motion with drill and all
into the wooden, stone, or metal world.)

This importing and transporting
of one motion by the other
along a certain path
towards a certain depth
renders every repetitive motion
(cleaning, grinding, praying, etcetera)
sense and meaning.

THE PENDULUM

138

The progress of a repetitive motion
along a certain path into the depths
isn't always easily traceable.

For example, the periodical motion of a pendulum
of a clock apparently isn't carried by a
depth-motion into the world,
she rather steadily persists in her single track.

(That's why pendulums are pendulums:
they let themselves be 'caught' in their track.)

Still, the depth-motion slumbers within the pendulum
through demonstrable facts, such as
the motion of the earth around her axis
(while swinging the pendulum changes his course),
or the extremely minimal path the pendulum-axis
grinds into the bearings in the long run
owing to the earth's pulling on the pendulum.

What makes the tracking of depth-motions so difficult
is that the relation between the three 'speeds'
is completely lost.
Indeed:
whereas the time of the swinging-motion
is a matter of seconds,
and a turn of the earth takes 24 hours,
the motion of the bearings' wearing and tearing
easily takes decades.

TRACK

139

PATH

A pressure touching the world
spreads himself in her.
As long as the pressure presses
the spreading is a flow.

What flows is not the pressure himself
but a part of the world
with regard to the whole.
That part carries the pressure along with him —
as a horse his rider.
(The part is literally charged with pressure.)

The flow of pressure
makes way through the world.
The flow passes us (us, perceivers) along.
She leaves the path in the way she is clearing it
behind her.

TRACK 140

Wherever a flow appears
she presses on and in the world.
The total of all these pressures
is a track.

A flow is irreversible.
Flow — just like time —
is irrevocable.
(Irrevocable, for happening just once.)

THE TRACK IS A VIEW 141

A track concerns the road (the path),
the flow followed through the world
and not the flowing itself.

A track is the spatial view of all places
that the flow has called at on his way,
and not the view of the calling itself.
(In this regard, a track is not like time —
for timeless as view.)

(Parenthetically:
the view shows a thread of places,
and not the places themselves.)

THE TRACK IS A MEMORY

Unfolded in space and folded in time
the track is anchored in a world
flowing no more.
There he rests.

Thus the track of an animal,
the clue of a crime,
the trace of a pen on paper
lie and rest — stretched qua space and still qua time —
in their respective worlds.

The world keeps the motionless and resting track
as an ineffaceable memory of the flow
that traced it.
(As its silent witness.)
For the flow indeed cannot remember herself.
She 'forgets' her route place-after-place
and position-after-position.

The track however doesn't forget anything of that!
It remembers and retains what the flow forgets.

Thus a dry bed keeps
the memory of a river flowing
and dried ink
the memory of a pen's route on paper.

COURSE

A flow is irreversible.
She literally doesn't turn around.
(Why would she!)
But what she can do,
is repeat her motion (her motion pattern).

When a flow repeats her movement
she retraces her steps.
She steps into her own trail.
This trail is the track of her very first movement:
the way left behind.

By passing along the path anew
the flow deepens the track
and grinds him down.
In doing so, she shapes the path.
She shapes the path into a course.

The difference between track and course is
not anecdotal but essential.

Both are created through the movement of pressure.
But:
whereas the track is only superficial,
the course is both superficial and deep!
In its horizontal flatness the course shows
the first track of the first flow,
and in its vertical depth
the track of all repeated flows together.

In a certain sense, the course may be considered
the fruit of the total work of all flows.
(As if those flows went at the same time
— on top of one another's shoulders —
through the world and not
one after another
— as in a procession —
which is the case.)

HOME

Repetitive movers feel themselves at home
on courses.
'Home' means to them:
firm house, trustworthy accommodation,
enclosing mantle, delimited space, etcetera,
to which one can return safely.

Typically repetitive movers
— i.e. pistons in gasoline engines —

feel themselves at home in their cylinders
That's why they always return to them.

In any case, all machine parts repeat their motions,
and all of them return
— sooner or later —
back to their state.
That state is their 'haven'.
Which means certainty.
(But that's what it also means to their owners!
Otherwise, they would find their machines already spread
out after a few motions —
for 'travelled apart'!)

How different are movers moving only once!
They don't know this certainty — this 'homeliness'.
On the contrary:
they are constantly on their way
from here to there.

(Such a mover is — like a Samurai —
alone in the world,
or — like Ulysses —
constantly looking for his home.)

CERTAINTY

For the certainty
that courses offer to periodically moving constructions,
the latter execute their repetitive motions more tightly,

more resolutely, and more systematically
than constructions moving only once.

Whereas the routes of the constructions moving once are
by nature of always being on their way
qua outline straight or curved (arrow, bullet, apple, flow),
or irregular (warehouse customers, water and
air molecules),
or playful (balls in ball games),
or studious (pens on paper);
the courses of periodically moving constructions
are methodical, functional, rational —
for forced, repeated, planned and experienced.

Courses are stable —
therefore secure
therefore instrumental
therefore compact.
Contrarily, tracks are unstable —
insecure
non-instrumental
and stretched out.

Tracks are stretched-out messages
passing us just once.
Once —
and never again.

CLOSED AND OPEN COURSE 146

There are two types of courses:
closed and open.
Accordingly, there are two types of plans
for repeating a motion:
cyclical and alternating
In the first case, the motion goes around
and 'wreathes' a field.
In the second case, she goes back-and-forth
but doesn't enclose anything.

If the course is closed
(the dial of a clock is such a closed course),
the motion repeats herself in one direction.
If contrarily the course is open at both ends
(as the course of a clock's pendulum
is 'open' at both ends),
the motion repeats herself alternately back
and forth again.

There are no other modes of repetition than these two.
Of course variations and combinations of them do —
but no others.

REPETITION 147

The question is
how the repetitive movement is working.
To which internal voice does what moves comply?

To the command ‘repeat the motion’,
or to ‘follow me, don’t ask questions’?

In the first case, what moves is an ‘imitator’
imitating the motions of the ‘forerunner’;
as workmen and factory robots repeat the motions
that have first been presented to them.
In the second case, what is moved
is unaware of any repetition
and blindly executes the instructions of its client
(the actual mover).

In the first case, the imitator lets himself be lead
by something that went ahead of him —
yes, something that was literally done before him
and now pulls him into the world.
In the second case, what is moved lets itself be
encouraged
by something that stands behind it
and pushes it into the world.

In the first case, the imitator follows
an already shaped course.
In the second case, what is moved follows
a conceptual track that is enclosed within
the thoughts of its inciter.

In case someone lets himself be led by
a conceptual track
the thought plan hiding behind the track pushes

that someone ahead of him into the world,
and steers — indeed, forces him to move as this plan
was already ‘planning’ long before.
Through this pushing a real track is created in the world.
(The real track appears in the world
as the unfolded and extended equivalent
of the conceptual track in the head
of the planning inciter.)

When someone lets himself to be led by such a
real track present-at-hand
that track literally goes before him
and guides him through the world.
Thus, through pulling repeatedly a track is created
that can set others to imitate.
(These others follow a forerunner
who was once ‘imitator’ himself.)

‘Guidance’ through the world along a track
lends the imitator the necessary certainty.
But this form of movement is more dependent and
reproductive than when the imitator would let
himself be led by his own plan (his own track),
and thus would be a forerunner.
The imitator pays for the certainty he acquired
with a certain lack of plan and initiative of his own.

Thus, a city plan lends a stroller in a city
he doesn't know yet the necessary certainty.
The plan shows courses
as they have been ground down by the city's inhabitants
as time passed by.
The stroller only needs to repeat
what others already walked through many times,
and he can safely hold on to their trails.

How different from the stroller is the pioneer!
He is a true 'first mover' —
alone in the world
in an environment nobody has entered before him.
Whereas the city stroller, city plan in hand,
draws the certainty from the fact
that he is following the right way,
the lonely pioneer lacks such a secure preformed path.
To him, 'way' doesn't mean a safe bed
he only needs to follow —
(a stretched out arm leading and seducing him),
but rather a forceful gaze in his back
propelling him to areas unknown:
away from that pressure —
forwards! forwards!

PART AND THING

SMALL WORLD

A mover persisting in his movement
splits the world.
He splits from the whole world a part:
a world-part.

A mover who persists
deepens the world unto the ground.
This depth is an endlessly deep course
separating the world-part from the world.
The world-part is a thing.

A thing is a world apart.
It is a small world
beside the big world.

The mover can take the thing in hand
and turn it.

While the mover is turning
he contrives a plan how to touch the thing.

(Not only the mover
but also history is at the point
of repeating itself.)

150 MANTLE

Endlessly deep courses are empty —
separated things are full.

Empty courses are views —
full things present views.

The view of the isolated thing fits
like yin-yang
in the view of the deep course.
Both views are each other's complement.

Courses enclose and encircle things.
They are: deep moats surrounding castles.
Courses mantle things —
as well as castles.

From the depths of the courses
the things show us their mantles.
(The mantles are ruptures, splits, separations, openings.)

Dismantling a thing means:
taking off the thing's mantle
and in doing so the thing's being-thing.

A dismantled thing
is a thing on the way back to the very first tracks
along which it was brought to light:
the very first view of a plan.

(Such a thing is no more than a few tracing lines
on the surface of the world.)

FIELD AND FORM 151

A mover tracing out a track
creates a field.
A mover deepening a course
creates a form.

A field is exclusively flat —
a shape both flat and deep.
A field leans to the conceptual —
a shape to the material.
(A firm shape is in fact
a spatial concept of two or more planes.)

Track and course,
field and form,
thus cohere.

MOUNTAIN 152

If the essence of a course is
an emptiness going down deep,
the essence of a thing is
a fullness extending up high.
A fullness up high
is a mountain.

A mountain is a thing in becoming.
He wants to be loose from the world.
(Still it is part of that world —
but just for how long!)

As one actualises a course
by continuously taking something away from the world,
one actualises a mountain
by continuously adding something to the world.
If one combines both actions,
one stacks here what one removes there.
(One heightens here what one deepens here.)
Thus world-parts — continents — are created.

CREATOR

The mover determines with his gestures
the shape of the world-parts.
(He conducts the outline of the future parts.)

What is visual about the mover's gestures
stamps the shape of the parts or the things.

The mover — doing thus —
is a creator of shapes,
parts and things.

PERCEIVER

TWO

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VII. PERCEPTION

FORMATION

TAKING 154

A perceiver is a true taker!
He is a taker of truth.

The truth of motions
— for perceivers —
are views.

A perceiver of views
is a taker of views of motions.

FOLLOWING 155

To take views
the perceiver follows the movement.
(He has to,
for a movement happens.)
He follows the movement
with eyes and hands.

Although he follows it,
the perceiver doesn't chase the movement.
(A perceiver is in the least a chaser —
he's more like a hunter.)

156

STANDING

A perceiver following a movement
doesn't move himself,
but keeps his spot.
(He is anchored to his place.)
His place is aside of the movement.

'Unmoved' and aside:
such is the place of the perceiver.
(The perceiver has chosen this place.)

157

PLACE

A movement that happens
takes place.
The place is a place-of-happening.
What happens
is the displacement
of this place.

The perceiver follows from his position
the displacement of the place-of-happening
in its footsteps
with eyes and hands.

THE MOVER

158

No movement without mover!
What moves is <u>not</u> the mover
but a 'this' moved by him.
(Also a mover is unmoved.)

A mover moving 'this'
desires to expand himself in the direction
of the world.
He desires to touch the world.

Not the mover touches the world
but 'this' does so in his stead.
'This' moves the place-of-happening
from the mover to the world.
This displacement —
that's what expansion is!

THE CONSTRUCTOR

159

A mover expanding himself
constructs.

He is the constructor of the relation
between him and the world.
(The intermedium between both —
that's 'this'.)

THREE CONSTRUCTIONS

160 **A MOTION-CONSTRUCTION**

The totality of a mover,
a motion-thing 'this'
and the world
is a construction.

The construction is the firm relation
through which the mover touches the world.
(The mover touches the world
to work or inform it.)

To the perceiver's eye, the firm relation is
an indivisible — for firm — whole.
The whole is a motion-construction.

161 **'UNMOVED' MOVING**

Outwards
(to the eye of perceivers),
motion-constructions are 'closed'.
Unstirringly they stand on the world
showing their mantles.

Inwards, motion-constructions are 'open'.
They show interior work.
The interior work consists of parts and portions.
(Movers, movement-things, targets and worlds.)

The parts and portions move
without the total relation moving.
(The motion-construction motionless by itself
frames an interior work working and moving by itself.)

Thus, the archer forms
together with his arrow, arch and target
a motion-construction anchored in the world
within which the arrow moves,
yet the construction as a whole
doesn't leave her place.

Thus, a car by itself is not a motion-construction
(what we would expect it to be)
but within the 'superconstruction'
garage-car-highway-target
it is a part moving back and forth.

(As a perceiver, one needs to have a broad view.)

A PERCEPTION-CONSTRUCTION 162

A perceiver who, aside and unmoved
follows a movement,
touches on the construction
executing the movement.

He touches on the construction
not to touch her
but to touch on her.

(By touching on her,
he gets to know her movement.)

The perceiver who thus touches on,
joins himself to the motion.
This joint is a connection.

If the connection works really and firm in the world
(the perception is actual),
this connection is a construction too:
a perception-construction.

A perceiver perceiving a movement
directs one construction at the other.
(He aims like a hunter.)

This directing —
that's what perceiving is!

163

AN INFORMATION-CONSTRUCTION

The connection between perceiver and motion
only concerns the side of the perceiver.
With that side the perceiver attaches to the motion.

With his other side, the perceiver reports to us
on what he knows about the movement.
What he knows,
are 'views'.

The perceiver tells us his report
by touching us with his views.

In case a perceiver reports to us,
he entertains with us a constructive relation.
This relation — firm and real —
is an informative construction.
(An information-construction.)

A perceiver both perceiving and reporting
is stuck between two constructions:
a perceiving and an informing construction.
He is part of both.
He forms the intermediary between the mover and us,
(We, who want to know the movement.)

A METACONSTRUCTION

164

Owing to the perceiver's intermediary position
construction attaches to construction
and relation to relation.
The whole is a network of constructions and relations.
A metaconstruction.

Outwards, the metaconstruction finds herself resting
(She stands on the world neither stirred nor moved.)
But inwards a continuous exchange prevails
of plans for motions
and motions for views.

Between the plans and the views
flows of views run.

The perceiver follows the motions
and touches the flows.
On this following and touching he reports to us.

We take the report from the perceiver.
(We take his views.)

POSITION

165

ASIDE

The plane in which a perceiver sees a motion
stands perpendicular to the plane
in which the mover moves.
(The direction of the latter plane is being determined by
the formation mover-this-that;
the direction of the former plane is being determined by
the formation perceiver-motion.)

More generally:
to be able to perceive
a perception-construction works at right angles to the
construction that executes the motion.
Or:
with regard to the mover's working
the perceiver works from aside.

A mover moves this in line to that.
The mover sees of that the frontside
and of this the backside.

Owing to his position (his 'place')
the mover can't see this move.
(The mover can't follow the track this is drawing
in the world.)

A perceiver who wants to see this move,
(and wants to follow its track)
arranges himself aside of the line mover-this-that.
The direction of his gaze stands perpendicular
to the direction of the mover's gaze.
So at right angles to the direction in which this moves.

With his gaze the perceiver cuts
the perspective of the mover.
Not the other way around!
The perceiver sees the mover —
but the mover doesn't see the perceiver!
(The perceiver does see his target —
but that target isn't the perceiver.)

Aside of the movement, the perceiver sees
the three parts of the motion-construction in a row.
Only thus he can see

how the mover sets this into motion
and how this, shortly after, reaches the target (that).

167

SOME DISTANCE

To be able to perceive well,
the perceiver keeps ‘some distance’ to that
moving.

Keeping means
that the perceiver doesn’t change this some distance,
but keeps it in the sense of ‘maintaining’.
(His position as perceiver prescribes this keeping.)

A perceiver keeping some distance
is rightfully an outsider.
He literally stands exterior to what he wants to perceive —
for aside of it.

Some distance implies:
bridgeable distance!
For if some distance would be unbridgeable,
the perceiver would close himself off from the
motion-happening.
He would neither be able to touch the movement —
nor to be touched by it.

A BRIDGE

168

A perceiver who wants to know a motion
must see to enter into contact with her.
He needs to touch or touch on her.

No touching or touching on
without bridging the distance to the motion.
(A perceiver who wants to know
has to cross the bridge.)

The spanning bridge is both a function and a fact.
She is a function,
for she makes the intention of the perceiver
formationally visible.
She is a fact,
for she is also bridge that links, sticks and bonds.

The linking bridge touches with her one side
the perceiver
and with the other side the motion.
She touches the perceiver for the motion
and the motion for the perceiver.

Thanks to the intermediary position of the bridge
the perceiver himself doesn’t need to cross her.
For the bridge represents him at the motion.
(The perceiver may keep his place —
on hither side of the bridge.)

The constructive relation between perceiver and motion
becomes a firm fact thanks to the bridge.
The firm fact is a perception-construction.
The bridge lends this construction direction and sense.

TWO TYPES OF PERCEPTION

169

THE MOTION 'SPEAKS'

A motion-construction can inform the perceiver
about her movement in a twofold way:
symbolic and sympathetic.
Symbolic —
through telling or writing him the motion.
Sympathetic —
through making him feel the motion.

'Telling' implies
that a motion informs her perceiver of
the speakable feature of her movement.

The speakable doesn't concern the movement as
physical fact,
but rather the path (the route, the flight, the track)
the motion clears through the world.

The cleared path is a script
the motion writes in the world.

A motion speaks to her perceiver the speakable
by displaying her script.
(Her script is a row of views.)

The perceiver reads the script.
(He takes the views.)
He can now speak the way of moving.
(He tells us.)

THE MOTION 'MAKES FEEL'

170

That, about which the motion cannot say anything,
she makes feel.
The unspeakable of a motion is the movement-self.
(That, one has to feel!)

A movement making her perceiver feel her motion
makes him participant in her movement.
She involves him in her movement
and actually sets him into co-motion.

That's what making feel is about:
compelling the perceiver to a physical
— therefore sympathetic — moving-along!
Consequently, the motion-happening shifts
in the direction of the perceiver.
(Now, the motion is not only there with the mover,
but also here with the perceiver.)

171 **SYMBOLIC PERCEPTION**

A motion speaking her movement
dispatches to the perceiver flows of impressions.
She bridges the distance between him and herself
and touches him with her impressions.

The impressions are symbols.
They do not so much press in
but rather on the perceiver.
They are not the physical motion herself,
but represent her.

Natural perceivers
— humans, animals —
experience the speakable of a motion sensorially.
(They see, hear, fell or smell
how the movement moves.)

Technical perceivers
— constructions technically equipped to that end —
experience the speakable of motions mechanically.
(They function optically, acoustically, haptically,
chemically, electrically, etcetera.)

172 **SYMPATHETIC PERCEPTION**

A motion who wants to make her perceiver
feel the movement-self,

touches him immediately and firm —
regardless of the distance that separates them.

'Firm' means:
hard enough to set the perceiver in co-motion;
yet not as hard to change him for good.

'Immediately' means
that the bridging between the motion and the perceiver
is real and tight to such extent,
that it completely annihilates the empty world
gaping between both.
Because of the annihilation of this world (this void)
the perceiver is capable to entertain an
immediate — physical —
contact with the motion.
(As if there were no bridge.)

PERCEPTION-OPERATION

MOVEMENT AS OPERATION 173

A mover moving this to that
executes a motion-operation this-to-that.

A perceiver first exercises in his thoughts a plan
upon which he effectively takes action
and finally he achieves a certain result.

Plan, action and result mark three phases (situations)
of the motion-operation this-to-that:
the situation of the preparatory movement,
the situation of the factual movement
and the situation of the completed movement.

174

PERCEPTION AS OPERATION

A perceiver perceiving a motion-happening
needs to follow the motion-operation this-to-that
from situation to situation.
(He needs to keep in step with the situation
of the 'plan', the 'action' and the 'result'.)

For each situation the perceiver adjusts his position.
He changes his setting.
(For each situation he changes both his concern and interest.)

This following of a motion-operation
is an operation on its own.
A perception-operation!

FIRST SITUATION

175

WAITING

During the situation of the preparatory movement
the factors 'some distance' and 'from aside' determine
the perceiver's position.

In and from this position
the perceiver awaits the movement.

This position the perceiver has acquired.
For he wanted to arrange himself here
in order to connect with the mover thus
and then to make a start with perceiving.

HERE, THUS, THEN

176

These three:
here, thus and then are the coordinates
rendering the perceiver the right to position.
They render his position content and status.

'Here' is the coordinate of location.
From 'here' the perceiver can keep a good eye on the three parts
of the motion-construction: the mover, this and that
without being actively related
to the factual movement.

'Thus' is the coordinate of connection.
The perceiver commits himself from 'here' to a constructive relation
with the motion-construction.
(To do so, he bridges the distance between him and her.)

'Then' is the coordinate of chronology.
The perceiver is an action-watching official
having to both await and follow the movement.

A small procession:
first the mover
and then the perceiver!
(Never the other way around.)

177 **MOVEMENT AND PERCEPTION DON'T GO TOGETHER**

A mover cannot do without a perceiver.
Without perceiver he is 'nowhere'.
Without perceiver he could still change the world.
But what for? — for whom?

A mover also cannot perceive himself!
He cannot be both mover and perceiver
at the same time.
For:
in case he desires to form a view of what
an external perceiver perceives of his movement,
he intends to unify two non-unifiable functions
— i.e. executing and perceiving —
within a single person.

He overstrains his function as 'mover',
and therefore his position.
He forces the formation of the perception plane

working perpendicularly on the motion plane.
(Thence a mover cannot do without a perceiver.)

THE FIELD MARSHALS 178

On historical paintings of heroic battle fields
it is all about the field marshals and not about the battles.
Still, the marshals don't usually find themselves amid
the turmoil of battle (what the turmoil is about),
but aside of it.

Although the marshals convincingly are the leaders
(they sit on their high horses)
the painters depict them primarily as perceivers
of their own battles.
And this, despite the fact that the smoke of battle
rising up here and there constantly reminds them that
they would do well — before it is too late —
to come out of the paintings' corners
and place themselves
without hesitation at the head of their troops.
It's there they are needed and nowhere else.

But there's more.
The marshals (nota bene field marshals)
don't watch their battle fields from aside
as should have been the case,
but rather from above.
(on high horses — from a hill.)

The field marshals are stuck above their battle fields.
(The painters have tilted the battles.)

That the facts are presented thus,
and not as is the case, is
because the painters don't desire as much to reveal
to us — (we, outsiders) — the facts of the battle fields,
but rather the brilliant ideas that form their groundwork.

By watching along over the field marshals' shoulders
we experience the painted battle fields as grandly
arranged Thoughts concerning the world
unfolded on the plane of that world:
thoughts housed just now in the heads of the marshals
in the shape of plans,
but now already presented to the people in full scale.
(Plans, painted on the scale of world plans —
not on the scale of maps:
that's what the painters intend.)

Even our current field marshals — our generals —
preferably have themselves displayed as 'perceivers'.
They peer through field-glasses,
look at maps,
or point with rods to planning boards.
(Accomplishments regular officers may only dream of.)

In a pyromaniac the mover
and perceiver are united.
To combine both functions
the pyromaniac overstrains his position of 'arsonist'.
This overstraining —
that's what his target is!

To reach the desired overstraining
the pyromaniac stages a situation (fire)
within which — visible to the eyes of others —
he can figure as the perceiver of what he
set into motion himself.
(He 'plays' the impossible:
the superposition of movement and perception.)

From a distance and aside of the place
where he lit the fire,
the pyromaniac visibly enjoys his successful
mise-en-scène.
Amid an eagerly watching audience
he knows himself to be the only one with a double
position:
the only one who, though observing the situation from
aside,
also sees himself busy behind the fire's seat.

The conclusion that for all others
such a unique position is unavailable,

doesn't add little to the success of the
pyromaniac's undertaking to overstrain.

What is the task of painters and photographers
in case of field battles
is in case of fire the pyromaniac's task:
namely depicting a duplication of the position of causer
and perceiver
for the eyes of others.
For a pyromaniac doesn't as much desire fire,
but theatre!
Moreover, he desires an audience!
For without it, the duplication of position
would both make no sense and have no effect.
(The 'perceiver' inside the pyromaniac desires
to be perceived.)

180 **INTENTIONAL PERCEPTION**

Perceivers have to wait for the movement of movers.
A perceiver only comes in action when the movement
begins
and with it the motion-construction starts to work.
Until then the perceiver keeps vigil.

Before the eye of the vigilant perceiver, the mover
'sleeps'.
This rest however — this sleep — is merely apparent!
For the mover has a plan at the ready.
He places his plan in position in his thoughts.

as long as he hasn't decided to reveal it.
Until that moment he exercises his plan in thought.
(The mover rehearses the movement.)

Yet the perceiver too — though awaiting —
doesn't sleep!
He is busy forming in his thoughts a conception of
how the mover will move his motion-construction
once he is moving.
He tries to conceive of the mover's plan.
He attempts to foresee the motions of the
motion-construction.
(The perceiver as visionary.)

With his eye fixed on the sleeping mover,
the vigilant perceiver constructs in his thoughts
a construction with which he tries to render his
conception a coherence as tight as possible.
He constructs an intentional construction
the movement whereof he both expects and hopes
will correspond optimally to the mover's construction.
He hopes,
because he might be mistaken and disappointed!
For indeed his thought construction anticipates
the factual movement of the mover.
(That's a risk the perceiver has to take.)

SECOND SITUATION

181 **ACTION**

The first situation of the motion-operation this-to-that
is concluded at the moment the mover decides
to proceed to actual movement.
Then, the second phase of 'firm action' has come
and the second situation becomes a fact.

But also for the perceiver!
Now the true perception begins!
No speculation or prognosis,
but firm and factual confirmation is the word!

182 **THE PERCEIVER KEEPS PLACE**

As long as the movement lasts
the perceiver keeps his place.
Keeping means:
not giving up the place of perception,
but maintaining it.

While the movement is moving
the perceiver is anchored in the world through his mantle.
Only thus he arrives at an optimal and truthful perception.
For indeed the only things moving
are his hands and eyes.
Those are moved — not his mantle!
(That's why all perceiving technical constructions stand

on the world vibration-proof and motionless.
They literally hold themselves on to the world.)

183 **THE PERCEIVER KEEPS SOME DISTANCE**

As long as the movement lasts
the perceiver not only keeps his place,
but also 'some distance'.
He keeps some distance
to be able to follow the flight of 'this' through the world
to 'that' in her entirety.
(His eye wants to mean a frame to that flight —
like a theatre frame to the actors' play.)

Thus — by keeping some distance —
the perceiver hopes not to lose sight of 'this'
nor losing contact with it on the way.

184 **THÉÂTRE EN RONDE**

The question, behind which line a perceiver
should stop to be able to follow the moving 'this'
during its entire flight,
is subjected to the laws of theatrical hierarchy.
This hierarchy says:
here the perceiver, and there — at some distance —
the motion-construction that will perform
the motion-play
for the perceiver's eye.

Whereas what is moved moves laterally
over the playing field
and finally gets off ‘on the side’,
the view of this game arranges itself frontally
before the perceiver.
(Vis-à-vis, and not from aside.)

From this position the view paces
into the perceiver’s eye,
as if it were entering a théâtre en ronde,
in order to nestle
in his memory —
somewhere behind the eye.

Thus, the flight of what is moved remains
literally with the perceiver
even if the motion has long left the world.
(The perceiver retains — and maintains — the thought.)

185

THE TRACK

A perceiver observing at some distance
a motion as if it were in-flight
receives of it a flow of impressions.
This flow of impressions touches the perceiver.
(The flow literally impresses him.)

While what is moved is speeding away in the world
the perceiver collects impressions

and stores them piece by piece in his memory.
(The perceiver gleans the impressions.)

The collected impressions form a track in the perceiver.
This trace is the remaining part of the flight
as she has left it
in the memory of the perceiver.
(The trace is the ‘memory’ of the movement
of the motion.)
Thanks to the trace, the movement stays with the
perceiver.

This remembering of a motion in the shape of a trace —
that is symbolic perception.
(The symbols are the impressions.)

THE WORLD-TRACK

186

Not only the perceiver receives of a motion
a flow of impressions,
but the world too.
(Even though she is not the target,
but we.)

As in us,
all impressions leave firm tracks
in the world.
This is the rule:
no motion is thinkable or presentable
without her leaving traces —

be it in us,
or in the world.

A motion leaving no traces of her movement
is experienced neither by us nor by the world.
(She had better not bothered to move at all.)

A motion without track
cannot prove her movement
(For a track forms a silent witness
of any motion whatsoever.)

187

THE WORLD TRACK AS 'MEMORY'

To be able to move
and move away from his place
what is moving must 'forget' his place.
But that's not all.
What is moving must forget his flight too!
(That's what fleeing is:
forgetting one's place!)

Whereas what is moving away forgets his flight,
the world manages to remember it
because she keeps track of it.
The track retains the route (the 'flight')
what is moving is taking through the world
inerasably, unchangeably and timelessly
in favour of that world.

THE PERCEIVER SEES THE WORLD-TRACK

188

A perceiver seeing a motion move through the world
also sees the track she leaves behind in the world.
But this track is remembered not only by the world
but also by the perceiver.
But the question is what the perceiver exactly sees
of a motion.
Does he see the factual firm movement
(the pure movement)
or exclusively this firm movement's firm track?

Do the impressions emerging from a movement
go directly from what is moving to the perceiver,
or do they reach him through the track of that motion
in the world?
In other words:
does the perceiver receive impressions from the
motion-self,
or from the track in the world?
(Are the impressions in the perceiver originals,
or copies of the track in the world?)

PURE MOTION

189

A perceiver who wants to form
a view of the movement-self
(pure movement),
needs to 'forget' just as the motion does
so as to be able to move.

But, when the perceiver forgets,
he also forgets the motion!
If, contrarily, he remembers,
the essence of the movement escapes him —
namely, how it knows to forget itself!
The perceiver remains stuck with a motion
itself not being of this world.
(A true dilemma.)

190

SWINGING

A pendulum swings in the world.
A perceiver watching that
sees the pendulum swinging, and says so.
(He tells us.)
The question however is, what the perceiver says
and whence he gains his impressions:
from the essence of the swinging (pure swinging)
— nothing more or less than the swinging as
happening —
or from the track the firm pendulum leaves in the world.

If he gains it from the pure swinging,
the perceiver must never to lose sight of the pendulum,
not even for the blink of an eye,
as it is constantly moving back and forth
in front of his eyes.
He constantly needs to be with the pendulum and
— like the pendulum — forget
everything preceding (all preceding positions)

in order to proceed.
Thus, he gets to know the swinging 'now'
and not the 'past'.
(He is a perceiver, not a historian.)
But: how will he be able to tell us the swinging?
May he suffice with a …now! …now! …now!?
Is that what swinging is:
a procession of spoken 'now's?

In case a perceiver decides henceforth not to orient
himself on the 'now' of the swinging,
but rather on the track the pendulum leaves behind,
the question rises in which way the perceiver
can present us that track.
He undoubtedly can speak the track
and spend a lot of time on doing so
(the perceiver as reviewer)
but presenting the track!
And even then:
may we trust the perceiver on his word?

Let's assume that the perceiver in one way or the other
is indeed capable to speak the swinging-happening
(he has it stored for us somewhere in his thoughts)
then why is the actual pendulum still
swinging in the world so clearly?
What does it mean that the pendulum repeats
his motions all the time, and doesn't know when to stop?
For indeed the swinging in the world continues.

That's what we're seeing —
we won't let that be talked out of our heads!

The question remains whether the essence of the
swinging
— to which its continuation belongs to a large extent —
can be reported on.
(Perceiving indeed is no soothsaying!)

Isn't it unreasonable to leave
perception to perceivers
who cannot perceive
the continuous swinging?
(Shouldn't we perceive by ourselves?)

191

THE PERCEIVER TOUCHES

A perceiver desiring to perceive
a motion-happening for once not from a distance
but from up close,
needs physically to bridge
the little distance separating him from the happening.
He bridges the distance
by making an arm grow from his perceptive body
touching the happening.

The arm means to the perceiver a bridge
between him and the motion.
Along this bridge the motion sends the perceiver
a flow of impressions.

But that's not all:
the perceiver is physically moved along by the motion!

Being physically moved along —
that is sympathetic perception.

THE PERCEIVER FEELS

192

A perceiver touching a motion with his arm
desires to feel her movement.
He feels, by letting himself partly and on location
be moved along
by what moves.

Partly means:
not the whole perceiver
but only a certain sensitively feeling part
(the tip of his arm)
is moved along.
On location means:
on the location where he touches the motion
the perceiver becomes
one with what moves.

The target of the becoming-one is
that the perceiver is set
as faithful as possible
— therefore stiff and sound —
in co-motion by the motion.
(The arm, though sensitive, is stiff and sound.)

193 **THE PERCEIVER PARTAKES**

A perceiver feeling a motion
transfers the motion towards himself.
(What moves there, now also moves here.)
In this sense, the perceiver partakes in the movement.

Partaking of a motion means:
literally taking a part of that motion
to make that part one's own.
But in that case the perceiver doesn't take
an amount from the motion so big
that she would be hampered in her movement.
(Though not an amount so small
that the perceiver cannot follow the motion anymore
and has to pull out along the way.)

194 **THE PERCEIVER BECOMES FAMILIAR**

By touching a motion
the perceiver gets a part of the motion for himself.
He literally makes the motion his own.

'Own' implies that the perceiver physically experiences
the pure motion
He himself becomes nothing but motion.
(Even though 'perceiver'
— and as perceiver motionless —
he moves!)

Moving himself
he can report on it first hand.
First to himself —
then to the world.

To speak the movement
the perceiver doesn't need to imitate the movement,
but exclusively to do.
He doesn't need to show,
but exclusively to be.

That is the sense of sympathetic perception:
being nothing but motion.

THE PERCEIVER AS TARGET 195

A perceiver touching a motion with his arm
forms with it a constructive relation.
(He sticks his perception-construction on
the motion's motion-construction.)

Despite this constructive relation
the perceiver stands aside.
He stands aside of the plane the motion moves in.
For he needs to prevent himself
from becoming a certain target of the mover,
thus losing his position as perceiver.
(Facing the perceiver and directly on the frontline —
that he will have to prevent!)

It is something else when the perceiver intends
to be lastingly wrought by the mover.
('Be lastingly informed' the perceiver would
prefer to say in this case.)
But then he wouldn't be a 'perceiver' in the sense of
someone trying to form himself a view of a motion,
but rather a part of the motion-construction
coming into motion to
touch and change himself efficiently
— as if he were some sort of 'world'.
(Anyway, that is how this dissident perceiver comes
across to a second perceiver just coming up from aside
watching him in wonder.)

THIRD SITUATION

THE PERCEIVER HALTS

As long as a motion's movement takes,
the perceiver keeps some distance.
(The perceiver is motionless.)

In this position, he follows the motion
in her footsteps.
More precisely: he follows a motion-thing
within a motion-construction.

The perceiver follows
with his eye and arm.
(Eye and arm keep pace with the thing.)

Joined thus
(eye, arm, thing)
the perceiver and the motion tag along
until the motion-thing touches the world.
Then the motion halts.

The perceptive eye sees that halting
and halts too.
It doesn't move anymore —
but stares.

The perceptive arm feels that halting
and flinches.
(The arm, not the perceiver,
takes as it were a step back.)

When the motion halts
the mover achieves a result.
(The mover achieves the world
as the result of his motion.)

The perceiver sees this achievement
and stares at the result.
(The third situation is a fact.)

PRESENTING THE WORLD

When a mover achieves the world
he knows it.
The mover knows the changed world

in exchange for all of his movement.
(He invested his movement in the world
to change the world —
and to know that.)

What the mover knows of the world
he can show.
(He can raise the changed world
as proof of his knowledge.)

By knowing the changed world
the mover can — sooner or later — go on with it.
By showing it
(the mover raises the world)
the perceiver can go on.
The mover can go on
by changing the world again.
The perceiver can go on
by forming a view of this change.
(A view of a changing world.)

198

THE CHANGED WORLD-PART

As for the world:
she feels the mover's touch.
(She feels what the perceiver sees.)
She feels the mover has touched her there.
There she knows the result of his movement.

The world touched there,
has changed there.
'There' is a part of the world.
This part has changed.
But its environment
— the big world —
has not.

The big unchanging world keeps
the changed part.
She 'surrounds' it in her resting part —
timelessly and motionlessly,
(The part feels itself in that big firm world
safely 'at home'.)

199

Exactly because the world keeps the change
caused to her by the mover
(the world houses the change)
it makes sense that the mover repeat his touching,
thus going ahead with the change.

The mover repeating his movement
stacks change on change.
He deepens the world.
(This depth is the house of the changed world-part.)

If the world would forget the touching
(the big world recovers from it),

the mover might as well forget about his plans too!
Touching so as to change loses its sense.
(The touch seems like shot in the dark.)

200

THE SENSE OF RESTING

That the world keeps means
that the world-part rests.
(Within the big world
the changed part rests.)

But this rest is only apparent.
No matter how still and motionless,
the part is charged with a capacity
to come into motion when the time's there.

This capacity was once put in the part by the mover
when he touched the part and therefore
changed its place, shape and quality.
(No world-part is just resting — there in the world,
but has been in all cases moved there
by a certain mover.)

It is this slumbering capacity
that offers sense and direction
to the part with regard to the big world.

THE MOVER (ALSO) TOUCHES THE PERCEIVER

201

The rest of a world-part touched within the world
is in truth the rest of a speeding arrow.

The touched world-part fires the sign
'I have been touched and changed'
like an arrow at the perceiver.
(The touched world as archer!)

But isn't this arrow the same as the one with which
the mover touched the world?
And if so —
then why hasn't the mover immediately
— without the world-part as detour —
touched the perceiver with his arrow?

The answer is, that the mover needs the world
would he want to touch the perceiver effectively 'deep'
and exhaustively.
The mover uses the world to bundle
all his impressions.
He stacks up all his impressions in the world.
(The world keeps the impressions.)

Thus the mover collects — thanks to the world —
both impressions and time in favour of the perceiver.
The world is a necessary detour.
Such is the archer's answer.

But there is also the writer's answer!
To touch his reader deep
he collects his impressions on paper.
(He records his impressions.)
The paper keeps the fruit of all the time and effort
it has cost the writer to change
the world with his views.
(The record is a necessary detour.)

202

TOWARDS THE WORLD

To the perceiver the moment
the mover touches the world
and the movement halts,
means a signal to move himself — direction world.

If the perceiver would not start to move
he might as well forget about perceiving.
(For the world as 'big world' is in no case
ready for any approach of her own accord.)

Thus the perceiver ought to act.
He needs to leave his perceiver's position aside
and start to move himself in the direction
of the unfamiliar motionless world-part —
there in the world.

Now, the roles have reversed.
Not the perceiver rests and waits,
but the changed world rests and waits

Not the mover's motion moves,
but the perceiver moves.
Not the mover's plan prevails,
but the perceiver's plan prevails.

AROUND THE WORLD

203

The perceiver approaching the changed world-part
doesn't head for it directly,
but first encircles it 'safely' at some distance.
He doesn't only want to watch the part from aside,
but also from other directions.
He wants to go around the part
to be able to take all its sides into account.

He doesn't want a flow of impressions from
a single side,
but from many.
He doesn't want a single view,
but stacks of views.
He desires a summative view of the unfamiliar world-part.

A perceiver moving thus
turns around the world.
He turns in reality,
like movers in their thoughts.
(He does exactly
what movers dream of doing.)

THE SUMMATIVE VIEW

A perceiver turning around an unfamiliar world-part
records series of impressions.
Each impression is a possible impression
of one and the same target.

Each impression lends the perceiver another view.
Each view is a possible view
of one and the same target.

Recording impressions means:
summing up impressions.
By summing up impressions the perceiver obtains
series of views stacked next or on top of one another
(a sum of views)
the contents whereof slide by.

By comparing the different views' contents
the perceiver acquires two insights.
One insight concerns what all contents have in common.
The commonality concerns the intrinsic value
(name, title, status) of the part,
and not so much its outer appearance.

The other insight concerns what causes the contents
to differ:
how and to what extent the views
— view after view — change qua content,
how the changed content as it were proceeds

as a result of the constantly 'different' perception.
(This procession is what the views have to say
to the perceiver.)

TWO INSIGHTS

I walk around my house and look at it.
While looking, I obtain a series of views.
(I record the house.)

I pay a fixed rent for my house.
I can walk around my house as much as I want —
the rent won't change.
I can obtain as many views as I like —
the rent won't increase.
Apparently I pay for something
that all views have in common.
That something determines the value of the house.

I can move far away from my house
until it is nothing more than a dot.
Still I don't pay for that dot a rent proportionally lower
than the rent for the life-size house
that I will enter soon.
This constant rent represents
the non-changing feature of my house.
Which is: this house — my house.
(From whichever corner you look at my house
it is and remains my house.)
Still, I can make the view of the house pass by

until it is a dot.
That is the variable, passing feature
of the same house that's mine.
And that variable too concerns my house.

These two features are two insights.
Insights are nothing more than (thought) views.
Both features of my house are views,
but the house itself is not.

Both views are charged with content.
The combination in my head of the two contents
yields me an overview of the house
which — whenever it wants —
can slip away from my environment until it is a dot.
And that, without losing its status —
i.e. being a part of the world
anchored here and nowhere else.

Combining and comparing thus
I relate the value of my house
(its worth, name, function)
to its variables
(passing, changing, disappearing).

TURNING

By turning around a world-part
the perceiver sets the view on it in motion.
(The view moves in his thoughts.)

The perceiver conceives of a view.
He 'sees' how it turns in his thoughts.
(There, it turns around its axis
like the perceiver around the view.)

While the view is turning and rotating,
the part itself is sunk still and immobile
in the world.

But there's more.
By moving around the world-part thus,
the view not only rotates in the thoughts
but also in the eye of the perceiver!
(It is not the perceiver moving, it seems,
but the motionless part!)

Considered thus, the part moves, turns, rotates and
passes by
in a flow of motion and time —
which, by the way, is not sustained by the part
but rather by the perceiver.

The perceiver allows the part no rest.
He makes it dance in his eye.
(The perceiver as MC.)

DANCING

The operation undertaken by the perceiver
to eye a certain part of the world,

is led by a plan.
(The perceiver doesn't 'just' perceive.)
This plan resides in his head.
There it resides in the shape of a trace.

By keeping to this trail
the perceiver can approach the part
and turn around it.
This manoeuvre (this approaching and surrounding)
is a dance the choreography whereof rests
on the thoughts of the perceiver.
The choreography is the track in his head.
The perceiver dances to that track.

But the part dances that same dance too!
The part dances to the track in the eye of the perceiver.
(As if the time is turned back
and the roles have reversed.)

Would the perceiver conceal the part's dance in his eye
from us,
we wouldn't know about it either.
We only see the perceiver dance
and not the part.
(The part does what it does:
resting still and timelessly in the bosom of the world.)

THE OUTLINE 208

The unfamiliar changed world-part rests in the big world
where it was left by its mover.
There, in that place, it waits for its perceiver
to discover it.

The perceiver discovers the part
because it is 'different' from the surrounding world.
It is different in the sense of 'changed'.
(It is different, for it has been changed by its mover
in place, shape and appearance.)

Since the world surrounds (encloses) the part,
the border where the part passes over into the world
isn't stretched;
it's closed.
It is this border the perceiver
(who wants to know the part) has to follow.
By following the border
the perceiver gets to know the part's outline.
(The being-different becomes clear to the perceiver.)

TOUCHING 209

To follow the world-part and thus get to know it,
the perceiver needs to touch the part first.
Not with the eye,
but with the hand.

Not symbolically,
but physically.

At the moment the perceiver effectively touches the part
(he sticks out his hand)
the hand halts.
The hand halting
knocks on the door of the part's 'house'.
(The perceiver desires effectively to meet the part.)

The aim of the touching is:
to feel the part's outline with the hand,
to follow and map it.
(The hand feels ceaselessly.
The touching is minimal.)

A perceiver touching, knocking and feeling
gets to know the changed world
like a blind man his environment.
By feeling ceaselessly
the world 'speaks' what she has to tell about herself.
When the feeling halts,
the tale ends.

THE PERFECT TOUCH

The ideal perceiver makes his touching go unnoticed by the world.
After the perception the world shouldn't have changed more than before.

(Blind men leave no trace of their touching,
desecrators on the contrary, do.)

Perceiving without disturbing the world
that's:
reading without wiping the writing
or:
tracing without trampling the tracks.
Perfect perception is:
reading without leaving a trace.

THE CAREFUL TOUCH

A perceiver approaching an 'unfamiliar' part
knows that part is resting.
How would he otherwise dare to come as close
as he does!
For it is not for nothing
that he has lengthily turned around that part
before even daring to approach it!

Should the apparently resting part,
when the perceiver is going to touch it with his hand,
show any sign of life nonetheless
(what is not to be expected),
then the perceiver won't hesitate
to take a step back.
(He flinches.)
Immediately, it matters everything to him
to rapidly enlarge the distance between his hand

and the part
and call on the safe empty world in between.
(He will keep this safe distance
until the part has returned to rest.)

(Archeology, geology, laboratory work,
police investigation,
are all disciplines in which the careful approach
to unfamiliar worlds is customary.
There one knows how to first move around cases one
doesn't know well
before actually touching them —
let alone taking them firmly in hand.
Never the other way around,
for that would undoubtedly give accidents!
In those cases there's usually no time for a step back.)

212

PRESSING

A perceiver touching the world
exerts pressure on the outline of the part to be perceived.
The outline undergoes that pressure.
Yet the perceiver too!

The perceiver feels the outline.
He feels how the outline lightly pushes back
against his groping hand
and informs him about the presence of the part
the outline whereof forms both mantle and border.

The outline stimulates the perceiver's hand
with a pressure pressing into him.
Literally an im-pression.

This impression is the information the perceiver wrests
from the part with his light and persistent touching.
For; no impression without pressure!
The perceiver, the blind man, the tracker,
the lab assistant:
all of them need to invest the necessary pressure
to be able to receive an impression.
(The world just doesn't press
back by herself.)

KEEPING

213

By following the outline of a world-part
the perceiver collects rows of impressions.
He gleans those impressions
and stores them in his memory.
There, they form a track.
This track is the registration of the perception.

The perceiver keeps this track —
for later
(For when he wants to 'tell' us.)

214 THE HAND AS ‘HOUSE’

The perceiver touching an unfamiliar world-part
gets to know it.
But for knowing only touching is not enough.
The perceiver can take the world as example.

The world surrounds her part with her whole entirety.
The part experiences this whole entirety as a safe ‘house’.
This house is the counterform of the part.
The part closely fits into that house.
(The world ‘knows’ her part,
by being its enclosing counterform.)

The perceiver follows the example set by the world.
He ‘houses’ the part,
by carefully taking it in hand
and enclosing it there:
not firm but relaxed,
not stiff but sensitively.
(The perceiver shouldn’t want to possess the part,
but should only want to know it.)

215 THE HAND AS ‘SMALL WORLD’

The perceiver housing and encasing the part thus
gets to know the part by playing with it.
He plays
by turning it in his hand.

By turning it thus
the perceiver sees the part move.
(The part dances in his hand.)

The perceiver turns the part
without losing contact with it for an instance.
(The part may in no case dance away from his hand.)

The part experiences the perceiver’s playing and turning hand
as a ‘small world’.
There, it feels itself at home just as well
as in the big world.
(But, the big world doesn’t play —
she rests.)

UNWINDING 216

By turning the at first glance complicated
(for unfamiliar)
part in his hand
the perceiver in fact unwinds it.
He dismantles the part.

The part is at least less complicated
after the turning.
The part becomes transparent.
One can see through it.
The part’s ‘house’ stands open.
The perceiver may enter.

The perceiver turning the part around
unwinding its mantle
and entering it,
acquires series of views.

Doing thus, the perceiver unstirringly manages
the blueprint of the 'plan' of the mover
(he, who touched and changed the part)
in front of him.
The perceiver sees through the mover's motives.
(Of course not the movement itself —
just the motives.)

Playing and reconstructing, the perceiver
is not exclusively 'perceiver' but also 'mover'.
The actual mover would have wished to have been able
to play with the part in his head thus —
to have been able to unwind the part thus
into and out of his plans
as the perceiver is succeeding in now!
But:
the perceiver doesn't move the part to change it
but rather to know it.
(He remains a sideways observer
and not a frontal initiator.)

217

THE REPORT

Everything the perceiver
— playing and moving —

gets to know about this unfamiliar world-part
he can tell us.
(The perceiver tells us what he knows,
by turning towards us.)

What the perceiver knows and says
is his report.
(The report is a trail of impressions.)

Through the perceiver's report
we know the world —
and her parts.

VIII. REPORT

WE AND THE REPORT

WE

We — 'we who want to know the world' —
want to know her
as perceivers know her.

Perceivers know the world
for their hands and eyes have touched her.
(They have turned the world.)

Perceivers not only know the world,
but also her mover!
(They have followed his movement closely.)

We on the contrary, know neither the world
nor her mover.
We only know the perceivers.
(We need to believe their reports.)

219 THE REPORT IS A VIEW

The perceiver knowing the world
can report on her.
He reports on her by repeating her.
He repeats here the original world there.

The perceiver doesn't repeat the original world,
but what is repeatable thereof.
What is repeatable (feasible) is a view.
The view here represents the original world there.
The view is a second world
representing the original world.
The report is a view.

220 THE REPORT IS A MOVEMENT

The perceiver knowing the mover
can report on him.
He reports him by repeating his movement.
He repeats here the movement there.

The perceiver repeating a movement
executes a second movement.
The second movement represents here
the original movement there.
The report is a movement.

THE REPORTER INFORMS US 221

A perceiver reporting
reports to us.
He touches us with his report.

If the report concerns the world,
the perceiver touches us with views.
If the report concerns a movement,
he touches us with pressure.

If we are touched by views,
we retain thereof a print.
If we are touched by pressure,
we retain thereof an impression.

Prints and impressions are traces
the perceiver leaves in us.
We keep the perceiver's report
by keeping his traces.

THE REPORT ON THE MOVEMENT-SELF

THE PERCEIVER'S SIDES 222

A perceiver reporting on a movement
'performs' what he experiences from that movement.
He experiences with his inside
and performs with his outside.

The inside is sensitive —
the outside tough.

The perceiver experiences,
by letting himself be touched by what moves
— what is moving, the motion-thing —
on his sensitive side.
The inside is sensitive to the pressure of what is moving.
(Would his inside be tough,
the pressure would instantly rebound.)

The perceiver performs,
by touching us on our sensitive inside
with his firm information.
(The information is a series of impressions.)

The perceiver touches us
with his tough outside.
The outside needs to be tough —
for the information not to deform.
(The perceiver's report needs to come across to us
firm and clear —
if we want to retain good impressions from it.)

With his inside the perceiver is 'perceiver'
with his outside 'reporter'.
(As a 'reporter' the perceiver presents
his other face.)
We believe the perceiver,
but know the reporter.

As long as a perceiver observes a motion
we cannot know its movement.
Indeed:
If we look in the direction of the motion,
our eye is stopped by the tough backside of the
perceiver.
(And backsides don't care about us.)

If the perceiver turns around
to report to us on his perception,
he again blocks
— but now with his faceside —
our sight on what we want to know:
i.e. the original movement.
(The perceiver literally stands in our way —
first with his backside,
and subsequently with his faceside.)

That's why we say
that we have to believe
the first — the original — movement,
and have to trust
the second — the perceiver's — movement.
(We are dependent
exclusively on the perceiver's movement.)

THE PERFECT REPORT

We trust the second movement of the perceiver.
(We trust his moved report.)
Our trust is justified
when the outline of the report
conveys a non-deformed copy
of the outline of the original movement.
(When, in other words,
the perceiver's 'second movement'
conveys a truthful rendition
of the original 'first movement'.)

If the report is truthful in that sense,
we see through the perceiver.
We see the second movement coincide
entirely with the original movement.
(The perceiver's tough outside becomes
transparent.)
It is as if we look over his shoulders
gazing along in the same direction,
and therefore see the original movement appear before our eyes.
just as profiled
as before his.
The truthful report, in short,
is perfect.

Neither we vis-à-vis the reporter
and the mover behind him,

nor we ducked behind the perceiver,
but we beside it:
that's what the perfect arrangement is —
that's what the perfect report is!
(This report however isn't really realistic.)

'TURNING AROUND' TAKES TIME

The perfect report might be perfect,
but it isn't realistic.
Indeed:
with each report (the perfect one too)
time passes by —
however little the amount.

A perceiver vis-à-vis a motion
cannot immediately report us on it.
To do so, he needs to
turn around first —
sooner or later.
He literally has to turn his back on the motion
and look at us.
(He has to, would he want to exchange his function of perceiver
for the function of reporter.)

A perceiver changing his function
turns around his position.
Turning his position around takes time.
During that time the perceiver 'retains' the motion.

(This retention isn't perfect —
but it is meaningful.)

The realistic report arrives to us with a delay.
(Qua outline possibly truthful
qua time always delayed:
such is the realistic report.)

226 **THE PERCEIVER NEEDS TO BELIEVE HIS MEMORY**

The perceiver retains of a motion her movement.
He keeps the traces thereof.
He keeps the tracks so as to
— later on —
be able to remember the movement.

The perceiver remembers the movement
by leading his 'attention' along the tracks.
(The point of attention of his thoughts follows
the outline of the tracks.)

Depending on the direction in which,
and the pace with which
the perceiver moves his attention along the tracks
(steadily paced, faster, slower, reversed,
mirrored, fragmented or repeated),
the memory appears to him in just as many guises
to his mind.

The perceiver moving his attention 'thus'
plays the tracks within his interior.
(He plays with his attention along the tracks
of his memory.)

The more the outline of the playing-movement along the tracks
matches qua direction and qua pace the outline of the motion which 'engraved' tracks,
the more truthful the representation of the original motion-happening by the playing-happening.
If it is a full — perfect — match,
it seems as if it is not the perceiver moving
but rather the motion's mover!
The latter becomes — as it is called —
'alive again'.
(Again, for repeated, for some time after.)

PURE MOVEMENT 227

A perceiver reporting on a pure movement
(the pure movement of a motion)
repeats this movement.
The report is a second motion
following
the first — the original motion.
The perceiver performs the movement.
(He reports.)

The perceiver performing the movement
executes the movement.
Executing means,
that the perceiver literally extends his movement
into our direction:
we, who want to know the movement.
He extends his movement —
until he reaches us with it.

When the perceiver touches us with his movement
we don't feel the original, pure movement;
we feel what the perceiver feels of it.
And what he feels of it depends again on
how the original movement has touched him:
immediately; body-to-body,
or at some distance; vis-à-vis.

A perceiver touched by a movement
is never its target.
(The target of every movement is the world,
and not the perceiver.)
To perceive, the perceiver arranges himself
aside of the line mover-world.
(He stays out of range.)
In this position, aside,
the perceiver sticks with his perceptive body
— hence physically —
to what is moving.
(As 'perceiver' he sticks with his faceside

to the motion-thing,
and as 'reporter' with his backside.)

Like this — stuck and aside —
the perceiver lets himself be touched along.
That's what perceiving is:
letting oneself be touched along
without notably hampering the motion-happening.

THE FORCED REPORT

If a certain movement touches the perceiver physically
— hence immediately —
then the perceiver moves along with this movement.
He is incited by that movement
to move along.
By moving along with the movement
the perceiver performs the movement for us.

Moving along implies
that the perceiver lets himself, stiffly and passively,
be driven and spurred by the original movement,
into our direction.

Doing thus, the perceiver extends the 'first movement'
in the guise of a 'second movement'
into our direction.
He delivers us a forced — for sympathetic —
version of the first original movement.

229 **THE ENACTED REPORT**

If an original movement touches a perceiver,
for a change not physically,
but across some distance,
the perceiver is incited by that movement
but not actually moved along.
He is incited to re-enact the movement!

The perceiver re-enacting the movement
makes us feel the original movement
He makes us feel it,
by doing the movement again for us.
Again —
therefore literally thereafter.
(After the original movement.)

A perceiver re-doing an original movement
offers us a theatrical version of that movement.

230 **THE FORCED REPORT IS MORE TRUTHFUL THAN THE ENACTED REPORT**

A perceiver letting himself be forcibly driven
by a movement
participates better in what is moving
than when he imitates the movement
and represents it 'by himself'.

In the first case the relation between what is moving
and the perceiver is immediate and stiff.
The perceiver is — though aside — immediately
stuck on what is moving.
The movement is as it were forced onto the perceiver.
The report he is giving us about it
is 'truthful' accordingly.

In the other case the relation between what is moving
and the perceiver is 'relaxed' — for over 'some distance'.
The motion-transfer is enacted.
The outline of the perceiver's movement is an
artificial interpretation of the outline of what is moving.
We have to believe the enacted report.

(Parenthetically:
a perceiver reporting to us on a movement
by enacting it,
blocks with his game the access to that movement
not only for our eye but also for our thinking.
But isn't exactly that what 'theatre' is:
blocking the sight on and insight in reality
in exchange for a handful of enacted illusions?)

THE ENACTED REPORT TAKES TIME 231

A perceiver enacting a certain movement
first has to 'turn around' to report.
Only afterwards
— however shortly afterwards that may be —

he is able to let us know
this movement in the shape of a second movement.
Well: the time it takes to the turn around
turns the second movement into an effectively enacted movement!
(For what would a enacted movement mean,
when it would be 'brought'
literally in the same time
at which the first original movement occurs?
We wouldn't be able to distinguish the play from the original!)

232

THE MESSENGER

On the stage of a theatre a messenger appears.
Out of breath he reports to us, who are watching,
a fierce battle.
Judging his messy clothing, he was actually
involved in the battle himself;
no doubt about that.
As it looks, he mustn't have left the scene of battle
(the scene of battle!) very long ago
to inform us with the necessary details about it.

Judging his elaborate story
the messenger has done everything
to 'keep' the whole happening of the battle
undamaged in his memory
during the long journey towards the theatre.

(This messenger insists on giving us
a report on that battle as truthful as possible.)

To manage the impossible superposition of taking part in the battle
and reporting in our theatre hall,
the messenger imitates — while he is telling his tale —
the fighting with wild gestures
(that's his way of reporting).
(He as it were dutifully continues the battle
uninterruptedly — but now on the stage!)
Just think about the possibility that the battle
— the actual original battle —
might have already been fought and decided!

By the way:
If we would stick our nose outside the theatre building
it is quite thinkable
that we wouldn't notice anything of a battle.
Perhaps the reporter has kept the battle for us
too long.
(And we're not even talking about any deceit or fabrications from his side!)

Moreover, the theatre director makes it
impossible for us 'just to have a look'
by placing between us-here and the battle-there
several pieces of scenery.
Thus he effectively and adequately
increases the distance between us and the battle.

We have to rely exclusively on the messenger and his word.
(Well, with the exception of a single 'leak':
a window, placed within the decor in such a way
that, when viewed from the hall, some faint firelight
can be discerned;
a shining just red enough to make us take the messenger
more seriously than we initially thought necessary.)

THE REPORT ON THE ESTABLISHED MOTION-RESULT

233

SPEAKING AND PRESENTING THE WORLD-PART

A perceiver who for once doesn't want to
report a motion's pure movement but rather the result,
needs literally to represent that result.
He represents it by repeating it.

He repeats the original result
by speaking the result again,
and presenting us with a copy.
(He speaks and presents it to us.)

If a motion-action results in a world-part
definitely changed,
the perceiver can only speak and present us that part
after he has seen and touched it himself.
(The perceiver has to make himself 'familiar' with the part.)

The perceiver first stands face to face with the
world-part,

then turns around towards us
and only then speaks and presents us that part.

Owing to this seeing, touching, speaking and presenting
flows of pressures and impressions flow to and fro
between the part, the perceiver and us.
Through all these interactions the part 'lives'.
The part knows the perceiver
(it feels his hand)
and through the perceiver it believes us.
(The part believes us,
as we believe both him —
and his perceiver.)

TWO TYPES OF CHANGE

234

A perceiver who wants to report on
a changed world-part,
is confronted with two distinguishable objectives
of the mover to change the world:
to inform her and to form her.

In the first case the mover's changing-performance
concerns a horizontal line across the world
(track, print);
in the second case a vertical depth into the world
(gorge, mountain).
The change in the depth stands perpendicular to
the change on the surface.

The superficial change reminds us of the way
the mover went for the first time,
and the deep change — however shallow sometimes —
reminds us of the number of times he passed over the
way again
after that first time.

The deep change includes the flat one —
not the other way around.
(Because of the repeated movement
the world changes only in one direction:
exclusively in depth,
and no more on the surface.)

It is the case, that the formative (the deep) feature
of the informative (the superficial) change
is completely at the service of the distribution of
information:
as the groove is at the service of an LP,
and the conductor's movement is at the service of a
sounding symphony.

(No matter how deep the commandments are
carved in stone:
saying more than they have to say
they cannot.)

A perceiver who wants to report
on an informatively changed world-part,
has to deal
exclusively with the change on the surface.
He follows the track left by the mover
as a single impression in the world
and presents or speaks it to us.

He presents it to us,
by showing us a print of the impression.
He doesn't present us the impression itself,
but a negative — a negative copy — thereof.
(The track as script-view)

He speaks it to us,
by translating the track into a flow of symbols.
(He transforms the track into a line of sentences
and words.)
He extends the symbols into our direction
and touches us with them.
(He touches us on our ear.)

By means of the print in the first case
and in the second case the flow of symbols
we form a view of the track in the world.
We 'understand' its information —
and with that the mover's message.

TURNING THE FORMATIVE PART

A perceiver who wants to report
on a formatively changed world-part,
has to deal both with the superficial and the deep
change.
The change on the surface is stretched out
(that is, viewed form the perceiver's position)
like a skyline left till right.
Contrarily, the change in depth rushes
as it were away from the perceiver —
into the world.
The perceiver can't follow the end of that change.
The end seems to be a point.
(A 'low point'.)

A perceiver who wants to follow the world-part's depths,
turns the part.
If he gives it a half turn,
the depths come closer
and what is nigh disappears in the depths.
(Over the shoulder of the part turned thus
the perceiver gazes into the direction
the mover occupied when he was deepening the part.)

If the perceiver doesn't give the part a half turn
but rather a quarter turn,
what is initially deep and nigh
form the balanced ends of the skyline
stretching from left till right.

(The perceiver calls this his favourite arrangement.)
He sees what is nigh and what is deep
— both equally deep —
move along before his eye like a procession:
as if the part possesses no depth
but exclusively surface.

DISASSEMBLING THE FORMATIVE PART

The perceiver
turning the formative part thus,
disassembles what is superficial and deep about it.
He takes the two dimensions of the part
'a-part' into components
in order to orderly store them in his memory.

At the moment the perceiver wants to report us
on the part,
he may choose from two options:
either he hands us the part as a whole
from his memory,
or component-after-component.
(Dimension-after-dimension.)

If the perceiver does the latter,
we need to reconstruct
from the components the whole part.
(We shouldn't be mistaken —
by swapping components!)

If the perceiver does the former,
he needs to imitate the whole part
by assembling a copy, replica or imitation thereof
and raising
that (and not the original!)
(For he indeed cannot show us the part itself:
that wouldn't mean report,
but theft!)

We for our part are allowed
to literally press what is raised against us.
(We foster a view.)

IX. VIEW

WORLD-VIEW

THE REPORT ON THE WORLD 238

The report on the world,
repeats the world.
It repeats here the original world there.
It fetches the world
here.

The report repeats and fetches from the world
what is repeatable.
What is repeatable of the world is her view.
The report is a view.

THE VIEW ON THE WORLD 239

A view on its own is not the world,
yet surely a world.
It is a 'second world'.

The view 'the second world' shows
the first original world.

It represents here the first world
which is there.

240 **THE WORLD TOO IS A VIEW**

The world is a view too.
Outwards the world appears as the view
of a plan turned inwards.
(According to this plan the world was once formed.)
The view of this plan —
that's what the world is.

In this sense, the outline of the world forms
a view of a 'view'.
(A view of a view of a plan
of the mover of the world.)

241 **A VIEW IS A CONSTRUCTION**

A view is just like the world,
a 'world' of parts.
The parts form rapports.
The rapports are connections that keep the view
together.
(Without connections the view-parts fall apart.)

The compilation of connections determines the view.
The view shows the compilation visibly and tangibly.
Visibly and tangibly, the view is
a construction.

A VIEW IS OUR CONSTRUCTION 242

We make use of views.
We take them in hand, in thought
or in the eye.
We accept and use them as
reports on worlds.

The view is a visible and tangible construction
for knowing the world.
We have wanted and intended the view.
We are constructors of the view
of the world.

INVIEW 243

The world leaves traces in the thoughts
of the perceiver.
Through these traces the world shapes herself
inside those thoughts.
The world shapes herself in those thoughts as a view:
a mental inview.

The perceiver keeps the inview of the world
in his thoughts.
He carries the world
in the guise of that inview
with him in thought.

244 **OUTVIEW**

The perceiver reporting on the world
turns around,
to present us his inview.
However:
the inview itself cannot be presented.

The perceiver presents his inview
by depicting it for us.
(He reviews the inview.)
He literally represents the inview out of himself
into our direction.

The form in which the perceiver depicts
is again a view:
an outview.
The perceiver constructs the outview
and hands it to us.
(The firm outview goes from hand to hand.)

245 **THE INVIEW EXCHANGES THE WORLD**

The firm outview repeats the mental inview.
In the sense that the mental inview
repeats the firm world in the head of the perceiver,
as the firm outview repeats the firm world in us.

The inview functions as verification-station.
(The arrangement of the inview is like

a lens between the world and the outview.)
The inview exchanges the world for the outview.
The inview compares the outview to the world
and sees to a faithful exchange.
(The inview functions like an = sign
between the world and us.)

THE OUTVIEW AS FACT AND CONCEPT 246

The perceiver encapsulates the perceived world in the outview,
turns around
and hands it to us.
(What is handed to us is not the world itself,
but its repetition.)
The outview transports the view of the world
in our direction.

If the world is transported spatially,
the outview is factual and concrete.
If the world is transported symbolically,
the outview is conceptual and formal.

THE SPATIAL VIEW 247

The factual outview presents the factual world
not as fact, but as projection.
The world repeats herself on the screen of the outview.
(Like a 'lens', the inview throws the world-view
on that screen.)

The outview enwraps the world-view.
It enwraps as ‘second world’ the view of the
original ‘first world’.

The manifestation of the outview as second world
is spatial.
(The outview is a spatial projection,
copy, replica or reproduction of the world.)

In whichever form:
each time the second world appears as a
‘small world’ in the outview.
(The world shrinks during the transport.)
The outview presents ‘small worlds’
we can take, feel and see.
(For to that end we construct views.)

(Parenthetically:
‘small worlds’ can be felt and seen,
but not be spoken.)

THE SPATIAL VIEW IS EITHER TRUE OR FALSE

A view
— outview or inview —
is either true or false.

A spatial view is true
as the configuration of its parts corresponds
to the configuration of the parts of the world

it represents.
If both configurations correspond,
the second world (of the outview) covers
the first world (of the original)
in a spatially projective sense.

The second world covers the first world
in case the second world contains no parts
that are not ‘at home’.
(Parts that don’t belong in the ‘home’ of the second world
are false.
They distort the view
and make it needlessly complex.)

THE SYMBOLIC VIEW

The world appearing in the shape of symbolic outview
is different.
She doesn’t appear as ‘small world’,
but as proposition.
The symbolic outview enwraps a formal proposition
about the world.

The inview translates the construction of the world
to a construction of symbols.
It functions as a transformation-station.
Not as ‘lens’.
(The inview is an ≈ sign.)

The proposed symbolic world is offered to us
in the shape of flat non-spatial schemata,
systems, constellations, plans or matrices:
constructions the connections whereof don't join
spatial parts;
they join formal values.

(Parenthetically:
all these appearances can be seen and spoken,
but not be felt.)

250 **THE SYMBOLIC VIEW TRANSLATES THE WORLD**

The symbolic outview is a formal translation
of the world.
A formal translation rests on deliberately
constructed schemata
by means of which we can recompose
the world.

The whole of translation rules, verification systems,
text templates and passwords
forms a 'world' on its own.
(An operative transformation-world.)
The elements of these schemata —
(the parts of the transformation-world)
are in the first instance deduced from
real parts of the world,
but they have become generalized into values.

The totality of the formal transformation-world
and her parts
is a conceptual apparatus (a concept-construction)
to classify the world into logical systems.
We have intended this framework thus
and have constructed it deliberately.
(Not in as much to repeat the world with it,
but to be ahead of her.)

We want to know the plan of the world —
and for once not her effect (the result).
We want to make the world's internal connections
visible —
and for once not her external appearance.
We desire insight into the world —
and for once not an outlook on her appearance.
All this want and desire is better fulfilled
through symbolic perception than through
spatial perception.
(The symbolic view possesses in this regard
a surplus value over the spatial view.)

THE SOUND VIEW 251

In case we translate the world formally,
the symbolic views need to
represent her faithfully.
Indeed, therefor they have been constructed by us
'like that'
and not 'like this'.

If the symbolic views don't represent the world faithfully,
they are on and in themselves unsound,
for they point to nothing else
than themselves.
They distort the view of the world's working.
They cannot make the world true.

True views are operable and mountable.
They are accessible 'houses'.
Their codes present a mutual coherence.
Their schemata can be opened qua system
with one and the same key.
True views are 'logical'.

252

THE TRUE TRANSLATION

There are not only sound and unsound views,
but also true and untrue translations.

The reporter reporting the world in formal views
can offer us different translations
of one and the same inview (his inview).
Of all possible translations, that translation is true,
of which all the informative content of the inview
— after its translation (transformation) —
has been kept best.

Not the measure of correspondence between according
parts of the translation and the original world determines
the being-true of the translation,

but the measure of retention of the informative content
of both worlds.

Each time, that translation (that outview) is chosen,
which is the simplest — the least complex —
and possesses the least amount of redundant — 'false' —
relations.
When used, such a simple translation neither distracts,
nor distorts,
but is operable as outcome.

THE TRANSPORT OF VIEWS

TWO CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS

253

The reporter on the world hands in a report.
He hands it to us.
He transports the report in our direction
until he touches us with it.

A reporter alone
means nothing.
('Alone' he cannot deliver his report.)
His function only acquires meaning
through a connection with us.
(We, who want to know the report.)

The visible and tangible connection with us
is an informative construction.
This construction lengthens the messenger's existence

into our direction.
Thanks to the constructive relation the perceiver can extend his outview visibly and tangibly into our direction.
Here, at the outside
— our side of the relation —
the outview appears.

Literally on the other side, a second constructive relation lengthens the existence of the reporter in the direction of the world.
The world touches the reporter through the outside of that construction.
This touching leaves traces in the reporter's memory.
These traces form the inview of the world.
The reporter keeps the inview.

Such is the state of affairs when we want to know the world in line with the reporter-perceiver and both constructive relations.

THE BRIDGE

The world reporter transports the world-view.
This view is his product.
He has constructed it to report with it to us.

To be able to transport the world-view, the perceiver forges both his constructive existences (the perceiving and the informing one) together into a bridge.
The bridge connects us to the world.

In the middle of the bridge:
the reporter as bridgeman!
He regulates the traffic of views
(Not the traffic of world-parts, but of world-views.)

The world stays where she is:
on yonder side of the bridge.
There, on her side of the bridge — the inside —
her status is the status of 'first world'.

On our side of the bridge — the outside —
the view of a world appears as 'second world'.
(The view here repeats the original 'first world' there.)

THE OUTSIDE

The outside of the bridge surrounds and frames the world-view.
(We stand vis-à-vis in front of the view.)

The bridgeman imports the world-view through the outside
— as if a port —

into our world.
(We can touch the view and take it in hand.)

We want to know the world,
but we have to make do with the view
the bridgeman hands to us.
We will have to believe
his stories about the world far away
— on yonder side of bridge.

The world —
that one we can forget about.

256

THE BRIDGEMAN

The bridgeman rarely 'just' transports views.
Each view-transport requires its own approach.
(It depends on what we intend to do with it.)

There are spatial views and symbolic ones,
views for our eye and views for our ear,
views to taste and touch
and views to understand,
views as firm result
and views as going motion.
Also:
views moving once
and views repeating their motion,
views writing
and views 'working',

views forcing
and views 'enacting',
views slowing down the world
and views speeding her up,
views analysing the world
and views synthesising her.

The bridgeman has to work
with all these sorts of views.
He arranges the transports
and distributes the cargo.
Where necessary, he disassembles the views into view-parts.
He leads the parts in all thinkable configurations along the bridge.
(In lines, groups, stacks, swarms, one-after-another, etcetera.)
He sorts and classifies them according to shape, size, length, complexity, substance, quality, etcetera.
And always he adds assembly instructions to the transport.
(Verification systems, deciphering keys, coding and decoding lists, manuals, etcetera.)

In each case, the bridgeman strives for an efficient transportation.
He seeks an information-transfer as economically as possible.
He desires to represent complex cases simply.

As far as he's concerned, the complicated world won't become even more complicated.

A bridgeman representing the world more complicated than she is,
adds parts to the view-transport
that don't 'belong' there.
When this bridgeman gets mixed up about his story
(he contradicts himself!)
he makes it hard for us to believe his stories any longer.

257

THREE TYPES OF REPORT

A reporter can deliver his report in three ways:
he can speak it, write it or present it.

In case the reporter speaks his report
he produces a flow of 'words'.
With these words he tells the world.
(He constructs a 'second world'.)
This speaking takes time.
(The report unfurls in our minds.)
The oral report is formal.
Its view is abstract.

In case the reporter writes his report
he produces a flow of motions.
With these motions he can either write the world down
or describe it.
The result of writing down is 'script' —

the result of describing 'theatre'.
Writing takes time.
Contrarily, script is timeless
and rests.

In the third case —
when the reporter presents the report,
one doesn't speak of production,
but rather of presentation or exhibition.
What is presented is real or conceptual —
yet still in both cases a view.

The real view is spatial
and concerns an object (fact).
The conceptual view is flat
and concerns a drawing (plan).
In both cases what is presented appears
with a leap.
(The view springs to the eye.)
What is presented doesn't move.
(What is moving are our eyes, hands and thoughts
turning and twisting what is presented.)

THE SPOKEN REPORT

THE SENTENCE

258

In case a perceiver tells (us) his perception,
a flow of 'words' appears at his outside.

The flow of words is a spoken sentence.
The spoken sentence is the outview of the report.

A sentence is a construction of words.
The spoken sentence is a construction moving.
The spoken word is a construction-part
inside the moving sentence-construction.

259

THE WORD

So many words, so many motions.
Speaking a word is moving a word.
Moving a word is the execution of a
word-plan.

The word-plan determines the content of the word —
the execution of the plan the motion of that word.
In the completion of the motion-operation 'word'
(the speech-act)
the plan manifests itself.
The plan lends the word meaning and direction
and determines its place within the
sentence-construction.

So many constructions, so many outlines —
so many outlines, so many meanings.
Words are understood,
by translating their outlines into meanings
with the help of word-templates.
(The whole arsenal of templates is the counterform

of all speakable words.)
The system of translations (the templates) belongs to
the spoken report.
Without this verification key the words don't
yield their meaning.

THE LANGUAGE

260

The words of the spoken report
flow through the channel of an abstract language.
Grammatical rules regulate the traffic of the words
inside the channel.
Semantic keys (the templates) say
to which facts or values the words are pointing.
(What they're meaning.)
It is not just a 'procession' of words
flowing towards us through the channel,
rather an intentionally meaningful configuration of
meanings.

Words and sentences are language-parts within an
abstract language.
The language is a 'world'.
This world houses the totality of all possible
configurations of all words and sentences.
(The 'house' is a metaconstruction.)

Every possible configuration is a construction:
a subconstruction.
Every possible subconstruction corresponds to

a metaconstruction that is the 'world' of the language.
The totality of all possible correspondences is
the 'plan' founding the world of language.
(A metaplan.)

The language-parts are values — no objective facts.
The parts are constructively related.
The relations are connections —
the connections are channels.
(Through the channels the parts touch one another.)

As to one another, the connections provide
the language-parts with direction and sense.
(The sentence makes 'sense' —
and can mean something.)
The whole of connections
keeps the language-parts together.

The speakable whole is the metaconstruction of
the world of language.

261

THE SPOKEN REPORT MAKES AN IMPRESSION

The spoken report touches us.
The flow of spoken words makes an impression.
The reporter stresses his words.
(He means effectively to strike us with his report.)

The statement literally presses the report's view
in us.

This view is the mental inview of the report.
The inview is the lasting projection of the statement
on the screen of our memory.
It remains there, after the tale,
left as impression.
(We can't lose the imprinted view —
otherwise the tale would lose its sense.)

WE UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN REPORT

262

The mental inview of the spoken report
is not just a single view,
rather a line of views (subviews).
The views represent words —
the line represent a sentence.

The successive input of the views into our memory
determines the line.
The configuration of the views-in-line corresponds
to the configuration of the words inside the sentence-construction,
such as the reporter has spoken.

To understand the words and know their meanings
we open the views with our templates.
We release their meanings.

To understand the sentence and see through its working,
we decipher the sentence-construction by means of
a language-plan included with the report.

(According to this plan
— a metaplan of a metalanguage —
the reporter assembled his sentence.)

THE WRITTEN REPORT

263

THE SCRIPT

A reporter who wants to write us a report,
moves.
While moving he extends his report in our direction.
On his outside a flow of motions appears
This flow is the outview of the report.

Wreathed by the outside's frame
the flow departs from the reporter, and leaves
— moving incessantly —
a track in our memory.

The track remains in us as script.
The script is our inview of the report.
(The inview is established —
and doesn't move.)

264

READING THE SCRIPT

The written script rests in us
until we decide to read it.
We read what is written
by coming closer,

touching it,
and taking it in hand.

We turn the script with our eyes and hands.
We turn the words round and round,
until we understand the 'sense' of the report.

When we read the script
it is as if the reporter moves,
and not we who are reading!
(Yet the reporter is resting —
and we are moving.)

DESCRIBING THE WORLD

265

A reporter for once not writing the world
but describing her,
demonstrates us his writing motions.
He describes the world to us
by imitating her.
He imitates her
by repeating her.
(By moving the 'arms' of the constructive relation
the reporter repeats the firm outline of the world
before our eyes.)

The reporter repeats the world
so that we repeat him.
He forcibly prescribes us his script.
(He makes us feel his writing motions well.)

He desires that we — through him —
feel along with the world.

But why doesn't the reporter tell us his report?
Why does he force us to move along with him?
Why does he pull our sleeves?
Why this 'theatre'?

The answer is, that the reporter —
to be able to report to us truthfully
on the actual world —
prefers drawings (depictions) to words.
Drawings are projections of the firm shape
of the world.
One doesn't speak them: one performs them.

The writing motions of the describing reporter
are stimuli — not symbols.
The descriptive report is realistic.
The reporter describing effectively reports.
(It even seems as if the world herself is reporting,
and not the reporter!)
Therefore the reporter forces us —
therefore he pulls our sleeves —
therefore that 'theatre'.

THE PRESENTED REPORT

THE PRESENTED REPORT IS A VIEW 266

A reporter presenting us his report
shows what is presentable thereof.
The presentable is by definition a view.
(The view is an outview.)

We, who want to know the report,
stand vis-à-vis the reporter.
(Not with the full reporter,
but with his outside.)

The view presented doesn't appear step-by-step
but with a leap.
(The view springs in our eyes.)
It springs into the outside.
There it rests —
wreathed by the outside's frame,
and looks at us.

The presented view is finished.
It appears as a ready-made construction.
(The view-parts are fully assembled.)
The view isn't unfurled
— like the spoken or written report —
during the presentation,
but appears complete.

(No operation is presented,
rather its established result.)

The presented view is complete.

267

TWO TYPES OF PRESENTED REPORT

What is presentable of a report is a fact,
or a plan.
If it is a fact —
the view is actual and spatial.
(Object, case, thing.)
If it is a plan —
the view is conceptual and 'flat'.
(Drawing, figure, scheme, chart, table.)

The conceptual view — being flat —
is carried by a plane.
Contrarily, the actual view
carries itself, one could say.

The actual view has many sides:
front, back, up, down.
(On can turn the actual view.)
The conceptual view
— flat as it is —
only has a single side.
It only shows a single aspect.
(One has to be stuck above it.)

Only in their use
the difference between actual and
conceptual view comes to light.
(In presenting it the type of view is announced.)

268

THE ACTUAL VIEW PRESENTED APPEARS 'VERTICALLY'

The reporters presents the actual view
by raising it.
The view appears vertically and upright
in the opening of the outside of the reporter.
It appears there with a leap.
(The presentation takes no time.)

The frame of the outside encloses the view.
Behind the view:
no trace of the world.
The view — though actual —
is an appearance.

(The view is nothing but light
and sometimes nothing but colour.
Sometimes it is a lamp —
sometimes a mirror.)

The actual view
— facing us —
is both close by and far off.
It is spatial (that's for sure),
yet still presents surface.

Our eye collides with the flat faceside
of the spatial view.

269 **WE ACQUIRE THE ACTUAL VIEW**

The reporter intends the collision.
Thence he verticalised the world.
Thence he tilted the world.
Thence he raises her like this.
He wants us to touch the view of the world
(her image)
well.

We, who want to know the world,
approach her view and image.
Whereas the actual world is stretching herself
unhamperedly
being essentially horizontal —
hence not approachable,
we take her artificial version —
the verticalised flat substitute —
in hand.
We acquire the verticalised view of the world.
(The view goes from hand to hand.)

270 **THE ACTUAL VIEW ACQUIRED IS 'HORIZONTAL'**

Once in our hand, the view is actually spatial,
and flat no more.
The acquired view is a 'second world'.

(The second world is a spatial copy
of the first — the original.)

We turn the view in our hand.
(Our hand as 'small world' surrounds the world.)
We de-verticalise the world.

As 'second world' the acquired view expands
across the plane of the world on which we stand.
It lays itself on top of our world —
and fuses with it.
(We look across it.)

The acquired view horizontalises.
It possesses its own horizon.
The horizon fuses with the skyline of our world.
Both worlds offer similar skylines.
(We foster our illusion.)

THE CONCEPTUAL VIEW PRESENTED IS 'FLAT' 271

The conceptual view
(different from the actual view)
is flat.
When it is presented to us —
not emphatically raised,
but rather inconspicuously laid down.
It rests on the ground of the outside
of the reporter.

Facing its flankside,
the view doesn't catch our eye.
The side aspect of a concept's carrier
is even less than a line.
(From aside the conceptual view doesn't
care about us.)

The reporter who wants to present us the conceptual view
brings it to our eyes.
He brings it,
by sliding the carrier of the view (itself a plane)
across the plane of our world
towards us.

Once underneath our eyes we observe the view
as we tend to observe our world as 'concept'.
Namely:
by being stuck above it.
(Viewed from above, our world presents her plan —
from aside she present her layered terrain.)
Viewing thus belongs to the conceptual view.
There's no other way of watching.

272 THE CONCEPTUAL VIEW IS A CONSTRUCTION

The presented conceptual view is a construction
that's flat.
(It is a 'pencil-and-paper-construction'.)
His parts represent values — no facts.

Neither the view itself, nor its parts,
moves.
The presented conceptual view is a
completed construction resting.

We, who are stuck above it,
see how the view has been conceived:
a network of values —
mutually connected by channels.
(The conceptual view competes with the view
of our world.)

The channels are connections made visible
between the values.
The ones visible are lines.
The lines represent relations between the values.

Because of the over- and undervaluation of values
flows flow through the channels.
The flows settle the values.
But: nothing in the view actually flows!
(The presented conceptual view is established,
and doesn't move.)
Only by touching the values with our hand
and following the lines
we imitate a certain flow.
(We follow the conceptual report
with the tip of our hand,
in its footsteps.)

273 **THE FLAT CONCEPT IS 'SPACIOUS'**

We, who follow the conceptual report,
move ourselves across its viewing surface.
(The view doesn't move;
our thoughts and hands do.)
We exercise the view and touch its content.

We execute true motion-operations.
We follow connections,
calculate values
and analyse relations.
We turn through the content of the view.

By turning through the view's content
we enlarge the view.
What is conceptual comes to life
and the content becomes transparent.

Qua concept the view comes close to the firm world
(the world represented by the view.)
The flatness of the concept appears to offer room
to our plans, ideas and expectations.

274 **THE ACQUIRED CONCEPT IS 'VERTICAL'**

If we want to know the conceptual view,
we touch it.
(We touch it with the farthest tip
of our hand and our thoughts.)

If we want to possess what is conceptual,
we raise it up.
We verticalise the horizontal concept —
and hang it.
(We take a step back.)

275 **AN APPARENT CONTRADICTION**

Strange:
the reporter presents us the actual view straight up,
yet the conceptual view lying down.
But we — once possessing them —
reverse things and horizontalise the actual,
and verticalise the conceptual!
The actual view we lay over our world,
or put it on top of her,
and the conceptual view we hang on our walls
or work it into the panels, boards and frames of
our technical constructions.

Still, this 'reversal of values and worlds'
neither is strange —
nor do we act strange!
Indeed, it's not we turning around,
but the reporter!
The reporter acknowledges the difference between
presenting and possessing —
between report and actuality,
and acts accordingly.

In case the reporter hands us his report on the world
as actual thing or conceptual plan
he knows how to convey this handing in such a way,
that we confuse looking at our future possession
with possessing such possession.
(Like a smart businessman the reporter runs
ahead of things.)

He confuses us,
by on the one hand holding up before our eyes
the actual thing as a 'concept'
(some sort of certificate, diploma, distinction,
that would label us the thing's rightful owner),
and on the other hand shoving under our eyes
an actually conceptual plan
(mostly nothing more than a piece of paper)
we need to stick above like above a real world.

As a reporter, he has to.
He could hardly throw the real before our feet
and raise up the conceptual!
He would then confuse report and actuality.
(We wouldn't believe our eyes.)

The reporter expects us to be good listeners.
He leaves it to us to reverse the things.
(That's business!)

MOSES

Moses as the reporter of the law.
He presents the people with a concept, that's for sure.
Still, he raises up stone tables!

He means Law,
but presents View.
He verticalises the Law (Thought)
for the sake of his people's religion,
and petrifies her.
(A mise-en-scène gone wrong.)

Too late, Moses attempts to break through the dilemma
arisen
by violently separating Thought from View.
He smashes the tables
and spreads the debris before his people's feet.
(He forcibly horizontalises the petrified view.)

Too late:
especially when Moses, on the mountain
— hanging above the world —
becomes aware of how his heathen believers
turn
around another view —
an idol.
This image is no concept; on the contrary:
a substantial, firm, for golden substitute.
(No trace of any Thought.)

It would have been better when Moses hadn't
presented the Law to his people raised up,
but instead spread over the face of the earth:
only visible when stuck above it —
only believable by leafing through its content.

277

THE GRAVESTONE

On each grave the same message:
'R.I.P…'

How is this message conveyed best:
straight up or lying down?
It depends on what the 'conveyor' has in mind:
what is actual or what is conceptual about the one
resting.

If it is the former,
the message works best in a vertical state.
An enamel portrait against a vertical stone is enough.
The 'sign' is clear.
The one resting stands.
He is actually present.
No trace of death.
The verticality of the message accentuates
the substantiality of the one resting —
and that substantiality is his body.

If it is the conceptual of the one resting (his soul)
the conveyor needs to horizontalise the message —

for example by applying a poem, a quote or a proverb
on the flat cover stone.
Only thus the grave presents what it is:
a resting place that it is not,
just an illusion.

If this code is neglected
— the portrait on the horizontal slope
the words on the vertical stone —
then the grave suggests to be something it is not:
namely a temporary resting place
from which the one who rests will momentarily
stand up refreshed.

Sometimes, these things are purposefully reversed
(or overstrained, if one prefers)
and we see a truthful copy of the deceased
— a marble statue —
on top of the grave, staging
what the resting original is doing inside, namely:
resting eternally.
Proverbs frame the view.
We cannot believe our eyes.
(But that's the whole purpose of this staging.)

THE SHOP WINDOW

278

We, who say we go shopping,
are looking for purchases
not for messages.

The shopkeeper understands his position
and delivers us those messages.
(He harasses us with purchases!)

Purchases are items —
items cost money.
The exchange of one against the other
(of things against ideas)
belongs to the profession of the shopkeeper.
This exchange —
that's what the shop-window is for.

A shop-window is a 'world'.
Everything on that world stands upright.
The exposition of items in the shop window
is verticalised by definition.
(All items are raised up
by invisible and subservient arms.)
The message of the vertical exposition is clear:
the items presented aren't just ordinary
consumer items;
they're obtainable trophies.
(The advertisement texts on the items are now
certificates,
then proclamations,
but always written in a conspiratorial language.)

Striking:
the items are presented in the shop window
just as we usually present

recently acquired things to our friends:
raised up and right under their nose,
but still just out of their grabby hands' range.
(We realize too well,
that once they have taken hold of our acquisitions,
they will 'try them out' just as long
until it is over with the fragile vertical status of
our possessions.
'Give them back immediately!' we shout.)

Our contemporary warehouses take less and less time
for the verticalisation of the items.
They present their wares
as we handle them in our own environment:
spread out horizontally on tables and in trays.
No trace of any verticality.
(Except for the display of the prices of course.)
For self-service excludes
the reception of the purchases.
(It is either this, or that.)

THE WORLD-WINDOW

When a reporter announces
he's going to report me on the world,
I place myself expectantly before the
window-to-the-world behind which
the world will appear in a moment.
(I am curious,
for the reporter has promised me

to present the world as realistically as possible.
He assured me that his report will be truthful
and undeformed.)

At the moment the reporter removes the shutters
from the window,
not a wide world rushing away from me
and fanning into the unmeasurable distance —
(the world that has been promised me)
appears in the frame that is released,
on the contrary:
a flat world tilted towards me
and menacingly towering above me!
This world approaches me so bright
— and so brightly coloured too!
(it springs into my eye!),
that I take a step back in fright.
(The world-view looks like a poster
advertising the world in cheap colours.)

I stand face-to-face with a verticalised world, that
— as if it were a piece of painting —
has been quickly hung there by the reporter
on the same wall and in the same spot as
where the world-window used to be just a moment ago.
(I would rather turn around,
and watch the wall across the window:
an empty, neutral surface,
where the colours of the world-window dissolve
in an equally empty and neutral white.)

It seems as if it matters everything to the reporter
to black out the world-window as hermetically as possible
with his world-view.
(As if he is seeking to take away
my sight on the actual world
— the world promised by him
and in which I still believe —
with his 'display'.)

The reporter apparently hopes to be able,
through his report,
to get me to give up my idea about a wide,
stretched out, spacious and horizontal world,
in exchange for the artificial verticalised version
like the one he wanted to
— say, physically —
force on me
just now.

No wonder the reporter doesn't get tired
of summing up all the advantages
the exchange of my world-view against his one
will yield me in the end.
For example, I will be able to touch his world
(his version of my world)
in detail —
as much as I would like to.
I will be able
— by taking a step closer —
to take the detail in hand and become familiar with it.

I will be able to copy and multiply the detail.
I will be able to trade the copies with others,
in the course of which I will of course have to conceal
that I don't offer any real worlds,
but rather views of worlds.
(So I will have to do to them what the reporter did to me
just now!)
In the long run I will be able
through the profits this trade will deliver me
to possess and trade this world again, more purposefully
and exhaustively than ever before.
Thus, I will in the end possess the world.

All this and much more the reporter promises me,
assuming at this moment I will definitely give in
to his attractive offer.
Indeed, what should he
— a reporter nota bene —
do with his report, when I
— exactly I, who wants to know the world so eagerly —
don't believe his representation of the world?
He just has to force, promise, and delude me!
Otherwise he might as well forget about reporting.

X. WE, MOVERS

There's this and that
We are this —
the world is that.
(We are 'we who want to know the world'.)

Perceivers know the world.
They have seen and felt the world
with their eyes and hands.
(They have travelled the world with their senses.)

What they know they can say.
What they say they can give (us).
What can be given are reports.
We take the reports
perceivers give us.

The reports are views.
We take the views
(what is presentable of the world)
in hand.

We decide:
this world
we want to see and feel for ourselves.
This one we want to travel and work on.
We want to leave our tracks.
(We are prepared
to exchange our position of reporter
for the position of globe-trotter.)

281

THE TRAVEL-VIEW

We prepare our journey around the world thoroughly.
(We don't 'just' set ourselves in motion.)

To begin with, we desire a clear conception
of what we intend with the journey.
(We need to have a good plan.)

We need to take all features of our journey
into consideration.
(We execute calculations by means of concepts,
records, tables, schemata and charts.)

We have to outline a possible travel route as efficiently
as possible.
(We spread out the world-view across the table,
stick ourselves above it,
and travel through the different possibilities
with the tip of our hand.)

We rehearse the journey —
until we formed a clear view of it
in our thoughts.
Only then we feel able to travel.

THE JOURNEY

282

With the view on the world in hand
and her 'plan' in thought
we leave our sideways position as perceiver.
We turn around a quarter turn
and occupy the position of traveller.
(A position facing the world.)

We (before the departure)
fix our eye on the world
as she lies before us.
What we see of her
(the world looks back)
is nothing more than a slice of world.

We hesitate.
Is the world flat,
or does she look flat?
We cast a glance at the reports.
(We see a spacious world.)
We believe the reports
and set ourselves in motion.

We on our way to the world.
(We, this —
the world, that.)

EPILOGUE

A mover and a perceiver are the two dramatis personae who control METHOD. The mover reigns over the first part of this book. He moves in order to touch the world and change her appearance. The mover — doing thus — realizes a 'construction': a technical construction. That is only half of the story.

In the second part of METHOD, the perceiver observes this moving, touching, changing and constructing of the mover and reports this to 'us' through views.

We in our turn accept those views and forge them into concepts. (For we too desire to move, and change and influence the world, etcetera.) That's the whole story.

METHOD doesn't address much more than that.

Because of the flat, one-dimensional, Caspar Hauserian perspective of the mover, the perceiver and 'us' employed in METHOD, their and 'our' world are described extremely close.

Such a precise description irrevocably results in a text in which all headwords are interpreted literally. One could say that METHOD devotes itself to stressing the 'forgotten' meaning of all kinds of simple, basic Dutch words to the extent that they relate to the subject — moving and perceiving; words which almost all have a topographical and positional origin. METHOD attempts to retrace this origin and put it into words.

Moreover, through the choice of sentence and text construction, METHOD imitates the action of the mover and

perceiver, and becomes mechanical and technical. Means and target — text and subject — thus coincide.

Nonetheless, METHOD is not a technical but a literary product; it aims, aside from the technical and artistic things constructed by us, for the words that we use to describe and name these things.

When, for example, METHOD deals with the construction and working of a nail, the text aims to hit this nail on the head as well as possible: not with a hammer but through words. (Therefore, the motto 'Je mehr der Nagel auf den Kopf…' to describe this task.)

The more all of this is successful, the better METHOD will strike the reader in turn. And what more could a writer, meaning to deal with the description of nails and related items, wish for.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

This translation has been based on the original edition of METHOD (which also included both the Introduction and the Epilogue) but differs at several points from it owing to several alterations made by Raaijmakers in the text during the years after its first publication, which he had brought to the attention of the translator. The following notes, which in no way intend to be exhaustive, deal with the peculiarities and details of this translation of METHOD and elucidate the choices made during the process. In case certain remarks pertain to literal words or phrases used in the text, line numbers are given. To differentiate clearly between Dutch and English, all Dutch (and other non-English) words and phrases have been underlined.

§1.1

'There's this and that' is a translation of Er is dit en dat. Er is is a construction comparable in use to French il y a and German es gibt. It is used at many instances in which we would expect English 'exist', as in: 'This and that exist'. I have, however, chosen consequently to translate er is and er zijn with respectively 'there's' and 'there are', even when grammatically less favourable. All instances of the verb bestaan have been translated with 'exist'.

§3.12

There are several words in METHOD referring to 'what is the case': (daad)werkelijk (actual(ly), effective(ly)), werkelijkheid (actuality) and reëel, which either refers to something which is actual (real), or, to a truthful and faithful rendering

(realistic). 'Real(ly)' and 'for real' also render echt, in the sense of 'genuinely'.

§5

Throughout METHOD, Raaijmakers explicitly uses the gendered anaphors zij/haar (she/her) and hij/hem (he/him), and possessives zijn/haar (his/her) to refer to abstracts such as 'construction' and concrete objects such as 'nail', when relevant for the expression of the language views. Anaphoric use of gender-indeterminate er and daar- has been translated either with the appropriate gendered pronouns or the neuter 'it'. Possessive use of zijn (his/its) referring to a neuter noun has been translated by 'its'. See the Postlude for discussion.

§16.2

'Eyes that': literally, 'has that on the eye' (heeft dat op het oog). Also implies a certain aim or target.

§16.11

'There's seeing and seeing': literally, 'seeing and seeing is two' (zien en zien is twee). Cf. Wijn en wijn is twee (there's wine and wine).

§17

'Formation': a key notion in METHOD and a translation of the military concept slagorde, which literally would mean something like 'strike order', but is usually rendered 'battle arrangement/array' or 'order of battle'. Raaijmakers deploys the term in a more general sense. See the Postlude for discussion.

§18

There are many sides (kanten) to METHOD, which are all translated as literally possible. Voorkant (frontside), achterkant or rugkant (backside) are the different sides the mover can see of this. Zijkant (flank(side)) is reserved exclusively for the perceiver. (see also the note to §88). The Dutch cognate of English 'side', zijde, is translated with 'facet' (see the note to §92).

§20.3

See note to §16.2.

§23.5

Throughout the text, 'view' is a translation of beeld. A more 'natural' translation in this case would have been 'image', but especially the paragraphs on reporting necessitate this translation. In Dutch, beeld can also have the meanings 'image', 'picture', or even 'sculpture' (see for example §244).

§25.16

'When the shots rings out': literally, 'when the shot falls' (als het schot valt).

§39.16

'Belong together': literally, 'are two' (zijn twee).

§45

From the description in this paragraph it becomes clear that Raaijmakers uses prefixes such as 'super-', 'meta-', and 'sub-' only to distinguish relatively between levels and

strata, e.g. the difference between 'subworlds' and 'worlds' depends on the point of view.

§47

'Grab' and 'grasp' both render grijpen, etymologically related to grip (grip).

§50

'Roundsight': formed analogously to the neologism omzicht.

§50.20

'Tomographic slices of world-view' refer to the plaques fixes that Marey deployed to record the different phases of a movement. See the Postlude for discussion.

§51.2-3

'We think up constructions — / down onto the world' is a translation of a Dutch pun: We denken konstrukties uit — / de wereld in. Constructions are literally moved when 'we think constructions out [of our thoughts], into the world'.

§51.13

'Present-at-hand' is a translation of voorhanden, analogous to the standard translation of Heidegger's concept of das Vorhandene. But there are significant differences in use of the concept. Raaijmakers seems primarily to use it to distinguish a voorhanden construction, a construction found in the world, from a technical construction, which is taken by us 'in hand', and is constructed by us for that purpose (cf. §46 and §79). For Heidegger, ein Vorhandenes

is not something to be usually encountered in the world, but something that shows itself exactly at the moment the usefulness of an object — construction — disappears.

§52.13-15

'Present-at-hand [voorhanden]…present-in-sight — foreseen [voorzien]'.

§53.10-12

'We expect [verwachten]…await [wachten op]…wait for [wachten af]'.

§53.24-25

'Prescribe [schrijft voor]…copies [(schrijft) na]'. Literally, a plan 'fore-writes' (prescribes), a law 'after-writes' (copies).

§61.5; 7; 27

'Act (out)' is a translation of spelen, which also carries the connotation of 'playing', e.g. een instrument (be)spelen (playing an instrument).

§64.6

'Paves the way' is a translation of werkt…in de hand, literally 'works into the hand'.

§68

'Trace' is a translation of opsporen. 'Trace', 'track' and 'trail' all render spoor.

§73.23
'Unpossessable' is a translation of the neologism onbezitbaar.

§76.2
'Prototype' is a translation of oer(-)model, the 'original model' or 'arche-model'.

§82.19-20
'Places…in position' is a translation of brengt…in stelling, which carries a distinctly military connotation, e.g. een kanon in stelling brengen (placing a cannon in position). See also the note to §17.

§88
'Exterior': again, one of the 'sides' (kanten). 'Exterior' is a translation of buiten(kant), 'interior'§89 is a translation of binnen(kant). The more literal translations 'outside' and 'inside'§95 are reserved for the neologisms uitkant and inkant, which denote the sides where pressure is respectively released and received.

§88.6
'Both sides': i.e. the 'frontside' and the 'backside'.

§92
'Facet' is a translation of zijde (the English cognate 'side' is already used for kant). The etymological relation to face (gezicht) is absent in Dutch though not infelicitous. Both frontside and backside present two aspects (aanzichten; cf. zicht (sight)), 'facing' respectively the interior and exterior of the TC. These facing aspects are 'facets'.

§93.10
'Features' is a translation of aspekten. See also the note to §92.

§95
This means that, for example, in case of an arrow, the 'backside' functions as 'inside', for it receives pressure from the archer's arch, and the 'frontside' functions as 'outside', for it delivers the pressure to the target. In this example, both the 'inside' and 'outside' are on the 'exterior' of the arrow TC. See also the note to §88.

§96.5
'Obediently following' is a translation of volgzaam volgen.

§97
'Tough' is a translation of hard as antonym of gevoelig (sensitive). When used as antonym of zacht (weak), the translation 'firm' has been used.

§102
'Subinterior'. See note to §45.

§106.4
'Instantly': literally, 'on strike' (op slag).

§107.25
'Clear-cut…univocal' is a translation of duidelijk…eenduidig from the verb duiden (to point to/at).

§107.26
'Capacity/capability' are both a translation of a different meaning of vermogen.

§111.40
The last line in German is the full version of the sentence which is also the motto to METHOD. It comes from the introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and is usually translated as: 'The more the nail has been hit on the head…' See the Postlude for discussion.

§115
From Chapter VI on, the following words are consistently used for terminology relating to pressure: 'press(ure)' (druk); 'print' (afdruk); 'impression' (indruk).

§120
'Motive' is a translation of beweegreden, literally 'movement-reason'.

§128.18
'In an instance': See note to §106.4.

§132
'Belong together': See note to §39.16.

§137.14
'Imports and transports' is a translation of voert en vervoert.

§138
Both 'path' and 'way' render weg.

§143.8
'Trail': used here more specifically for voetspoor, literally 'foot trail'. See also the note to §68.

§145.16; 20
The antonym pair 'stable' and 'unstable' again reflect an opposition between hard (tough, firm) and niet hard: zacht (sensitive) or gevoelig (weak). See also note to §97.

§147.6-7; 26
'Imitator…forerunner' are a translation of na-beweger…voor-beweger, literally 'after-mover…before-mover'. 'Inciter' is a translation of voort-beweger, literally 'forth-mover'.

§147.44-45
'Forerunner…imitator' equally render voorganger…na-volger, literally 'before-goer… after-follower'. See also previous note.

§150.23
'Tracing': is a translation of (om)trekken. See also note to §68.

§151.1
'Tracing': is a translation of een spoor trekken. See also note to §68.

§152.18
'Continents': is a translation of werelddelen, literally 'world-parts'.

§154
This section features a nearly untranslatable play of words on the meaning of the title, nemen (taking) in etymological connection with waarnemen (perceiving) and waar nemen (truth taking, but also taking goods/wares). Since this is one of the most hermetic paragraphs from METHOD, I will cite the original Dutch completely: Een waarnemer is een echter nemer! / Hij is een nemer van waar. // De waar van bewegingen / - voor waarnemers - / is beelden. // Een waarnemer van bewegingen / is een nemer van beelden van bewegingen.¶

§155.9-10
'Chaser…hunter' is a translation of najager…jager, literally 'after-hunter…hunter'.

§167.9-10
'Outsider…stands exterior to' is a translation of buiten-staander…staat buiten. However, this 'outsider' has nothing to do with what Raaijmakers defines as the 'outside'!

§169
'Speaking', 'telling', 'saying' are all translations of different aspects of zeggen. See also note to §138.

§192.13-14
'Becomes / one' is a translation of een-worden, a verbal back-formation from eenwording (unification).

§193.5-6
'Partaking…taking a part' is a translation of deelnemen… neemt een deel.

§219.7
'What is repeatable (feasible)' is a translation of het her-haalbare (het haalbare).

§221
See note to §115.

§223.11
'Faceside' is a translation of gezichtskant, which is similar to 'frontside'.

§227
See note to §188.7.

§229
'Enact' is a translation of spelen, translated elsewhere with 'play'.

§238.3-4
'Repeat…fetch' is a translation of herhaalt…haalt. Cf. §219.7.

§243
'Inview' and 'outview' are translations of the neologisms inbeeld and uitbeeld, back-formations from the verbs inbeelden (imagine) and uitbeelden (depict). I kept the literalness of 'views', categorised in either 'inviews' or 'outviews', though they also have an explicitly mechanical meaning§245 comparable to 'insides' and 'outsides'.

§244.8
'Reviews' is a translation of hakt na, which basically plays on the meaning of beeld not only as 'view' but also as 'sculpture'. (See note on §23.5) Nahakken means 'cutting after', as in copying a sculpture. The 're-' in 'review' here loosely corresponds to the na- of nahakken as a repetitive action.

§251.5-6
'Like that…like this' is a translation of zo…zus, from the idiomatic expression zus en zo (so-and-so).

§257.13-14
'Write down…describe' is a translation of opschrijven… beschrijven.

§260
It is unclear how the world of language can suddenly house the 'totality' of language. For worlds can be parts

of chains of worlds, etcetera. Raaijmakers seems to have some difficulties in defining this upper limit, which also comes forward in his employment of the awkward terms of 'metaplan' and 'metalanguage'§262 Also, it is unclear how language as such is delimited by the 'speakable whole'. On the other hand, since this section is strictly speaking a section on the 'spoken report', we might want to delimit Raaijmakers conception of language here to the speakable whole of the spoken report, ignoring all the other possibilities that 'language' usually gives rise to.

§260.32
'The sentence makes sense' is a translation of de zin heeft 'zin', a pun on the word zin, meaning 'meaning', 'sentence', or 'sense'.

§269.6
'Image' is a translation of the neologism afbeeld, a back-formation from afbeelden (depict, portray) and afbeelding (image). It is also a beeld (view) which is af (finished).

§276.22
'Idol' is a translation of afbeeld (see also previous note). Both the 'firm' connotation of beeld (view) as 'sculpture' as well as the reference to afgod (false god) are exploited here.

§277.35
'Statue' is a translation of beeld as 'sculpture'.

§278.1-6

'Go shopping': is a translation of boodschappen doen. Boodschappen can mean both 'purchases' and 'messages', and both meanings are intentionally confused in this paragraph.

§278.47-49

For a 'reception' of any purchase to take place, the article should first have been in vertical position, to be horizontally presented by the shop keeper, and then again verticalised once displayed at home. The horizontal aspect of self-service clearly obstructs this model.

TECHNIQUE AS FREE FALL

In 1978, at the request of the editorial office of Raster, I wrote an essay on the art of reading machines. The concept of 'machines' was used for the totality of thinkable constructions that can be produced both within the technical and the artistic domain, and 'art' for the idea that the spatial manifestations of all these constructions are essentially congealed concepts, which we, after some exercise, can literally read off from their physical appearance. To do so, we as it were turn the machines around and strip them layer after layer. We say that we have 'gone deep' into these machines. What we get to know from them, are views.

In a certain sense, these views represent the final state in which machines can appear to us. But there is more.

By going into machines and reading their physiognomy, we repeat the thinking that has been invested by their constructors into their design and execution. In other words, we go ahead and do the very first thinking of the first constructors all over again and thus rethink and recall their thinking in the way they shaped it in the form of schemata, drafts, diagrams, models, photographs, drawings, etc. The 'art' of it all thus comes down to the fact that with our views, we try to represent the views of the very first machine builders: not consumptively and reproductively, but actively and creatively. By rethinking machines in this way and making their views our own, we are promoted from actual observers to potential machine builders, and history will repeat itself.

'The Art of Reading Machines' was written so I could make an inventory of the members of the hybrid realm of the machines together with their views and appearances.

In order to do so, I made distinctions between mechanical and electrical, open and closed, technical and artistic, and spatial and conceptual constructions. Each time, one specific construction was set as a representative and model for a whole group, class or type. The mise en scène around the staging of these models rendered even the most ordinary appliances the appearance of weird apparitions from worlds other than ours. Hence, the essay acquired a sense of being a revelation and initiation instead of a well constructed account or survey.

In comparison to 'The Art of Reading Machines', METHOD, which I started working on in 1979, […] and which again deals with the movement and perception of technical constructions, is constructed much more systematically and abstractly — if only because of the lack of illustrations and anecdotal references. Still, differently from what the title suggests, METHOD is not a method in the sense of an exact instruction or 'manual', but rather a report on something inevitable and irreversible. And this inevitability and irreversibility concerns the perpetration of technique in general.

For it is the case that every time when technique comes into play and ideal concepts in their turn are turned into solid, concrete constructions, a chain reaction is initiated that we euphemistically tend to call 'progress.' But this is in fact nothing else but a free fall downwards, even if the many cyclic processes in the world of technique would want to suggest contrarily, that true progress strive upwards and not downwards.

On this free fall [val] (of 'what is the case [geval]'), METHOD desires to report as faithfully as possible. And what could be a better guarantee for a faithful report than the reporter

arranging himself as technique, and not as some kind of moved human subject! In other words, when the argument of the report — in this case METHOD — proceeds mechanically and therefore predictably — as if it would concern only one everlasting fall — and not in a whimsical, unpredictable, playful, intuitive, daring, apodeictic or whichever artistically equivalent way. Hence, it is not unjust to compare METHOD to some sort of machinery within which the several subjects-of-attention are not 'treated' in the traditional sense, but instead are moved to the edge of what can be discussed and imagined. At the edge where only a small touch — often nothing more than a push from one single short sentence — is enough to cause the most inevitable and disastrous nosedives. METHOD as falling machine.

In METHOD, there is no room for any positive perspective or 'vision'. The sentences are uniform like the links in chains used to hoist objects onto their position. The contents of the objects are served to the reader only in small portions and in simple terms. It is language back to basics: cogwheel language. […]

Dick Raaijmakers, 1982

Note

This essay was originally published as a postscript to the publication of an early version of the chapter 'Perception'§154-§217 in literary magazine Raster. Refer to the Postlude for bibliographical references.

POSTLUDE

Lemma

METHOD, written between 1979 and 1982 and published in 1985 is the second of Raaijmakers' four main theoretical works, the others being: 'De kunst van het machine lezen' (The Art of Reading Machines), published in 1978 in literary magazine Raster, and which later appeared translated, though heavily reworked and revised, in Dick Raaymakers: A Monograph, the monograph on his visual and theatrical work; Kleine mechanica van de open vorm (Small mechanics of the open form) from 1992, parts of which, such as the opening section entitled 'The Great Plane' and the two final chapters under the title of 'Het destructieve karakter' (The destructive character) have been published in respectively the aforementioned monograph and Raster; and Cahier-M: A Brief Morphology of Electric Sound, which deals with the issues of electricity left untouched by the more mechanically oriented METHOD. A prepublication of its seventh chapter, 'Perception', appeared in Raster in 1982. When METHOD appeared in 1985, it hardly received any attention; writer Charlotte Mutsaers included some references to METHOD in her oeuvre,[1] as did pataphysicist Matthijs van Boxsel, who wrote a short entry on the book for his Encyclopaedia of Stupidity.[2]

1 Mutsaers, Rachels Rokje, 87 (§72); Mutsaers, 'Le plaisir aristocratique de déplaire', 82 (§127). All paragraph numbers refer to this edition of METHOD unless noted otherwise.

2 Van Boxsel, Morosofie, 159 (filed under Etymology).

A horizontal line: the reclining woman.
A vertical line: the man who penetrates her.
— Adolf Loos

METHOD is a theoretical treatise in two parts: 'Mover' and 'Perceiver'. METHOD aims to describe the working of the world in a flat, mechanical, 'stupefying', 'Kaspar Hauserian'[3] logic. 'The apples are tired', Hauser observed when he saw them lying in the grass underneath an apple tree. It is this same child-like, though not so innocent wonder at the world that Raaijmakers puts forward in his work.

> I always try to understand things from the position of a little Martian. This Martian functions like some kind of model, which allows me to look at things stripped from all knowledge. I do assume that the Martian is intelligent and has an overview. Insight, however, he lacks. Certain things elude his grasp, because he is not from this (our) world.[4]

The two parts of the treatise reflect the two main dramatis personae of METHOD, even though their nature is fully abstracted and not necessarily 'human': the 'mover' and the 'perceiver'. In the first part, the mover moves 'this-here' to the 'target-there'.§17 They stand in line, a line which neither the mover, nor this, nor the target can leave. The mover only sees the 'backside' of this as he moves it towards the target. The mover, this, and the target stand in a 'formation'.

3 Kaspar Hauser (1812?-1833) was a German foundling allegedly raised in the total isolation of a dungeon. When he was discovered he could barely walk and speak, nor could he remember where he came from.
4 Raaijmakers, De sound man in Frascati, 49-50. All translations are mine, except when an explicit English reference is given.

After these relations are established, several forms of constructions are dealt with, such as 'constructions present-at-hand',§51 'artistic constructions',§62 and, most importantly, 'technical constructions',§79 at which a mover can exert pressure in order to put them to work. Then, the mover can form, with one of these constructions and the 'world', a 'motion-construction', in order to touch and move the world.§160

In the second part, the mover turns ninety degrees and becomes a sideways perceiver, standing perpendicular to the formation of mover, this-here, and the target-there. He can only observe them from aside, at straight angles.§165 The perceiver cannot influence the movement of the mover at all, for if he would do so, he would force himself into the position of some kind of mover. Trying to do so will result in disaster.§179 The perceiver cannot change anything fundamental in the motion-construction as such, but merely stretch out an 'arm', in order to be informed about the movement he is watching.§191 At this point, the perceiver — always at a (some) distance§202 — is building a 'perception-construction', in order to perceive the action. He subsequently changes into a 'reporter' by turning around 180 degrees§222 so as to give a 'report' to 'us'; we have to either believe the reporter — whose report is always at least minimally flawed§279 — or go into the world and move it ourselves as real movers do§282; the circle is closed and this is all that happens.

Already in this short summary of the different movements inside METHOD, we can locate the lasting influence of Piet Mondrian and De Stijl in Raaijmakers' thought concerning composition: straight angles, elementary constituents, flat

surfaces. But still, in all its terse abstraction, METHOD is a work of poetry, a work of pathos. Perhaps, METHOD is much more of a testimony to Raaijmakers' insight into the inner workings of technique than anything else, it is a testament of technology. In fact, he has never referred to it after it had been published, as if it had never existed. Nonetheless, this afterword aims to locate the inner passions of METHOD and the targets they might have had.

METAPHORICAL MODEL (1)

In a short introduction to 'The Art of Reading Machines', the editors of magazine Raster state that Raaijmakers aims to put forth a 'metaphorical model' for the 'reading' of technical devices,[5] observing them in order to learn their working and purpose. It is this same metaphorical model that we encounter in METHOD. But,

> METHOD, which I started working on in 1979, and which again deals with the movement and perception of technical constructions, is constructed much more systematically and abstractly — if only because of the lack of illustrations and anecdotal references.[6]

In 'The Art of Reading Machines', Raaijmakers employs metaphorical models such as: 'the metaphor for a machine existing in the world is a closed cube with tubes sticking out of either side', and 'the metaphor for a short-circuited

5 Raaijmakers, De kunst van het machine lezen, 6.
6 This volume, 318.

apparatus is a cube with two tubes in which the exit tube runs back into the entrance tube, thus isolating the cube from "the world".[7] These cube-tube models are still rather concrete, when compared with the abstractions that populate METHOD. And whereas in 'The Art of Reading Machines', the reader is introduced to different prototypical machines through illustrations, diagrams and photographs, which the written description supplements with a certain degree of abstraction in order to render them a 'model' — 'cube', 'tube', 'entrance' and so on —, METHOD works strictly on the level of language. Its short, highly structured sentences and paragraphs are intended to make up for the absence of images, for they intend to provide for the image themselves. These paragraphs present what Raaijmakers calls a taalbeelden (language views).

This may cause the reader to think that METHOD is a mere formal exercise in abstract description, which, to a certain degree, is indeed the case. For example, in METHOD, the aforementioned 'cube with tubes' is dissected into concepts such as 'in-', 'out-', 'front-' and 'backsides', 'interiors' and 'exteriors', etc. Nevertheless, we don't encounter a language with the formal quality that would expect from an ordinary technical manual. The language of METHOD and the way in which this language is organized suggest a poetic quality: a quality not sustained by inserted pictures or photographs, but rather by literary illustrations that cannot be merely reduced to a strict, formalized, 'scientific' language. In the short epilogue, Raaijmakers writes that in METHOD, 'the flat, one-dimensional…description…irrevocably results

7 Raaijmakers, De kunst van het machine lezen, 16-17; Mulder and Brouwer, Dick Raaymakers, 13-14.

in a text in which all headwords are interpreted literally'.[8] This 'literal' interpretation in its turn leads to the employment of all kinds of literary devices, which are not often found in technical discourse to this extent.

First, each headword — 'mantle', 'nail', 'outside', etc. — functions as a metaphorical model in itself: the mantle is a model for all containers, the nail stands for every thin object sharp on one side and flat on the other, the outside for all sides emanating pressure. Second, the (typographical) form of METHOD, divided into strictly organised paragraphs, features hard returns, a more than average amount of white space, and other formal devices usually only actively deployed in poetry. And finally, Raaijmakers exploits the ambiguity concerning grammatical and semantic gender in Dutch so as to eroticize the relations between different agents and patients.

Adding to these literary devices for exploiting his language to the fullest, Raaijmakers also introduces an ample amount of anecdotal paragraphs, with which the 'flat, one-dimensional descriptions' are interspersed. For example, we can find a meditation on the Zen archer,§22 the story of Newton's apple,§54 seemingly (auto)biographic notes about sitting on a chair,§36 his love for Bugatti cars,§72 and watching his own house.§205 These paragraphs give us insight into how METHOD applies to itself, and how its mechanical language can be practically put to work in the world. The final 'ecstatic' paragraphs, in which the flat world from the reports and diagrams is exchanged for the three-dimensional 'real' world, even exhort us to get up, travel, and move

8 This volume, 301. My emphasis.

the world in a direct and dramatic address to apply what we have learned.

SEXUSEMBLANCE

In order to elucidate Raaijmakers' disposition to language, I will first shortly discuss the function of the category of gender in METHOD. Primarily because it is the least interconnected with both external references relevant to METHOD and the internal structure of the work.

Raaijmakers consciously — and sometimes consciously inconsistently — uses masculine, feminine, and neuter anaphoric pronouns (for example, 'the mover…he', 'the construction…she', 'the plan…it'), even when the Dutch grammatical gender is indeterminate, since, contrary to for example German, masculine and feminine words share the same definite article de. (Neuter nouns can be easily distinguished by the article het.) Thus, the expression of the (grammatical) gender of the anaphor (in case one is used, for unmarked gender Raaijmakers employs constructions with daar-/er- or het, which are gender-neutral) is a poetic choice of Raaijmakers that operates on a separate textual layer. For example, all movers, hunters, archers and marksmen, as well as arrows, billiard balls, nails and pendulums are masculine, whereas motions, connections, constructions, flows, techniques and worlds are feminine.

The existence and necessity of (grammatical) gender as such is as yet one of the unsolved mysteries of language, and — therefore I would say — one of the stages where poetic intervention can occur. It is here that Raaijmakers puts the French philologist and philosopher Gaston Bachelard's

concept of sexusemblance[9] to work. Sexusemblance is the idea that nouns — window, tree, house — 'show' their masculine or feminine aspects in their form and the shape of their letters. In French, Bachelard's native language, this meaningful concordance between grammatical gender (le versus la) and semantic gender (him versus her) can only be analysed, not generated, for the masculine and feminine genders are explicitly encoded in the language, both on nouns and pronouns. Raaijmakers however, can fully exploit the lack of external, morphological features that would signal grammatical gender difference between masculine and feminine nouns in Dutch and give them their own 'sexusemblant' interpretation.

For example, 'pressure' is treated neuter up to §85, when it acquires a definite masculine quality. Consequently, the whole of chapter six can be also read as the mechanics of the act of love, of pressure shaping and penetrating feminine worlds just once or repeatedly.§126 This concept of sexusemblance, pointing at a relation between the grammatical — 'meaningless' — gender of a word and its meaning within a sexualised, bipolar world, where masculine and feminine features complement each other, however, has been long banished from technical discourse to the outer regions of 'useful' and 'meaningful' language; that is, poetry.

Thus, it seems to be the case that the use of 'ordinary words' in a 'flat one-dimensional description' generate, as if forced to do so, a poetic quality, a libidinal economy of constantly moving, hitting, pressing and reproducing machines.

9 For discussion, see Genette, Mimologics, 203.

This expressive desire is only amplified by the linguistic or architectural restraints exerted on the compositional structure. This also means that the terse, poetically inclined typography of METHOD is not without good reason. Although the text does not incorporate all textual techniques that one can locate in poetry, such as enjambments or metrical devices, the hard returns, white spaces, and the standardized, sometimes highly synthetic (Dutch) word order suggest that this text is supposed to function not only on the level of purely theoretical, descriptive discourse.

> Through the choice of sentence and text construction, METHOD imitates the action of the mover and perceiver, and becomes mechanical and technical. Means and target — text and subject — thus coincide.[10]

In a way similar to the use of gender throughout the text, explicitly shaping the metaphorical model that METHOD aims to provide, the syntax of the sentences is supposed to show more than what they mean. Raaijmakers doesn't content himself with the 'arbitrariness of the sign' — the fact that the length or sound of the word 'tree' has nothing to do with a tree such as we find it in the world, or the shape of a sentence has nothing to do with the action described by it — but takes the shape of the sentence as such, the 'arbitrary' word order to reflect the order and direction of the objects represented by it. For example: 'Is dit bij dat / dan raakt dit dat'. Literally: 'Is this at that / than touches this

10 This volume, 302.

that'.§3 In both in the first and the second sentence, 'dit' and 'dat' touch, first through the preposition 'bij', signalling the not-yet-touching, but then, one return later, for real: 'dit dat'. This feature of the original Dutch text is obviously lost owing to the nature of English syntax, but the reader should be aware that any described touching-event is also always a syntactical touching-event.

THE GRAPHICAL METHOD

The way in which the text is constructed shows the mechanics of technique it intends to describe. Each paragraph expresses a 'tomographic slice of world-view'.§50 Each paragraph resembles a film still. For this method of rendering every literary description as flat as possible, Raaijmakers is heavily indebted to the French physiologist Étienne Jules Marey, who was, together with his English counterpart Eadweard Muybridge, the first to capture movement on camera by cutting it into consecutive slices. Moreover, Marey was the first to abstract from the image, and reduce the movement of different body parts to the movement of dots and lines, his so-called graphical method.

In 1878, Marey wrote La méthode graphique dans les sciences expérimentales et principalement en physiologie et en médecine (The graphical method in the experimental sciences and mainly in physiology and medicine)[11] which is his main treatise on the graphical method: the rendering in different phases, through photographic means, of a movement on a photosensitive plaque fixe. A plaque fixe differs

11 Raaijmakers become acquainted with this work through its Dutch translation De grafische methode from 1883.

from film stills on a film tape (a plaque mobile in Marey's terms) with regard to the reading of the image. In case of a plaque fixe, our eyes are moving while the image is resting. In case of a plaque mobile, our eyes rest, while the tape is moving in front of the projector lens. In METHOD, Raaijmakers deploys the level of abstraction that characterizes these plaques by using the abstractions ('dots and lines') of language, while the reader moves his eyes across the pages of the book, and the book turns its pages in front of him.

On the opening page of the introduction to La méthode graphique, Marey claims that it 'aims to expose the movement of a phenomenon, of which it renders the phases with a clarity that language doesn't possess.'[12] But METHOD aims to do exactly this through language only, to 'penetrate the intimate functions of the organs, where life seems to convey itself through an incessant mobility',[13] and convey them stepwise in slices. Thus, La méthode graphique served as an inspiration for METHOD.

> Before Marey, nobody could even use the expression 'moving images'.… Historically speaking, Marey has, with La méthode graphique, marked the moment at which image and sound gained a definitive and irrevocable independence as reproducible and tradeable products. Thus — hundred years ago — he has not only sanctioned the break between hearing and seeing on one side, and acting and moving on the other, but moreover executed it. Apart from that, nearly nobody knows how high the price will be that

12 Marey, La méthode graphique, i.
13 Ibid., iii.

> we will have to pay for all this artificial image and sound.[14]

This high price that we will have to pay for all this artificiality is a theme that underpins much of Raaijmakers' visual output, in installations, theatre pieces and performances, one of which, 'Hermans Hand', I will discuss below at length. This visual work, which has recently been collected in Dick Raaymakers: A Monograph, aims to visualise exactly how high the price and cost of the technology of carelessly 'taking' pictures and 'capturing' films is. This happens for example in pieces such as 'The Graphical Method: Bicycle' which very slowly 'reanimates' one of Marey's plaques which recorded the movements of a man getting off a bike. Marey

> recorded human motions in their subsequent stages and kept of this movement a number of views. He analysed the motion by literally taking the view from the mover. From that cyclist getting off his bike, he literally took ten to twelve views; at the loss of the cyclist. Through a high-speed projection of the views thus acquired, one can make the cyclist get off his bike time after time again without any effort. The relation between the effort of getting off a bike on film — nothing more than switching on the projector — and doing this in reality, is out of any proportion. That's why I turn the process around, because I want to know exactly how the matter stands.… In order to make visible how coercively a technical

14 Raaijmakers, De sound man in Frascati, 37-38.

> insight works, one executes reversal-operations to force technical images back into the viewing-machines they came from. That's no performance, that's Kasper Hauser. He also wanted to have the apples back up in the trees.[15]

The slow motion effects in Raaijmakers' performances — in the case of 'The Graphical Method: Bicycle' a man slowly getting off his bike during thirty minutes instead of in roughly three seconds — thus visualise the physical effort captured by technical devices, just like the language of METHOD shows them in slow motion. Similar theatrically complex slow motion elements can be for example found in the 'Dépons' cycle, as a critical response to the employment of live electronics and the concept of 'horizontal arpeggios' in Pierre Boulez's key composition 'Répons', when the gravitational force that in the end 'kills all sound' comes back at Boulez with a vengeance, and 'Hermans Hand — A Pro Memoriam', which deals with the 'fatal fall' of the Dutch novelist W.F. Hermans after hurting his finger on a typewriter at a flee market in Brussels. The extreme slow motion movements characterising Raaijmakers' work are intended to show the huge amounts of 'free' energy captured at 24 images per second, and also used as a metaphor for the huge amounts of conceptual energy that is 'freely' enjoyed by both Hermans and Boulez; Hermans as a 'collectionneur' of antique machines — typewriters which he neither invented nor constructed —, and Boulez as the impious heir of the 'neoplastic music' such as defined in

15 Raaijmakers, Schönberger, and Vogelaar, 'Verschuivingen in de slagorde', 54-57.

the first decades of the twentieth century by Mondrian and composer Jacob van Domselaer, without acknowledging his indebtedness to them.[16]

'Just like Marey's method, METHOD aims to be working like a film. It wants to transport the motions of the "mover" before the readers' eyes phase by phase, like film stills on a film tape',[17] and of course, it is again the effort put into that meticulous description of the different phases of a movement from here to there that pays back for the luxury of having it at our disposal at any time we wish.

FORMATION

These different phases of a movement, with its participants in different positions, are organized through the concept of slagorde (formation). Formation is one of the key concepts in Raaijmakers' oeuvre and is, like much of the other terminology employed throughout METHOD, invested with a strong military connotation. A more literal translation of slagorde would be 'battle formation' or 'battle array', yet such renderings would ignore the scope of the term in the way Raaijmakers employs it. A formation organizes the objects or concepts in the formation horizontally (like a map) and vertically (like a hierarchy or a stack). For example, the aforementioned configuration of mover-this-target can be called a formation,§17 there is a formational difference between the 'high' violin and the 'low' firearm,§70 and the hierarchical organisation of composer-notation-performer-

16 See Raaijmakers, Cahier-M, 31-60.
17 This volume, preface

sound-listener[18] is also to be defined as a formation. In relation to the latter, he defines the concept as follows:

> 'Formation' is a term that has been borrowed from the art of war; by the way, the same discipline that gave us the term 'avant-garde' in the 19th century.… We limit the concept of 'formation' here to a schematically ordered model that allows us to form an orderly and conveniently arranged view of the essence of the musical apparatus in full operation.[19]

Futhermore: 'In this model you can travel up and down, you can take sideways, you can take a position aside, as I have often done, you can consider it a constellation'.[20] The formation is not the only concept in METHOD showing military origins. Marshals, battle fields, arsenals, mantles and messengers populate large sections of it, and the archers, hunters and marksmen serve as a model for the most elementary type of mover. Thus, Raaijmakers stresses the dynamics of battle as the prototypical scene of technical and technological development. For example, the extensive scene in 'the field marshals'§178 deals with the problems of depicting motion and perception, 'the marksmen'§25 are identified with the ideal motion-construction, and the classical 'messenger'§232 is staged as the archetypical reporter from the battlefield far away.

18 See Raaijmakers, 'Het destructieve karakter', 183.
19 Raaijmakers, 'Het destructieve karakter', 193.
20 Raaijmakers, Schönberger, and Vogelaar, 'Verschuivingen in de slagorde', 30.

Instead of entertaining the standard pop-science discourse on how terrible wars cleaned the slate and brought forth new technologies standing at the base of each and every prosperous golden age, Raaijmakers rather refers to morphological analogies between 'the art of reading machines' and 'the art of war'[21] as such; not war as the cause of the development of new technology, but rather the acts of war as modelling technical development.[§49] This constant comparison between war and technology finds its origin in the chronophotographical gun, which was developed by Marey in order to record the movements of flying birds.

The gun houses a photosensitive disc, gradually rotating 360 degrees in twelve steps during one full second; the light enters the gun through the barrel and records twelve different steps of the movement in front of the gun. 'The shape of our current cameras still reminds us of their original source and actual use: namely weapons to kill "life" and shoot "images".'[22] In this sense, our current camera is still somewhat of a pseudomorph, like the first automobiles which looked like horse carriages without a horse. The camera is a gun without bullets, and the uncanny remainder of this fact still hides in the uncomfortable feeling of posing in front of a camera, waiting for the picture to be, literally, taken.[23]

> The function of the weapon is first of all the function of the eye: sighting. Before attaining his target, a hunter or a warrior must always take aim, to align his target between the eyepiece and the sight of his weapon, exactly as a cameraman frames the subject that he is about to shoot. "Silence, action" is therefore not far removed from "Silence, fire".[24]

21 See also, for a striking similarity in rhetorical structure: Sun Tzu, The Art of War.
22 Raaijmakers, De kunst van het machine lezen, 39.
23 See Raaijmakers, Schönberger, and Vogelaar, 'Verschuivingen in de slagorde', 56.

Not only does Marey's chronophotography take the first snapshots of moving bodies, it is the first technique to register the different movements of the body and make them available for analysis.

> In the field of experimental physiology, its traditions led to the development of a different strategy for registering, recording, and utilizing bodies. The focus was to analyse the microelements of motion and translate this into data, diagrams, statistics and graphs. The (chrono)[photo]graphic method and its notation became a universal language.[25]

Through this method, we enter the age in which the dissolution of the body in front of a registration device into an abstraction acquires momentum, and momentum and speed become truly universal.

It is therefore no surprise that another contemporary thinker of technology in relation to the scientific-military complex points to exactly Muybridge and Marey as the source of the dissolution of the object as something that only occurs as a registered obstacle (or target) on the trajectory of a one-dimensional formation. The French

24 Virilio, Desert Screen, 53-54.
25 Zielinski, Deep Time of the Media, 245.

philosopher Paul Virilio stresses time after time again the relation between war and the development of technology. 'Violence can be reduced to nothing but movement'[26]: it finds in the process of the globalization of its potential battle grounds (rockets can be fired from anywhere to anywhere), the same process of acceleration (more distance in less time) that typifies technological development ever since the late nineteenth century.

> Equestrian studies, considered as an exact science of the movements of the horse, introduce us to the truly mechanical art of the motor. The analytical geometry of the gallop of horses, in Muybridge's studies, for example, renews the all-too-elementary geometrical attraction of the body fighting on foot. Now the object counts less than its path, than its given trajectory.… Thanks to Marey's chronophotographic gun, the running of horses, the flight of birds, and the gait of man will be reconstructed in the sequential magic of the hidden gestures of movement.[27]

This 'sequential magic of the hidden gestures of movement' is exactly what METHOD aims to uncover, along its stable trajectory from the first to the last paragraph, a trajectory of constant acceleration that Raaijmakers calls the 'free fall'. For Raaijmakers, the essence of technique is this free fall, its course, its trajectory. It is the trajectory of technological development in which the dissolution of object, both in relation to Raaijmakers' idea of electric sound as 'bodiless'

26 Virilio, Speed and Politics , 62.
27 Virilio, Negative Horizon, 63.

sound,[28] and Virilio's concept of 'stealth' as the dissolution of the military body,[29] and the immersion of the digital highway into daily life has become the central tenet.

> For it is the case that every time when technique comes into play and ideal concepts in their turn are turned into solid, concrete constructions, a chain reaction is initiated that we euphemistically tend to call 'progress'. But this is in fact nothing else but a free fall downwards, even if the many cyclic processes in the world of technique would want to suggest contrarily, that true progress strive upwards and not downwards.[30]

METAPHORICAL MODEL (2)

Raaijmakers' fascination for the concept of falling is visible throughout his oeuvre as artist, with objects, people and scenes falling slowly, fast, with a bang or softly, extremely slow or amazingly abrupt: the fall is the primal movement his world is made of.

In his essay 'De val van Benito Mussolini' (Benito Mussolini's fall), he discusses all the different motions and 'tumbling positions' of man during his fall, comparable to the different turns around the vertical axis in METHOD —from mover to perceiver (90°), perceiver to reporter (180°), and so on — and the short fragment 'Het vallen als muziek' (Falling

28 See Raaijmakers, Cahier-M, 17-18.
29 See Virilio, Desert Screen, 109-10.
30 This volume, 320-21.

as music)[31] locates falling as 'the last and lowest' in the formation of musical gestures, such as singing, bowing, beating, etc. Yet in METHOD, the fall as such only comes to the scene once: in 'the apple',§54 which renders a playful, but nonetheless serious description of the primal scene of modern science — the apple falling on Newton's head — and the relation between a law of nature and our actual experience of and expectations from nature. He comments on the curious phenomenon that, since we all think we know Newton's law of gravity, when we see an apple hanging from a tree, we expect the apple to fall, 'as if it were our falling law / urging the apple to fall / and not the world pulling on the apple.' In fact, we desire it to fall, because that would confirm what we would think we know about this apple, yet in doing so, 'we encumber our apple with a want and desire / this apple neither wants nor desires.'

Here, we can, shifting gears, discern one of the many references that Raaijmakers makes to the German philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, and more specifically, his Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung, translated as the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The formal paragraph structures of the earlier 'Art of Reading Machines' and METHOD, are clearly reminiscent of the Tractatus, as well as the ideas voiced in it on, for example, propositions as images of the world (Raaijmakers' language views) and the views on the limits of human knowledge: 'It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means we do not know whether it will rise',[32] which is a reasoning very similar to the one§54 I discussed above.[33]

31 Raaijmakers, De sound man in Frascati, 57-59.

Instead of discussing the overlaps and differences in observation and description between METHOD and the Tractatus, I would like to discuss in the following few paragraphs three paratextual elements. First, Raaijmakers' interpretation of §1 of the Tractatus in the light of his concept of 'free fall'. Second, the relation qua structure between the preface to the Tractatus and the preface to METHOD, and third, the motto to METHOD, taken from the preface to the Tractatus: 'Je mehr der Nagel auf den Kopf…'.

1.

Raaijmakers summarizes the function of METHOD in relation to the 'free fall of technology' by claiming that 'on this free fall [val] (of 'all that is the case [geval]'), METHOD desires to report as faithfully as possible',[34] which is one of his clearest acknowledgments of his indebtedness to Wittgenstein. The first proposition of the Tractatus reads 'Der Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist', which is usually translated into English with 'The world is all that is the case', which obscures, in Raaijmakers'

32 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. Pears and McGuiness, 84 (§6.36311).

33 We can also, backtracking to the 'military reading' of Raaijmakers' Method, note a comparable tendency in a recent analysis of Wittgenstein's language of the Tractatus by French philosopher Alain Badiou. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein defines philosophy as the 'clarification of propositions' (§4.112). Badiou's first, preliminary attack on this position pulls this definition immediately into the realm of war: 'Let's translate that in military language: what is relevant is not shooting itself, but clarifying the shot.' (Alain Badiou, L'antiphilosophie de Wittgenstein, 15). In this sense, Badiou voices the same objection against Wittgenstein's 'archi-esthetics' as Raaijmakers does in §72.

34 This volume, 321

interpretation, that Fall can not only be translated with 'case' but also simply with 'fall'.

> Wittgenstein's famous first sentence of his Tractatus: 'The world is all that is the case' can be read differently if the word 'case' (in German: 'Fall') is taken literally as that which remains after the falling of the world. The sentence would then read: 'The world is all as it has fallen'.[35]

This rather unorthodox reading of Wittgenstein is of course closely related to the observations we made in the previous section on war as a model for technology and vice versa, in which the concept of 'movement', and therefore 'speed' plays an essential role. To put it differently, every attack (aanval) is a fall (val) which is the case (geval). The world, as we constitute her in our times, is moved, perceived and reported on through technology more and more, and whereas we ourselves move faster and faster across the earth, the world, all that is the case, falls away (valt weg) from our direct perception at commensurate speed: our own perception fails (valt uit), whereas the technical machines retain their accuracy even at high velocities. More than this we cannot say, and even Raaijmakers himself admits: 'I am not looking for falling, falling is looking for me. Although I have to admit that it's about time to call an end to all this. By now, falling is starting to annoy me.'[36] So much for falling for the moment. Below, I will discuss a pertinent case from a

35 Raaijmakers, De sound man in Frascati, 59. Note that in English, the word 'case' derives from the Latin verb cadere, 'to fall'.
36 Polling, 'Gebroken hand van Hermans uitvergroot'.

different angle, in an analysis of aforementioned theatrical performance, 'Hermans Hand'.

2.

The opening line of Wittgenstein's preface to the Tractatus reads:

> Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts expressed in it — or at least similar thoughts. — So it is not a textbook.[37]

Usually, Wittgenstein's curious introduction to this monument claimed by analytical philosophy is interpreted as pertaining quite literally to the difficulty and perhaps obscurity that the Tractatus presents to the reader, while it is in fact much more a comment about genre. Although the title of the Tractatus seems to suggest a treatise that a student may read as part of his studies, this certainly does not seem the intention of it, for it only provides answers, and not the questions to which they would be the answer. If you didn't ask yourself these questions already, you wouldn't even recognise the propositions contained in the Tractatus as answers. In a strikingly similar style, Raaijmakers opens the preface to METHOD as follows:

> This book doesn't offer the reader what the title promises. It is not a method in the sense of a handbook or operation manual. It is rather a travel guide,

37 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. Pears and McGuiness, 3.

albeit for travellers who already have reached their final destination.[38]

The overlap in style and content is considerable here. Both authors confess that the formal titles of their works do not bear the standard connotations of the respective genres of textbook and manual. They are respectively a textbook with no questions but only answers, and a manual with only descriptions, no explanation how to get to them, and only a few hints about their practical application; the reader is supposed to think of those himself. Both books are self-contained, 'short-circuited' texts, wired in such a way that the reader is supposed already to be in them in order to understand their content. This is exactly the point Marvin Rowe makes when talking about the influence of Goethe on Wittgenstein, and, transitively I think, the influence of Wittgenstein on Raaijmakers with regard to their style.

> In Goethe and Wittgenstein the literary surface is fragmented, but this is precisely because they want the reader to grasp a synoptic, organized view of a certain set of phenomena, which cannot be simply stated.… Their remarks…do not have the isolation, wit and disorder we would expect from a book of aphorisms; nor do they exhibit the kind of order and coherence we would expect from more conventional texts with more conventional, quasi-scientific notions of explanation. They do, however, exhibit a deep rhetorical structure which springs from an attempt to educate the eye rather than inform the mind. The way such writing must be approached if its underlying order is to reveal itself, is brilliantly summarized by Heidegger: 'Let me give a little hint on how to listen. The point is not to listen to a series of propositions, but rather to follow a movement of showing'.[39]

38 This volume, preface.

This is as clear as one can get on the Wittgensteinian opposition of saying and showing: Both the Tractatus and METHOD do not say anything, they don't offer us a 'theory', they merely show a way, a method of seeing and thinking through an inevitable rhetorical structure that drives the reader from beginning to end. In this sense, Raaijmakers' language views aim to show through language what can not be said in language. And in order to do so, he needs to call to arms the literary, poetical devices that I have discussed above.

3.

Keeping the similarity between the prefaces of METHOD and the Tractatus in mind, the fact that Raaijmakers chose as the motto to METHOD a sentence quoted from the introduction to the Tractatus, 'Je mehr der Nagel auf den Kopf…' (The more the nail [has been hit] on the head…), should not come as a surprise. Hitting the nail on the head, showing what is seen in the most efficient and direct — and therefore most technical — way possible, is what METHOD aims for, thereby thrusting the reader forwards through the world

39 Rowe, 'Goethe and Wittgenstein', 15-16.

in the right direction. The motto comes from the original introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. It was removed accidentally or on purpose in the German original Suhrkamp editions[40] but is present in Wittgenstein's sketches for the introduction to the Tractatus[41], and foreign editions of the work.

> If this work has a value, it consists in two things. The first is that thoughts are expressed in it, and one this score the better the thoughts are expressed — the more the nail has been hit on the head — the greater will be its value.[42]

Peter Keicher, who studied the different sketches of introductions that Wittgenstein wrote throughout his life, already observed that 'the [sketches for the] introductions contain a wide range of informative metaphors and can be seen as a kind of dialogue between Wittgenstein and his readers',[43] and it is clear that Raaijmakers intended the 'informative metaphor' of the nail to be part of the metaphorical model of the language views expressed in METHOD. Again, Raaijmakers signals that the 'ordinary words', such as nail, which populate his treatise, together represent a model for movement in technology.

But the sentence that Raaijmakers quotes from Wittgenstein's introduction to the Tractatus is not complete. The predicate 'getroffen ist' (has been hit) has been left

40 See Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. Hermans, 172.
41 See Keicher, 'Ich wollte'.
42 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. Pears and McGuiness, 4.
43 Keicher, 'Ich wollte', 275.

out and replaced with the three dots signalling an ellipsis. The omission of the predicate places a focus on the two juxtaposed concepts 'Nagel' and 'Kopf'. This juxtaposition, the concatenation of two or more concepts in a sentence to be concluded with a predicate is, as we have seen, one of the main grammatical peculiarities of METHOD that are possible in Dutch (and German) but remains untranslatable in English. 'Der Nagel auf den Kopf' signals the end point, so to say, of all pressure exerted by a certain mover intending to move the nail through the world, and the moment the nail becomes a mover himself.§58 It is the event only to be confirmed by the suspended conclusion of 'getroffen ist'. Also, by the omission of the predicate in the motto, Raaijmakers stretches the idea of being-hit across the whole of METHOD, as if the whole textual machinery expressed in it is one big process of trying to hit the nail on the head. The 'informative metaphor' of the nail that still seemed to have a shaky status in the Tractatus, is raised to a fully operative model functioning until the moment the nail is hit, and after which we have finally moved from thinking about penetrating the world to actual penetration:

> At the moment we exert pressure from the exterior
> on the flat side of the nail,
> the potential toughness of the pointy side
> coincides — thanks to the right state —
> with the exerted firmness of our pressure —
> powerfully, the nail shoots into the right direction
> through the world.
> ('Je mehr der Nagel auf den Kopf getroffen ist…')§111

TYPEWRITER (1)

In this context we should also cast a glance at the relation between Raaijmakers and the Dutch novelist and Wittgenstein translator Willem Frederik Hermans, and their different approaches towards both Wittgenstein and technology, illustrating the entanglements that Raaijmakers' theoretical and visual work finds itself in. METHOD was written after a period of heavy polemics between Hermans and Raaijmakers, which started with the publications of their respective essays 'Machines in bikini' (Bikini-clad machines) and 'The Art of Reading Machines'. Hermans wrote 'Machines in bikini' as a manifesto about technology starting out with the observation that 'while women are becoming more and more undressed, machines are being dressed up'.[44]

> It may be the virtue of the twentieth century, that a woman may once again be unhamperedly streamlined, but it is a mistake of frustrated engineers if they intend to sexualise machines by streamlining them. The result will be the contrary.… Who will describe the erotic feelings that can be caused by skeleton clocks with their outspoken unrest?[45]

The issue is that, whereas Hermans describes the 'actual' relation between the development of mantles around machines and the gradual undressing of women, and the fact that 'streamlining' machines in order to increase their fetish

44 Hermans, 'Machines in bikini', 751.
45 Ibid., 758.

aspect seems a mistake when compared with the bare nakedness of antique clocks, Raaijmakers suggests a much more complex economy within language itself, that I tried to sketch out above as far as it concerned the language of METHOD and which was first explored in 'The Art of Reading Machines'. Also, their respective outlooks on the future of technology are radically different. Hermans claims a dystopian future in which 'there are no more machines. This stage will be reached when physics has overcome psychology.… [Man] doesn't live, nor will he die.'[46] But Raaijmakers seems to be much more concerned in his work with 'the bill that technology will present us'[47] in the sense of changes in our culture and cultural production, as well as our environment. Whereas Hermans comes across as downright nihilistic, Raaijmakers in the end concerns himself with us, as we read — in full analogy to the overemphasized mystical turn in the final paragraphs of the Tractatus — in the last chapter of METHOD, 'We, Movers':

> We decide:
> this world
> we want to see and feel for ourselves.
> This one we want to travel and work on.
> We want to leave our tracks.§280

The discussion between Raaijmakers and Hermans started after the publication of 'The Art of Reading Machines'. Hermans published a lengthy review of the essay on the

46 Ibid., 760.
47 Raaijmakers, Schönberger, and Vogelaar, 'Verschuivingen in de slagorde', 32.

front page of the cultural section of the Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad on November 10, 1978. As one of the first interpreters of the Tractatus in the Netherlands, he attacks the 'false' appropriation of Wittgenstein (not reading him as the logic-positivist defender of hard science against the threats of religion, metaphysics, idealism, and so on, but taking him as a model to look at and act in the world) as well as the peculiar sexualisation of words that Raaijmakers already employed in 'The Art of Reading Machines'.

> As for its form, 'The Art of Reading Machines' has been obviously inspired by Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.… However, entirely different from Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 'The Art of Reading Machines' is in no way a treatise. It is an accumulation of unconnected remarks, which, organized in 147 paragraphs, would like to give the impression of being systematically organized. Raaijmakers starts as follows: '…2. Exchange (1). The character of force is determined by the mutual relation between her ('her'? of the force that is? WFH) ingredients: the factors path, time, and mass'.[48]

He goes on to accuse Raaijmakers — who started his career as sound technician in the famous Philips NatLab (Laboratory for Applied Physics) — of a lack of technological know-how, which would be the reason for his 'anthropomorphic use of language dating from even before Socrates'[49] and 'the Marxist persecution hysteria that rules

48 Hermans, 'Poetsen is niet stompzinniger dan lopen'. My emphasis.
49 Ibid.

his simili-thinking [sic!]'.[50] Incidentally, Wittgenstein himself was, later on in his life, much more interested in finding similes through his method of language games, than the logical propositions put forward in the Tractatus, which gives reading Hermans' vehement attack on Raaijmakers' 'misappropriation' an ironic twist. He continues:

> Without knowing what he talks about, indeed, even without ever having become enthusiastic about the beauty and charm of machines (just as an example), this writer has quite succeeded in composing a pseudo-technical treatise that is as boring, dull, and unimaginative as the majority of the real technical treatises.[51]

In fact, this seemingly innocuous 'example' of what Raaijmakers' treatise lacks, namely an admiration for the beauty of machines, seems, in light of Hermans' other work, to be chosen quite deliberately. Hermans has expressed, on more than one occasion, his love for well-made machines,[52] specifically typewriters, which he collects with a passion. In, for example, a short note entitled 'Lectures', Hermans talks about strategies of answering the question 'Why do you write?' He would usually respond first by discussing the ridiculousness of the question itself, but there is also another option:

50 Ibid.
51 Ibid. My emphasis.
52 Perhaps his most pathetic statement regarding his relation towards machines is the following: 'It is perhaps my greatest misfortune that I wasn't born as a machine and that I cannot write with light like a photo camera.' (Hermans, 'Paranoia', 219.)

> I reveal that I write because of my love for typewriters. I have always written everything on a typewriter. Screwdrivers and socket wrenches close at hand. When I don't know what to write anymore, I take the typewriter apart. Then put it back together.[53]

Through this short fragment, we can imagine the intimate relation Hermans, an ardent collector of typewriters,[54] has to his beloved writing machine. This has not gone unnoticed by Raaijmakers, who, in a reaction to Hermans' review, sends a letter to NRC Handelsblad which is published on December 1, 1978.[55] In this letter, he degradingly dubs Hermans a 'collectionneur' of machines, instead of somebody with true know-how of the maintenance of machines and technology, and who is therefore unable to judge the value of his work. The rest of the letter is filled with a parody on exactly the arguments that Hermans used against him, false arguments in his view, that clearly seem to have annoyed him. For the moment, this letter ends the discussion between the two, but collectors and 'amateurs' of technology, especially typewriters, will remain the constant target of Raaijmakers' scorn throughout his career, which forms a theme on its own. For example, in METHOD, he states very clearly that 'technical beauty an sich — / without anyone caring about the function or purpose / of the technical construction admired — / has no right to exist.'§72

53 Hermans, 'De laatste resten tropisch Nederland', 416.
54 Which, incidentally, if we follow the line from Friedrich Kittler to Avital Ronell, are, just like the camera, intimately related to the military production apparatus: 'The Remington typewriter and the machine gun are produced by the same industrial firm, and in a certain way they make the same sound.' (Avital Ronell, American Philo, 42)
55 Raaijmakers, Machine lezen.

> It all gets very confusing at the moment when a specific type of perceiver just can't get enough of considering certain 'beautiful forms' of technique as art and seeing their designers as true artists (especially those observant writers and essayists who collect technique as a hobby seem to feel this urge.…).… The summum of joy is reached when a certain category of outsiders — especially collectionneurs of typewriters, photo cameras or toy trains alike — … disassemble, clean, if necessary repair, and then reassemble technical objects with a curious sort of patience (filled with 'love for technique').[56]

Even more than ten years after the hostile initial exchange, Raaijmakers feels the need to disqualify 'those observant writers and essayists'. And that wouldn't even be the end of it.

Let's leave their quarrel on technical expertise aside for the moment and focus on their fundamental difference in opinion concerning the interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. The way in which Raaijmakers' METHOD takes up the Wittgensteinian informative metaphor in order to express the world of technique through petrified language views, is in this sense interpreting the Tractatus from a perspective similar to the latter's later Philosophical Investigations. But Hermans sticks to the logic-positivist line of interpretation of Wittgenstein's work, which cannot tolerate such a 'creative' reading.[57]

56 Raaijmakers, Kleine mechanica van de open vorm, 16-29. My emphasis.
57 See Hermans, 'Wittgenstein's levensvorm'.

Hermans had made the first Dutch translation of the Tractatus in 1975, and had already written several essays on Wittgenstein, interpreting his work as a full attack on anything that is metaphysical and not verifiable through 'hard science' — Hermans himself was trained as a physical geographer. Naturally, this interpretation causes Hermans several problems with the few informative metaphors present in the Tractatus, such as aforementioned 'nail' in the preface and the mystical twist in the final paragraphs, where Wittgenstein seems to talk about exactly those (metaphysical) things one should remain silent about ('wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen', §7).

For example, in Tractatus §4.0412, Wittgenstein talks about a certain 'Raumbrille' (space-glasses). Hermans is thoroughly puzzled and can only state — ironically, in a typical Raaijmakers fashion — 'Het is niet duidelijk wat Wittgenstein hier op het oog (!) kan hebben gehad',[58] literally: 'it is unclear what Wittgenstein had 'on the eye', what he meant here'.

And when commenting in a short note on Tractatus §6.54, which, just before the apotheosis of §7 suddenly deals with the famous metaphor of the 'ladder' that has to be climbed and then thrown over after it has been used. Hermans comments in confusion: 'Is a 'senseless' ladder something you

58 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. Hermans, 176. §6.54 reads in full: 'My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them — as steps — to climb beyond them. He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it'. (Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. Pears and McGuiness, 89). Also compare this to: 'At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him'. (Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 55).

could climb on, and is it actually a ladder?'[59] Rowe tells us in relation to this same paragraph: Wittgenstein

> tries to convey by his prose what cannot be contained in his prose, and what he hopes to bring about cannot take place on the page but only in the reader's consciousness.[60]

This is an observation again equally applicable to METHOD, and the reason for Hermans' puzzlement when faced with Wittgenstein's metaphors and his inability to cope with the 'anthropomorphic use of language' in Raaijmakers' texts. He even issues a warning for the 'pre-Socratic' use of language in 'The Art of Reading Machines'.

> He who wants to follow the example of Heidegger and the phenomenologists, meaning to dig up from the use of language all kinds of sagacious or hidden properties of objects, will only meet deception.[61]

It is Hermans who brings up the German philosopher Martin Heidegger — Raaijmakers does not refer to him in any of his texts as far as I know. And because Heidegger's inquiries into the nature of technology sometimes run strikingly similar to the poetic gist of Raaijmakers' discourse, I would like to start a little excursion, a short voyage, a cadenza if you like, because there resides a remarkable, and irresistable, short-circuit between Hermans' dismissal of Heideggerian

59 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. Hermans, 161.
60 Rowe, 'Goethe and Wittgenstein', 16.
61 Hermans, 'Poetsen is niet stompzinniger dan lopen'.

language and Raaijmakers' 'pièce de resistance' against Hermans.

> **Technology, perhaps more so than any other thing..., is inseparable from catastrophe in a radically explicit way.**
> — Avital Ronell

TYPEWRITER (2)

In 1995, Raaijmakers produces the theatre piece 'Hermans Hand: A Pro Memoriam.'[62] The performance tells the story of Hermans falling after hurting his finger on a vintage typewriter at a flee market in Brussels in 1992. In 'Hermans Hand',

> this minor drama — which was caught on film in a television program about the writer — is elevated by theatrical means to a metaphorical model, which ends in a fatal fall…, a 'via crucis'.[63]

Our excursion will start off with the following question: what is the 'metaphorical model' that 'Hermans Hand' provides us with, and what is it a model of?

In 2003, Jacques Derrida published an essay entitled 'Heidegger's Hand (Geschlecht II)', focusing, in part, on the tropes of the 'hand' and 'handwriting' as a model for thought in opposition to technology in general, and the 'destruction of the word' through 'typographic mechanization' specifically. Enter the typewriter, Hermans' object of desire and cause of his demise in 'Hermans Hand'. Derrida's essay deals with

62 Mulder and Brouwer, Dick Raaymakers, 306-319.
63 Ibid., 307-308.

Heidegger's text 'The Question Concerning Technology', of which we first have to inspect the final pages before dealing with the different emphases that Derrida puts on it in his own essay.

> The frenziedness of technology may entrench itself everywhere to such an extent that someday, throughout everything technological, the essence of technology may unfold essentially in the propriative event of truth.[64]

Here, we get our first taste of Heidegger's language and we can immediately signal the same idea of frenziedness, of unfettered reproduction and acceleration in technology itself, just as we have seen with Virilio. Indeed, we could say that this 'frenziedness' would constitute an important aspect of the essence of technology, the enframing or standing-reserve (Gestell), 'because the essence of technology is nothing technological',[65] and someday indeed this frenziedness might unfold in the truth of the world, and present us the bill.

We remind ourselves here of Raaijmakers' description of technology as 'a chain reaction…that we euphemistically tend to call 'progress'. But this is in fact presents nothing else than a free fall downwards'.[66] A frenzied free fall. Falling is the stupidest movement, makes the harshest sound exactly because there is nothing technical about it, which would be precisely what makes it the non-technological essence

64 Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Technology', 340.
65 Ibid.
66 This volume, 320.

of technology that Heidegger describes. Everything and everyone can drop — and will drop — without one rehearsal or even the slightest intelligence. In fact, obtaining an upright position is literally one of the first steps — next to the acquisition of language – into a 'fully developed' human existence, integration into the symbolic order of society. 'Technology', Derrida concludes from this, 'remains plunged in a fog, for which no one responsible, neither science, nor the scientists, nor man in general'.[67] No one is responsible for the free fall of technology as such. 'Because the essence of technology is nothing technological', Heidegger goes on,

> essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it.[68]

This complementary difference between technology and, this other realm, art, is echoed in Raaijmakers' introduction to 'Hermans Hand': 'The irrevocability of the fall — its fatality — can only be undone by a miracle. That miracle is performed by artists and writers.'[69] This fall of technology, which is the essence of technology, should be countered 'miraculously', and that, if we follow Raaijmakers with Heidegger, would constitute the essence of art. It is therefore the task of the artist to confront technology as such. Not as a 'collectionneur' of antique typewriters or as the

67 Derrida, 'Heidegger's Hand', 36.
68 Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Technology', 340.
69 Mulder and Brouwer, Dick Raaymakers, 306.

'type of artist [who] develops his artistic thinking in such a way, that it keeps in pace with the developments in technique and science'. Because 'that sort of artist will become technique if he doesn't watch out.'[70]

Raaijmakers realises that working miracles, undoing, painstakingly reversing technological processes, and showing their cost, the cost of technology that nobody can estimate, is in fact a job which can hardly counter the sheer force of 'progress': 'Wanting to undo technique, …indeed comes close to a Don Quichotte attitude, yet one does as if one doesn't know better.'[71] Artists and writers ought to wrest themselves from the clutches of technology, from its inevitable fall. But this entails that the artist is critical of technology, but however does not indiscriminately disavow it. Their realms remain ghastly akin.

> From what I tell you, you shouldn't conclude that I would scream along the sideline 'where is it all supposed to lead with photography', and 'wrong, wrong', like some kind of ethicist. Not at all. What interests me is that if one wants understands something about the relation between photography and its user, about the relation between visual arts and photography, one has to be conscious about the aspect of disengagement.[72]

70 Raaijmakers, Schönberger, and Vogelaar, 'Verschuivingen in de slagorde', 23.
71 Ibid., 55.
72 Raaijmakers, De sound man in Frascati, 39-40.

There is also a last warning from Heidegger: 'Yet the more questioningly we ponder the essence of technology, the more mysterious the essence of art becomes.'[73] The more we ponder the endless, frenzied falling that is technology, the less likely it that we will see an opening for art to intervene. METHOD provides us in one of its anecdotal paragraphs with an example. If we keep on focusing on the endless swinging of a pendulum, we, in the end will not be able to say anything more about its movement than 'now, now, now'.§138 Art is in essence 'fundamentally different' from technology, yet also 'akin'; both are — in Raaijmakers' terms — constructions.

This is where the hand, both Heidegger's hand and Hermans' hand come into play. When Raaijmakers comes to discuss the different types of possible constructions, he defines a split between 'technical constructions', which are used exclusively with the hand, and 'artistic constructions', which are to be used exclusively with the eye. One cannot be the other,§68 and while technique is aimed at insight, art dissolves insight, aiming for sight as such.§73

In METHOD, a technical construction is 'an actually executed existence of the hand'.§79 The hand is inextricably linked to technique and to technology: 'One cannot talk about the hand without talking about technology'.[74] This 'hand' is always singular, just like other bodyparts such as 'eye' and 'arm' throughout METHOD, as if they were not strictly human. Accordingly, Derrida makes it clear that the hand in case — Heidegger's hand — is in no way 'just' a body part. Here, we touch on a first approximation of the

73 Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Technology', 341.
74 Derrida, 'Heidegger's Hand', 36.

metaphorical model that Raaijmakers alludes to in his description of 'Hermans Hand'. Heidegger

> always thinks the hand in the singular, as if man did not have two hands but, this monster, a single hand.… This signifies that we are no longer dealing with prehensile organs or instrumentalizable limbs that hands are. Apes have prehensile organs that resemble hands; the man of the typewriter and of technology in general uses two hands. But the man who speaks and the man who writes by hand, as one says, is he not the monster with a single hand?[75]

For Heidegger, the hand is inextricably linked to thinking as Handeln (action) and the manuscript of the hand is the most direct inscription of the word for our gaze,[76] the expression of a thought, of the world, closest to speech. 'It even seems as if the world herself is reporting, / and not the reporter!'§265 exclaims Raaijmakers, when describing the writing motions of the reporter, whose hand rethinks the world. In fact, this connection between thinking and hand is already stressed in 'The Art of Reading Machines':

> The extension of the repeating hand is called a tool; the extension of the thinking hand is an instrument. The function of this instrument is to replace the repeating hand, so the hand can think and drive the instrument.[77]

75 Ibid., 50.
76 See Derrida, 'Heidegger's Hand', 46.
77 Mulder and Brouwer, Dick Raaymakers, 140. My emphasis.

Thinking, speaking and handwriting belong together as 'man's essential distinctions'.[78] The typewriter — in Raaijmakers' sense a tool for the repeating (typing) hand and not an instrument for the Heidegger's thinking (writing) hand — destroys this unity, it hides the hand's 'relation to speaking by pointing and by writing'.[79] In this sense, the typewriter is literally the 'execution of the hand'; the same warning all over again, but in a different guise. If the artist is to use a typewriter to report his findings on the free fall of technology, to show or perhaps even miraculously counter it, he should be well aware of the fact that it is technology, technique itself he is using for it. And, formationally speaking, a typewriter embodies, has overcome the pencil and the pen,§104 and as such, comes at a higher price.

For Raaijmakers the use of technique per se is not enough to execute Heidegger's hand; a pen is also a piece of technology. The execution of the hand obtains Heidegger's dramatic dimension at the moment that man, the artist, does not stand aside, is not just akin to technology, but also desires to share in the essence of technology, and has either become the aforementioned 'collectionneur' of technique or even technique itself. This is what causes Hermans to fall in 'Hermans Hand'. He steps out of line by wanting, exactly with the body part that is most sensitive, the body part that for Heidegger 'embodies thought', and which is inextricably linked to technology already, to touch and therefore short-circuit with the typewriter, the final execution of his hand. Consequently, the only thing left for him to make his own fatal fall. Hermans, by giving up

78 Derrida, 'Heidegger's Hand', 47.
79 Ibid.

his sideways position to the typewriter, the minimal difference or gap with technology that is so vital for any artistic production, undermined exactly the type-writing act he intended to perform with it. And, while he is falling, 'Hermans' body is elevated to the position of being part of a complex steam engine arrangement. There could be no higher honour for him than being driven by the kind of highly polished steam engine he loves so much. An unimaginable tombeau is the result.'[80]

Vincent W.J. van Gerven Oei, 2009

80 Mulder and Brouwer, Dick Raaymakers, 314.

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