

REARTIKULACIJA

UMETNIŠKO-POLITIČNA-TEORETIČNA-DISKURZIVNA PLATFORMA
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ARTISTIC-POLITICAL-THEORETICAL-DISCURSIVE PLATFORM

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Reartikulacija O PROJEKTU / ABOUT THE PROJECT

REARTIKULACIJA preko časopisa, organizacije in kuratorske platforme pripravlja in predlaga razstave, predavanja in predstavitev; skozi sodobno teorijo, kritiko, umetniške projekte ter aktivizem predstavlja samoorganizacijsko strukturo, ki intervenira v slovenski, balkanski in mednarodni prostor. Ta interventna umetniško-teoretična logika (ki povezuje vizualno in tekstualno) omogoča vzpostavitev novega prostora/polja diskurza za kritiko, teorijo in umetniško prakso. *Reartikulaciji* gre za politiko sodobne umetnosti in za vprašanje, ali je sodobna umetnost zmožna poseči in spremeniti kapitalistične odnose izkoriščanja, ki vladajo v širšem družbenem kontekstu. *Reartikulaciji* gre za sodobni diskurz, ki ni omejen le na formo, ampak temelji na raziskovanju in apliciranju novih radikalno-kritičnih vsebinskih strategij. Platforma omogoča povezovanje z drugimi kritičnimi, aktivističnimi, teoretičnimi in umetniškimi subjekti doma in v svetu, ki jih zanimajo oblikovanje in vzdrževanje kritičnega dialoga s konkretnimi družbeno-političnimi prostori. Projekt je strukturiran tako, da omogoča konstantno spreminjajočo in dograjujočo se platformo, saj vpenja konceptualne zasnove posamezne številke/razstave/predavanja v specifičen kontekst ter domačim in tujim sodelavcem prepušča popolno avtonomijo; le-to pa avtorizirajo zgodovina, politika in umetniška praksa vsakega sodelavca.

REARTIKULACIJA je umetniški projekt z jasno interventno logiko, ki vztraja, da je s kritičnim in radikalno političnim diskurzom mogoče relevantno poseči v širši družbeno politični prostor. Časopis je projekt skupine Reartikulacija (Marina Gržinič, Staš Kleindienst, Sebastjan Leban in Tanja Passoni) in se deli brezplačno.

REARTIKULACIJA is an art project of the group Reartikulacija (Marina Gržinič, Staš Kleindienst, Sebastjan Leban and Tanja Passoni). It is based on a precise intervention logic; through contemporary political theory, critic, art projects, activism and self-organization, it aims to intervene in the Slovene, Balkan and international space. The platform allows networking with other political subjects, activists, artists, who are interested in the possibility to create and maintain a dialogue with concrete social and political spaces in Slovenia, Europe and worldwide. The platform is organized on several levels: a journal, creation, production and organisation of exhibitions, lectures, presentations and organisation of auto-educational processes/school for radical theory. The project is structured in such a way to allow for a constant changing and upgrading of each issue/exhibition/lecture according to a specific context and due to collaborators from Slovenia and abroad, who are given full autonomy based on their historical, political and artistic backgrounds.

REARTIKULACIJA takes as a proper credo a process of constant self- and political-artistic-theoretical education that is used for interventions in the social and political spheres with the idea to establish different political and theoretical practices for contemporary art seen as a social practice. The logic of this intervention is a formulation of a contemporary discourse, which is not only limited to formal solutions but is based on research and application of new radical-critical strategies in terms of content. Reartikulacija is an artistic project with a precise intervention logic based on the belief that with a critical, political and artistic discourse it is possible to produce significant changes in the wider socio-political space.

REARTIKULACIJA umetniško-politična-teoretična-diskurzivna platforma.
REARTIKULACIJA artistic-political-theoretical-discursive platform.

REARTIKULACIJA je umetniški projekt skupine Reartikulacija/REARTIKULACIJA is an art project by the group Reartikulacija.

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Tematska številka Časopisa za kritiko znanosti ZGODBA NEKEGA IZBRISA

Tematska številka Časopisa za kritiko znanosti, domišljijo in novo antropologijo – ČKZ *Zgodba nekega izbrisa* vsebuje intervjuje (z Aleksandrom Todorovičem, Aleksandrom Dopliharjem, Robertom Pignoniem in Borisom A. Novakom), avtorske članke (Marta Gregorčič, Vlasta Jalušič, Neža Kogovšek, Andrej Kurnik, Uršula Lipovec Čebon, Borut Mekina, Igor Mekina, Marta Stojič, Imma Tuccillo Castaldo, Svetlana Vasović, Boris Vežjak in Jelka Zorn), obsežno kronologijo izbrisa in upora izbrisanih, zgodbe, recenzije nekaterih kulturno aktivističnih dogodkov, dva dokumentarna filma (dvd) ter fotografije.

Zgodba o izbrisu ima dva obraza. Je zgodba o civilni smrti, o golem življenju, oropnem vseh družbenih, pravnih in političnih standardov 20. stoletja: tako prepovedi ustvarjanja apatridnosti kot pravice do političnega in družbenega udejstvovanja, nedotakljivosti telesa in dostojanstva, pravice do zdravstvenega, socialnega zavarovanja, pravice do izobraževanja, pokojnine, družinskega življenja in združevanja. A zgodba o izbrisu je tudi pripoved o neverjetnem pogumu, umetnosti preživetja in kreativnem uporu, ki so jih v vsakdanjem življenju in skozi dolgoletni skupni boj izkazali prav vsi izbrisani in izbrisane. Krik nevidnih je razrezal temo brezizhodnosti in apatije, njegov odmev pa odzvanja v upanju vseh, ki se borijo za svet mnogoterih svetov brez izbrisov, ilegalnosti, nevidnosti in ponižnosti. Nevidni so si že zdavnaj nadeli obraze. Čas je, da jih skupaj nadenemo še tistim, ki so jim ga skušali odvzeti.



Naslovnica tematske številke *Časopisa za kritiko znanosti*, 2008.
Cover of the thematic issue of the *Journal for Critique of Science*, 2008.

The thematic issue of the Journal for Critique of Science A STORY OF AN ERASURE

The thematic issue of the *Journal for Critique of Science, Imagination and New Anthropology* (Časopis za kritiko znanosti, domišljijo in novo antropologijo – ČKZ) entitled *A Story of An Erasure* consists of interviews (with Aleksander Todorovič, Aleksander Doplihar, Robert Pignoni and Boris A. Novak), scientific articles (Marta Gregorčič, Vlasta Jalušič, Neža Kogovšek, Andrej Kurnik, Uršula Lipovec Čebon, Borut Mekina, Igor Mekina, Marta Stojič, Imma Tuccillo Castaldo, Svetlana Vasović, Boris Vežjak and Jelka Zorn), an extensive chronology of the Erased citizens of Slovenia and their uprising, stories, reviews of some events of cultural activism, two documentary films (dvd) and some photographs.

The story of the Erased is twofold. It is a story about civil death: bare life deprived of all social, juridical and political standards of the 20th century; failure to realise that people cannot be rendered stateless and have the right to be politically and socially active; that they are entitled to bodily integrity and dignity, and that they have the right to health and social insurance, education, pensions, family and social life. However, the story of the Erased is also a story of great courage, of the art of survival and of a creative uprising which the Erased have shown in their everyday life and throughout the many years of their struggle. The cry of the invisible has pierced the darkness of a hopeless situation and apathy, its echo resounding for the hope of all fighting for a world free from erasure, illegality, invisibility and submission. The invisible became visible long ago. It is time now to make visible all those who tried to make the Erased invisible!

Translated from Slovenian by Tanja Passoni.

Marina Gržinić

REARTIKULACIJA RAZMER ALI EVROPSKO-SLOVENSKI NEKROKAPITALIZEM

Prehod Slovenije iz socialistične republike znotraj nekdanje Jugoslavije v neodvisno liberalno kapitalistično družbo je s seboj prinesel tudi vse »bolezni« sodobnega kapitalizma. S tem sta se v 17-letno slovensko zgodovino zapisali izključitev in evakuacija, ki sta na eni strani neposredno povezani s procesom »ugrabljene ustvarjalnosti« s strani različnih ekonomskih, političnih, ideoloških in institucionalnih organov oblasti v Sloveniji, na drugi strani pa s pretresljivimi in obscenimi postopki, ki predstavljajo nezaslišan primer kršenja temeljnih človekovih pravic v Sloveniji in Evropi. Prav zato je treba te točke ponovno jasno artikulirati in jih politizirati, da se pokažejo protidemokratične in rasistične težnje v Sloveniji in širšem evropskem prostoru. Dogajanja v Sloveniji se bistveno ne razlikujejo od politike diskriminacije, deportacij itd., ki jo vodi Evropska unija. Primer take politike je izjava Evropske komisije z dne 14. februarja 2008 o novih ukrepih za zagotavljanje varnosti na zunanjih mejah. Bruselj je predlagal, da se tujcem ob vstopu v Evropo odvzamejo prstni odtisi in da se uvede vstopno-izstopni sistem registracije. Nekateri od teh nadzornih ukrepov se že izvajajo na večjih letališčih v Veliki Britaniji, Franciji, Nemčiji in na Nizozemskem. Po besedah evropskih uradnikov naj bi Evropski sistem za nadzor zunanjih kopenskih in pomorskih meja (EUROSUR) zagotovil večjo notranjo varnost, povečano operativno sodelovanje držav članic pa naj bi še bolj okrepilo vlogo evropske agencije za nadzor zunanjih meja FRONTEX. Zato sta moji tezi dvojni: primera Slovenije ni mogoče razumeti pravilno, če ga ne upoštevamo hkrati kot simptom in ponovno artikulacijo procesa nekropolitike (Achille Mbembe) v Evropski uniji danes, na drugi strani pa kot simptom in ponovno artikulacijo turbofašističnih procesov (Žarana Papić) na ozemlju nekdanje Jugoslavije (ki ga je Papićeva analizirala na primeru Srbije). V svojem eseu *Necropolitics* (2003) Achille Mbembe obravnava prostorske razmejitve izrednega stanja, ki jih razume kot geopolitične razmejitve con, in novejšo mobilizacijo vojnega stroja. Mbembe esej konča s trditvijo, da ne gre več za biopolitiko, pač pa za nekropolitiko. Pri tem je seveda treba upoštevati nekropolotiko hkrati kot simptom in ponovno artikulacijo, in sicer po Santiagu Lópezu Petitu, ki v svojem eseu *A civic democracy: a new form of control* (Civilna demokracija: nova oblika nadzora) uporablja termin artikulacija tako za oznako procesa kot za njegove rezultate. Četudi se zdi, da gre za dva ločena procesa in da med njima ni mogoče vzpostaviti platforme skupne, a prikrite genealogije, menim, da sta procesa povezana in kot taka še učinkovitejša, saj predstavljata širšo politiko prostora Evropske unije. Če se opremo na analizo filmskega gibanja Dogma 95 Nataše Govedić, bi ta prostor lahko označili kot »čudovit fašizem in grda svoboda«. Ali pravkar predlagani ukrepi varovanja schengenske meje ne ponazarjajo prav takih življenjskih razmer v EU danes? Postjugoslovanskega stanja ne gre razumeti kot nekaj samoniklega, ločenega od trenutne situacije neoliberalnega globalnega kapitalizma. Nasprotno, upam si trditi, da ne gre za stanje, ki je zunaj tega okvira, pač pa je to stanje njegov najbolj notranji del.

V nadaljevanju bom izpostavila spremembe, ki vplivajo na stanje sodobne umetnosti, na njene institucije in umetniški trg, zaradi katerega se sodobna kultura spreminja v enega najbolj zatiralskih področij znotraj sodobne kapitalistične družbe. Na eni strani smo danes priča popolni institucionalizaciji področja sodobne umetnosti. Kritične prakse in teorije sodobne umetnosti in kulture so del zelo močne umetniške institucije, kjer mlajša in starejša generacija iščeta možnosti, kako organizirati različne oblike umetnosti in kritike. V resnici pa so vsi tisti, ki predstavljajo novo generacijo, pravzaprav odvisni od starejše generacije, saj prostor upravlja peščica ljudi. Večinoma so to moški in le nekaj je žensk (sicer spolno razlikovanje niti ni toliko pomembno, saj sta obe skupini po večini ali morda v celoti sestavljeni iz pripadnikov belega srednjega razreda, ki so podrejeni moči kapitala in ki prek multinacionalnih korporacij, bank, zavarovalniških družb in vplivnih družinskih podjetij odločajo, kdo bo glavni, občasno pa tudi, kdo od mladih bo izbran, da se prevetri umetniška scena). Isti ljudje so odgovorni za izbiro (novih kuratorjev) in organizacijo najvplivnejših in najuglednejših festivalov, bienalov in drugih prireditvev, kjer se predstavljata umetnost in kultura svetovnega pomena. In isti ljudje vodijo državna in vplivna združenja, sklade na nacionalni in mednarodni evropski ravni in so člani vidnih in manj vidnih komisij, ki so med seboj povezane in se podpirajo. Razlogi za to so preprosti: sodobna umetniška institucija je odvisna od sredstev, trga in zbirateljev, zato ne more ogroziti sistemov moči, saj le-te druži ideologija neoliberalnega kapitalizma, to je ideologija udobnega življenja, kot bi dejala Suely Rolnik. Vsi so ujeti v začaran krog razkošne subjektivne produkcije, so pripadniki srednjega razreda, potujejo in obiskujejo umetniške festivale, kjer dobro pijejo, jejo in se zabavajo. To je skupno vsem strukturam: zasebnim, polzasebnim, državnim ali poldržavnim. Na njihovem dnevnem redu je vselej samo en cilj: zagotoviti si vse več moči, ki temelji na različnem kanaliziranju neoliberalne ideologije, ki željo po udobnem življenju tolmači v jeziku »modne« teorije, ta pa se poslužuje besed, kot so demokratizacija, učinkovitost in razvoj. Skratka, rečemo lahko, da se zaradi globalizacije in informacijsko-komunikacijske tehnikologije količina informacij in kritičnih analiz sorazmerno večja. Zato je pomembno poudariti, da je življenje v nekdanjih jugoslovanskih državah kakor tudi v državah nekdanjega vzhodnega bloka danes organizirano v skladu s standardi, ki jih določa prvi kapitalistični svet. Če je tako, potem bi bilo treba biopolitiko, ki operira in upravlja z življenji, še bolj stopnjevati. Pri biopolitki gre za artikulacijo politike življenja, kjer življenje (kjer ni več pomembno, ali je le še golo življenje ali način življenja) predstavlja ničo stopnjo, zato lahko vanj poseže prav vsaka politika. Danes presežna vrednost in njena kapitalizacija temeljita na smrti (na mrtvih svetovih). V prvem kapitalističnem svetu ne gre za logiko maksimiranja vrednosti življenja, pač pa za logiko, ki omogoča le minimalne pogoje za preživetje, včasih pa še tega ne. Po tej logiki je namreč organizirano sodobno neoliberalno globalno-kapitalistično družbeno telo. Stanje življenjskega minimuma se kaže v trenutnih razmerah v Evropi, ki segajo od zahtev po nadzorovanju procesov prekrvnosti do izgube socialne države, socialne in zdravstvene varnosti, da evropske politike poostrenega nadzora na schengenski meji niti ne omenjam. Na novo predlagani ukrepi za nadzor schengenske meje predstavljajo tiste ločnice, na podlagi katerih se bodo regulirali procesi in politika smrti. Tisti, ki bodo ustavljeni na evropski meji, so že živi mrtveci, ki nimajo več kaj izgubiti, tudi življenja ne. Poostrena in usklajena evropska imigracijska politika, ki omogoča ureditev statusa imigrantov in drugih, je le politika, ki omogoča vzpostavitev sistemov za ubijanje, iztrebljanje in uničenje teh teles brez življenja (če bodo zavrnjena) na schengenski meji.

Sklicujoč se na Agambena in Mbembeja, Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee v svojem eseu *Live and let die: Colonial sovereignties and dead worlds of necrocapitalism* (Živi in pusti umreti: kolonialne suverenitete in mrtvi svetovi nekrokapitalizma), objavljenem leta 2006, obravnava, kako sodobne kapitalistične prakse prispevajo k nekropolitiki. Nekropolitika je povezana s konceptom nekrokapitalizma, to je sodobnega kapitalizma, ki svoje oblike organizacijske akumulacije organizira prek razlastitve in podreditve življenja moči smrti. Nekrokapitalistično zavzetje družbenega pomeni nove načine vladanja, ki upoštevajo pravila korporacijske racionalnosti in se uporabljajo za upravljanje nasilja, družbenega konflikta in množstva. Prepovedan je vsakršen konflikt, ki bi utegnil ogroziti najvišje zahteve kapitalistične racionalizacije – gospodarsko rast, maksimiranje profita, produktivnost, učinkovitost in podobno. Nekropolitika je po mojem mnenju vpletena v vse politike, ki določajo pogoje organiziranja družbenega in političnega prostora postjugoslovanske realnosti. Oglejmo si te primere поблиže. V Sloveniji se proces nekropolitike odraža v dveh situacijah. Prvi primer, ki ga je treba pripeljati na mednarodno raven in ga nadalje politizirati, se dotika vprašanja »izbrisanih«. Osem mesecev po osamosvojitvi, 26. februarja 1992, je Slovenija iz registra stalnega prebivalstva izbrisala 28.000 državljanov. To se je zgodilo dolgo po tem, ko so bili sovražni odnosi med Slovenijo in Jugoslavijo odpravljeni, zato vojna nikakor ni mogla biti opravičilo za odvzem pravnega položaja prebivalcem s stalnim prebivališčem v Sloveniji. Mednje namreč spadajo Srbi, Hrvati, bošnjaški Muslimani, albanski Kosovarji, Romi in drugi prebivalci neslovenskega porekla iz drugih držav nekdanje Jugoslavije, ki so mnogo let, nekateri tudi več desetletij, živeli in delali v Sloveniji. Ti ljudje so nenadoma ostali brez uradnega statusa, njihovi osebni dokumenti so bili zaseženi, razveljavljeni in uničeni, skratka, ostali so brez pravice do dela, brez zdravstvenega zavarovanja in nenazadnje tudi brez pravice do dostojnega življenja. Tako množično kršenje človekovih pravic, ki ga je zagrešila slovenska država, bi lahko označili na več načinov: mehki genocid, administrativni genocid, administrativno etnično čiščenje, civilna smrt, množična denacionalizacija itd. Gre za oznake družbene in politične izločitve v postopkih deteritorializacije in reteritorializacije teles in življenj, ki jih danes že kot primer navajajo učbeniki – ne učbeniki o sodobni biopolitiki, pač pa o nekropolitiki. Taka politična gesta je pripeljala do tega, da je 12.000 članov ciljne skupine (od skupaj približno 30.000) zapustilo Slovenijo, 18.305 izbrisanih, ki so ostali v Sloveniji, pa živi razpetih med dvema oblikama smrti: fizično – kajti brez dokumentov ne morejo delovati – in simbolično – kot posledico strahovitega psihološkega pritiska, ki ga ti ljudje doživljajo zaradi izključenosti iz družbenega, družinskega in javnega življenja nasploh.

Leta 2003 se je slovensko ustavno sodišče izreklo za izbrisane in zahtevalo, da se jim prizna državljanstvo za nazaj in povrne status s priznano veljavnostjo od 26. februarja 1992 naprej. Slovenska desnosredinska koalicija, ki je trenutno na oblasti, nasprotuje odločbi ustavnega sodišča. Vlada Republike Slovenije je ko-

nec oktobra 2007 predlagala osnutek ustavnega zakona o izvajanju temeljne ustavne listine o samostojnosti in neodvisnosti Republike Slovenije v zvezi z izbrisanimi. S tem osnutkom sedanja slovenska vlada kategorizira izbrisane, se do njih vede skrajno diskriminatorsko, zanika odgovornost državnih organov za izbris in odreka izbrisanim pravico do povračila škode. Namesto da bi vlada izbrisanim vrnila ukradeno življenje, uvaja še bolj neustavne, nezakonite in diskriminatorске ukrepe. Tak je tudi predlagani osnutek, s katerim želi vlada »ugoditi« Bruslju, torej Evropski uniji, ki je od nje zahtevala, da se vprašanje o izbrisanih razreši pred slovenskim predsedovanjem Svetu Evropske unije leta 2008 (glej izjavo Mirovnega Inštituta, Ljubljana na http://www.mirovni-institut.si/Main/Index/en/). V podobni situaciji so tudi delavci iz nekdanjih jugoslovanskih republik, ki sicer niso bili izbrisani, ampak živijo v zelo prekrernih pogojih; gre namreč za novi »lumpenproletariat«, ki denimo sploh ni vključen v sindikalni boj za boljše življenjske pogoje, ki jih danes delavci zahtevajo od neoliberalne kapitalistične slovenske države in vlade. Še en tak primer, ki je prav tako vreden mednarodne in nadaljnje politične obravnave, je zadeva Strojan. Številčna družina 31 Romov, od tega 14 otrok, je bila 28. oktobra 2007 prisiljena zapustiti svojo zemljo, ko so lokalni prebivalci Ambrusa in drugih bližnjih vasi obkrožili njihove domove, jim grozili s smrtjo in zahtevali njihovo deložacijo. Medtem ko so policisti mirili množico vaščanov, so slovenski vladni uradniki sklenili premestiti sporno družino. Po mnenju nekaterih skupin za človekove pravice vladna odločitev o odselitvi Strojanovih velja za enega najresnejših napadov na romsko skupnost v Evropi zadnjih deset let.

Če združimo ti dve situaciji, ugotovimo, da je pri razmišljanju o zgodovini kritike umetniških in kulturnih ustanov treba upoštevati tudi družbeni in politični kontekst, iz katerega izhaja Slovenija. Zato je najpomembnejša naloga sodobne umetniške in kulturne produkcije v Sloveniji raziskovalne in umetniške projekte, ki lahko prek takih dogodkov politično in socialno univerzalizirajo t. i. »avtonomni prostor sodobne umetnosti in kulture, ki je posvečen samo ustvarjalnosti«. Na lokalni umetniški in kulturni ravni (tudi na ravni EU) je treba razkriti vseprisotno vprašanje kapitalističnega izkoriščanja, ki je zaznavno tudi v manjših skupinah specializirane nove generacije kuratorjev in umetnikov, ki niso zmžni celotno povezati problema »lumpenproletariata« v neoliberalnem globalnem kapitalizmu s perverzno komercializacijo in specializacijo umetnosti kot prostora, ki omogoča udobno življenje in kjer je umetnost zgolj in samo vprašanje trenutnih trendov in blagovnih znamk. Še več, ti lokalni procesi so še dodatno podprti in institucionalizirani na različnih ravneh s strani evropskega neoliberalnega globalnega sistema, ki od zunaj utrjuje to »postjugoslovansko« stanje. Te specializirane, vodstvene mreže, ki se ustvarjajo prek različnih kanalov, skupin in pozicij, so v večini primerov povabljene, da se pridružijo predstavitvam na ravni Evropske unije in tako tudi same postanejo tržno blago za tisto, kar se predstavlja kot »normalizirano« stanje »medkulturnega dialoga kot temeljne vrednote EU«. V že omenjenem eseu je Santiago López Petit zapisal, da diskurz o regulaciji civilnega obnašanja vključuje in zahteva dvojе elementov: prvi je vojno stanje, to je kapitalistični mehanizem, ki izdaja ukaze na podlagi vojn, drugi pa postmoderni fašizem. Civilno obnašanje, zapiše Petit, je danes le lažen način omogočanja širši populaciji, da intervenira na področjih družbenega in političnega, medtem ko sodobne neoliberalne globalne kapitalistične države poskušajo taka poseganja depolitizirati tako, da enačijo »državljana, ki urinira na cesti« s »protestniki, ki zahtevajo izboljšanje družbenih pogojev življenja«; država jih obravnava le kot dve vrsti zločincev.

V primeru izbrisanih in družine Strojan gre pravzaprav za združitev teh dveh situacij: pogoji, ki določajo obe situaciji, predstavljajo le neskončno izredno stanje. Vojno stanje, kot ga definira Petit, je kapitalistični mehanizem, ki na podlagi vojne vzpostavlja red in zahteva nenehno prepoznavanje posameznega sovražnika. V Sloveniji se ta vojna kaže enkrat v boju proti revščini, drugič v boju proti novinarjem, ki so leta 2007 na evropske institucije poslali peticijo, v kateri so razmere medijev v Sloveniji označili za totalitarne, ali pa v trenutnem boju slovenske vlade proti tajkunom oziroma ultrakapitalistom. Kot trdi Petit, postmoderni fašizem priznava razlike samo zato, da se s pomočjo njih ustvarja enoten red, in dodaja, da obramba osebne avtonomije ni nič drugega kot oblika nadzora; svoboda izbire pomeni, da se pravzaprav nič ne spremeni. Po Petitovem mnenju je demokracija danes ponovna artikulacija vojnega stanja in postmodernega fašizma. Ne gre zgolj za temeljni lastnosti, značilni za države nekdanje Jugoslavije, ampak sta to tudi temeljni lastnosti EU, če se spomnimo samo omenjenega cilja o spremembi politike nadzora. Sicer pa vsaka demokracija, kot trdi Petit, ti dve stanji artikulira po svoje. Danes država v neoliberalnem globalnem kapitalizmu vsiljuje, izvaja in artikulira trdno politiko degovermentalizacije na področjih, na katerih so se nekoč uresničevali skupni javni, družbeni in zdravstveni programi, od katerih je po desetletjih razrednih bojev (v kapitalizmu ni nič podarjenosti) imela koristi večina državljanov, danes pa veljajo za področja, ki jih vlada pušča vnmor. To je bila ideja evropske socialne države, ki je bila za čas socializma živa tudi v jugoslovanskem kontekstu. Danes pa se proces degovermentalizacije (vladnega zanemarjanja javnih, skupnih oz. socialnih področij in njen umik s teh področij) kaže le kot prosta pot do popolne privatizacije javne sfere. Da se prikrije popolna privatizacija javnega sektorja, ki je le učinek kapitala in multinacionalnih interesov, ki proizvajajo nekropolitiko (minimum, ki ne dosega več niti določenega minimuma), se na celotnem ozemlju EU ponovno uvaja cela vrsta ideoloških praks. Država in državni aparat lahko nekrokapitalistične prakse, ki jih izvajata prek nacistične ideologije krvi in zemlje prekrita le tako, da se v specifičnih pogojih in prek točno določenega jezika sklicujeta na nacionalni ponos in pravice Slovencev, Hrvatov, Srbov, Francozov, Nemcev itd. iz 19. stoletja. V ta postmoderni fašizem je treba zarezati še globlje in o postjugoslovanskem stanju razmišljati ob primeru Srbije in Kosova. Zakaj? Ker postjugoslovanskega stanja Slovenije pravzaprav ni mogoče analizirati, če ga ne umestimo v širši evropski prostor na eni strani, in ne povežemo z Miloševićevo nacionalistično in fašistično politiko, s holokavstom vred, ki so ga srbske paravojaške enote in čete zagrešile v Srebrenici in BiH (in to pod okriljem Mirovne misije Organizacije Združenih Narodov) na drugi strani.

Po poročilu humanitarne organizacije Amnesty International iz leta 1998 »A Human Rights Crisis in Kosovo Province. Background: A crisis waiting to happen« (Kršenje človekovih pravic v pokrajini Kosovo. Ozadje: krizno obdobje, ki se še bo zgodilo) se je Kosovu po drugi svetovni vojni in ustanovitvi druge Jugoslovanske države priznal velik del avtonomije. Z ustanovitvijo nekdanje Socialistične Federativne republike Jugoslavije (SFRJ) leta 1974 pa je kot socialistična avtonomna pokrajina uživala skoraj enako stopnjo avtonomije kot ostale republike SFRJ, a brez ustavne pravice do odcepitve od SFRJ. Marca in aprila 1981 so albanski protestniki zahtevali, da se Kosovo prizna kot avtonomna republika. Protestniki so bili s silo zatrti in šele pozneje je Amnesty International ugotovila, da je imel CK ZKS podatke o več kot 300 smrtnih žrtev tega procesa, čeprav objavljena poročila ne navajajo več kot 11 žrtev. Sledila je razglasitev izrednega stanja v pokrajini Kosovo in bolj ali manj poostren policijski nadzor. V poznih osemdesetih letih minulega stoletja je oblast prevzel Slobodan Milošević, sprva kor predsednik vladajoče Zveze komunistov Srbije, pozneje pa kot predsednik Srbije z izrazitim srbsko nacionalističnim programom, ki je bil še zlasti osredotočen na Kosovo. Leta 1989 je ukinil avtonomijo pokrajine in jo kmalu za tem zreduciral na golo upravno območje Srbije. Novi politični vodje albanske etnične skupnosti so bojkotirali srbski in jugoslovanski politični sistem; razglasili so neodvisno »Republiko Kosovo« in ustanovili svoj parlament, predsedstvo in vlado. Še več, ustanovili so tudi ustrezne ali privatne zdravstvene, izobraževalne in druge institucije, ki so izhajale tako iz političnih teženj kot iz gole potrebe, saj so takrat albanske delavce po večini masovno odpuščali (če so zavrnili podpis deklaracije o zvestobi srbskim oblastem). Prav tako je bil v državno vodenem sistemu ukinjen pouk v albansčini. Kosovski Albanci, ki so v nekdanji Jugoslaviji, še zlasti pa v Srbiji, veljali za drugorazredne državljane, so bili produkt – kot je ugotovila Žarana Papić leta 1994 – hegemonističnih nacionalizmov; nacionalni separatizem, šovinistična in rasistična izključevanja ali marginalizacije (nekdanjih in novejših) manjšinskih skupin so praviloma tesno povezani s patriarhalno, diskriminatorno in nasilno politiko do žensk in njihovih civilnih in družbenih pravic, ki so jim bile v nekdanji komunistični ureditvi »zagotovljene«. Nekoliko pozneje Žarana Papić opiše proces, ki je potekal v devetdesetih in v začetku 2000 v Srbiji, takole: »Te [razmere] bom preprosto označila z besedo *turbo-fašizem*«. In dodaja: »Kot vemo, je fašizem zgodovinski termin; zgodovine nacistične Nemčije ne moremo primerjati z Miloševićevo Srbijo. A vendar, post-modernistična in feministična teorija govorita o »izmenjujočih se pojmih«, zlasti kadar nova doba podeduje pojme, ki pripadajo dobi pred njo, in jim še sama kaj pridoda, kot velja za feministični pojem *izmenjujoči se patriarhat*. Po mojem mnenju se ne smemo izogibati uporabi 'velikih terminov', če ti *ustrezno* opisujejo neko politično realnost. Srbski fašizem je imel svoja lastna koncentracijska taborišča, na svoj način je izvajal sistematično nasilje do Drugih, imel je samosvoj kult družine in vodje, svojo izrazito patriarhalno strukturo, kulturo, ki je bila indiferentna do izključitve Drugega, družbo, zaprto znotraj sebe in v svojo lastno zgodovino; za to družbo sta empatija in multikulturalizem tabuja; imel je močan medijski vpliv, ki je podpiral genocid; imel je nacionalistično ideologijo; imel je epsko miselnost, saj je vse *vzel* dobesedno in bil *pokoren* oblasti. Predznak 'turbo' se nanaša na specifično mešanico politike, kulture, 'mentalnih sil' in obubožanje življenja v Srbiji: gre za mešanico ruralnega in urbanega, pred-modernega in post-modernega, pop kulture in 'junakinj', realnega in virtualnega, mističnega in 'normalnega' itd. Ta termin, naj bo še tako naiven ali nedolžen, še vedno vsebuje fašizem v pravem pomenu besede. Kot vsak fašizem tudi turbo-fašizem vključuje in povzdiguje slabšalno poimenovanje, odtujitev in nenazadnje odstranitvev Drugega: Hrvatov, Bošnjakov in Albancev. Turbo-fašizem pravzaprav zahteva in temelji na tej *kulturi normalnosti fašizma*, ki je bila v svoji osnovi prisotna že mnogo pred vojnimi poboji, kakršne poznamo danes.«

Da zaključim zgodbo o postjugoslovanskem stanju kot specifičnem stanju in hkrati združitvenem momentu, ki »naddoloča« – kot bi dejal Louis Althusser – celoten postjugoslovanski prostor in ga neposredno veže na EU, bom gospodarsko, družbeno in politično situacijo v Sloveniji označila kot turboneoliberalizem. Slovenska neoliberalistična ideologija namreč z jasnimi turbo- in klerikalno fašističnimi potezami neposredno in na vseh ravneh preprečuje možnost razvoja socialne države.

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Iz angleščine prevedla Tanja Passoni.

Marina Gržinić

REARTICULATION OF THE STATE OF THINGS OR EURO-SLOVENIAN NECROCAPITALISM

The passage from a socialist republic within the former-Yugoslav state (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or SFRY) into an independent neoliberal capitalist society brought with it as well all the “illness” of a contemporary capitalism. Slovenia therefore displays in its 17 years of independence a history of exclusions and evacuations that is, on the one hand, directly linked to processes of “kidnapped creativity” by various economic, political, ideological and institutional forces of power in Slovenia, and, on the other, to traumatic and obscene procedures that can be termed as éclatant examples of violence against basic human rights in Slovenia and in Europe at large. It is necessary to rearticulate precisely these points, to politicize them in order to make visible antidemocratic and racist processes in Slovenia and through it in the wider EU space. What is going on in Slovenia is not far from processes of discrimination, deportation, etc., similar to the EU politics. An example of this politics is a statement on new border-security measures presented by the European Commission on 14 February 2008. Brussels has proposed fingerprinting for all foreign visitors to Europe, and electronically registering at each entry and exit. Some of these control measures are already being used by major airports in Britain, France, Germany and the Netherlands. A European Border Surveillance System for the external land and sea borders is another possibility for boosting internal security, Brussels officials said. More member states’ joint operations would also see the role of the EU’s border control agency FRONTEX expand. My thesis is therefore twofold: the case of Slovenia is not possible to be properly understood if not enlarged on the one hand as being the symptom and the rearticulation of the process of necropolitics (Achille Mbembe) in European Union today, and on the other as being the symptom and the rearticulation of the turbo fascistic processes (Žarana Papić) in the post-Yugoslav territory (mainly analysed by Papić in Serbia). In “Necropolitics,” (2003) Achille Mbembe discusses the spatial demarcations of the state of exception as the geopolitical demarcation of zones, and the more recent mobilisation of the war machine. Mbembe concludes the essay by arguing that the concept of biopolitics might be better replaced with necropolitics. I am making a reference to both symptom and rearticulation of it according to Santiago López Petit, who in his essay “A civic democracy: a new form of control,” employs the word articulation as a process and as well as its result. Although it seems that these two processes are very different and is not possible to establish a platform of a common, though hidden genealogy, my thesis is that these processes are connected and therefore even more effective as they are part of the wider European Union space politics. This space can be described, if I make a reference to Nataša Govedić analysis of the Dogma 95 film movement, as “wonderful fascism and ugly freedom.” Are not the new proposed Schengen border-security measures precisely picturing such a new condition of living in the EU today? The post-Yugoslav situation is not a condition per se, i.e., a condition separated from the current situation in the neoliberal global capitalism. On the contrary, rather than “outside” of this framework, I can fully argue it is most internal to it.

Let’s in the first part of this essay expose the changes that affect the position of contemporary art today, its institution and the art market due to which contemporary culture is being transformed into the most repressive field within contemporary capitalist societies. On the one hand, what we have today is the complete institutionalization of the field of contemporary art. The practices of critic and theory of contemporary art and culture are part of a very powerful Institution of art where there is a mixture of younger and older generations in “search” for possibilities to organize different formats of art and critique. But in reality all those who are seen as a new generation depend terminally on the old structures; few names are organizing the space, mostly men and some women (the gender division becomes unimportant as both groups of mostly or maybe is possible to say solely white middle class are subordinated to the power of capital that, through multinationals, banks, assurance companies and family powerful businesses, decides who will be part of the core and, from time to time, who among the younger generation will be chosen to refresh the art scene). They are all themselves as well in charge of selection (of who will be the next curators) and organization of the most powerful and notable festivals, biennales and other formats of art and cultural presentations of world wide importance. They are in charge of state and powerful associations, funds on national and international European levels are as well part of such visible and less visible boards that are connected to each other and support each other. The reasons are very simple; the contemporary institution of art depends on money, the market and collectors and will not jeopardize this power; what all of them have in common is the ideology of neoliberal capitalism; this is the ideology of good life, as Suely Rolnik would say, they are caught in the vicious circle of luxury subjectivity production, of being part of the middle class elite, travel around art festivals, eat and drink well, and have fun. This is common to all of these structures, be it a private, state, semi-private or semi-state structure. All of them have only one agenda, power and more power based on different channelling of the neoliberal ideology that translate this strive for good life in the vocabulary of a fancy theory using words as democratization, efficiency, development. In short, it is possible to say that for example because of globalization and ICT technology, the quantity of information and the quantity of critique and analysis rise proportionally. Therefore, coming to this second part of the essay, it is important to state that the horizon that today organizes the lives in the post-Yugoslav condition and as well in the former eastern European block is the “standards” set by the first capitalist states. If so maybe the biopolitics that is operative and is managing this life needs to be intensified. Therefore, instead of talking about biopolitics, we should talk, in Mbembe’s words, about necropolitics. Biopolitics is a horizon of articulating the politics of life, where life (does not matter any more, being bare or life with forms) was seen as the zero degree of intervention of each and every politics. But today the capital surplus value is based on and capitalized from the perspective of death (worlds). Also in the First capitalist societies, the logic is not the maximum of life but the minimum for living and sometimes not even this. It is this logic that organizes the contemporary neoliberal global capitalist social body. The minimum that is imposed is possible to be captured through analysis of all the battles that are going on at the moment in Europe; from the demands to control the processes of precarity, the loss of the social state, social and health security, not to mention the politics of improving measures of control on the Schengen borders throughout the whole EU space. The new proposed measures to control the Schengen borders are seen as those lines of division that will regulate the process and politics of death, those who will be stopped at the EU’s frontiers are already the living dead, those who have nothing to lose not even life. EU’s improved and coordinated politics of immigration and possibility to arrange the status of immigrants and all others is nothing more than the policy enabling to set up a system of how to kill, exterminate and get rid of all these bodies without a life (if being rejected) at the Schengen borders.

In his essay, “Live and Let Die: Colonial Sovereignties and the Death Worlds of Necrocapitalism,” published in 2006, Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee, referring to Agamben and Mbembe, discusses how some contemporary capitalist practices contribute to necropolitics. Necropolitics is connected to the concept of necrocapitalism, i.e., contemporary capitalism, which organizes its forms of organizational accumulation that involve dispossession and the subjugation of life to the power of death. The necrocapitalistic capture of the social implies new modes of governmentality that are informed by the norms of corporate rationality and deployed in managing violence, social conflict and the multitudes. No conflict is tolerable that challenges the supreme requirements

of capitalist rationalization – economic growth, profit maximization, productivity, efficiency and the like. My thesis is that this necropolitics has to be implied in all the politics that lay down the condition of originating the social and political space of the post-Yugoslav reality. Let us just draw in details these elements. In Slovenia, this necropolitics is put on motion in at least two very precise situations. One such case that has to be “internationalized” and politicized further is the so called “erased people” or in Slovenian language “izbrisani.” On 26 February 1992, eight months after declaring independence from Yugoslavia, the new Republic of Slovenia deleted some 28,000 residents from its civil registries. This happened long after hostilities between Slovenia and Yugoslavia had ended, so war cannot be used as an excuse for the mass cancellation of these residents’ legal status. These people, who came to be known as *izbrisani*, or the “erased,” are Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Albanian Kosovars, Roma and others non-ethnic Slovenians originally from other parts of the former Yugoslavia who had lived and worked in Slovenia for many years, some of them for decades. They were suddenly deprived of all official status in Slovenia. Their citizenship papers were confiscated, destroyed or invalidated, which meant that other official documents were also made invalid. As a result, they found themselves deprived of the right to work, to social insurance, indeed the right to live a normal life. There are many names for this massive violation of human rights by the Slovenian state: soft genocide, administrative genocide, administrative ethnic cleansing, civil death, mass denationalisation and so on. These are all names for social and political elimination in the de- and re-territorialisation of bodies and lives in a textbook case of contemporary not biopolitics, but necropolitics. As a result of this policy, some 12,000 members of the targeted groups (out of approximately 30,000) left Slovenia. The 18,305 “erased” who remain in Slovenia exist between two deaths: the physical – since without papers they cannot function – and the symbolic, resulting from the horrific psychological pressure of being expelled from the social context, cut off from their own families and from all manifestations of public life.

In 2003, the Slovenian Constitutional Court proclaimed itself in favor of the *erased* asking to retroactively recognize the erased people and to give them a status since the erasure on 26 February 1992. The right wing nationalistic coalition on power in the present moment in Slovenia opposes the Constitutional Court Decision. In the end of October 2007, the Government of the Republic of Slovenia presented a Draft Constitutional Law for the Implementation of the Fundamental Constitutional Charter on the independence of the Republic of Slovenia, concerning *the erased people*. With this Draft the present Slovenian Government creates different categories of the erased people, it is fully discriminatory towards the erased, enables new withdrawals of statuses, denies responsibility of the state bodies for the erasure and annuls the right of the erased people to compensation. Instead of finally giving a stolen life back to the erased people the Government tries to implement further unconstitutional, unlawful and discriminatory procedures. The Draft is a measure with which the present Slovenian Government want to “solve” the demand from Brussels, from the EU, that the erased problematic has to be resolved before Slovenia takes over the EU Council presidency in 2008. (Cf. the statement issued on the case by the Piece Institute, Ljubljana <http://www.mirovni-institut.si/Main/Index/en/>). This situation is as well connected with the position of those who are not erased but are workers that from former republics are living in the most precarious situation, they are the new lumpenproletariat that is not even included for example in the syndicate demands for better life that are presented today to the neoliberal capitalist Slovenian state and government. Second such case that has to be “internationalized” and politicized further is the so called Strojans, an extended family of 31 Roma, 14 of them children, were forced to abandon their land on 28 October 2007 when a mob from Ambrus and other nearby villages surrounded their homes, threatening to kill them and demanding their eviction. While the police kept the crowd back, Slovenian government officials negotiated the blitzkrieg family’s removal from their land. Because of the government’s role in the forced removal of the Strojan family, the incident ranks as one of the most serious attacks on a Roma community in Europe in a decade, according to rights groups.

Therefore, putting these two “situations” together it is obvious that it is only possible to think about the history of the critique of the institutions of art and culture in connection with the social and political spheres in Slovenia. Therefore, the most important task in contemporary art and culture situation in Slovenia is to develop such analysis and art projects that are through such events capable to universalize politically and socially the so called “autonomous and only to creativity dedicated space of contemporary art and culture.” At the local level of art and culture, it is necessary to detect the universal (meaning EU as well) question of exploitation by capital. This exploitation is visible also in small groups of specialized new generation of curators and artists that are not able to connect transversally and fully the question of the lumpenproletariat of neoliberal global capitalism with the perverse commercialization and specialization of art as space of good life where art is only and solely a question of trends and brands. Moreover, these local processes are enforced and institutionalized by different levels from outside the post-Yugoslav condition, reinforced by the neoliberal global system in Europe. These specialized managerially motivated and through different channels groups and positions established networks are in most of the cases asked to join European Union presentations, being themselves as well changed in the brand of what is seen as the “normalized” – Intercultural dialogue as a fundamental value of the EU – status. In his already mentioned essay, Santiago López Petit writes that the discourse on civic behaviour implies and requires two elements: the first is war state, which is a capitalist mechanism that produces orders based on war, and the second is postmodern fascism. Civic behaviour, argues Petit, is a spurious way of determining today the intervention by the largest population in the social and political sphere, while contemporary neoliberal global capitalist states try to depoliticize such interventions by transforming the “citizen that urinates on the street” and the “protesters that try to improve social conditions,” in equal group of citizens; the state qualifies them as just two type of criminals.

What we have in the case of erased people or in the case of the Roma family Strojan is precisely these two conditions coming together. They present as well a never ending state of exception. The war state as defined by Petit is capitalist mechanism that produces order based on war that needs a permanent individuation of the enemy. In practice, this is a war that, in Slovenia for example, ranges from war against poverty to the war against the journalists, who in 2007 sent a petition to the EU institution describing the situation of media in Slovenia as totalitarian to the present moment when the Slovenian government is in a war against the so-called tycoons or ultra capitalists. Petit says that postmodern fascism acknowledges differences so that they can be used to unify order. In this context, as argued by Petit, the defence of personal autonomy is actually a form of control; freedom of choice means that nothing really changes. According to Petit, democracy today is practically the re-articulation of the war state and postmodern fascism. These are not only the two major features of the post Yugoslav condition, but as well of the EU, if we just think of the mentioned task of changing the control policy. However, each democracy, as argued by Petit, is implementing a specific articulation of these two features. Today the state in neoliberal global capitalism is pushing, realizing and articulating a strong policy of de-governmentalizing sectors of what was seen in the past as public life, social and health agendas of common interest that were after decades of class struggles (nothing is given in capitalism) set for the majority of citizens. It was the idea of the European social state, which was also active in the Yugoslav context in the time of Socialism. Today this de-governmentalizing process is going on with the total and complete privatization of all these public fields. In order to cover this complete privatization and the role of the state in neoliberal global capitalism that is just the agency of capital and multinational interests processing necropolitics (the minimum that is beyond the minimum) a whole set of ideological practices are re-implemented on the whole territory of EU. In order to obfuscate the necropolitical practices through Blut and Boden ideology, the state and its apparatuses, respectively in specific condition and through specific language, knock on the 19th century national pride and rights of Slovenes, Croats, Serbs and as well French and Germans, etc. We have to move further within this postmodern fascism and reflect on the post-Yugoslav condition through Serbia and Kosovo. Why? As the post-Yugoslav condition of Slovenia is not possible to be analyzed if we do not connect it with the larger EU space on the one side, and with the Milošević nationalistic and fascistic politics and as well taking into the story the holocaust by the paramilitary and regular Serbian forces effectuated in Srebrenica and BiH (and safeguarded by the UN peacekeeping forces), on the other side.

As reported by Amnesty International in 1998 in the article “A Human Rights Crisis in Kosovo Province. Background: A crisis waiting to happen” after the Second World War and the creation of the second Yugoslav state, Kosovo was given increasing degrees of autonomy. This culminated in the 1974 Constitution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), when, as a Socialist Autonomous Province it had almost the same degree of autonomy as the constituent republics of the SFRY, albeit lacking the constitutional right to secede from the SFRY. In March and April 1981, ethnic Albanian demonstrators voiced calls for Kosovo to be made a full republic. The demonstrations were broken up violently and Amnesty International later learned that the Central Committee of the League of Communists was informed that over 300 people were killed in the process, although published reports claimed no more than 11 dead. A state of emergency followed for a period and to a greater or lesser extent there has been increased policing in the province ever since. In the late 1980s, Slobodan Milošević came to power, first as President of the ruling League of Communists of Serbia and then as President of Serbia, with a heavily Serbian nationalist program which focussed on Kosovo. In 1989, he succeeded in abolishing the province’s autonomy and soon reduced it to a mere administrative region of Serbia. The ethnic Albanians’ new political leaders boycotted the Serbian and Yugoslav political sys-

tems altogether, declaring instead an independent “Republic of Kosova” and establishing a parallel parliament, presidency and government. In addition, parallel or private health, educational and other institutions were created. Their creation had a political aspect, but also stemmed from necessity, as many Albanian workers were dismissed *en masse* from employment (sometimes after refusing to sign declarations of loyalty to the Serbian authorities), and teaching in the Albanian language was effectively suspended in the state-run system. The Albanians from Kosovo, being treated as second range citizens through all former Yugoslavia and especially in Serbia were a product, as noted by Žarana Papić in 1994, of the hegemonistic nationalisms; national separatisms, chauvinist and racist exclusion or marginalisation of (old and new) minority groups are, as a rule, closely connected with patriarchal, discriminatory and violent politics against women and their civil and social rights previously “guaranteed” under the old communist order. Later, Žarana Papić describes the process in the 1990s and at the beginning of 2000 in Serbia, saying, “I am freely labelling this as *Turbo-Fascism*.” She continues, “It is, of course, known that Fascism is a historical term; that the history of Nazi Germany is not the same as that of Milošević’s Serbia. However, in post-modernist and feminist theory we speak of ‘shifting concepts,’ when a new epoch inherits with some additions concepts belonging to an earlier one, like, for instance the feminist notion of *shifting patriarchy*. In my view, we should not fear the use of ‘big terms’ if they *accurately* describe certain political realities. Serbian Fascism had its own concentration camps, its own systematic representation of violence against Others, its own cult of the family and cult of the leader, an explicitly patriarchal structure, a culture of indifference towards the exclusion of the Other, a closure of society upon itself and upon its own past; it had a taboo on empathy and a taboo on multiculturalism; it had powerful media acting as proponents of genocide; it had a nationalist ideology; it had an epic mentality of *listening* to the word and *obeying* authority. The prefix ‘turbo’ refers to the specific mixture of politics, culture, ‘mental powers’ and the pauperisation of life in Serbia: the mixture of rural and urban, pre-modern and post-modern, pop culture and heroines, real and virtual, mystical and ‘normal,’ etc. In this term, despite its naive or innocent appearances, there is still fascism in its proper sense. Like all fascisms, Turbo-Fascism includes and celebrates a pejorative renaming, alienation, and finally removal, of the Other: Croats, Bosnians, and Albanians. Turbo-fascism in fact demands and basically relies on this *culture of the normality* of fascism that had been structurally constituted well before all the killings in the wars started.”

In order to come to a conclusion about the post-Yugoslav condition as a condition of specificity, but as well a unifying moment that overdetermines, as Louis Althusser would say, the whole space of post-Yugoslavia and connect it directly to the EU, I will call the economical, social and political situation in Slovenia turbo neoliberalism. By presenting an ideology of neoliberalism, with clear turbo and clerical fascistic patterns, it disrupts straightforwardly, and at all levels, any kind of a possible social state.

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BEOGRAJSKA (DRUGA) SCENA/BELGRADE (OTHER) SCENE

Re-load: kratak uvod v BEOGRAJSKO (DRUGO) SCENO, odprti glosar
Sestavljajo jo trije segmenti, ki se medsebojno preizprašujejo skozi lastne sopostavitve. Segment imenovan *Družba – politika: kontekst* vsebuje presoje sociopolitičnega konteksta, v katerem delujemo. V vsako temo vnašamo posamične kontekste, ki so značilni za srbski kontekst: tranzicija, kulturna politika, javni prostor, duhovno-ortodoksno prepričanje, antiintelektualizem, ksenofobija, nacionalizem, narod, mizoginija, potvarjena zgodovina, kvazitradicionalizem, izobraževanje/univerza, državljanska vzgoja, homofobija, turbofolk, prosta trgovina, itd. Segment *Umetnost – kultura: neodvisna scena* sestavljata konceptualizacija in samorefleksija o pojmi, ki se neposredno navezujejo na dejanski fenomen beograjske neodvisne scene. V tem delu so predstavljena poročila o iniciativah, težavah in dogodkih neodvisne scene na področjih sodobne teorije, umetniške prakse in kulturnega aktivizma. V tretjem segmentu, *Umetnost na delu*, so prispevki gostujočih umetnikov.

Ana Vujanović in Marta Popivoda v sodelovanju z Ano Vilenico
ODPRTI GLOSAR – PRISPEVEK ŠT. 02/08

Družba – politika: kontekst – IZOBRAŽEVANJE (Ana Vujanović)
Teorijo in prakso izobraževanja v lokalnem okviru pogojujeta tako lokalni kot tudi globalni kontekst in pripadajoči socialni, politični in ekonomski procesi. Lokalni okvir bi lahko natančno opredelili kot neoliberalni kapitalizem, ki je v postsocialistični Srbiji v tranzicijskem obdobju. Medtem ko razmišljamo globalno in se sklicujemo na tisto, kar je naš osnovni interes – sodobno izobraževanje – bi bilo potrebno poudariti pomemben paradigmatški premik, to je premik od materialne k nematerialni produkciji. Na ta način lahko razmišljamo o tako imenovanem »tretjem sektorju«, kamor sodi izobraževanje; izobraževanja ne smemo ločevati od produkcije znanja in njegove distribucije ter uporabe, kakor tudi ne od spremembe same epistemologije sodobnega izobraževanja. Poleg tega postaja čedalje bolj pomembna tudi vplivna

prevlada digitalne paradigme (tehnologija, kultura, mediji). Lahko bi dejali, da digitalizacija, v katero se vnašajo protokoli in postopki medijske materialnosti, ki so dostopnejši od informacije kot take, razkrivajo vse plasti sodobnega kapitalizma. Razvoj informacijsko-komunikacijske tehnologije pomembno spreminja status informacije, osnovne celice znanja in izobraževanja. Internet omogoča preprost in hiter dostop do informacij, zato se osnovni »alkimističen« element institucionalnega izobraževanja od osnovne šole do univerze izgubi; to pomeni, da mora izobraževanje najti nove postopke, metode, motivacijo in legitimnost za svoj obstoj. V lokalnem srbskem kontekstu je potrebno omeniti uvajanje Bolonjske deklaracije (2003). Kot večina reform, se tudi ta v Srbiji uveljavlja postopoma in počasi. Nasprotniki »Bologne« v Srbiji ščitijo neko imaginarno preteklost, torej tradicionalni univerzitetni sistem, ki temelji na poglobljenem študiju določenega področja. A ta upornost je, na žalost, usmerjena v napačno smer. Omenjeni lokalni argument ne opravi preizkusa stvarnosti: študij v lokalnem izobraževalnem sistemu ni nikoli temeljil na poglobljeno-sti, temveč na neobstoju izobraževalne politike, posameznika pa je zasul z veliko nepotrebnimi informacijami, pomanjkanjem praktičnega dela, iracionalnim povprečnim trajanjem študija (8 let) in brezmejno birokracijo. To je na nekaterih študijskih področjih posledično pomenilo nenačrtovano število kadrov. Po podatkih srbskega Inštituta za statistiko zgolj neverjetnih 16 odstotkov srbskih študentov študij zaključi v rednem roku, več kot 50 odstotkov pa študija nikoli ne konča. Na bergenski Konferenci ministrov za izobraževanje leta 2005 je srbski visokošolski izobraževalni sistem v točkovanju 45 držav prejel zgolj točko več od Andore in Bosne in Hercegovine. Toda zares pomemben podatek o izobraževanju v socializmu je, da je bilo šolanje BREZPLAČNO, kar pomeni, da je bilo relativno dostopno vsem in je torej omogočalo vertikalno mobilnost znotraj družbe. V resnici »Bologna« poglobljen študij brezobzirno nadomešča z učinkovitim šolanjem. Lokalni kritiki »Bologne« so ta »pogled v prihodnost« spregledali. Z uveljavitvijo bolonjskih reform znanje eksplicitno postane tržno blago; to je osnova, ki pogojuje vse vidike »bolonjskega izobraževanja«, od nuje po učinkovitosti, naglici in storilnosti, do brezplačne izmenjave študentov, profesorjev in strokovnega kadra. Ta dilema pa ne vpliva na Evropsko unijo pri definiranju štirih *svobod* z zahtevo po »prosti trgovini z blagom, osebam, uslugami in kapitalom«. Torej, ne zaradi ohranjanja preteklosti, temveč zato, ker se pojavlja radikalna komodifikacija znanja, je vprašanje izobraževanja v evropskem kontekstu vprašanje tema tako za institucije kot za tiste izven njih.

Umetnost – kultura: neodvisna scena – SAMOIZOBRAŽEVANJE (Tihotapljenje znanja!) (Marta Popivoda)
V kontekstu tranzicije (z bolonjsko reformo in novo tržno logiko izobraževalnega sistema) je platforma TkH (Teorija, ki hodi) v sodelovanju z akterji beograjske neodvisne scene pričela intenzivno proučevati procese samoizobraževanja. Posebna pozornost je namenjena raziskovanju in formaciji metodologij samoizobraževanja, kakor tudi proučevanju asimilacije samoizobraževanja in institucionalnega izobraževalnega okvira. Po zaključku raziskovalnega projekta *Samoupravni izobraževalni sistem v umetnosti* (projekt s-o-s), ki je bil izveden v sodelovanju z galerijo Kontekst, je TkH razvila dva nova projekta: *Tihotapljenje znanja!* v sodelovanju z beograjsko Drugo sceno in *Raziskovalni laboratorij: principi in metodologije avto-izobraževanja* v kolaboraciji s francoskim PerformingArtsForumom, dunajskim TanzQuartierjem in skupino Advanced Performance Training iz Antwerpna. Z dolgoročnim projektom *Tihotapljenje znanja!* želimo odpreti razpoke na dominantnem trgu znanja in poseči v obstoječi dominanten sistem produkcije znanja. Zato tihotapimo znanje iz uradnih izobraževalnih institucij v tolikšni meri, da potešimo osebne potrebe in področja kulture v najboljši možni meri. Projekt smo začeli z enotedensko regionalno zimsko šolo, *Tihotapljenje znanja!*, v novem beograjskem kulturnem centru Magacin (Ulica Kraljevića Marka) med 24. in 30. januarjem 2008. Šolo smo zasnovali kot intenziven program delavnic, laboratorijev, predavanj in predstavitev na področju scenskih umetnosti, kjer smo razvijali odnose med uprizarjanjem, kritičnimi teorijami, digitalno tehnologijo in svobodno kulturo. Šola se je vzpostavila kot samoorganizirana pobuda sodelavcev platforme TkH in udeležencev projekta s-o-s z namenom, da deluje kot kolektiven poligon samoizobraževanja. Učni načrt se je torej razvil *ad hoc* in je nastal iz konkretnih, osebnih potreb in zanimanj sodelavcev, brez vodje ali urednika, ki bi projektu nudil znanstveno, teoretično, umetniško itd. legitimnost. Šola je nastala v okviru East Dance Academy v sodelovanju z Multimedijskim inštitutom MAMA in kolaborativno umetniško skupino BADco. iz Zagreba, z zavodom za založništvo, kulturno in producersko dejavnost Maska iz Ljubljane in s pobudo beograjske Druge scene. Celoten program šole je dostopen na http://www.tkh-generator.net/spip.php?breve254. Upamo, da bo šola, ki smo jo ustanovili, dokazala, da je samoizobraževanje potrebno in celo nujno za vsako kritično delo o sodobni kulturni sceni, ki se spreminja hitreje kot katerakoli univerza.

- Dr. Ana Vujanović (Beograd, r. 1975); samostojna delavka (teoretičarka, organizatorka, urednica, dramaturginja, predavateljica) na področju sodobnih scenskih umetnosti in kulture. Poleg tega je glavna urednica *TkH, časopisa za teorijo sodobnih scenskih umetnosti*, Beograd.
- Marta Popivoda (Beograd, r. 1982); programska koordinatorka teoretsko-umetniške platforme *TkH, urednica TkH, časopisa za sodobne scenske umetnosti*, video umetnica in kulturna delavka.
- Ana Vilenica je direktorica ProSfere, pisarne, ki deluje v Pančevu, Srbija, od junija 2007. Vilenica je strokovnjakinja za projektiranje modelov organiziranosti in poslovne postopke in običaje.

Iz angleščine prevedel Jernej Možic.

BELGRADE (OTHER) SCENE

Re-load: a brief introduction to the BELGRADE (OTHER) SCENE, open glossary
It consists of three segments that reread each other through their specific juxtaposition. The segment *Society-politics: context* comprises reflections of the socio-political context in which we act. In each issue, we inscribe one of the concepts that are characteristic of the Serbian context: transition, cultural policy, public space, pastoral-orthodox doxa, anti-intellectualism, xenophobia, nationalism, People, misogyny, fabricated history, quasi-traditionalism, education/University, civil education, homophobia, turbo-folk, free market, etc. The segment *Art-culture: independent scene* consists of conceptualization and self-reflection on concepts that directly refer to the actual phenomena of the Belgrade independent scene. In this segment reports about initiatives, problems and events of the independent scene in the fields of contemporary theory, art practice and cultural activism are presented. The third segment *Art at Work* consists of the contribution by the invited artist.



Ana Vilenica, ProSfera, pisarna za raziskave in delovanje v lokalnem tržišču ekoloških problemov, razglednice, pisarna v Pančevem, 2007/08.
Ana Vilenica, ProSfera, office for research and implementation in the local market of ecological problems, postcards, Pančevo office, 2007/08.

MAREC/MARCH 2008

S F e r a,
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Ana Vujanović and Marta Popivoda in collaboration with Ana Vilenica OPEN GLOSSARY – ENTRY No. 02/08

Society – politics: context – EDUCATION (Ana Vujanović)

Both local and global contexts and their social, political, and economic processes condition the theory and practice of education in the local framework today. It could be precisely defined as global Neo-Liberal Capitalism that is in the Post-Socialist Serbia in its transitional phase. While thinking globally and referring to what is of our primal interest – contemporary education, we should emphasize an important paradigmatic shift that is a shit from material to immaterial production. In this respect we can think about the so-called “third sector,” to which education belongs; education cannot be separated from the production of knowledge and its distribution and use, even not from the change of the very epistemology of education today. Besides, an important aspect is becoming increasingly influential and that is the domination of the digital paradigm (technology, culture, media). It could be said that digitalization – in whose media materiality protocols and procedures of a more open access than solely information are inscribed – unveils layers as those of capitalism. Development of ICT significantly changes the status of the information, the basic cell of knowledge and education. On the Net, accessibility of information is becoming easy and fast, and the basic “alchemical” element of institutional education from the elementary school to the university is lost; thus, education has to search for new practices, methods, motivations and legitimatation of its existence. For the local Serbian context it is important to mention the implementation of the Bologna Declaration (2003). As in the majority of the reforms here, this one is also being introduced very gradually and slowly. What the local “Bologna” opponents are protecting is an imaginary past, i.e. the traditional university system based on profound study of a particular field. However, the resistance points to the wrong target. This local argument does not pass the reality check: studying in the local educational system has never been based on profound study, but on the non-existence of an educational policy, filling one with lots of unnecessary information, lack of practice, irrational average length of studying (8 years) and immense bureaucracy. This resulted in a non-planned number of cadres in certain fields, and according to the incredible data of the Institute for Statistics of Serbia, only 16% of the students in Serbia finish faculty in the planned term, and more then 50% of the students who start university studies never graduate. At the Conference of Ministers of Education in Bergen (2005) in a competition of 45 countries, Serbia attained one mark better than Andorra and Bosnia and Herzegovina for its higher educational system. However, what was really important in Socialism was that education was FREE, which means it was relatively accessible to everyone, and thus making vertical mobility within society possible. The truth is that “Bologna”brutally replaces deep study with efficient training. What local “Bologna”opponents miss is precisely this very “view to the future.”By implementation of “Bologna,” knowledge is explicitly seen as a market commodity; and this is the basis that determines every aspect of “Bologna education,”from the imperatives of efficiency, rapidity and performance, to the free exchange of students, professors and professional cadre. The EU is not affected by this dilemma when it defines its four *freedoms* with the demand of “free movement of goods, persons, services and capital.”The issue of education in the European context is a hot topic, both for the institutions and for those outside of them, not because of preserving the past, but because of the radical commodification of knowledge that is going on now.

Art – culture: independent scene – SELF-EDUCATION (Knowledge Smuggling!) (Marta Popivoda)

In the context of transition (marked by the Bologna reform and the new market logic of the educational system), the TkH platform (Walking Theory) in collaboration with actors of the independent scene in Belgrade began to intensively work on the processes of self-education. A distinct focus is placed on research and formation of methodologies of self-education, as well as questioning its assimilation in the institutional educational framework. After the research-based project *Self-Managed Educational System in Art* (s-o-s project), which was realized in collaboration with Kontekst gallery, TkH started two new projects: *Knowledge Smuggling!* in collaboration with the Other scene (Belgrade) and *Research Lab: Principles and Methodologies of Auto-Education* in collaboration with the PerformingArtsForum (Fr), TanzQuartier (Vienna) and Advanced Performance Training (Antwerp). With the long-term project *Knowledge Smuggling!* we wish to open a temporary crack in the dominant knowledge market and to intervene in the existing dominant system of knowledge production by smuggling knowledge from official educational institutions, within the scope of satisfying individual needs and territories of culture to the greatest degree possible. The project started with a one-week regional winter school, *Knowledge Smuggling!*, which was held in the new cultural centre Magacin (in Belgrade at Kraljević Marka Street) from 24th – 30th of January 2008. The school was conceived as an intense curriculum of workshops, laboratories, lectures and presentations in the field of performing arts, which set forward relations of performance, critical theories, digital technology, and free culture. The school emerged as a self-organized initiative of collaborators of the TkH platform and participants of the s-o-s project, aimed at functioning as a collective self-educational polygon. Thus, the school curriculum developed ad hoc, emerging from the concrete, individual needs and interests of the collaborators, without a director or an editor giving it scientific, theoretic, artistic, etc. legitimacy. The school is realized within the framework of the East Dance Academy, in collaboration with the Multimedia Institute MAMA (Zagreb), collaborative performance group BADco. (Zagreb), Maska – institute for publishing, production and education (Ljubljana) and the initiative of the Other scene (Belgrade). Full program of the school at http://www.tkh-generator.net/spip.php?breve254. We hope that this school, that is just running, proves that self-education is needed and even necessary for each critical work on the contemporary cultural scene, which is changing faster then any university.

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NOVI FAŠIZMI/NEW FASCISMS

Šefik Šeki Tatlić TUJEC V TRANZICIJI KOT ODRAZ KAPITALISTIČNEGA TOTALITARIZMA

Nedavno so pred nekim nočnim klubom v Zagrebu po koncertu avstrijske transvestitske glasbene skupine *Menstruation Monsters* verbalno napadli njene člane. Napadalci so jih zmerjali s psovkami in žaljivkami, da taki »pedri« v Zagrebu niso zaželeni, pa tudi drugih očitkov v zvezi z njihovo spolno identiteto ni manjkalo. Tak odnos, ki se na prvi pogled morda zdi povsem »običajen« homofobičen napad, je v resnici nekaj, kar presega nasilje, ki temelji na spolni diskriminaciji. Neljubi dogodek namreč ni le odraz družbenega vzorca postsocialistične družbe, ki prek kseno- in/ali homofobičnosti relativizira učinke nove razredne ureditve družbe, ki prehaja v kapitalizem, ampak je hkrati tudi diabolichen odraz tistega, kar pojmujemo kot različnost v liberalnem kapitalizmu, ki paradoksalno rečeno, dopušča drugačnost le, če ta v resnici sploh ne obstaja. V okoliščinah, kjer je nekdanji drugi svet izpuhtel v praznini med gospodujočim prvim, kapitalističnim svetom in tretjim svetom, ki je prizorišče mnogih spopadov, je prav pojmovanje drugačnosti postalo subverzivno za samo jedro zahodnega neoliberalnega kapitalističnega sistema, ki v resnici vidi sebe kot raj, v katerem se ta drugačnost bohoti. Zato praznina med temi svetovi ni le vrzel, ki se lahko premosti z gospodarskimi ukrepi, kakor zatrjujejo vladajoči mediji, pač pa je možnost, da se prek nje razkrije pravi obraz demokracije, ki je ujeta v spone liberalnega kapitalizma in njegovega demoničnega svobodnega trga.

Praznina

Oglejmo si pravnjji kontekst, ki nam bo pomagal razložiti figuro tujca. Kadar govorimo o praznini, v resnici mislimo na proces, ki skuša prekriti praznino, jo monopolizirati in premostiti. Proces premostitve praznine v vzhodni in jugovzhodni Evropi je poznan kot proces tranzicije, tj. prehoda neke države izključno v liberalni kapitalizem, hkrati pa je to proces, ki zahteva politično in vojaško integracijo v evroatlantske povezave. Nad vsem tem bedi svobodni trg, katerega neizogibna vpeljava bo tranzicijo pripeljala h koncu. Vendar globalizacija kot proces premostitve praznine na globalni ravni, ki je pravzaprav globalizacija kapitala (globo talizacija kapitala in ne ljudi), zahteva reartikulacijo pojma svobode znotraj demokracije; treba je poudariti, da je prav praznina tista travmatična točka, zaradi katere je drugi (in nikakor ne prvi) svet nenehno v središču obravnave. Od tod tudi vojna, ki jo bije liberalni kapitalizem, da bi vpeljal postideološki kontekst za oba svetova (tako prvega kot tistega, ki to ni). Rezultat takega ravnanja je ustvarjanje

paradigmatske figure, figure tujca, priseljenca ali *aliena*, ki je zmožen živeti v obeh svetovih hkrati. Ta figura je torej posledica širjenja kapitala na nova fizična ozemlja. S tem ko multinacionalna združenja zasežejo gospodarsko infrastrukturo nekega lokalnega prostora, prisilijo priseljenca, da se odzove. Ta izbruhne in zaneti politični spor, kar naj bi bilo v nasprotju s prizadevanji liberalnega kapitalizma. Tako se ustvari kontekst, v katerem same oblike življenja začnejo sprožati konfliktne situacije. Pri podrobnejši analizi te figure ne moremo mimo oblik življenja, kot jih opredeli Giorgio Agamben. Golo življenje (grško *zoe*) pomeni življenje kot tako in je zato primerljivo z življenjem priseljenca, tujca. Čeprav je golo življenje izpostavljeno rasnemu razločevanju, samo po sebi ni predmet rasne kategorizacije. Golo življenje bi na primer lahko primerjali z življenjem afriškega ali azijskega priseljenca, mehiškega delavca v Arizoni, vseh smrtnih žrtev v Iraku, ki so padle zaradi tamkajšnjih okupacijskih sil, homoseksualcev na Poljskem, Francozov afriškega porekla v Franciji, Srbov ali Bošnjakov na Hrvaškem ali pa obojih s Hrvati in Romi vred, ki živijo v Sloveniji. Tu so še v Srbiji živeči Slovenci, Hrvati, Bošnjaki in Albanci in seveda beli zahodni Evropejec med anti-globalizacijskimi protesti. Skratka, golo življenje je življenje vsakega posameznika, ki ne ustreza splošno sprejeti obliki suverenosti. Golo življenje si je treba razlagati s pojmom *homo sacer*, tj. sveti človek, ki se ga lahko ubije, a se ga (za suvereno oblast) ne more žrtvovati. Na drugi strani imamo življenje s stilom (grško *bios*), ki je primerljivo z življenjem v prvem, kapitalističnem svetu. Lahko bi celo rekli, da je to življenje, ki ga proizvaja suverena moč kapitala; gre torej za življenje brez humanističnega ali političnega ozadja. *Bios* ali življenje s stilom, ni nič drugega kot način življenja, torej kategorija, ki ne predvideva rasnega razločevanja in ki je hkrati apolitična. Kot taka je vključena v proces, ki ne le proizvaja tržnih dobrin, pač pa tudi krepi suvereno moč kapitala, bodisi ko ta pošiljuje v Iraku, podpira parlamentarne volitve kot poslednjo demokratično prakso ali ko preprosto ignorantsko živi naprej svoje udobno življenje in si ustvarja ugodje po svoji meri. Tujec se porodi prav med tema oblikama življenja – golim in modalnim. Nad golim življenjem se nasilje lahko izvaja, ne da bi bil kršitelj zanj kaznovan, zato je to življenje izpostavljeno taki obliki nasilja, ki k suvereni oblasti, ki to nasilje proizvaja, ne prispeva ničesar. Modalno življenje (*bios*) je po drugi strani tudi predmet nasilja, a tu gre za nasilje, s katerim se utemeljuje suverena oblast, ki ga tudi izvaja. To razlikovanje v praksi pomeni, da smrt desetih migrantov ne šteje nič v primerjavi z desetimi ubitimi vojaki. V primeru slednjih je dejstvo, da so umrli, povsem drugačna zgodba. Tujec je torej figura, ki se znajde na križpotju, kjer lahko izbere le obliko nasilja, ki ga bo deležen. Poskušajmo to pojasniti tako, da opišemo kontekst. V času, ko vodilni mediji veselo razglašajo »konec ideologije« in ko se je celotna družba spremenila v tovarno (Antonio Negri), se za edino pomembno družbeno dinamiko šteje interakcija med oblikami življenja.

Trenje in ne navzkrižje med temi paradigmatskimi oblikami življenja ob robovih praznine danes predstavlja prevladujočo družbeno dinamiko. To trenje je zgolj kompenzacija za družbeni red, ki noče priznati, da je njegov lastni razkroj posledica pomanjkanja etičnosti liberalnega kapitalizma, saj je nenazadnje prav liberalnokapitalistična etika tista, ki spodnaša družbo kot politični dejavnik, in sicer tako, da organizira patetično skupnost posameznikov, ujetih v lastno pozicioniranje znotraj tega trenja. Ti subjekti brezupno ščitijo svojo pozicijo tako, da zagovarjajo etiko liberalnega kapitalizma in s tem preprečujejo, da bi se ta razkril kot ideologija. Njihova travma je, da se le-ta lahko predstavi kot – travma. Kot je dejal Lacan, travma ne zavaja, a je kljub temu problematična, ker je pomanjkljiva. Če parafraziramo Agambena, travma o razgalitvi travme pomeni, da svetost življenja, ki vključuje temeljne človekove pravice in je danes predstavljena kot nasprotje suvereni oblasti, pravzaprav predstavlja podrejenost življenja moči smrti; gre za življenje, ki obstaja le v odnosu do stigmatizacije (Agamben, 2006: 76). Pravzaprav je danes ta odnos stigmatizacije nad golim življenjem in modalnim življenjem, ki sta ga vsilila logika liberalnega kapitalizma ter njegov suvereni monopol nad definicijo življenja, še edini politični konflikt oz. proces, ki je sestavljen iz paradigem ali, če želite, praks izključevanja in vključevanja. Življenje s stilom torej ni samo po sebi že vključeno v kapitalistični proizvodni način, kakor tudi ni golo življenje iz njega izključeno; položaj obeh je odvisen od zavzetja odnosa do stigmatizacije s strani samega objekta eksploatacije. Potemtakem ne golo ne modalno življenje nista politična subjekta, ampak sta objekta stigmatizacije.

Če se vrnemo na uvodno zgodbo o napadeni glasbeni skupini, lahko rečemo, da se mora subjekt iz jugovzhodne Evrope (točneje s Hrvaške) kot objekt kapitalistične eksploatacije ali kot subjektiviteta, ki želi postati ta objekt, odzvati na tuje telo transvestita. Ta ne predstavlja ne golega ne povsem modalnega življenja. Njegov politični potencial je razpet med tema biološko-socialnima skrajnostma. Homofobni državljani Hrvaške v tranziciji v figuri transvestita ne vidi groznje zato, ker naj bi ta figura predstavljala neko neposredno politično opcijo, ampak zato, ker jo predstavlja posredno. Hrvaška se navzven predstavlja kot država zahodnih vrednot, hkrati pa je to država, ki jo bremenijo zelo močna verska dogma, arhaične družbene vrednote in ksenofobija. Biti Zahodnjak v takih okoliščinah pa je neznosno težko. Napad ponazarja resentment kot ambivalentno čustvo, kjer je oboževani objekt hkrati zaželen in osovražen; v tem primeru je Zahodnjak oboževan, obenem pa tudi osovražen zaradi močno zakoreninjenih čustev, ki napadalcem onemogočajo, da bi v celoti sprejeli, kar ponuja Zahod. Če smo še bolj precizni, tranzicijske družbe vidijo v Zahodu podpornika homofobične oziroma diskriminatorne fantazme. Napad se tako ni zgodil le zaradi kompenzacije za travmo, izhajajoče iz države, ki se je »osvobodila« izpod enega jarma, tj. državnega socializma, da bi zaživel pod drugim, še nevarnejšim od prejšnjega (pod kapitalizmom, v katerem napadalcu nikakor ne uspe postati *bios*), ampak je napad hkrati posledica nespoznanja, da je *passage de l’act* sam na sebi nesmiseln. Na eni strani imamo subjektivnost napadalca, ki predstavlja prevladujoči družbeni vzorec na Hrvaškem in je tesno povezan s tamkajšnjo konzervativno versko dogmo. Ta se želi na vsak način uveljaviti kot »del zahodne kulture«, nikakor pa se ne more sprijazniti z vsem, *kar ponuja Zahod*, ker bi s sprejetjem zahodne dekadence utegnila uničiti tradicijo lastne države. Na drugi strani pa napadalec pozdravlja prav tisti Zahod oz. prvi svet, ki spodbuja segregacijo in tržno pogojeno diskriminacijo. Kot bi dejal Nietzsche, ta subjektivnost ne preide k dejanju, ampak se kot prizadeti objekt *odzove* na fantazmo prvega sveta tako, da napade figuro, ki ni ne izključeno golo življenje ne popolnoma vključeno modalno življenje Zahoda, temveč je ta figura tudi na Zahodu percipirana kot objekt stigmatizacije, skratka kot *alien*. Napadalec se odzove natanko tako, kot bi to storil Zahodnjak, *če bi moral, vendar običajno mu ni treba*, ker je njegov *presežek* že vključen v obliki golega življenja, to je v pomilovanja vrednem položaju vzhodnoevropskih družb, ki hrepenijo po tem, da postanejo *bios*, da postanejo objekt eksploatacije zahodnega liberalnega kapitalizma. Vloga homofobnih zagrebških napadalcev je potemtakem podobna vlogi pakistanske tajne službe, ki ji ameriške sile dovolijo zasliševati (beri: mučiti) iraške upornike.

Drug primer načelnih nasprotij, za katerimi trpijo tranzicijske družbe, so odzivi Hrvatov na Spielbergov film *Schindlerjev seznam*. Ko so ga pred nekaj leti prvič predvajali na hrvaški nacionalni televiziji, je nekaj državljanov poklicalo na televizijsko postajo in se pritoževalo, da so podnapisi v srbsčini in ne v hrvaščini, čeprav so razlike med jezikom neznatne. Nadvse nenavadno se zdi, da se nekdo, ki želi gledati film o rasnem in etničnem holokavstu, hkrati pritožuje nad nekaj besedami, ki pripadajo drugi etnični skupini. Ponovno gre za tisto čustvo, ki sprejme nek kulturni dosežek samo zato, ker prihaja iz prvega sveta, hkrati pa ostro napada, kar je v prvem svetu pravzaprav prepovedana misel (*denkverbot*). Potemtakem bi dejanje napadalca lahko pojasnili takole: ta se enkrat znajde v vlogi postsocialistične vzhodnoevropske družbe, spet drugič, *mutatis mutandis*, pa v vlogi prvega sveta. Skratka, ujet je v proces racionalizacije novega gospodarja – označevalca, etike liberalnega kapitalizma. Kot poudarja Marina Gržinić, ima ta subjekt dvojno vlogo: predstavlja ontološko celovitost v absolutnem oženuju subjektivnosti in prekinitev vezi med subjektom in realnostjo (Gržinić, 2005: 37). Na tem mestu se srečamo z analogijo, na katero prav tako opozarja Gržinićeva. Podobno kot v holivudskih filmih, kjer glavni igralec po akciji, ki povzroči kaos, namesto da bi obrisal mizo in vzpostavil red, uniči vse s popolnim izbrisom, z dejanjem, znanim kot »čiščenje terena« (prav tam). Vzhodnoevropsko golo življenje, ki si prizadeva postati *bios* ali objekt kapitalistične eksploatacije, sebe postavi v odnos do praznega prostora, ki ločuje dva svetova, in v odnos do življenja, ki predstavlja to praznino, tj. življenje *aliena*. Tako se ne povsem vključene vzhodnoevropske subjektivnosti nanašajo na še neizrečeno liberalnokapitalistično ideologijo, kjer se prav zato, ker se ta ne razglaša kot taka, odzovejo in »očistijo teren« tistih, ki so s strani te iste ideologije percipirani kot neproduktivni del prvega sveta. V našem primeru je to transvestit. Golo življenje, ki prehaja v *bios*, »očisti teren« za svojega gospodarja in namesto njega. V tem procesu se jugovzhodnoevropsko golo življenje zavestno postavi v položaj evropskega *presežka*. S tem se *ne obregne le* ob tiste, za katere meni, da so krivi, da je sam le golo življenje, pač pa hkrati napade domnevni *primanjkljaj* prvega sveta, po katerem hrepeni. Ko govorimo o praznini, lahko vidimo, da je etični odnos prevladujočega prvega sveta do *aliena* – ki ga patetično oponašajo jugovzhodnoevropske satelitske države – pravzaprav odnos prvega sveta do praznine, ki ne presega puhlosti praznine, ampak jo naredi bolj znosno. Odnos vzhodnoevropske subjektivnosti do *aliena* kot figure, ki predstavlja praznino, bi lahko primerjali z odnosom Toma Waitsa (v vlogi Renfielda) v Coppolajevem filmu *Dracula* iz leta 1992. Tom Waits v vlogi Renfielda, brezupnega sužnja Drakule, nesrečno tiči v grajski ječi, kjer je insekte in hrošče. Skratka, je življenje, da bi ugodil gospodarju, ki mu obljubi, da ga bo naredil nesmrtnega, vampirja. Zanimivo se zdi, da zdajšnji narodi jugovzhodne Evrope gledajo na socializem kot na »ječo narodov«. Vzhodnoevropska subjektivnost »je« dostojanstvo življenja (insekte) in predstavlja praznino, ki je posledica globalizacije kapitala, da bi jo njen novi gospodar, kapitalizem (vampir)

sprejel kot sebi enako; a samo zato, da bo uničevala življenja tistih, ki ne ustrezajo liberalnokapitalistični definiciji življenja. To je primer dojemanja tujca v vzhodnoevropskih državah, ki tako figuro ustvarijo zato, ker same niso zmogne sprejeti novega razrednega antagonizma in tržno pogojene segregacije. Sadistični odnos do *aliena* (Drugega) se pokaže kot spriena premostitev travme od razrednih h kulturnim razlikam. Potemtakem tranzicija vzhodnoevropskih držav nikakor ni prehod v neko romantizirano različico demokracije, pač pa v sam kanibalistični kapitalistični stroj.

Demokracija kot ideologija

Demokracija v takšnem kontekstu ni krinka, pod katero se skriva liberalni kapitalizem, ampak je diabo-lična senca, klovn morilec, ki učinke kapitala relativizira tako, da vzpostavlja odnos stigmatizacije *kot* od-nos, kjer kršitev človekovih pravic v imenu zaščite demokracije postane norma. Pa naj gre za komuniste, transvestite, geje ali pa kot vedno za Žide. (Tudi prvi hrvaški predsednik, Franjo Tudjman, se je denimo v procesu demokratizacije Hrvaške »ponosno« pohvalil, da njegova žena ni ne Srbkinja ne Židinja.) Kot trdi Alain Badiou, je demokracija norma, ki je zakodirana v odnosih subjektov do liberalne države. V primeru Hrvaške je demokracija norma, zakodirana v svobodi subjekta, ki se sme zoperstaviti domnevnemu so-vražniku objekta svoje lastne diskriminatorne fantazme. Objekt te fantazme je seveda svoboda, ampak ne vsakršna, pač pa taka, ki omogoča izvajanje sadističnega dejanja zoper tiste, ki niso del te fantazme. Golo življenje postane življenje s stilom tedaj, ko napade objekt, ki golo življenje ločuje od življenja s stilom. Demokracija, ki se predstavlja kot sistem enakosti in odgovornosti posameznika, predvideva tudi delno vključitev *aliena*, a je popolnoma neprizanesljiva do drugačnosti kot take. Neoliberalni režim uradno sicer podpira drugačnost Drugega, vendar ga takoj, ko v njem opazi nekaj izvorno drugačnega, segregira in njegovo drugačnost dovoljuje samo, če je ta del že segregirane drugačnosti. To se jasno pokaže v ideo-loškem aparatu filmske industrije. Kot ugotavlja Gržiničeva, je v filmu *Alien* Ridleyja Scotta odnos človek – pošast mogoč še le tedaj, ko Ripley (Sigourney Weaver) odkrije, da je v resnici polčlovek, hibrid, in ne človek. Ali nismo taki ideološki podstati priča v današnjih demokracijah, ki so pravzaprav uglašene na utilitaristične strune in objektivizirane tako, da ustrezajo zakonu? Francoska vlada je pred kratkim imi-grantskim družinam, prosilkam za vstopno vizo, predlagala, da opravijo test DNA in s tem dokažejo, da je njihova prošnja za pridobitev vize utemeljena. Čeprav naj pregledi ne bi bili obvezni, je povsem verjetno, da imigranti, ki bodo pregled zavrnili, vstopne vize ne bodo prejeli.¹

Kaj se od take prakse, razen tega, da je ta povsem hipokritska, še lahko naučimo? S posrednim pritiskom na tujca (torej na figuro, ki predstavlja praznino), da opravi pregled DNA, režim na eni strani ustvarja bi-ološko pogojeno segregacijo, na drugi strani pa »domačega« tujca opominja, da pripada tretjemu svetu in da sicer podpira njegovo »integracijo« skozí odnos stigmatizacije, vendar pod pogojem, da ta odnos povsem sprejme tudi tujec sam. Potemtakem ne gre za »civilizacijski spopad«, pač pa je »spopad« upora-bljen kot sredstvo za racionalizacijo učinkov globalizacije. Pregledi DNA so nazoren primer metarasizma, ki ga vpelje Etienne Balibar. Metarasizem pomeni sprejetje Drugega, vendar le pod pogojem, da ta ostane na zadostni razdalji, od koder ne more ogroziti udobja modalnega življenja, tj. *biosa* (npr. belca). Odličen primer problemov, s katerimi se soočajo tujci, so nemiri v predmestjih francoskih mest. Tamkajšnje spore v osnovi ni povzročila neka verska dogma, ampak so nastali kot posledica tržno pogojene segregacije po-pulacije, ki ni vključena v kapitalistični odnos stigmatizacije. Ta populacija, izključena iz francoske družbe, predstavlja politični dejavnik, kar je za oblast moteče. Ideologija liberalnega kapitalizma potemtakem presegá starejšo obliko rasistične kategorizacije s tem, da prizna golo življenje za drugačno samo tedaj, ko si le-to prizadeva postati življenje s stilom. V nasprotnem primeru je golo življenje *alien*, do katerega se vede skrajno totalitaristično. Kot bi dejal Alain Badiou: »Tvojo drugačnost sprejemem samo, če postaneš jaz.« Iz tega sledi, da golo življenje lahko postane drugačno, tujec pa ne.

Če parafraziramo Agambena, (današnji) politični prostor suverenosti temelji na dvojni izjemi: na presežku profanega v religioznem in na presežku religioznega v profanem (Agamben, 2005: 76). Ta trditev se ne nanaša na institucionalizirano religijo kot tako, ampak na neoliberalno kulturo, kjer je Bog blago. *Homo sacer*, trdi Agamben, je izpostavljen silovitemu nasilju, ki se izvaja onkraj zakona in žrtvovanja (Agamben, 2005: 78). Četudi je *homo sacer* objekt silovitega nasilja, pa ni istoveten s tujcem. Tak postane šele v pri-meru, da ne sprejme odnosa stigmatizacije ne glede na svojo versko pripadnost. Glede na število padlih v Iraku bi Iračane upravičeno lahko poimenovali *homo sacer*, vendar Iračani niso tujci, ker niso bili žrtvovani demokraciji, v imenu katere so bili ubiti. Nasprotno, demokraciji so žrtvovani tisti, ki ubijajo golo žvlje-nje; vse to z namenom, da bo le-to sprejelo demokracijo. Podobno bi lahko dejali, da se je emancipacija Afroameričanov začela prav tedaj, ko so ti postali predmet novačenja za ameriško državljansko vojno. Če povzamemo, golo življenje, ki se ga ubija in ne žrtvuje, ni istovetno s tujcem. Golo življenje ni izključeno iz družbe zaradi rasne, spolne, ekonomske ali kulturne segregacije, kakor tudi modalno življenje vanjo ni kar takoj vključeno. Še huje je, da se golo življenje v družbo vključuje postopoma in da modalno ostaja vključeno v kapitalistično matrico, hkrati pa sta obe obliki življenja izpostavljeni stigmatizaciji oz. lahko prevzameta položaj tujca, ČE se politizirata, torej če zahtevata politično moč, kar ni v skladu s prevladujo-čo ideologijo liberalnega kapitalizma. Tujec na poti v modalno življenje ALI v golo življenje, ki si prizadeva postati *bios*, življenje s stilom, preneha biti tujec. Tujec, ki želi biti vključen, se depolitizira in postane vključen, vendar le kot apolitična entiteta, kar *bios* pravzaprav že je. Žal se v takem primeru emancipacija pokaže kot zahteva po vključitvi v liberalnokapitalistično ideologijo. Emancipacija v kulturnem konte-kstu, ki je predvsem ideologija liberalnega kapitalizma, pa naredi ta proces viden.

Emancipacija je diskriminacija

Liberalni kapitalizem kot totalitarni sistem razkrije svoj pravi obraz, ko začne golo življenje predstavljati kot vrednost, kot blago, in ko potrdi lastno vključenost, medtem ko ostaja tujec predstavnik tiste oblike življenja, ki se ne more predstaviti kot blago. To se še zlasti dogaja na področju, ki je trenutno najmočnejše podvrženo kapitalistični kolonizaciji, to je kultura. Zato ni odveč trditi, da je tujec oblika življenja, *ki se ne more predstavljati* kot vrednost ali blago. Če se zdaj preusmerimo v to, kaj se je pravzaprav zgodilo s per-cipiranjem odmevnejših emancipacijskih gibanj, vidimo, da se je namesto politične agende emancipiralo življenje kot oblika življenja, torej življenje kot kulturni objekt in ne kot politični subjekt. Danes nismo pri-ča emancipacijski politiki Martina Lutherja Kinga, ampak figuri Afroameričana npr. iz TV-serije *Kevin Hill*, v kateri je glavni igralec Kevin uspešen odvetnik, ki živi z ljubimcem, prireja zabave v prijetnem stanovanju in se bori za korporacijske pravice. To je preprost primer, kako se golo življenje sprijazni z dejstvom, da postane življenje s stilom, ki se navzven predstavlja kot uspešna emancipacija. Da ne omenimo zatona hip hop kulture, ki je iz politično motiviranega poslanstva v osemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja zapadla v groteskno slavljenje potrošniškega načina življenja. Prvi kapitalistični svet zahteva od vseh tistih, ki že-lijo postati del njega, da se odpovejo političnim ciljem, ki ne pripadajo prevladujočemu neoliberalnemu kapitalističnemu diskurzu. Instantna emancipacija, ki je drugo ime za vključitev golega življenja in prega-njanje tujcev, pa ne vključuje izvornih kulturnih razlik, ki bi se utegnile sprevreči v *politične* zahteve, ampak dovoljuje samo tiste razlike, ki demokraciji omogočajo, da se navzven predstavlja kot strpen družbeni sistem. Zato se mora *alien*, tujec, ki je izključeno golo življenje, rekodirati in spreobrniti, ne le tako, da bo suverenost države na njem utrjevala svoj položaj, ampak da bo tudi kapitalistična suverenost ponovno potrdila svojo nepotešljivo lakomnost po osvajanju novih ozemelj. Primer takega procesa je britansko podjetje, ki proizvaja igrače v obliki bakterije Ebola, virusa HIV in podobnih mikrobov (ki predstavljajo tudi percepcijo Afričana, Arabca, Orientalca, Žida in Evropejcev) ter ponazarja, kako kapitalistični totalita-rizem preoblikuje drugega, da postane sprejemljiv in ne ogrožajoč. Tujca dobesedno preoblikuje v igračo, v predmet ugodja in užitka, torej v nekaj, kar je v popolnem nasprotju s tistimi, ki so že vključeni.

V praznem prostoru med svetovi je politični konflikt ukinjen v imenu kulture, v imenu ozemlja, kjer so neplodna prizadevanja za življenje s stilom in njegovo predstavljanje drugim kot neke ideologije postala tako podružbljena, da je to še edina politika, ki nam je ostala. V kontekstu pop kulture velja omeniti po-pularno TV-serijo *Seks v mestu*, ki »izkorišča naravo odnosov« v vmesnem času med zabavami, seksom in nakupovanjem čevljev znamke Manolo Blahnik. S tem, ko poveljuje nihilističen odziv posameznika na neformalno zahtevo, ugrablja sam pojem individualnosti. Z drugimi besedami – monopolizira definicijo individualnosti in jo postavlja za normo, ki se jo priznava samo, če se jo hkrati krši. Zato je vloga Carrie Bradshaw bistveno bolj nevarna kot vloga Busha, Angele Merkel, Sarkozyja in Blaira skupaj. Kaj ima to pravzaprav opraviti s pojmom tujca? Gre za ponazoritev tega, kar liberalni kapitalizem zahteva od golega življenja. Namreč to, da se golo življenje kodira v matrico kot subjektiviteta, ki je nato prepuščena objek-tivni matrici hiperkapitalistične nematerialne tovarne – tovarne za proizvodjanje ničā. Kot trdi Hegel, obča volja vključuje individualno voljo, ki je podrejena obćim zakonom in obćemu ustvarjanju, individualna zavest pa se zaveda, da je del obće zavesti. Zaveda se, da sta njena objekta zakon, ki ga je uvedla, in stvar-jenje, ki ga je ustvarila, s prehodom k dejanju in z ustvarjanjem objektov pa ne ustvarja nič individualne-ga, ampak samo zakone in državne predpise (Hegel 1974: 343). Golo življenje, ki je še naprej izključeno iz kapitalistične proizvodne matrice, je ničta faza življenja s stilom; golo življenje bi lahko postalo *bios*,

vključeno je lahko le, če opusti svojo politično agendo. Če tega ne stori ali se ne zave, da ima to možnost – ki v resnici ni nikakršna možnost –, postane *alien*, tujec, ki z izpostavljanjem svoje razpetosti v praznini med dvema svetovoma razgalja etiko teh svetov. Trenje med golim in modalnim življenjem, ki bi moralo priversti do prehoda prvega življenja v drugo, omogoča monopol kapitalizma nad definicijo življenja. Kot lahko vidimo, je emancipacija postala diskriminatorna praksa, saj deluje tako, da golo življenje popolno-ma podredi modalnemu; subjektiviteta ne more biti nič drugega kot odraz izprijenega sistema, kateremu se je predala. *Alien* se temu upre, zato ostaja tujec. Znano trditev Gayatri Spivakove, da je izključenost Drugega iz Evrope izrednega pomena za vzpostavitev evropskih epistemoloških režimov, saj temelji na pojmovanju, da evropski razlašćenci (tiste podentitete, ki si jih je Evropa podjarmila) itak ne morejo govo-riti, bi bilo treba nadgraditi s trditvijo, da Drugi v resnici lahko govori, vendar vse, kar lahko reče, je »DA«. To je *spiritus movens* prvega kapitalističnega sveta in nenazadnje bistvo same demokracije. Kako ukrepa-ti? Golo življenje ne sme postati *bios*, ampak mora ostati *alien*, tujec, konfliktno bitje, ki si pripravi svojo politično agendo in s tem prepreči, da bi to namesto njega storil liberalni kapitalistični stroj.

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Šefik Šeki Tatlić ALIENTHIN TRANSITION AS A REFLECTION OF CAPITALIST TOTALITARIANISM

Some time ago, a few members of the Austrian transvestite band *Menstruation Monsters* were attacked in front of a Zagreb night club after holding a concert there. The attackers cursed them and shouted that they did not need any fags/gays in their town along with other offensive statements related to the sexual identity of the band members. Although at first glance this situation might look like a “classical” homophobic attack, in fact it reflects a much deeper problem that spreads far beyond the boundaries of sexually based violence. This incident reflects not only a social pattern in which post-socialist society through xeno-/homophobia, makes relative the effects of the newly imposed class order brought on by the transition to capitalism, but primarily reflects the very diabolical nature of perceptions of difference in liberal capitalism, where differ-ence is allowed to exist as such only when it is, paradoxically, not a difference at all. In a situation where the once existing Second world has vanished in a void, somewhere amid the dominant capitalist First world, the West, and the Third World, a resource of rich battlefield territories, it is exactly the concept of difference that has become subversive for the very core of the Western neoliberal global capitalist system, which ultimately sees itself as a haven for differences. Hence, this void created between the worlds is not a mere gap, not a potentiality to be solved by economic means, as we are informed by mainstream media, but a potentiality that could unmask the very nature of democracy that is conditioned and framed by liberal capitalism and its demonic free market.

The Void

Let’s take a brief look in a proper context in which the figure of an alien could be explained. When we look at the void, we are in fact watching a process, which is trying to cover the void, to monopolize it, to transcend it. Transcending this void in Eastern and southeastern Europe is known as a process of transition, that is, a transition exclusively directed towards liberal capitalism, a process that asks for political and military integra-tion into Euro-Atlantic institutions and above all, the imposition of the free market as a default step for the transition to be finalized. However, as globalization as a process of a void transcendence on a global level that is revealed primarily as a globalization of capital – freedom of movement for capital, not for people, it easily turns it self upside down into a re-articulation of the notion of freedom within democracy itself; it is important to say that the void stages itself as a traumatic point through which the articulation of Other (not First) world countries is planned in the first place. Hence, this is the manner liberal capitalism makes us pay for its war for imposition of post-ideological contexts to both worlds (First and not First); the consequence of this process is the production of a paradigmatic figure, which simultaneously lives in both worlds, the figure of a stranger, immigrant or alien. This figure is produced because of capital spreading to new physical terri-tories; an immigrant, after multinational corporations take over its local economical environment, has to act, and starts to break out and ignite political conflict, precisely the opposite of what liberal capitalism desires. This figure creates a context in which forms of life themselves start to create political conflict. To undertake a deeper look into this figure, we have to refer to Giorgio Agamben’s forms of life. Bare life is life in itself, a pure medium of life that resembles today’s immigrant or alien, also known in Greek as Zoe. Bare life is not an a priori racial category, although it is burdened with racist dogma. As an example, bare life is the life of an African or Asian immigrant, a Mexican worker in Arizona, all those killed in Iraq by the occupation forces, homosexuals in Poland, Frenchmen of African descent in France, Serbians or Bosnians in Croatia or both, Croatians and Roma peoples in Slovenia or Slovenians, Croats, Bosnians and Albanians in Serbia...However, it is also a white western European during the anti-globalization riot, everybody not fitting into a widely accepted form of sov-ereignty. Bare life is to be understood under the name of Homo Sacer, holy man, a man who can be killed but cannot be sacrificed (to-the-sovereign). On the other hand, we have life with style, also known in Greek as *Bíos*, that is life usually from the First world of capital, I might add, life produced by the sovereignty of capital; this is not a life with humanist or political backgrounds. Bios, life with style is exactly that, life with style, a-racial and non-political category included into process of production not only in the meaning of a commodity, but as a result of the production of sovereignty of capital itself whether it rapes in Iraq, accepts parliamentary elections as ultimate democratic practice or *just* ignorantly lives its life creating its own commodity. The alien occurs exactly *between* these two forms of life – bare life and life with style or modal life. As bare life can become object of violence without sanction, it becomes a certain model of violence, which does not contribute to the sovereignty that generates the violence. Modal life (bios), on the other hand is also an object of violence, but violence that does contribute to the sovereignty from which it emerged. A banal example is, 10 dead immigrants do not mean anything, but 10 dead soldiers do. The alien, however, is on the crossroad, and he or she can choose only the modality of violence that will be brought upon it. To clarify this, let’s take a look in context. In times when idiotic “end of ideology” is heralded by mainstream media and when all of society has become a factory (Antonio Negri), only a momentum of interaction between forms of life can be seen as relevant and socially dynamic.

It is the friction, a constant interaction – but never a collision, among these paradigmatic forms of life along the sides of the void that represents today’s social dynamics. This friction is a mere compensation for the so-cial order which does not want to recognize that its decay is due to the lack of ethics of liberal capitalism, for in the last instance it is the very liberal capitalist ethics that prevents social issues from becoming a political factor – while organizing it as a pathetic collective of subjectivities caught in a struggle for individual posi-tioning within the mentioned friction. The same subjectivities of course desperately protect their positions by defending the same ethics from its exposition as ideology. Their trauma is that the same could be exposed as ... trauma. As Lacan used to say, trauma does not cheat, but the problem is that trauma lacks. This trauma of exposition of trauma, paraphrasing Agamben, means that holiness of life, that is today exposed against sovereign power as a human right in every basic meaning, in fact reflects exact the submission of life to the power of death, its unrecoverable exposure in the relationship of stigmatization. It is exactly the relationship of stigmatization *over* bare life and modal life that is aggressively imposed today by liberal capitalist sovereign monopoly over the definition of life itself as the only political process or conflict. This process is a process that consists of paradigms, or practices, if you want, of exclusion and inclusion. Meaning, life with style is not by default included into the production matrix of capital, nor is bare life by default excluded, but the positioning of both depends on acceptance of the same relationship to stigmatization by an object of exploitation itself. This means that neither bare life nor modal life, life with style, position themselves as political subjects, but as objects of stigmatization.

As an example, if we go back to the story from the beginning of the text, we see that southeast European sub-ject (in Croatia) as an object of capitalist exploitation, or as subjectivity that wants to become the same object, reacts toward a foreign body of a transvestite. Transvestite is not a bare life, although it is not completely life with style as well. Meaning, its political potential exists between these two biosocial extremes. This figure in

^[1] http://www.guardian.co.uk/france/story/0,,2169068,00.html

the transitional state of Croatia is recognized by a homophobe as a treat not because it, as transvestite, does not represent some political option, but because it indirectly does. As Croatia is a country that desperately wants to represent itself as a country with western values, it is at the same time a country whose dominant sentiment is burdened with very strong religious dogma, archaic social values and strong xenophobic sentiment, where being a Westerner, within such arrangement, turns out to be quite painful. A gesture of the attackers is therefore an illustration of resentment as an ambivalent feeling where an object of adoration is simultaneously adored and hated; in the case of West, it is adored, but simultaneously hated as well, because of the archaic sentiments preventing the embrace of the heritage of the West in its totality. To be fully clear, the perception of the West by a dominant sentiment in the transitional state is also a perception of a West that supports the homophobic, in general, discriminatory phantasm of the West. This attack occurs not only as a compensation for the trauma one experiences in a country that “freed” itself under one master – state socialism – only to find itself in the jaws of another, but something much more dangerous – capitalism (in which the figure of the attacker fails to become *bios*), and also as a result of the refusal to acknowledge the meaninglessness of this *passage de l’act*. On the one hand, the attacker’s subjectivity, as a proper illustration of the dominant social pattern in Croatia, still relies heavily on conservative religious dogma that desperately wants to perceive itself as a “nation of western culture,” but still cannot accept *what is seen too much of in the West*, because western decadence would presumably destroy the country’s tradition. On the other hand, the perception of the West as the First world that will impose segregation and market based discrimination is, however warmly welcomed. As Nietzsche would say, this subjectivity does not act, it *reacts* as an object of resentment towards its phantasm of the First world, attacking the very figure which is not from the West excluded bare life and neither the fully integrated bios, but it is the relation subsumed under the object of stigmatization, that is an alien in the West itself. It reacts precisely the way the West would, but usually *does not have to*, as the West has a *surplus* already in the form of bare life that is the pathetic position of Eastern Europe’s societies that crave to become Bios, to become fully integrated, as a matrix of exploitation by western liberal capitalism. The role of the homophobic attacker from Zagreb is therefore similar to the role of the Pakistani secret service which Americans let “interrogate” (read: torture) captured Iraqi insurgents.

The other example of being the locus of fundamental contradictions (from which transitional societies suffer from) may be found in some reactions by Croat citizens to Steven Spielberg’s film “Schindler’s List.” When it was aired on Croatian national TV for the first time a couple of years ago, a number of citizens started to call the TV station complaining about the subtitles, which were in Serbian and not in the Croatian language. Although there are only minor differences between the two languages, it is bizarre that someone wants to see a movie about racial and ethnic extermination while simultaneously complaining about a couple of different words coming from the language of another ethnic group. ... It is the very present sentiment, which accepts a cultural product just because it comes from the First world, and at the same time, aggressively reacts to what is a *denkverbot* (thinking forbidden) for the First world. Therefore, this attacker’s gesture is *mutatis mutandis*, the very role of post-socialist eastern European society, but also the role of the First world itself, in the process of rationalization of a new master – signifier, the ethics of liberal capitalism. As Marina Gržinić noted, the role of this subject is dual, it is an ontological totality in the absolute narrowing of subjectivity and a break up of the subject with reality. Here we come across the analogy, also presented by Gržinić, in which, like in a Hollywood movie, a protagonist after an action scene that made a mess on the working table, instead of precisely cleaning the table, erases and destroys everything in an act popularly known as “cleansing the terrain.” (Ibid.) East European bare life, craving to become bios, to become the object of capitalist exploitation therefore positions itself towards the very void that separates the two worlds and towards the very life, which represents this same void, the life of an alien. In this manner, these not fully included subjectivities of Eastern Europeans relate to the non-proclaimed liberal capitalist ideology where, precisely because the same is not proclaimed as such, it reacts, “cleans the terrain” against those who are perceived by the same ideology as a non-productive part of the first world matrix, as in this case of a transvestite. Bare life in transition to bios, “erases the terrain” for its master so the master does not have to do it. In this process southeast European bare life positions itself voluntary as Europe’s *surplus* after which it *targets* not only its presumed cause of being bare life, but also attacks the presumed *lack* of the First world it craves. Speaking of a void, we now see that the relationship of the dominant First world ethics towards an alien – which is pathetically mimicked by south-east European satellite states – is in fact a First world relationship towards the void where it does not overcomes the emptiness of a void, but makes it more bearable. The position of East European subjectivity towards the alien, as a figure of the void, does indeed resemble a role created by Tom Waits (acting as Renfield) in Coppola’s movie *Dracula* from 1992. Tom Waits as Renfield, the hapless slave of Dracula, who miserably sits in a dungeon, where he eats insects and bugs, eats life and everything in order to please his master who promised to make him immortal, a vampire. Interestingly enough, it should be pointed out that today’s southeastern European nations refer to socialism as “the dungeon of nations,” the prison of nations. East European subjectivity “eats” the dignity of a life (as an insect) and represents the void as consequence of globalization of capital, so that its new master, capitalism – the vampire – accepts it as an equal, but in nothing else than in devouring the life of those that does not fit into the liberal capitalist definition of life. This is an example of the East European perception of a stranger where the stranger is produced because of an inability to accept new class antagonism and market based segregation. The sadistic relationship towards “aliens” (others) functions as a perverted dislocation of trauma from class to the register of cultural differences. Here is the point where the East European transition unmarks itself only as a transition toward the cannibalistic capital machine, and not to any romanticized version of democracy.

Democracy as Ideology

Democracy that is brought up in such a context by the same liberal capitalism is not its mask, but a diabolical shadow, a killer clown, that ultimately makes relative the effects of capital by precisely imposing the relationship of stigmatization as the relationship in which human rights violations, in order to protect democracy, becomes a norm. It does not mater if we are talking about communists, transvestites, gays or as it always turns out, Jews. (As Croatian’s first president Franjo Tudjman in the process of establishing democracy in Croatia once “proudly” stated, he is happy his wife is not a Serb or a Jew...) As Alain Badiou claims, democracy is a norm encrypted into the relationship of subjects towards the liberal state. In the context of Croatia, democracy is a norm encrypted into the freedom of a subject allowed to act against a presumed enemy of an object of its discriminatory phantasm The object of this phantasm is, of course, freedom, but no other freedom that the one of sadistically acting against those who does not share the same phantasm. In the same way, bare life becomes life with style when it attacks the object that separates the bare from bios. However, the predicament of democracy as system of equality and individual responsibility implies the inclusion of an alien into it, partially, though what has to be left out is the recognition of included difference *as* a difference. Even if the neo-liberal regime officially insists that the “other” should stay different, it segregates it immediately if it sees it as authentically different, and encourages the difference only if it is already part of the segregated difference. This is excellently presented through the ideological bulletin board: the movie industry. As Marina Gržinić noted regarding Ridley’s Scott movie Alien, the human – beast relationship is allowed only when Ripley (Sigourney Weaver) is uncovered as half-human, a hybrid, not a human being. Are we not witness to this kind of ideological background in today’s democracies, which are only framed by the utilitarian context and objectified functioning of the law? French government recently proposed that immigrant families with visa applications for entering France undergo DNA testing to prove that the application is genuine. Although the tests will not be compulsory, it is highly likely that immigrants who reject the DNA testing will be rejected as well.¹

What can we learn from this practice besides that it is highly hypocritical? By indirectly forcing an alien (the figure that exposes the void) to undergo DNA tests, the regime firstly creates a biologically determined segregation and secondly, it reminds the native alien of his Third world roots, by letting it know that it supports its “integration” in this relationship of stigmatization, but with the presupposition that the alien accepts fully this relation as well. This is not about the “clash of civilization,” the “Clash” functions only as a device for rationalizing the effects of globalization. This DNA example is very much in line with Etienne Balibar’s notion of meta-racism, where meta-racism is acceptance of the “other,” but with the presupposition, she or he stays far enough not to endanger the commodity of a bios (of a white man, if you want). When we mention France, the problem with French suburb riots is therefore a problem of an alien *par excellence*, because fundamentally, the clash was not generated by religious dogma, but the result of market based segregation of a certain population that failed to become included into capitalist relationship of stigmatization. The fact that this population is excluded from French society made them a political factor, and this is what the regime finds disturbing. Liberal capitalist ideology therefore transcends the form of old racist categorization with the recognition of bare life as difference only when it tries to become bios, if not, then it treats it as an alien toward which it will act in a totalitarian manner. As Alain Badiou would say, “I will accept your difference only if you become me.” Bare life therefore CAN become different, but an alien cannot.

Paraphrasing Agamben, (today’s) political space of sovereignty constitutes itself through a double exception, a surplus of the profane in religion and a surplus of religion in the profane. This claim does not primarily refer

to institutionalized religion as such, but to a predicament of neo-liberal culture where God is the commodity. In addition, Agamben adds that Homo Sacer is an object of intense violence that transcends the sphere of law and the sphere of sacrifice. As such, as an object of intense violence, Homo Sacer still does not reveal itself as an alien, as a stranger, it only does so when it refuses to accept the relationship of stigmatization, whatever religion it belongs to. If we look at the latest number of dead in Iraq, it is not an exaggeration to say that the whole nation could be named as Homo Sacer, though they are not aliens. They are not sacrificed to democracy in whose name they were killed, but on the contrary, those who killed them have been sacrificed to democracy in order that bare life being killed accepts this same democracy. In this context, we can state, that the emancipation of African Americans started the moment they were co-opted for the American civil war... To summarize, bare life that can be killed but cannot be sacrificed is not precisely an alien. Bare life is not by default excluded from society in the form of racial/sexual/economic or cultural segregation and neither is bios by default, included. Even worse, bare life is gradually being included while bios remains included in the capitalist matrix, with both subjected to stigmatization and subjected to becoming an alien, if they start to make their agenda political, i.e. if they claim political power, which is not within the ruling discourse of the liberal capitalist ideology. Hence, the alien in transition to bios OR to bare life – desiring to become bios, ceases to be an alien. The alien who wants to be included loses its political agenda and gets its inclusion, but only as a-political commodity, what bios already takes as its primal feature. Emancipation unfortunately turns out to be in such a case nothing else but a demand for inclusion into the same ideology. Therefore, the process of emancipation in the context of culture, that is the liberal capitalist ideology, makes this process visible.

Emancipation is Discrimination

Liberal capitalism as a totalitarian system starts to unmask itself when it starts to represent bare life as a value, as a commodity, and confirms its inclusion; an alien is a life form, which cannot be presented as commodity. It does so in the field that is its current most potent territory of capitalist colonization or field of culture. We could say that the “alien” is a life form unpresentable as a value or a commodity. If we take a look at what happened to the perception of major emancipation movements, we see that instead of political agendas, only life as form of life, as a cultural object, not as a political subject, has been emancipated. We do not witness a re-articulation of Martin Luther King’s politics as a tool for emancipation, but, as is the case in the Kevin Hill TV show, a figure of an African-American who is a successful lawyer, has a gay friend, hosts cool parties in his fancy apartment and fights for corporate justice. That is a banal example how bare life by itself accepts being turned into bios, under the parole of a successful emancipation, not to mention the decay of the hip-hop culture that from a politically motivated agenda in the late 1980s has turned itself into a preposterous celebration of the consumer life style. The First world’s demand from all those who want to be included in it is to abort every political agenda that was not born within the ruling capitalist neo-liberal discourse. Instant emancipation as another name for inclusion of bare life, and prosecuted aliens, does not however include authentic cultural difference(s) that could result in *politically* articulated demands, but includes only such differences that serve to present democracy as a tolerant social system. Therefore, an alien as a bare life that has not been included, must be recoded, converted into a differential that should serve as a position through which, not only the sovereignty of a state will reaffirm itself, but through which the sovereignty of capital will reconfirm itself as an incessantly hungry matrix in search of new boundaries to be conquered. An example of such a process is the British toy company that produces toys of bacteria of Ebola, HIV and similar microbes (that of course represent the perception of Africans, Arabs, Orientals, Jews and others in Europe) and serves as a perfect illustration that capitalist totalitarianism must first redesign the other to make it acceptable and not threatening. It literally produces a foreign body as a toy, an object of pleasure, an object of enjoyment that is in stark contradiction to those already included.

In the void space in-between worlds, the political conflict has been abolished in the name of culture, in the name of a territory in which sterile practices of pursuing life styles and their exposition to others as an ideology, becoming socialized at such a level that it became its only politics. In the context of pop culture, we could just look at popular TV shows like *Sex and the City*. This series that “exploits the nature of relations” in spaces between parties, sex and buying Manolo Blahnik’s shoes, rapes the notion of individuality by praising individual action as a nihilist reaction to un-formal demand. In other words, it monopolizes the definition of individuality, integrates it into the norm and then celebrates the norm as norm destruction. Doing so, the character of Carrie Bradshaw is far more dangerous then Bush, Angela Merkel, Sarkozy and Blair together. What does it have to do with the notion of a stranger? Well, it is an illustration or representation of a demand liberal capitalism wants out of bare life; to be coded into the matrix as subjectivity and then to delegate the definition of that subjectivity to the objective matrix of the hyper- capitalist immaterial factory, a factory for the production of nothing. As Hegel claimed, general will subsumes individual will, that is subordinated to general law and general creation, but this individual consciousness is also directly aware of itself as general consciousness; it is aware that its object is a law it imposed, and a creation it created, while by moving into action, and by creating objects it does not create anything that is individual, but only laws and state regulations. Therefore, bare life, while still excluded from the capitalist production matrix, is a zero phase of life with style; bare life could become bios, could be included only by rejecting its political agenda. If it does not want to, or does not recognize the choice – which-is-not-a-choice at all, *then* it becomes an alien, foreign body that by exposing the nature of the void between two worlds exposes the very ethics of both worlds. It is the friction among these two (bios or bare life) under which bare life should become bios that allows capitalism to impose the monopoly over definition of life. Therefore, emancipation, as we can see has become a discriminatory practice when it operates through total submission of bare life to bios; where subjectivity will be nothing else but a reflection of perversion of the system to which it has invested its subjectivity. An alien is an alien because it refuses to do so. Gayatri Spivak’s notorious claim that the exclusion of the “other” from Europe is very important for production of the European epistemic regimes is based on the subaltern that can not speak, should be upgraded with the claim that other can speak, but all it can say is “yes.” This is the *spiritus movens* of the First world itself as well as the core of democracy itself. What should be done? Bare life should not become bios, but instead it should become an alien, a creature of conflict, by organizing its own political agenda, not letting the liberal capitalist establishment act in its place.

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QUEER

Tatjana Greif SCHENGEN KONKRETNO

12. decembra 2007 so voditelji držav članic Evropske unije v Strasbourgu podpisali »Listino o temeljnih pravicah EU«. Reformirana listina bo stopila v veljavo leta 2009 z ratifikacijo v vseh članicah oziroma z uveljavitvijo nove pogodbe o Evropski uniji. »Listina o temeljnih pravicah EU« ali – skrajšano – »Listina« je požela veliko odobranja v evropskem prostoru, zlasti zato, ker naj bi za silo nadomestila nespueli projekt skupne evropske ustave in ublažila bolečino ob njenem klavnrem koncu. V nagovoru pred podpisom »Listine o temeljnih pravicah EU« je predsednik evropskega parlamenta in pristaš *Evropske ljudske stranke* Hans-Gert Pöttering zanosno izjavil: »V Evropski uniji nima pravice moč, ampak ima moč pravica«, prisegajoč na vladavino prava, ki so jo ustoličili že »naši očetje«. Prvo skrito bistvo »Listine o temeljnih pravicah EU« je, da sta si Velika Britanija in Poljska izborili *opt-outs*. Slovenski mediji prevajajo *opt-outs* kot »izvzetje«. To niti ni tako napak, čeprav čudno spominja na »vnebovzetje«, bolj napak je, da večinoma ostanejo zgolj pri golem prevodu, samega pojava pa ne razgrnejo ali problematizirajo; morda zato, ker je novinarski komentar žanr, ki počasi hira. *Opt-outs* je zakonska izjema ali ločeni status, mehanizem, ki ga države članice EU s pridom izkoriščajo na različnih področjih, da se izognejo evropski zakonodaji. *Opt-outs* pomeni pravico Poljske in Velike Britanije, da ne spoštujeta določil »Listine«. »Listina« za ti dve državi torej ni pravno zavezujoča. Tako si uzurpirata način, da sami presojata, kaj so človekove pravice in kaj ne, kdo jih ima in kdo ne, kaj je kratenje človekovih pravic in kaj ne. Na Poljskem, pri tem homofobičnem prvaku Evropske unije, to lahko pomeni, da človekovih pravic seksualnih manjšin preprosto ne

¹ http://www.guardian.co.uk/france/story/0,,2169068,00.html

bodo priznali. Hkrati pa je vseobča prvakinja v *opt-outs* Velika Britanija, ki si »izvzetje« izbori nenavadno pogosto, denimo na področju delovno-pravne zakonodaje. *Opt-outs* v praksi prav tako pomeni, da Britanci in Poljaki ne bodo imeli možnosti pritožbe na *Evropsko sodišče za človekove pravice*, če njihovi državi presodita, da jim pravice pač niso bile kršene. Drugo skrito bistvo »Listine« je, da gre za prvo mednarodno pogodbo nasploh, ki izrecno prepoveduje diskriminacijo na osnovi spolne usmerjenosti – vendar ne za vse ljudi enako. Izrecna prepoved diskriminacije seksualnih manjšin zagotovo pomeni napredek v polju človekovih pravic gejev in lezbijk v Evropski uniji, vendar ta napredek velja zgolj za tiste geje in lezbijke, ki so državljani držav Unije. Za nedržavljane EU, migrante, delavce brez vize, tujce, politične in vojne begunce ter azilante te pravice ne veljajo. Četudi jih preganja totalitarni režim, jim grozijo smrtna kazen, mučenje ali zapor.

V *Reartikulaciji* št. 2 sem pisala o Makwanu Moloudzadehu, dvajsetletnem iranskem geju, obsojenem na smrt zaradi homoseksualnosti. V času nastajanja prispevka je mednarodna kampanja v podporo na smrt obsojenemu še trajala, bila je v polnem teku. Zagnale so jo nevladne organizacije, nato so jo podprle številne vlade in politiki, Evropska unija naj bi zahtevala takojšnjo razveljavitev kazni. Tik pred izidom druge številke *Reartikulacije* me je doletela vest, da je bila usmrtitev že izvršena. Mladeniča, ki je pred tem dlje časa gladovno stavkal, so 5. decembra 2007 ob 5. uri zjutraj zvlekli iz zaporniške celice in obesili. Usmrtitev so izvedli po hitrem postopku in na skrivaj – obešen je bil v zaporu, čeprav iranska zakonodaja predpisuje javno izvajanje eksekucij. Smrtna kazen je bila izvršena kljub ukazu vrhovnega tožilca o preklicu. Družina umorjenega je prejela krsto z iznakaženim truplom in polomljenimi rokami. Pogreba se je udeležila množica okrog šest tisoč ljudi, skoraj vsi prebivalci mesteca Paveh v zahodnem Iranu. O tragičnem primeru si je upala poročati ena sama iranska novinarka, ki je tudi edina spremljala sodni proces; zahodnim medijem je vidno prizadeta povedala tudi to, da o usmrtitvi ni bil obveščen niti žrtvin odvetnik in da je bil članek, ki ga je napisala po usmrtitvi, nemudoma umaknjen iz tiska, sama pa je bila premeščena in zdaj pokriva »lahkotnejše družbene teme«. Makwanu Moloudzadehu so pred usmrtitvijo sodili na sodnem procesu, ki je bil prava farsa, bil je obtožen za dejanje »sodomije«, kot se v islamističnem vokabularju pravi homoseksualnemu razmerju, ki naj bi ga zagrešil kot trinajstletni deček. Vse priče na sodišču so izrecno navedle, da so bile njihove obremenilne izjave podane pod prisilo in kot posledica ustrahovanja. Na koncu ni bilo v sodnem procesu niti ene priče, ki bi potrdila očitani zločin, zato je sodnik sprejel obsodbo po »lastnem občutku«. Po mednarodnem in tudi iranskem pravu je smrtna kazen za dejanje, ki ga storijo mladoletne osebe, prepovedana. Trenutno čaka v Iranu na usmrtitev oseminsedemdeset mladoletnikov. Iran je država z najvišjo stopnjo smrtnih kazni na svetu. Lani je bilo izvedenih preko dvesto deset eksekucij. Lahko vas obesijo, obglavijo z mečem, pahnejo v prepad ali do smrti kamenjajo iz različnih razlogov – od prešuštva, čarovništva, disidentstva, do homoseksualnosti in lezbištva.

Nizozemska je januarja 2008 odredila deportacijo devetnajstletnega iranskega geja v Veliko Britanijo. Na Nizozemsko je pobegnil po tem, ko so mu v Britaniji zavrnili prošnjo za azil. Vendar mu je nizozemsko sodišče prisodilo prisilno vrnitev v Anglijo, čeprav ga od tam čaka deportacija v Iran, v Iranu pa smrtna kazen. Tovrstne postopke omogoča *Dublinska konvencija*, ki preprečuje iskanje azila v več državah hkrati, pa četudi ti v eni državi azil že zavrnejo. Poleti 2007 je hud mednarodni pritisk komajda preprečil deportacijo iranske lezbijke Pegah Emambakhsh iz Velike Britanije v Iran, kjer jo je čakala smrtna kazen. Leta 2006 je nemško ustavno sodišče preprečilo deportacijo sedemindvajsetletne lezbijke v Iran. Leta 2005 so svet obkrožile tri fotografije usmrtitve dveh iranskih najstnikov, šestnajstletnega Mahmouda Asgarija in osemnajstletnega Ayaza Marhonija, ki ju je iranska oblast obsodila zaradi homoseksualnih nagnjenj. Na prvi fotografiji sta objokana mladeniča v policijskem vozilu, nato rablja v črnih kapucah natikata zanko okrog njihovih vratov, na tretji fotografiji je videti njuni obešeni trupli. Usmršena sta bila v mestu Mashhad na severovzhodu Irana, dejanje pa je na mestnem trgu opazovala množica. Leta 2004 je Israfil Shifri, devetindvajsetletni gej iz Irana, vkorakal v imigracijski urad v Manchesteru, se polil z bencinom in sežgal. Vse njegove prošnje za azil je Velika Britanija zavrnila in ob grožnji deportacije se je raje usmrtil kar sam. Morda bi bilo predsednika evropskega parlamenta Hansa-Gerta Pötteringa potrebno vprašati, kdo ima torej pravico in kdo moč. S preprečevanjem in omejevanjem migracij na ozemlju Evropske unije se totalitarni režimi krepijo. To so spregledani momenti schengenizacije Evrope in skupne azilne politike. Spregledan moment ostajajo deportacije gejev in lezbijk iz EU v države, kjer veljajo smrtna kazen, mučenje ali nečloveško poniževanje – v Iran, Mavretanijo, Savdsko Arabijo, Jemen, Sudan, Združene arabske emirate, Ugando, Zimbabve, Pakistan, Alžirijo, Jamajko, Belorusijo, na Kosovo, v Albanijo...

Zunanja meja Unije je meja strahu, vadbeni poligon za *fear-management*. Schengenski informacijski sistem izvaja prikrite metode nadzora, kontrole in sledenja. *Prümska pogodba* nalaga Sloveniji od leta 2007 meddržavno izmenjavo informacij o DNK in prstnih odtisih, v okviru projekta *VISA* nastaja največja biometrična informacijska baza na svetu. Schengenizacija je zamajala poznani koncept državljanstva in koncept zasebnosti. Aktivisti vztrajno opozarjajo na pasti schengenske mejne ekspanzije, ki ni le nevarna arena evropskega apartheida, razizma, ksenofobije in homofobije, ampak prinaša tudi uresničitev nočne more, zloglasnega *svobodnega trga, prostega pretoka blaga in storitev*, globalno redistribucijo bogastva in revščine, zatiranja ter izključevanja. Zunanja meja EU je nepropustni filter – in pod okriljem evropskih institucij delujejo ekstremistične frakcije, katerih poslanstvo je protimigracijska politika in boj za »čisto Evropo«. Ena takšnih skupin je *ITS – Identiteta, tradicija, suverenost*, ki deluje znotraj evropskega parlamenta in ima v skladu z obstoječimi parlamentarnimi pravili letno na voljo milijon evrov proračuna. Milijon evrov za neofašistične novodobne križarje, za pregon manjšin, migrantov, azilantov, Romov, Judov; za homoseksualce terjajo »kapitalno kazen«, organizacije proti rasizmu so označili za »mentalni aids«. Podlaga za članstvo je zavezanost krščanskim temeljem in tradicionalnim družinskim vrednotam. Medtem evropske univerze in druge bolj ali manj razsvetljene ustanove merijo indeks integracijskih politik migrantov. Slovenija si na lestvici integracijskih politik med članicami EU deli 11. mesto. Pa pogledjmo. Slovenska policija je za odkrivanje ilegalnih pribežnikov vrhunsko usposobljena in vrhunsko opremljena. Uporablja naprave, ki zaznajo človeško toploto, nočne detektorje, meri vsebnost ogljikovega dioksida v kombijih in zaprtih tovornjakih. Po uradnih podatkih je bilo leta 2000 in 2001 v Sloveniji odkritih 35.000 ilegalnih migrantov, leta 2006 samo še 4.000, leta 2007 pa 3.000. Slovenija je v predpisanem roku prenesla azilne evropske direktive v nacionalni pravni red. Januarja 2008 je v veljavo stopil *Zakon o mednarodni zaščiti*, ki nadomešča *Zakon o azilu* in uvaja enotni azilni postopek, ki je del skupnega evropskega azilnega sistema. A prenovljena zakonodaja prenaša evropske direktive v nacionalno zakonodajo tako, da dejansko znižuje mednarodne pravne standarde in omejuje možnosti iskalcev azila, da bi v Sloveniji našli zaščito.

Evropski direktivi o minimalnih standardih glede izpolnjevanja pogojev za priznanje statusa begunca oziroma osebe, ki potrebuje mednarodno zaščito (direktivi iz leta 2004 in 2005), določata minimalne normative, pri čemer pa so nekateri nižji od obstoječih mednarodnih standardov humanitarnega prava. Zato obstaja nevarnost, da bo polna realizacija obeh evropskih direktiv privedla v državah članicah do zniževanja že pridobljenih standardov. Ravno to naj bi se zgodilo v Sloveniji. *Visoki komisariat Združenih narodov za begunce* je že kritiziral *Zakon o mednarodni zaščiti*; očita mu, da ne dosega mednarodnih pravnih standardov in postavlja iskalce azila v nevarnost zapora in deportacije. Novi zakon omogoča deportacije, četudi azilni postopek oziroma pritožba še traja. Omogoča tudi široko uporabo pripora za prisilce za azil. Prenovljena azilna zakonodaja torej zastruje položaj azilantov in otežuje postopke za njihovo zaščito, obenem pa ne upošteva več ključnih elementov, ki jih predpisujejo tako evropske direktive o minimalnih standardih o pogojih za priznanje statusa begunca kot tudi mednarodni standardi. Pravica do azila je individualna pravica, vendar imajo vsi prosilci za azil pravico do združitve z družino, pri čemer se kot družinski člani štejejo zakonski ali izvenzakonski partner in otroci, v novem zakonu pa ni navedeno, da se enak status priznava tudi neporočenim in istospolnim partnerjem. Ravno tako ne spoštuje navodil evropskih direktiv glede upoštevanja dejavnika spola v azilnih postopkih. To pomeni, da se mora pri presoji vseh petih osnov, na podlagi katerih se ugotavlja, ali so bili prosilci žrtve pregona – politično prepričanje, narodnost, rasa, religija in pripadnost posebnih družbeni skupini – nujno upoštevati dejavnik spola. Prosilkam za azil se mora omogočiti sodelovanje tolmačk, odvetnic ali svetovalk. O tej možnosti jih mora obvestiti uradna oseba, ravno tako jih mora informirati o pravici do intervjuja brez prisotnosti družinskih članov. V azilnih postopkih se upošteva faktor strahu, sramu in travmatičnih izkušenj, od prosilcev in prosilk azila pa ni potrebno zahtevati natančnih podatkov o posilstvih in drugih seksualnih deliktih. Po podatkih *Visokega komisariata Združenih narodov za begunce* ima Slovenija že sedaj eno od najnižjih stopenj priznavanja pravice do azila v Evropi – leta 2006 je bil status begunca priznan samo enemu prosilcu za azil, leta 2007 pa dvema. Ministrstvo za notranje zadeve RS je ta podatek demantiralo in trdi, da je bil v zadnjih dveh letih v Sloveniji priznan status begunca osemnajstim osebam. Letno kvoto določa država. Elfriede Jelinek je v leta 1989 objavljenem romanu *Lust* (Naslada) zapisala nekaj, kar mi prebujá prispodobo idilične vasice Schengen: »V hitlerjanskih zadnjih sobah gostiln spet udarjajo drug po drugem, ti majhni rodovi na povodcih...«. Ampak pri nas v podalpjú je lepo varno. Imamo »Eurokopter« in »Schengen-bus«, ki nas varujeta pred tujci. Politiki obiskujejo dojenčke v porodnišnicah in sprejemajo kolednike.

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MAREC/MARCH 2008

Tatjana Greif SCHENGEN IN PRACTICE

On 12th December 2007, the leaders of European Union Member States signed the *Charter of Fundamental Rights* in Strasbourg, France. The reformed document will take effect as of 2009 after ratification by all members, or with the coming into force of the new European Union Agreement. The *Charter of Fundamental Rights*, or in short the *Charter*, won approval throughout Europe especially as it was seen as a replacement for the unsuccessful project of the European constitution – easing the pain after its sad ending. In his address preceding the signing of the *Charter of Fundamental Rights*, the President of the European Parliament and a member of the European People's Party Hans-Gert Pöttering said with enthusiasm: "In the European Union it is not power that has rights, it is the right that has power"; he thereby emphatically stated that Europe is committed to the rule of law, something which had already been established by "our forefathers". The first hidden fact of the *Charter of Fundamental Rights* is that the United Kingdom and Poland both negotiated the possibility of opt-outs. [In general, the law of the European Union is valid in all of 27 EU Member States. However, occasionally Member States negotiate certain opt-outs from legislation or treaties of the European Union, meaning they do not participate in the common structure in these fields. Editor's remark.] The Slovenian media did provide a suitable translation for the term (the word *izvzetje*), however, it denotes, more often than not, that things are omitted. The notion of "opt-outs" itself therefore remains unexplored and unquestioned, perhaps due to the fact that an editorial column that critically approaches such issues in newspapers nowadays is becoming a sort of a relic of the past. Opt-outs are in fact an exception or measure that insists on a separate status, a mechanism that the EU members exploit broadly in different areas to avoid European legislation. The "opt-outs" allow Poland and the United Kingdom to disrespect the articles of the *Charter*. These two countries therefore do not need to abide by the laws of the *Charter*. They thus usurp the option of using their own judgement of what are or are not human rights; who may or may not enjoy them; what is violation of human rights and what is not. For Poland, this homophobic champion state of the European Union, this could mean that the human rights of sexual minorities would simply not be recognised. At the same time, the UK is the overall champion of opt-outs, making exceptionally frequent use of it, for instance in the field of work legislation. In practice, the opt-outs also mean that British and Polish citizens will have no chance of appealing to the European Court of Human Rights in the event thattheir rights are violated in their home countries and they have used all the legal means there. The second hidden fact of the *Charter* is that it represents the first international treaty which strictly forbids discrimination based on sexual orientation – but not in an equal way. The explicit prohibition of discrimination against sexual minorities surely signifies an improvement in the field of human rights for gays and lesbians in the European Union, but this only applies to those gays and lesbians who are citizens of the EU. For non-EU residents, migrants, workers without a visa, foreigners, political and war refugees, and asylum seekers these rights do not apply even if they are prosecuted by a totalitarian regime, threatened with capital punishment, torture, or imprisonment.

In *Reartikulacija* no. 2, I wrote about Makwan Moloudzadeh, a 20-year old Iranian gay man who was sentenced to death on account of his homosexuality. At the time of writing the article, an international campaign in support of the accused was in full swing. It was an initiative of non-governmental organisations supported by numerous governments and politicians and the EU was supposed to request the abolition of the sentence with immediate effect. Just before the second issue of *Reartikulacija* went to print, I received news of his execution. The young man, who had been on a hunger strike for some time, was hauled out of his cell and hanged on 5th December 2007 at 5.00 am. The execution was carried out quickly and secretly – he was hanged in the prison, even though Iranian legislation specifies that executions should be public. The execution was carried out despite the supreme attorney's order of withdrawal. The victim's family received a coffin with his mutilated body and broken arms. A crowd of about 6,000 people, nearly the whole population of the small town of Paveh in West Iran, attended the funeral. Only one Iranian female journalist dared to report about the tragic case and she was also the only one to follow the legal proceedings; she spoke to the Western media and revealed, in a visible state of shock, that even the victim's lawyer had not been informed of the execution and that her article, written just after Moloudzadeh's death, was immediately withdrawn from the press while she was transferred to cover "lighter social topics". Makwan Moloudzadeh's trial was nothing short of a farce. He was charged with sodomy, the expression for homosexuality in the Islamic vocabulary, which he allegedly committed at the age of 13. All witnesses heard in court, explicitly declared that their previous accusations against the defendant were uttered under constraint and as a result of intimidation. Upon conclusion of the trial there was not a single witness that would confirm the evil deed and so the judge reached the verdict according to "his own intuition". International and Iranian legislations forbid capital punishment for deeds committed by minors. Currently there are 78 minors awaiting execution in Iran and the country has the highest number of death penalties in the world. Last year, over 210 executions were carried out. These are either death by hanging, beheading, pushing the accused over a precipice, or stoning and for various reasons – from adultery, witchcraft, dissidence, to homosexuality and lesbianism.

In January 2008, the Netherlands ordered the deportation of a 19-year old Iranian gay man to the United Kingdom. The Iranian fled the United Kingdom for the Netherlands after being refused asylum. The Dutch court ordered his him to be deported to the United Kingdom even though a further deportation to Iran would follow and, once there, he would be executed. Such procedures are enabled on account of the Dublin Convention which forbids people to seek asylum in two EU countries at the same time, even though asylum was denied in one of them. In the summer of 2007, international pressure barely prevented the deportation of the Iranian lesbian Pegah Emambakhsh from the United Kingdom back to Iran where she would face capital punishment. In 2006, the German constitutional court hindered the deportation of a 27-year old Iranian lesbian to her home country. In 2005, three photographs of two executed Iranian teenagers circled the globe. Sixteen-year old Mahmoud Asgari and 18-year old Ayaza Mahroni were sentenced to death on charges of homosexual inclinations. The first photograph shows the two young men in tears in a police vehicle, the second one shows two executioners in black hoods fixing the noose around their necks, and the third photograph displays the hanged bodies. The two teenagers were executed in the city square of the town of Mashhad, northwest Iran and the event was watched by a crowd of people. In 2004, Israfil Shifri, a 19-year old Iranian gay man, walked into the Immigration Office in Manchester, poured petrol over his own body and set himself on fire. All his requests for asylum in the UK were denied and, threatened with deportation, he opted to kill himself rather than be executed. Perhaps the President of the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pöttering should indeed be asked who has rights and who has power.. As a result of restrictions imposed on migration into the territory of the European Union, the totalitarian regimes are becoming stronger. This has been overlooked in the "Schengenisation" of Europe and the common asylum policy, as has the deportation of gays and lesbians from the EU into countries, which carry out capital punishment, torture or merciless humiliation – Iran, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, Algeria, Jamaica, Belarus, Kosovo, Albania...

The external EU border is the border of fear, a training ground for fear management. The Schengen information system carries out concealed methods of control and tracking. As of 2007 Slovenia must comply with the Prüm Treaty which demands the international exchange of DNA and fingerprint information within the framework of the *VISA* project – the world's largest biometric information base. The Schengenisation of Europe has shaken the established concept of citizenship and the concept of privacy. Activists persistently warn against the traps of the Schengen expansion of borders, which is not only the arena of European Apartheid, racism, xenophobia and homophobia, but also brings the nightmarish realisation of the notorious *free market policy, uncontrolled traffic of goods and services*, a global redistribution of wealth and poverty, suppression and exclusion. The external border of the EU is a watertight filter – and there are extremist fractions operating under the auspices of European institutions operate, whose mission is anti-migration and a fight for a "cleaner Europe". One such group is ITS – *Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty* which acts within the European parliament and, in accordance with the existing parliamentary regulations, has a yearly budget of EUR 1 million. This means EUR 1 million for modern-day neo-fascist crusaders to persecute minorities, asylum seekers, Roma people, Jews; ITS demands capital punishment for homosexuals; it considers anti-racist organisations to be "mental aids". Meanwhile European universities and other more or less enlightened institutions measure the index of migrant integration policies. Slovenia currently occupies joint 11th place on the EU members' ratings. Let's see: Slovenian police are trained at a top level and possess state of the art equipment. They use of instruments, which detect human warmth, night detectors; they are able to measure the levels of carbon dioxide in vans and other goods vehicles. According to official reports 35,000 illegal migrants were captured in Slovenia in 2000 and 2001, while there were only as many as 4,000 in 2006 and 3,000 the following year. Slovenia incorporated the European asylum directives into its own legal system within the prescribed time frame. January 2008 marks the operational implementation of the International Protection Law, replacing the EU Asylum Law and enforcing a unified asylum procedure which is part of a common European asylum system. The modernised legislation transfers European directives into national legislation by means of lowering international legal standards and limiting the chances of asylum seekers finding protection in Slovenia.

European directives on minimal standards in fulfilling the criteria to acquire the status of refugee, or rather, a person who requires international protection (directives dating back to 2004 and 2005), define minimal norms; however, some of them are lower than the existing international standards of humanitarian law. There exists, therefore, a danger that full realisation of both European directives will bring a decrease in the current standards in EU member countries. This is expected to happen in Slovenia. *The UN High Commissioner for Refugees* has already issued criticism of the *International Protection Law* claiming that it does not comply with international legal standards and exposes asylum seekers to the danger of a prison sentence or deportation. The new law allows for deportation even if the asylum procedure or rather an appeal against it is still in the process of being resolved. It also enables the wider usage of a prison sentence for asylum seekers. The reformed asylum legislation therefore complicates the seekers' situation and renders their protection difficult. It also does not take into account several key elements prescribed by European directives on minimal standards for conditions of granting asylum as well as international standards. The right to asylum is set on an individual basis; however, all seekers have the right to be united with their families whereby a family member includes spouses or boyfriends/girlfriends and children. The new law does not state that the same status may be awarded to unmarried couples or partners of the same sex. In addition, the new legislation does not honour European directives on considering gender in the procedures. This means that judgement of all five basic notions that determine whether seekers were victims of persecution – political conviction, nationality, race, religion and appertaining to a particular social group – must inevitably take gender into account. Female asylum seekers must be allowed the option of female interpreters, lawyers or counsellor for assistance. This option needs to be offered through a legal person who must also inform them of the right to an interview without the presence of family members. Asylum procedures must take into consideration fear, shame or traumatic experiences and it must not be necessary to get exact data on rapes and other sexual offences. According to the data from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Slovenia currently has one of the lowest levels of asylum recognition in Europe – in 2006 only one individual was given asylum, while in 2007 two people were given asylum. The Slovenian Ministry of the Interior denied the report, claiming that 18 people have been awarded refugee status in the last two years. The annual share is determined by the Government.Elfriede Jelinek's novel *Lust* (1989) contains a sentence which to me symbolises the idyllic village of Schengen: "In the Hitlerian back rooms of home restaurants, again, against each other fight these small 'nations' on leashes..." But here, under the Alps, it's safe. We have a "Eurocopter" and a "Schengen Bus" to protect us from strangers. The politicians visit new-borns in maternity wards and give a warm receptions to carol-singers.

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Translated from Slovenian by Jernej Možic.

HARD(CORE)

Katja Kobolt SIVE ZVEZDE NA (OTOŽNO) MODREM EVROPSKEM NEBU: sanje o evropskih sredstvih in prekarizacija slovenske kulture

Ob uradnem odprtju Evropskega leta medkulturnega dialoga, za katerega je bila zadolžena Slovenija kot predsedujoča država članica EU, je bilo o »izjemni pomembnosti kulture« izrečenih veliko besed. Kljub temu je bila na ta dogodek oziroma na otvoritev konference »Medkulturni dialog kot temeljna vrednota EU« povabljena le peščica predstavnikov slovenskih nevladnih kulturnih organizacij. Četudi bi bili na konferenco povabljeni v večjem številu, se je mnogi sploh ne bi mogli udeležiti, saj je bil dogodek predviden v začetku januarja 2008, ko so kulturni producenti zaposleni s prijavljanjem na razpise. To zahtevno in dolgotrajno administrativno delo morajo opraviti, da se temeljna vrednota EU – to je kultura – sploh lahko udejanji. Resnica je namreč ta, da se v Sloveniji kulturi namenjena bistveno manj sredstev kot pa besed. Ali bolje rečeno, nevladne kulturne organizacije se v prizadevanjih, da bi izboljšale sistem financiranja in s tem tudi izvajanja svojih programov, srečujejo z vrsto ovir, čeprav so prav nevladne kulturne organizacije tiste, ki pomembno prispevajo k tako cenjeni evropski kulturni raznolikosti. Ta problem se pokaže tudi, kadar gre za pridobivanje evropskih sredstev. Predlog Nacionalnega programa za kulturo 2008–2011 (NPK 2008–2011) podpira zlasti kulturne projekte, katerim bodo odobrena evropska sredstva. V Sloveniji so sredstva Evropske unije postala nekakšna retorična figura, ki jo bomo poizkušali zrušiti s pojmom »kulturni materializem«. Kulturni materializem namreč želi pojasniti organizacijske vidike politike in ekonomije,¹ zato bom v nadaljevanju spregovorila o tem, kako slovenske nevladne kulturne organizacije »živijo« (evropsko) kulturno politiko, še zlasti kako preživijo v luči sofinanciranja lastnih programov z evropskimi sredstvi.

V prvi številki časopisa *Reartikulacija* je bil predlog NPK 2008-2011 že kritično analiziran s posebnim poudarkom na njegovi dikciji in smernicah o vizualni in scenski umetnosti. Program NPK v razdelku »Smernice kulturne politike« obravnava (čeprav zelo na kratko) znaten vpliv kulture na gospodarsko rast. V zadnjih letih so bili na podlagi mnogih ugotovitev družbeni in politični vlogi kulture ter o pomenu kulture za gospodarsko rast in zaposlovanje v kulturnem sektorju v EU sprejeti številni evropski dokumenti o kulturi, ki urejajo kulturno področje. Kultura velja torej za pomemben ekonomski dejavnik, ki ga slovenska kulturna politika spodbuja, da bi »povečala zaposlenost«, ki je med drugim ena od razlogov, zakaj se kulturi pripisuje tolikšen pomen. Eden od načinov za spodbujanje tega področja so tudi evropska sredstva. Če pa se osredotočimo na delovne pogoje na kulturnem področju, kjer se v Evropi zaposluje vse več ljudi, ugotovimo, da se v Sloveniji ta »svet« zaposlitve močno oddaljuje od modela, znanega kot »zapuščina evropske socialne države«. V začetku vsakega leta se kulturne organizacije ne le prijavljajo na razpise za sofinanciranje, ampak hkrati tudi sestavljajo poročila o svojem delovanju, ki vsebujejo podatke, na podlagi katerih strukture, ki jim zagotavljajo finančna sredstva, odločajo o tem, katere kulturne programe bodo podprle in katerih ne. Nedvomno sta samo-ocenjevanje in tako imenovano eksterno ocenjevanje zelo uporabni metodi za vrednotenje dela in programov, saj zagotavljata strukturne spremembe, ki spodbujajo kreativno, varno in strokovno produkcijo in s tem omogočajo visokokakovostne kulturne programe.² Kljub temu pa smo nenehno priča paradoksalnim razmeram, saj kljub temu da nevladne organizacije vsako leto vložijo ogromno časa in truda v sestavljanje poročil o svoji dejavnosti, njihovi programi niso ustrezno ocenjeni. Zato, kot lahko beremo v raziskavi o predlogu Nacionalnega programa za kulturo za obdobje 2004–2007, ki sta jo pripravila Maja Breznik in Aldo Milohnić (2007), finančni podporniki po večini zaradi pomanjkanja zaposlenih nekaterih programov sploh niso ocenili, kar pa je bilo v nasprotju s smernicami, ki jih je določal predlog NKP 2004–2007 (Breznik in Milohnić, 2007: 5, 10).

Kar zadeva nevladne kulturne organizacije, se zdi, da jim ne primanjkuje človeških virov, saj se – če sem nekoliko cinična – takih, ki delamo v nevladnem sektorju, drži nenapisano pravilo, da to zlahka počne-mo brezplačno. Tako pripravljamo osnutke programov, se prijavljamo na razpise, sestavljamo poročila in prirejamo prireditve v svojem »prostem času«; umetniki prav tako predstavljajo svoja dela »brezplačno« in tudi soorganizatorji projektov in programov delajo večinoma v »prostem času« in nudijo »brezplačne« prostore.³ Zdi se, kot da kulturni producenti še vedno živijo v svetu nedenarne menjave. Zato slovenski kulturni sektor pravzaprav ne more bistveno prispevati h gospodarski rasti. Namreč, brez finančnih transakcij ni gospodarskega razvoja, saj vsi vemo, da je višina BDP odvisna od prihodkov.

In kaj ima to pravzaprav opraviti z evropskimi sredstvi? Kaj imata nedenarna menjava ali siva ekonomija opraviti z evropskimi sredstvi? Da bi se kulturne organizacije lahko prijavile kot partnerji v organizaciji teh projektov, morajo dokazati konstanten in kar visok prihodek, ki si ga morajo zagotoviti iz drugih virov – javnih ali zasebnih, kot so donatorji in sponzorji. Konstanten in visok priliv sredstev je torej edino zagotovilo za uspešno realizacijo projekta. Žal, pa je le peščica slovenskih nevladnih kulturnih organizacij zmožna uresničiti to zahtevo, kar bi jim omogočilo, da se na evropske razpise o financiranju prijavijo kot krovna organizacija ali nosilna partnerska organizacija pri pridobivanju denarja in realizaciji projekta. Kot se zdi, bi problem sive ekonomije v slovenskem kulturnem sektorju lahko hitro rešili z vzajemnim zaračunavanjem uslug partnerjem v kulturnem programu. A ker je večina kulturnih organizacij odvisna od istih sredstev in dejansko prejemajo sredstva za skupne programe, čeprav s prijavljenimi različnimi stroški, si eden drugemu ne morejo zaračunavati storitev, saj bi to pomenilo, da zaračunavajo nekaj, za kar so že prejeli plačilo s strani javnih finančnih podpornikov zadevnega dogodka. Oglejmo si to kočljivo situacijo. Kulturna organizacija, ki je hkrati producent in organizator nekega kulturnega dogodka, nima

na voljo prostora, kjer naj bi se ta dogodek odvijal. (V Sloveniji imamo veliko nevladnih organizacij, ki nimajo lastnega prireditvenega prostora). Tako morajo te organizacije dogodek izpeljati v prostoru druge kulturne organizacije, ki pa je odvisna od istih javnih sredstev. Če organizacija, ki razpolaga s prostorom, želi tega oddati v uporabo neki drugi organizaciji, potrebuje sredstva za vzdrževanje in tehnično opremo, človeške vire, ki bodo prostor upravljali itd. Gre torej za sredstva, ki – kot rečeno – prihajajo iz istega javnega sklada in niso namenjena komercialnim dejavnostim. Zaračunavanje uporabe prostora in opreme v njem bi pravzaprav pomenilo dvojno »trženje« tega prostora. Čeprav velja poudariti, da je soobstoju subvencioniranih organizacij s prostorom ali brez njega nedvomno pomemben dejavnik, saj kulturnim organizacijam v Sloveniji omogoča, da sploh lahko organizirajo prireditve. Priča smo torej začaranemu krogu, kjer sredstva iz enega in istega sklada krožijo ali, bolje rečeno, zaradi pomanjkanja sredstev ne krožijo dovolj. Kot se zdi, so se ponudniki javnih sredstev zavedali problema, saj so sprejeli nov zakon, in sicer, da sme za en kulturni program samo ena nevladna organizacija prejeti javna sredstva. To pa ne pomeni, da bo organizacija prejela več sredstev – saj ta ostanejo enaka. Če so nekoč sodelujoče organizacije združile svoja sredstva, da bi izpeljale program, pa se zdaj zahteva, da program pripravi samo ena organizacija, ki pa za to ne prejme nič več sredstev kot prej. Še več, nekateri uradniki slovenskega Ministrstva za kulturo celo podpirajo nekakšno »prevzemno politiko«. Zamislili so si bistveno bolj učinkovito strategijo, ki »večjim« organizacijam, ki razpolagajo s prostori ali tehnično opremo, omogoča, da delujejo kot producenti in zaprošajo za javna sredstva, medtem ko manjšim organizacijam ne preostane drugega, kot da »prodajajo« svoje zamisli... Na ta način se bodo večje organizacije še bolj širile, manjše pa izginjale. Manjše organizacije namreč ne bodo imele nobene možnosti, da bi se potegovale za evropska sredstva. V kulturnem sektorju smo potemtakem priča zmešnjavi različnih logik: na eni strani nekomercialne logike nedenarne menjave, na drugi strani pa vse večji potrebi, da kulturne organizacije povečajo prihodek in tako izpeljejo svoje dejavnosti. Da bi kulturna politika zares spodbudila kulturni sektor na način, ki bi prispeval h gospodarski rasti, bi bilo treba uresničiti naslednje: a) vložiti več javnih sredstev v kulturne programe, da bi organizatorji dejansko lahko plačali storitve, ki jim jih nudijo druge organizacije; ali b) ustanoviti več zasebnih skladov za kulturo – to sta rešitvi, ki ustrezata zgoraj omenjenim načinom povečevanja prihodkov kulturnih organizacij. Prva rešitev je mogoča le, če pride do prerazporeditve javnoporo-računskih sredstev; druga rešitev pa je mogoča le, če bo država spremenila svojo davčno politiko in se odrekla deležu prihodkov, ki jih zdaj prejema prek davkov. Poleg evropskih sredstev, ki veljajo za eno od načinov izboljšanja slabega financiranja kulture, resolucija Nacionalnega programa za kulturo 2008–2011 omenja tudi »usklajeno sodelovanje med kulturnim sektorjem, znanostjo in ekonomijo«. Zdi se tudi, da je Ministrstvo za kulturo celo že podalo konkreten predlog o spremembi davčne politike – kolikor gre zaupati neuradnim virom podatkov – vendar je tak predlog Ministrstvo za finance zavrnilo. Dokler bodo donatorji za kulturo deležni tako nepomembnih davčnih olajšav na lastne donacije – v Sloveniji je davčna olajšava na sredstva, namenjena za kulturo, le 3-odstotna – je nesmiselno pričakovati večjih donacij. Poleg tega je nemogoče, da donator in organizacija, ki prejmeta sredstva, skleneta dogovor o tem, kaj naj (formalno in vsebinsko) simbolno povrne donatorju organizacija, ki je finančno pomoč prejela.

Glede na opisano situacijo, kjer na eni strani ni dovolj ne državnih ne lokalnih javnih sredstev za kulturo, na drugi strani pa sploh nimamo davčne politike, ki bi spodbujala zasebne donatorje in sponzorje, je težko pričakovati kakršne koli spremembe na bolje bodisi v kulturnem sektorju bodisi kar zadeva prekerne (negotove) pogoje v njem. Še več, Slovenija je pravkar sprejela nov zakon o obdavčitvi neprofitnih organizacij, ki predvideva dodatno obdavčitev javnih sredstev, ki jih te organizacije prejmejo za svoje dejavnosti. Namesto smotrne in funkcionalne politike, ki bi pripeljala do strukturnih sprememb na področju financiranja kulture, je Slovenija spet pred dejstvom, da bo potrdila še en spisek pretencioznih besed o kulturi kot bistvu nacionalne in evropske biti in blaginje. Skratka, soočamo se s situacijo, v kateri so se umetniki, producenti in kulturne organizacije znova znašli v vlogi nekakšnih junakov in mučnikov, ki se pod nezavidljivimi pogoji borijo za eno od temeljnih vrednot EU.⁴

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Iz angleščine prevedla Tanja Passoni.

4 Če bi morda koga utegnilo zanimati, naj povem, da ta prispevek ni prispeval ničesar ne k slovenskemu ne k evropskemu BDP.

Katja Kobolt GREY STARS ON THE EUROPEAN BLUE(S) SKIES: The European Funds a Dream and a Precarization of Culture in Slovenia

At the opening ceremony of the "European Year of Intercultural Dialogue," for which Slovenia was responsible as it presides the EU in the first half of 2008, many words about the "great importance of culture" were said. It is a fact that not many representatives of Slovenian NGO cultural organizations were invited to the event or to the opening conference: "Intercultural Dialogue as the Fundamental Value of the EU". And even if they had been invited, I am sure that they could hardly attend the event. The opening event was namely scheduled at the beginning of January 2008 when NGO cultural producers are extremely busy with fundraising. They have to carry out this demanding and time-consuming administrative work in order that the fundamental value of the EU – culture – is kept "alive". The truth is that in Slovenia not as many funds are given to NGO cultural production as there are words spent. Or to put it differently, NGO cultural organizations face many obstacles on their way to improving their financial situations in order to realize their programmes. However, NGO cultural organizations are precisely those organizations that make an important contribution to this European cultural diversity. This difficulty is just as evident when it comes to raising European Union funds. The draft resolution on the National Programme for Culture 2008-2011 is willing to support cultural projects which are capable of raising these funds. Actually, these European Union funds are nowadays in Slovenia almost a figure of speech; that is why it is important to deconstruct this figure using a sort of "cultural materialism." Cultural materialism seeks namely to explain the organizational aspects of politics and the economy.¹ What follows is a report on how (European) cultural policy is "lived" on a daily basis by NGO cultural organizations in Slovenia, especially in relation to the possibility of co-financing their programmes with European funds.

In the first issue of *Reartikulacija* the proposed "resolution on the National Programme for Culture 2008-2011" was already critically examined, particularly its discourse and its chapters concerning the visual and performing arts. The resolution also discusses (though very briefly) under the title "Guidelines for Cultural Policies", the great impact of culture on economic growth. In the past years, on the grounds of quantitative facts about the great impact of culture on economic growth and employment rates within the EU in the cultural sector as well as the social and political role of culture, numerous EU documents dealing with culture have been ratified. Therefore, culture is perceived as an important economic factor, which Slovenian cultural policies intend to stimulate in order to "enable growth of employment rates," one of the reasons why the cultural sector is supposed to be so important. European funds are perceived as one of the methods of stimulating this sector. But if we focus on the work conditions in the cultural sector, which is an ever growing employment sector in Europe, in Slovenia this employment universe is far from the work model known as the "European social state legacy." The beginning of each year is not only the time when cultural organizations are submitting their proposals for funding but it is also the time when they are reporting on their activities. Cultural organizations provide data in order that the structures which give them funds can decide which cultural programmes are successful and which are not. No doubt that self- and external evaluations are a very useful method for evaluating work and programmes. Such evaluations provide structural changes, which will stimulate a creative, safe and professional production environment that will enable high quality cultural programmes.² However, a paradox is persistently reappearing, as it seems that although NGOs each year spend much time and effort reporting on their activities, they are not evaluated properly. Therefore, as reported in the research about the previous resolution on culture in Slovenia, the resolution on the National Programme for Culture 2004-2007 carried out by Maja Breznik and Aldo Milohnić (2007), the subsidizers in some instances failed to evaluate the programmes in relation to the directives of the 2004-2007 resolution, mostly due to lack of human resources (Breznik and Milohnić, 2007: 5, 10).

As far as NGO cultural organizations are concerned, if I may be cynical, it seems that human resources are less of a problem, mainly because it is an unwritten rule that if you are working in the NGO cultural sector, it should not be a problem for you to work for free. So we do project drafts in our "free time," we fundraise in our "free time," we do the reports in our "free time," we organize events in our "free time," artists present their work for

1 Cf. Jon Marcoux, »Cultural Materialism«, na URL: http://www.as.ua.edu/ant/Faculty/murphy/cultmat.htm

2 Cf. Breznik in Milohnić (2007), na www2.arnes.si/~ljmiri1s/slo_html/novosti/umanotera_porocilo_5.doc

3 Cf. Katja Praznik, na http://www.humourworks.org.

1 Cf. Jon Marcoux, "Cultural Materialism" at http://www.as.ua.edu/ant/Faculty/murphy/cultmat.htm

2 Cf. Breznik and Milohnić (2007) at www2.arnes.si/~ljmiri1s/slo_html/novosti/umanotera_porocilo_5.doc

“free” and co-organizers of our projects and programmes do it mostly in their “free time” and provide us with project space “for free.”³ It seems that cultural producers still live in a world of moneyless exchange. Therefore the Slovenian cultural sector cannot contribute greatly to economic growth. Namely, without financial transactions there is no economic growth, for as we all know the growth of the GDP depends on what has been paid.

And what has this to do with EU funds? What does moneyless exchange or the grey economy have to do with EU funds? In order for cultural organizations to be able to take part in such projects, they need to prove a steady and relatively high turnover which should come from other sources – other public or private funding such as donors and sponsors. Therefore, only a steady and high turnover is seen as a guarantee for the successful realization of the project but, unfortunately, only a few Slovenian NGO cultural organizations are able to present such a turnover, which would qualify them to apply as the main organizers of EU funded projects. It seems that the problem of the grey economy in the Slovenian cultural sector could easily be solved by reciprocal charging of partners in cultural programs. However, as most cultural organizations depend on the same public subsidizers and are *de facto* receiving funds for the same shared programs, though for different costs within these programs, they cannot charge the services among them as this would mean they would charge for something for which they have already been paid by the public subsidizers of the event.

Let us illustrate this quandary. A cultural organization that is both the producer and the organizer of a cultural event does not run the premises in which this event could take place. (There are many NGO cultural organizations in Slovenia, which do not dispose of a proper venue.) So these organizations have to propose their events to some venues, which are again run by some other cultural organizations, but which depend on the same public subsidizers. In order that an organization running a venue can offer space to the organizer lacking a venue, the former needs funds to maintain the venue and the technical equipment, as well as human resources to run the place, etc. Funds which, as stated above, mainly come from the same public financiers and are not supposed to be spent for commercial activities. Charging the space and the facilities would namely mean “double trading” the venue. Although it is important to state that the co-existence of subsidized organizations with and without venues is indeed a very helpful and important factor, which helps cultural organizations in Slovenia to organize their events at all. The problem we are faced with here is the vicious circle in which funds of one and the same subsidizer are circulating, or better, are not circulating enough due to the lack of funds. It seems that public subsidizers have realized the problem. Namely, they have just put into force a new rule: for one cultural programme only one NGO cultural organization can get public subsidizes. However, this does not mean that the organization would get more money for the programme – the sum it receives remains unchanged. If in the past collaborating organizations put their income together to produce a programme, now the programme should be produced by only one organization, which however disposes with the same income for the programme as before. Furthermore – some officials of the Slovenian Ministry of Culture even speak in favour of a kind of “takeover policy.” They imagine a far more effective strategy whereby “larger” organizations which have at their disposal venues or technical equipment would function as producers and apply for public funds, while smaller organizations would only “sell” their ideas ... In this way – larger organizations would grow even larger and the small ones would get even smaller. No chance then for the small to take advantage of European funds. What we face in the cultural sector is a jumble of different logics: on the one hand the non-commercial logic of moneyless exchange and on the other hand the ever-growing need for cultural organizations to increase their turnover in order to be able to implement their activities. In order for the cultural policy to really stimulate the cultural sector in a way which would add to economic growth, there should be again: a) more public funds invested in cultural programs, so organizers could *de facto* pay for services they need from other cultural organizations; or b) more private funds for culture – the solutions which are complementary with the above mentioned ways of how to increase the turnover of cultural organizations. The first solution is only possible if a redistribution of public budget takes place; the second solution is only possible if the state is willing to change its fiscal policy and renounce some of the income that it now gets via taxes. Apart from the EU funds, considered as one of the methods of improving the miserable financing of culture, the resolution on the National Programme for Culture 2008-2011 also mentions “synergetic co-operation between the cultural sector, science and the economy.” Well, apparently there has already been a concrete proposal by the Slovenian Ministry of Culture on how to change the fiscal policy, as far as we could trust an unofficial source, but the proposal has not been approved by the Ministry of Finance. As long as tax reductions for donors to culture remain so small – in Slovenia only 3% of a company’s income could be set off against tax liability – it is unreasonable to expect that there will be any serious donations. In addition, it is impossible for a donor and an organization which receives the donation to conclude any agreement in what will effectively be the symbolic return of the donation by the supported organization.

On the grounds of the described situation where there are not enough state and local public funds meant for culture on the one hand, and taking into account the fact that we lack the appropriate fiscal policies, which would stimulate private donors and founders on the other hand, it is difficult to expect any great changes in the cultural sector in Slovenia, and therefore also any improvements in the precarious work conditions within it. In addition, a new law on taxing non-profit organizations, which are founded by public funds, has just been introduced; it orders that non-profit organizations have to pay additional tax on the public funds they gain for their activities. Instead of a concrete and functional policy which would introduce structural changes in the field of financing culture, Slovenia is again about to ratify another collection of pretentious words about how culture is the core of the national and European being and well-fare. Therefore, we are confronted with a situation where artists, producers and cultural organizations act as some kind of heroes and martyrs who as a rule fight under unenviable conditions for one of the fundamental EU values.⁴

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³ Cf. Katja Praznik at <http://www.humourworks.org>.

⁴ For those who might be interested: this text hasn't contributed anything to either the Slovenian or the European GDP.

IZREDNO STANJE/STATE OF EXCEPTION

IZJEMA: SODOBNA UMETNIŠKA SCENA IZ PRIŠTINE

Razstava *IZJEMA: Sodobna umetniška scena iz Prištine*, ki sta jo organizirali Kontekst in Napon, kulturno-umetniški nevladni ustanovi iz Beograda in Novega Sada, je bila najprej predstavljena v Muzeju sodobne umetnosti v Vojvodini v Novem Sadu (od 22. januarja do 5. februarja 2008). Četudi se je srbska desnica negativno odzvala nanjo in jo po večini napačno interpretirala, razstava ni bila deležna večjih izgrediv in nasilja. Ko je napočil čas za njeno ponovno odprtje, tokrat v Galeriji Kontekst v Beogradu 7. februarja 2008, pa je bila še pred njenim odprtjem istega dne s silo prekinjena. Na razstavi so predstavljeni albanski umetniki mlajše generacije s Kosova: Artan Balaj, Jakup Ferri, Driton Hajredini, Flaka Haliti, Fitore Isufi Koja, Dren Maliqi, Alban Muja, Vigan Nimani, Nurhan Qehaja, Alketa Xhafa, in Lulzim Zeqiri. Kustosi so Vida Knežević, Kristian Lukić, Ivana Marjanović in Gordana Nikolić.

Eduard Freudmann in Ivana Marjanović IZJEMA POTRJUJE PRAVILO

Razstavo *Izjema: Sodobna umetniška scena iz Prištine* v Novem Sadu je 22. januarja 2008 otvoril Bojan Kostreš, predsednik skupščine avtonomne province Vojvodine (LSV – Zveza socialnih demokratov iz Vojvodine). V svojem govoru je izjavil, da so kosovski umetniki dobrodošli v Novem Sadu, ne glede na to, ali je Kosovo samostojna pokrajina ali le del Srbije. Sledili so siloviti napadi s strani predstavnikov reakcionarnih strank (DSS – Demokratska stranka Srbije in SPS – Socialistična stranka Srbije), ki nista bili neposredno vključeni v drugi krog predsedniških volitev v Srbiji. Da bi se zaščitil, je Kostreš po napadih zavzel znani srbski nacionalistični pristop in povedal: »Dejstvo, da so kosovski in albanski umetniki prišli v Novi Sad, pomeni, da se čutijo državljani Republike Srbije.« Zatem je Radikalna stranka izrabila razstavo za svojo volilno kampanjo v televizijski reklam, ki je nagovarjala gledalce z naslednjim besedilom: »Razstava slavi grozovitosti, ki so jih albanski teroristi zagrešili na Kosovem.« Na to se je skliceval tudi predsedniški kandidat Nikolić, ki je razstavo uporabil kot argument proti svojemu nasprotniku Tadiću v dvoboju na srbski nacionalni televiziji v času največje gledanosti. Drugi krog srbskih predsedniških volitev pa je potekal prav med eno in drugo otvoritvijo razstave v Novem Sadu in Beogradu (3. februarja 2008). »Zmerni« in »zahodno usmerjeni« kandidat Boris Tadić (DS – Demokratska stranka) je na volitvah z dvema odstotko-ma glasov več premagal ultra-nacionalističnega nasprotnika Tomislava Nikolića (SRS – Srbska radikalna

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stranka). Februarja je bilo ozračje v Srbiji zelo napeto, saj naj bi Kosovo 17. februarja napovedalo neodvisnost. Štiri dni po predsedniških volitvah 7. februarja je bila otvoritev razstave v Beogradu nasilno prekinjena. Naslednji dan sta Mestna občina in srbsko Ministrstvo za kulturo sklicala tiskovno konferenco, na kateri sta obsodila ta dogodek in povedala, da je bil »Beograd vedno odprto mesto in bo tako tudi ostalo«, hkrati pa sta se sklicevala na »osnovna načela strpnosti, spoštovanje kulturne raznolikosti, svobodo govora in umetniškega izražanja«. Kljub takim izjavam sta obe instituciji zavrnili podporo razstavi, češ da to ni v njuni pristojnosti, pač pa v pristojnosti Ministrstva za notranje zadeve. Če potegnemo črto pod celotno zadevo, lahko rečemo, da je celotna srbska politična scena nasprotovala razstavi; vsi tisti, ki so se vključili v dogajanje, so razstavo napadali (SRS, SPS, in DSS) ali pa dogodak sploh niso komentirali (DS). Podporne izjave so bile redke in še te samo s strani manjših strank, kot sta denimo G17 plus in LDP (Liberalna demokratska stranka); podpora razstavi pa je prišla s strani večine nevladnih organizacij. Prvi novinarski odzivi po otvoritvi v Novem Sadu so bili presenetljivo pozitivni – v rumenem tisku je bil dogodek celo vključen »med priporočene dogodke dneva«. Zatem so beograjski mediji stopili v napad. Najprej so obsodili politika, vpletenega v to zadevo (Kostreša), in institucijo (Muzej sodobne umetnosti v Vojvodini), tik pred otvoritvijo v Beogradu pa še organizatorje razstave (kuratorje in nevladne organizacije). Mediji se niso zanimali za koncept in vsebino razstave, še manj za kontekstualni prostor dialoga in refleksije, ki naj bi ga razstava na novo vzpostavila. Medije je zanimal le škandal, ki ga lahko razstava vzpostavi. Prav zaradi tega so načrtno izpostavili delo *Face to Face* Drena Maliqija, ki predstavlja dvojno podobo Elvisa Presleya kot kavboja, umetnika Andyja Warhola, sopostavljeno dvojni podobi Adema Jasharija, vodje UÇK (Kosovska osvobodilna vojska). Jashari velja za borca za svobodo v Albaniji in za ikono na Kosovem, v Srbiji pa za terorista in vojnega zločinca. Razstavljena Jasharijeva slika in ogorčenje, ki ga je le-ta sprožila, je povzročilo histerične in sovražne odzive srbske družbe. V običajni nacionalistični terminologiji je bila razstava označena kot dogodek, ki »slavi albanske separatiste in teroriste«. Predstavniki strokovne in nestrokovne javnosti, kot so denimo nacionalistični nogometaši, so v medijih slavili uničevalce razstave v Beogradu, jih povzdigovali, hkrati pa so obsodili kuratorje in organizatorje razstave, da so ti proti Srbiji in zato krivi izdaje.

Prvi znak možnih nasilnih napadov je bila javna zahteva Združenja premeščenih oseb iz Kosova in Me-tohije, naj se razstava v Novem Sadu zapre. Ti so hkrati zagrozili, da bodo poslali svoje člane, ki bodo pomagali zapreti razstavo, če organizatorji ne bodo upoštevali zahteve. Medtem so skrajno desno usmerjeni spletni forumi napovedali, da bo razstava prepeljana v Beograd, in že kovali načrte, kako jo uničiti. Dan pred otvoritvijo razstave v Beogradu je klerofašistično gibanje Otačastveni pokret Obraz (Gibanje za dostojanstvo domovine) pozvalo »vse srbske patriote, da se udeležijo razstave [...] in albanskim separatistom in njihovim beograjskim pajdašem pokažejo, kaj [patrioti] menijo o umetniških in političnih ciljih take manifestacije«. Uro in pol pred otvoritvijo razstave 7. februarja se je množica 300 fanatičnih članov gibanja Obraz, nogometnih huliganov in drugih nacionalističnih sil zbrala na ulicah okrog galerije. Policija je intervenirala, da ne bi napadli galerije (sočasno pa je tudi obiskovalcem onemogočila vstop v galerijo in udeležbo na otvoritvi). Kljub temu je izgrednikom uspelo udreti v razstavni prostor in raztrgati Maliqijevo umetniško delo. Eden od njih je prekinil otvoritveni govor, zavzel podij in imel sovražni govor, v katerem je diskreditiral sodelujoče umetnike, organizatorje pa obtožil, da so izdali domovino in človeštvo. Kazal je kamen, s katerim je želel uprizoriti po vsej državi razširjen kliše kamenjanja, ki le potrjuje neciviliziranost Albancev. Policija ga je odstranila in organizatorjem naročila zapreti razstavo še pred njenim uradnim odprtjem. Naslednji dan so bila steklena vrata galerije razbita. Ker je bila galerija pod policijskim nadzorom, so bili storilci pridržani in preiskani. Policija je od njih zahtevala, da se direktorju galerije opravičijo za svoja dejanja.

Če na ta dogodek gledamo širše, bi lahko dejali, da so imeli policisti pri celotnem dogajanju aktivno vlogo. Medtem ko so policijske enote na eni strani preprečile drhali vstop v galerijo in napad nanjo, pa so na drugi strani dovolile izgrede ob otvoritvi, na osnovi česar so policisti od organizatorjev zahtevali, da se razstava zapre. Policisti niso le dovolili, da so se vandali prebili skozi nadzorovano ograjo in uničili umetniško delo, ampak kljub svoji številni prisotnosti v galeriji med motenjem otvoritvenega govora niso intervenirali; pri tem pa so se navkljub številnim prošnjam, da intervenirajo, sklicevali na svobodo govora. Zato se je direktor stavbe, v kateri je galerija, strinjal, da se razstava zapre. Pri tem je upošteval nasvet policije, da »ti ne morejo več zagotavljati varnosti obiskovalcem in organizatorjem«. Policisti so zatem nasilno pregnali obiskovalce in prisilili direktorja k podpisu dogovora, da se odpoveduje odprtju razstave. Naslednji dan so policisti najprej zahtevali odstranitev razstavljenih del, vidnih skozi okna galerije, zatem pa vseh del, ki naj bi jih odpeljali v obsežnem policijskem spremstvu, kar kaže na jasen poizkus prestrašiti organizatorje, da si v prihodnje razstave ne bi upali ponovno postaviti in odpreti.

Za konec velja poudariti štiri točke:

Prvič, da je razstava sprožila ponovno uprizoritev represivne politike, ki jo je Srbija že desetletja izvajala na Kosovem.

Drugič, pokazalo se je, da je del srbske družbe, ki se ima za »demokatično«, pravzaprav talec nacionalističnega konsenza, zato je bila nemočna v trenutku, ko je bilo treba ukrepati in zavzeti pozicijo.

Tretjič, srbsko kulturno politiko oblikujejo ultra-nacionalistične sile, izvaja pa jo nasilna drhal, ki jo podpirajo tudi same uradne institucije Republike Srbije.

Četrtič, Jasharijevo podobo, ki naj bi bila vzrok negodovanja in ki naj bi sprožila histerično škandalozno kampanjo, bi pravzaprav lahko zamenjala katera koli druga podoba na razstavi, saj je bil povod za sovražne odzive in slepo uničevanje bolj v tem, da so odlično artikularane pozicije sodobne umetniške scene iz Prištine obrnile na glavo in dobesedno izničile kulturno-rasistične stereotipe o »neciviliziranem albanskem narodu«; tako so umetniki vrnili udarec reakcionarnim srbskim silam in predstavili drugačno podobo o Kosovem.

Za več podatkov o dogodku in medijskem odzivu glej: www.kontekstgalerija.org

• **Eduard Freudmann je umetnik, ki živi na Dunaju in v Beogradu ter poučuje na Akademiji za likovno umetnost na Dunaju. V sodelovanju z Jeleno Radić končuje film o incidentih, ki jih je sprožila razstava *Izjema – sodobna umetniška scena iz Prištine*.**
• **Ivana Marjanović je soustanoviteljica galerije Kontekst iz Beograda ter sokuratorka programa galerije. Trenutno dela doktorat na Akademiji za likovno umetnost na Dunaju. Živi in dela v Beogradu in na Dunaju.**

Iz angleščine prevedla Tanja Passoni.

Ana Vujanović v sodelovanju z akterji Druge scene BREZ IZJEME!

Po besedah kuratorjev (Vide Knežević, Kristiana Lukića, Ivane Marjanović in Gordane Nikolić) »razstava preizprašuje vlogo vladajočih kulturnih hegemonij, nacionalnih in spolnih identitet v polju vizualne ume-tnosti, ki jih določajo balkanska partikularnost, doktrine omejene suverenosti, konflikti zaradi globalnih varnostnih zavezništev, nacionalizmov, pogojev in posledic evroatlantske integracije in krepitev kapita-lizma«. V omenjeni izjavi ni ničesar provokativnega in subverzivnega, kar bi namigovalo, da ne gre za običajno, politično korektno sodobno umetniško razstavo, ki podpira lokalne specifičnosti in razlike v multikulturnem svetu. A vendar v tem primeru temu ni tako.

Na žalost že samo dejstvo, da albanski umetniki razstavljajo svoja dela v Srbiji, sproža polemične odzive v lokalnem kulturnem in družbenem kontekstu. S takšno predpostavko moramo začeti že, če upoštevamo dejstvo, da je bila razstava zaprta še pred njeno otvoritvijo. Obenem menimo, da je treba za razumevanje incidenta, ki se je zgodil v galeriji Kontekst, upoštevati dva ključna dejavnika trenutnih političnih razmer v Srbiji. Prvi je ta, da je bilo odprtje razstave predvideno nekaj dni po srbskih predsedniških volitvah, na katerih je s samo 2-odstotno prednostjo pred kandidatom desne opcije zmagala demokratska stranka, drugi pa je bila 17. februarja napovedana razglasitev neodvisnosti Kosova s strani kosovskega parlamen-ta. Srbski predsednik Tadić, predsednik vlade Koštunica in predsednik srbskega parlamenta Dulić so 11. februarja izjavili, da Srbija ne bo sprejela enostranske razglasitve neodvisnosti. V takih kritičnih makro-političnih razmerah je bilo medijsko poročanje o dogodku v zvezi z razstavo neuspešno, kar sicer ni nič novega. S točno določenim političnim načrtom a brez vsakršne odgovornosti za javni diskurz so mediji odigrali ključno vlogo pri ustvarjanju ozračja napetosti in deljenega mnenja javnosti, ki so jo prisilili, da se opredeli ZA razstavo (Evropo, demokracijo, strpnost, internacionalizacijo) ali PROTI razstavi (kar pomeni za Srbijo, nacionalizem, ohranjanje zgodovine, nacionalni ponos in proti evroatlantski integraciji in str-pnosti). Tak omejen in sramoten razkol, ki je nastal zaradi pomanjkljivih in neustreznih pojasnil oziroma nepopolnih informacij o razstavi, je na večer otvoritve povzročil izbruhe nasilja.

Med otvoritvijo so člani domovinskega gibanja »Obraz« (Ponos) in drugi skrajni desničarji s silo prekinili otvoritveni govor. Dobesedno so napadli galerijski prostor. Eden izmed njih je vstopil v galerijo s kamnom v roki in grozil kuratorjem razstave, medtem ko so drugi uničevali umetniško delo *Face to Face* Drena Maliqija. Srbski slikar Čalija je agresivno prekinil otvoritveni govor in začel opominjati na srbske žrtve in begunce s Kosova, od organizatorjev pa zahteval prekinitev odprtja razstave. Policija je morala ukrepati; zaprla je ulice, kjer se nahaja galerija in s tem preprečila obiskovalcem vstop v galerijo. Tik pred otvoritvijo razstave pa je ocenila, da umetnikom, kuratorjem in obiskovalcem ne more zagotoviti varnosti. Zato se je direktor prostora, kjer se nahaja galerija, odločil zapreti razstavo. Pomembno je poudariti, da je gibanje »Obraz« skrajno nacionalistično in desničarsko gibanje, ki ga je leta 2005 Ministrstvo za notranje zadeve Republike Srbije razglasilo za ilegalno »fašistično organizacijo«.

Ker lokalni mediji javnosti niso priskrbeli zadostnih informacij o delu, ki je predmet sporov, bomo o njem spregovorili v nadaljevanju. *Face to Face* je vizualna instalacija, temelječa na reappropriaciji znanega dela Andya Warhola, ki kot množični mediji v obliki jumbo plakatov upodablja Elvisa Presleya, ameriško pop ikono. Ta postopek izgradnje dela je značilen za sodobna umetniška dela, ki jih zgodovinar umetnosti in nekdanji sodirektor Palaisa de Tokyo Nicolas Bourriaud uvršča v »post-produkualne«. Maliqi prevzame Warholov način dela, naredi kopijo njegovega Presleya in ga primerja s podobo aktualne ikone kosovskih Albancev: Adema Jasharija. Delo obravnava medijske reprezentacije, vprašanja nacionalizma na Balkanu, mit o ameriško-albanskih prijateljskih odnosih in spektakularizacijo vsakega segmenta sodobnega družbenega življenja v »družbi spektakla«. Po avtorjevih besedah delo predstavlja družbeno realnost, v kateri je Jashari zares pop ikona. Zato bi tudi nestrokovnjaki na področju sodobne teorije umetnosti morali vedeti, da ne gre za »razstavo reklamnega plakata Adema Jasharija« in da se tega plakata ne more primerjati z domnevno »razstavljenim plakatom Arkana v Prištini«. Naše prepričanje pa podpirajo tudi nekateri komentarji na spletnih forumih in blogih, da bi odgovorna in ustrezna razlaga preprečila nasilje in javnosti omogočila premisliti in oceniti razstavljeno delo. Žal so namesto tega mediji samovoljno manipulirali z dekontekstualiziranimi informacijami in na ta način razstavo pripeljali na raven sramotnega političnega škandala.

Mnogi akterji javne scene, organi oblasti in aktivisti nevladnih organizacij so se odzvali po incidentu. Kuratorji razstave so javno zahtevali od Ministrstva za kulturo Republike Srbije in Sekretariata za kulturo v Beogradu, da reagirajo in obsodijo nasilno dejanje ter da dovolijo odprtje razstave *Izjema*. Aktivisti nevladnih organizacij za človekove pravice so povečini zahtevali kaznovanje in javno obsodbo vandalov in se pri tem sklicevali na »Evropske vrednote«, kot sta strpnost in demokracija. Druga scena (<http://drugascena.org>), t. i. neodvisna kulturno-umetniška scena iz Beograda, v kateri sodeluje tudi galerija Kontekst, obsoja državo in mestne oblasti, ker se niso dovolj odločno odzvali na dogodek, še zlasti pa obsoja ravnanje policistov na samem kraju dogodka in se sprašuje, koga ta pravzaprav štiti – obiskovalce in umetnike pred zločinci ali zločince pred zakonom. Druga scena je odprla tudi razpravo o vlogi množičnih medijev, v kateri jih ostro obsoja neodgovornega in nezanesljivega podajanja informacij o razstavi in razstavljenih delih. Zainteresirani občani, kulturni delavci in umetniki iz Srbije, ki menijo, da državne institucije ne smejo dovoliti nacističnoklerikalnim organizacijam, da vodijo kulturno politiko države, so ustanovili spletno peticijo za odprtje razstave *Izjema*. Peticija je bila poslana na Ministrstvo za kulturo Republike Srbije, Sekretariat za kulturo v Beogradu. V njej se zahteva, da takoj in neposredno podprejo organizatorje in omogočijo odprtje razstave (www.petitiononline.com/odstupi/petition.html). Podporo smo prejeli tudi s strani mnogih akterjev regionalne in mednarodne kulturne scene, ki so podpisali peticijo in pomagali širiti informacije o nastali situaciji v svet. Četudi večina misli, da umetnost ni sposobna načeti kritičnih vprašanj v javnosti ali da so primeri, ko umetniška dela sprožijo tako široko javno debato, redki, pa ta primer kaže, da je problematizacija glavnih družbenih vprašanj skozi umetnost vendarle mogoča, pa čeprav morda ne na pričakovan način. Ob vsem tem je najpomembnejše razumeti, da do zaprtja razstave ni prišlo samo zaradi vsebine razstave, saj si beograjska javnost razstave sploh ni imela možnosti ogledati in si o njej ustvariti mnenja. Glavno vlogo pri vsem tem so odigrali množični mediji in njihov sistem reprezentacije, ki pozablja na odgovornost in stremi k spektakularnosti. Prav tako pomembno je razumeti – in s tem zaključujemo naš kritičen pregled dogodkov – da nasilno zaprtje razstave ni bilo zgolj naključje, eksces, izjemni primer, ki je zarezal v običajno družbeno realnost Beograda. Ne! Gre za SIMPTOM, ki kaže na pomanjkanje svobode javnega govora, vsakodnevno nasilje nad življenjem, globok razkol v družbi (med liberalci in nacionalisti, kjer ni kritične leve pozicije) in prikazuje napadalen in sramoten uradni javni diskurz, ki ne omogoča pogajanj o družbenem subjektu, to pa se tiče prav nas. Izjema tukaj ni dovoljena. In s tem dejstvom se moramo soočiti.

Iz angleščine prevedla Tanja Passoni.

EXCEPTION: CONTEMPORARY ART SCENE FROM PRISHTINA

The exhibition *EXCEPTION: Contemporary art scene from Prishtina* whose organizers are cultural-artistic NGOs from Belgrade and Novi Sad (Kontekst and Napon) was firstly exhibited in the Museum of Contemporary Art Vojvodina in Novi Sad (22 January–5 February, 2008). Although the exhibition received negative and mostly wrong interpretations by Serbian right-wing forces, it survived without incidents and violence. When the exhibition was scheduled to reopen at Kontekst gallery in Belgrade on 7 February 2008, it was forced to close in the evening of the opening. The exhibition presents artworks by Albanian artists of the younger generation from Kosovo: Artan Balaj, Jakup Ferri, Driton Hajredini, Flaka Haliti, Fitore Isufi Koja, Dren Maliqi, Alban Muja, Vigan Nimani, Nurhan Qehaja, Alketa Xhafa, and Luzim Zeqiri. The curators of the exhibition are Vida Knežević, Kristian Lukić, Ivana Marjanović, and Gordana Nikolić.

Eduard Freudmann and Ivana Marjanović THE EXCEPTION PROVES THE RULE

The exhibition *Exception – Contemporary Arts Scene from Prishtina* that opened on 22 January 2008 in Novi Sad was inaugurated by the president of the Assembly of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina Bojan Kostreš (LSV – League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina). In his speech, he stated that Kosovarian artists were welcome in Novi Sad irrespective of Kosovo’s status, being it either independent or part of Serbia. Harsh attacks by representatives of reactionary parties followed that were not directly involved in the presidential elections’ second round (DSS – Democratic Party of Serbia and SPS – Socialist Party of Serbia). The attacks led Kostreš – in order to defend himself – to approach the Serbian nationalistic common standard by stating that “the fact that Kosovo-Albanian artists came to Novi Sad, shows that they feel like citizens of the Republic of Serbia.” Furthermore, the exhibition was abused by the Radical Party in their election campaign TV’s advertisement stating: “The exhibition glorifies atrocities committed by Albanian terrorists in Kosovo.” Additionally, the presidential candidate Nikolić referred to the exhibition attacking his opponent Tadić in the prime time head-to-head confrontation on Serbian state TV. On 3 February 2008 – in-between the openings in Novi Sad and Belgrade – the second ballot of the Serbian presidential elections was held. The “moderate” and “pro-western” candidate Boris Tadić (DS – Democratic Party) won it by a narrow margin of 2% against the ultra-nationalist Tomislav Nikolić (SRS – Serbian Radical Party). In February, the situation in Serbia was tense because of the expected declaration of independence by Kosovo on 17 February 2008. On 7 February four days after the elections, the exhibition was violently prevented from being opened in Belgrade. On 8 February, the City Council and the Serbian Ministry of Culture issued press releases, condemning the incidents by stating that “Belgrade has always been and will remain an open city” and referring to “the basic principles of tolerance, the respect of cultural variety, the freedom of speech and artistic expression.” Nevertheless, both institutions stated that they could not support the exhibition beyond such a declaration, as they were not in charge of it, thus shifting their responsibility to the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Overall, it is possible to say that the Serbian political landscape was opposing the exhibition; the protagonists were either attacking it (SRS, SPS, and DSS) or not commenting on it (DS). Supportive statements were rare and only given by small parties such as G17 Plus and LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) as well as by a large part of the NGO sector. The very first press reactions after the opening of the exhibition in Novi Sad were surprisingly positive – one of the yellow press papers even listed the event in their daily “top rankings.” Subsequently, the media coverage started with the attacks. Initially the attacks were against the involved politician (Kostreš) and the institution (Museum of Contemporary Art, Vojvodina), but as soon as the exhibition was about to open in Belgrade, the media started to attack the organizers (curators and NGOs). The media was not at all interested in the concept and content of the show, even less in the new contextual space of dialogue and reflection that would have been opened up with the exhibition. The media was rather attracted by the putative scandalous potential they scented. They drew the attention solely on Dren Maliqi’s artwork *Face to Face*. The work displayed face-to-face Andy Warhol’s double picture of Elvis Presley as a cowboy and the double image of Adem Jashari, a leader of the UÇK (Kosovo Liberation Army).

Jashari is considered a freedom fighter by the Albanians and is stylized as a national icon in Kosovo, whereas Serbs consider him a war criminal and terrorist. Displaying Jashari’s picture and the scandalization it brought, lead to hysteric and hostile reactions throughout the Serbian public. With the constant use of nationalistic terminology, the exhibition was declared as an event that “glorifies Albanian separatists and terrorists.” Experts and non-experts spoke in the media about the violators of the Belgrade exhibition in superlatives, glorifying them, and accusing the curators and organizers of the exhibition as being Anti-Serbs guilty of treason. The first indication of a violent act was the public request by the “Association of displaced persons from Kosovo and Metohija” to close down the exhibition in Novi Sad. It included the threat to send their members to accomplish the closing in case the organizers would not comply. Meanwhile, in far-right internet forums it was announced that the exhibition will travel to Belgrade and plans were made how to disrupt it. On the day before the Belgrade opening, the clerical-fascistic movement “Otačastveni pokret Obraz” (Fatherland Movement Dignity) invited “all Serbian patriots to attend the opening [...] and to show to the Albanian separatists and their Belgrade accomplices what [the patriots] think about the artistic and political goals of such a manifestation.” On 7 February 2008, half an hour before the exhibition was about to be opened a mob of 300 fanatic Obraz members, football hooligans and other nationalistic forces gathered in the streets around the gallery. Police had to prevent them from attacking the gallery (at the same time they also prevented visitors from reaching the gallery and attending the opening). Nonetheless, violators succeeded to enter the exhibition space and tore down Maliqi’s artwork. One of them was interrupting the opening speech by capturing the stage and holding a hate-speech in which he discredited the participating artists and accused the organizers of betraying fatherland and humanity. By showing a stone, he intended to reproduce the countrywide spread cliché of stone throwing and therefore of uncivilized Albanians. Although he was marched off by the police, his intervention made the police instruct the organizers of the exhibition to shut it down before it had even been opened. On the day after, the glass door of the gallery was broken. As the building was under police surveillance, the perpetrators were arrested and examined by the police who subsequently proposed to stage a public performance including the institution’s director and the perpetrators within which the latter would apologize for their act.

In providing a possible overview of the events, it could be said that police has to be considered an active protagonist in the events. However, their special units prevented the mob from accessing and attacking the gallery space, at the same time the police let the opening being disrupted in order to insist on the claim that the organizers have to close the exhibition. The police not only let vandals pass through the controlled gate and destroy the artwork; they did not intervene during the violation of the opening speech either, though considerable police forces were present in the gallery. In spite of repeated requests, the police refused to do so referring to freedom of speech. At this point, the director of the space in which the gallery is located agreed to close down the exhibition taking into consideration the police’s evaluation that the “safety of visitors and organizers can no longer be guaranteed.” Subsequently the police evicted the visitors and pressed the director to sign an agreement to renounce the opening of the exhibition. On the next day, the police demanded that those art works, which were visible from outside the gallery, be removed. Afterwards, they demanded the works to be removed from the space altogether – according to their conception the transport should have been organized with massive police protection, which obviously was an attempt to frighten the organizers in order to make them not even think of reconstructing and opening the exhibition in the future.

In conclusion, four points have to be stressed further: Firstly, what was triggered off by the exhibition was the reproduction of a repressive policy Serbia has imposed on Kosovo for decades. Secondly, the part of Serbian society that designates itself “democratic” turned out to be hostage of the nationalistic consensus and therefore found itself paralyzed when it was time to act and take a position. Thirdly, Serbia’s cultural policy is conceived by ultra-nationalistic forces, and executed by violent mob forces while official institutions of the Republic of Serbia compliably assist. Fourthly, the cause of disagreement in the hysteric scandalization campaign (Jashari’s image), is interchangeable. The reason for hatred reactions and blind destruction was that the reactionary forces saw their cultural-racist stereotype about “uncivilized Albanians” being strongly contrasted and therefore nullified by perfectly articulated artistic positions of Prishtina’s contemporary art scene.

For more details about event and media reactions please see: www.kontekstgalerija.org.

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• **Ivana Marjanović is co-founder and co-curator of the Kontekst Gallery in Belgrade. At the moment she is a PhD candidate at the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna. Lives and works in Belgrade and Vienna.**

Ana Vujanović in collaboration with the actors of the Other Scene NO EXCEPTION!

By the words of the curators (Vida Knežević, Kristian Lukić, Ivana Marjanović, and Gordana Nikolić): “The exhibition is about questioning dominant cultural hegemonies, national and gender identities in the field of visual art which are defined by Balkan particularities, doctrines of limited sovereignty, conflicts of global security alliances, nationalisms, conditions and consequences of Euro-Atlantic integrations and strengthening of capitalism.” According to this statement, there is nothing too provocative and subversive here and it might be seen as a regular, politically correct contemporary exhibition that supports local specificities and differences in a multi-cultural world. However, this is not the case.

Unfortunately, the very fact that Albanian artists exhibit their artworks in Serbia is controversial information in the local social and cultural context. We must depart from this assumption already if we take into consideration the fact that the exhibition was closed before it was open. Also we think that there are two points of the actual political situation in Serbia that are crucial for considering the nature of the incident that happened in the Kontekst gallery. First, the exhibition was meant to open just after the Serbian president elections where the democratic option won with only 2% more votes than the right wing option, and second, the proclamation of Kosovo independence by the Kosovo parliament was scheduled for the 17 February. On the 11 February Serbian President Tadić, Prime Minister Koštunica and the President of Serbian Parliament Dulić declared that Serbia would not accept a one-sided independency. In such critical macro-political conditions, mass media in Serbia reporting about the exhibition mostly failed, as they did many times before. With a precise



Posredovanje policije na dan otvoritve razstave 7.2. 2008 v Beogradu.
Police intervention on the day of the opening of the exhibition on 7 February 2008 in Belgrade.

political plan or just without responsibility for the public discourse, they played a remarkable role in empowering tensions and divisions of the public. They forced the public to decide: PRO (for Europe, for democracy, for tolerance, for internationalism) or CONTRA (which means for Serbia, for nationalism, for preserving history, for the national dignity, and anti Euro-Atlantic integrations, anti tolerance) the exhibition. This reductive and stultifying division produced by the lack of adequate explanation or at least a complete information resulted in violence at the evening of the exhibition opening.

During the opening, the group of members of the fatherland movement “Obraz” (Dignity) and other right wing actors stopped the opening by violent means. They literally attacked the gallery space. One person entered the gallery with a stone in his hand and threatened the curators, while few of them destroyed the artwork *Face to Face* by Dren Maliqi. The painter Čalija aggressively stopped the opening speech reminding about the Serbian victims and refugees from Kosovo, and asking the organizers not to open the exhibition. The police had to intervene; it closed the street where the gallery is located, prevented audience from visiting the exhibition and just before the opening, it estimated that it could not guarantee safety to the artists, curators, and the public, and according to this the director of the venue where the gallery works decided to close the exhibition. It is important to mention that “Obraz” is an extreme nationalist and right wing movement, which, according to the Ministry of Interior Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, was classified as a “fascistic organization” in 2005, and thus illegal.

As the local media failed to explain adequately the artwork that is at stake here, it is important for us to do it. *Face to Face* is a visual installation that is based on the procedure of re-appropriating the famous work by Andy Warhol that in the manner of mass media billboards represents Elvis Presley, American pop icon. The procedure is characteristic for the contemporary artworks labelled under “post-production” by the art historian and former co-director of the Palais de Tokyo Nicolas Bourriaud. Maliqi appropriates Warhol’s manner, makes a copy of his Presley and confronts it with the image of the actual icon of the Albanians from Kosovo: Adem Jashari. The work deals with media representations, questions of nationalism at the Balkans, myth of American-Albanian friendship, and spectacularization of every segment of contemporary social life in the “society of the spectacle”. According to the words of the author, it depicts his social reality, where Jashari is a pop icon indeed. Thus, and even without any specialist knowledge in contemporary art theory, this artwork is not and cannot be understood as “exhibiting the promotional poster of Adem Jashari,” and compared with a hypothetical “exhibiting the poster of Arkan in Prishtina.” We strongly believe, and some a posteriori comments on the Internet forums and blogs encourage our belief, that this kind of responsible and adequate explanations would prevent the violence and give the audience possibility to think and judge about the work. Unfortunately, instead of it, the mass media arbitrarily manipulated de-contextualized information, and in that way brought the exhibition at the level of shameful political scandal.

The days after the incident, many actors of our public scene, authorities, and NGO activists reacted. The curators of the exhibition asked publicly the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Serbia and the Secretariat for Culture of the City of Belgrade to react and condemn this violent act and allow the exhibition *Exception* to be held. NGO activists for human rights mostly asked for the punishment and public condemnation of the vandals, recalling “European values” such as tolerance and democracy. Other Scene (<http://drugascena.org>), an initiative of the independent cultural-artistic scene in Belgrade, in which Kontekst gallery also participates, criticizes limp reactions by the state and city authorities, and especially the behaviour of the police at the locus, asking whom the police protects – visitors and artists from criminals, or criminals from the law. Other Scene also opened a debate about the role of the mass media, and strongly condemned them for their irresponsible and unreliable informing about the exhibition and the works included. Interested citizens, cultural workers and artists from Serbia, who argued that state institutions must not allow Nazi-clerical organizations to head the cultural policy of a state, initiated the online petition for opening of the exhibition *Exception*. The petition is directed to the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Serbia, the Secretariat for Culture of the City of Belgrade, as a demand for immediate and direct support to the organizers to open this exhibition (www.petitiononline.com/odstupi/petition.html). Many actors of the regional and international cultural scene also gave their support, signed the petitions, and helped spreading the information worldwide. Many of us might think that art has no impact on producing critical questions in the public sphere, or that it is a very rare case in the current global context that artworks provoke such a broad public debate, yet this example shows us that problematizations of the core issues of a society through art is possible. However, maybe not in the way we expect. What is most important to understand here is that the exhibition was not closed because of its content, since the public in Belgrade did not have a chance to see it and make a proper judgement. The crucial role here was played by mass media, and their system of representation – forgetting the responsibility and instead aiming at producing a spectacle. Second, it is crucial to think, and with this we will finish our critical review, that the violent closing the exhibition is not an incident, an excess, an exceptional case that breaks our normal social life here. No! It is a SYMPTOM. And as such it indicates the lack of freedom of public speech, everyday life violence, deep divisions within society (on liberals and nationalists, and without a critically left position), and it demonstrates the aggressive and stultifying official public discourse that cancels any negotiation about social subjects that touch many of us. No exception is possible. That is what we must face here.

(HARD)CORE

Katharina Morawek ODMRZNITEV MUZEJEV: MOČ RAZSTAVLJANJA

Zgodovina pojma »muzej« je tesno povezana z zgodovino moderne, še posebej z moderno idejo o znarnosti in z ustanovitvijo nacionalnih držav. Nastanek nacionalnih muzejev sovpada s pojavom znanstvenega rasizma in prvih etnografskih zbirk. Take tehnike produkcije znanja so hkrati inštrument izvajanja kolonialne moči; ustvarjene podobe so bile del buržoaznega pojmovanja kulture in so bile ključne za uvedbo glavnih konceptov »kulture« in »narave«, ki sta bila povezana z rasističnimi in seksističnimi stereotipi. Že od začetkov kolonializma in nacionalne države je ustanovitev skupnosti potekala sočasno s konstituiranjem »Drugega«. Ti muzeji so arhivi in sedimenti znanja, podob in tehnik, v ozadju katerih se nahaja skupni cilj, ki je povezan s kolonializmom, modernizacijo, kapitalizmom in razsvetljenstvom. Med zaposlenimi v dunajskem Muzeju naravne zgodovine kroži interna šala: »Delamo na drugem največjem pokopališču v Avstriji.« Pravzaprav je to bolj mrtvašnica, v kateri je na tisoče lobanj in kosti, ki so povečini ostanki žrtev nacionalsocialistične uničevalne politike. V arhivu Oddelka za antropologijo imajo biologi in drugi znanstveniki dostop do podatkov o rasističnih meritvah. Polemik o izvoru teh objektov ne sproža nihče; prav nasprotno, odgovorni ne želijo dajati nikakršnih pojasnil v zvezi z odškodninskimi zahtevami. Če se kdo zanima za produkcijo podob in znanja, mora na muzej gledati kot na institucijo, ki proizvaja podobe, znanje, jezik in razstave in ki vzpostavlja odnos med (naravno) znanostjo in umetniškimi tehnikami. Dejstvo je, da se za politiko razstavljanja vedno nahaja neka avtoritarna zahteva prikazovanja: »tako pač je«, kadar gre za vzpostavljanje in ponovno vzpostavljanje t. i. »kulturnih razlik«. Te prakse ustvarjanja razlik v posameznih zgodovinskih obdobjih so vse do danes bolj kot ne ostale neizprašane. V mislih nimam le etnografskih muzejev, ampak tudi vse institucije, ki prikazujejo umetnost: popularnost »kitajske« ali »balkanske« umetnosti – kar koli naj bi to že pomenilo – kaže na to, kako zelo povezane so te vrste razstav. Prikazovanje objektov, obdanih z avro, tj. kosov ali umetniških del, ki so predstavljena samo zato, da proizvajajo določene zgodbe, zahteva podrobnejšo analizo, saj so te prostorske postavitve rezultat premišljenih političnih odločitev. Vsi dobro poznamo diorame, ki so tako popularne v muzejih naravne zgodovine in ki zaradi razsvetljave in scenerije spominjajo na izseke iz filma *Indiana Jones in zadnji križarski pohod*. Postopek je povsem preprost: razstavljeni objekti brez imena, »brez zgodovine« ustvarjajo vzdušje »vsakdanje« estetike, da bi nas prepričali: »To je resnično.« Na teh razstavah je komaj omenjena nasilna zgodovina, skozi katero so se ti objekti prebili. Fascinacija večine kuratorjev muzejev naravne zgodovine nad objekti ima svojo logiko: objekti ostanejo in niso »zmuzljivi« kot besede, zato predstavljajo »visoko kulturo«. Znova gre za razločevanje med kulturo in naravo: narava, ki je nedotaknjena in »nekontaminirana s strani zahoda«, je prepuščena tistim, ki so skozi te procese skonstruirani in predstavljajo »druge« tistim, ki te procese določajo. S tega stališča lahko govorimo o konceptu »zamrznitve«, ki omogoča, da se ti objekti ohranijo v nepoškodovanem stanju in kot taki zavarovani pred napredkom ali vplivi t. i. »tehno-loškega razvoja«. Kakšne posledice bo to imelo še zlasti za muzeje? Postkolonialni raziskovalci so se s tem vprašanjem dolgo ukvarjali. Kako lahko te opazke še močneje vplivajo na prihodnost muzejev in same politike razstavljanja?

Analiza sproža vrsto vprašanj:
- Ali sta zgodovina in politika zbirk vidni in premišljeni oziroma kako se kažejo poskusi, da bi se prikrlili?

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- Kako se lahko politika razstavljanja otrese binarne logike normalnega/nenormalnega, zunanjega/notranjega, moški/ženska?
- Katere politike in koliko od njih, če si izposodim besede Gayatri Spivak, »ne naredijo enakih napak«?
- Kako postavljati razstave in se hkrati izogniti istim napakam, etnicizaciji in objektivizaciji tehnik »drugačenja«?
- Kako se sedanja emancipacijska perspektiva, aktivistično znanje in zahteve po vrnitvi teh objektov ujemajo s temi zahtevami?
- Kakšna bi bila funkcija muzejev, če bi bilo zaplenjene objekte treba vrniti?
- Kako bi uporabili prazne razstavne prostore?
- Kako razstaviti svojo zgodovino in ne zgodovine »drugega«?

Treba je na novo načrtati strategije in koncepte postavljanja razstav: nove muzeje, ki ne bodo razstavljali zgodovine kulturnih razlik, ampak kulturne zgodovine, v katerih bo vidna raznolikost ljudske in vsakdanje kulture.

Katharina Morawek je umetnica in teoretičarka, ki živi na Dunaju.

Iz angleščine prevedla Tanja Passoni.

Katharina Morawek UNFREEZING THE MUSEUMS: THE POWER OF DISPLAY

The history of the concept of “the museum” is closely connected to the history of modernity, especially the constitution of the national state and the establishment of the modern idea of science. National museums were built at the same time scientific racism was established and ethnographic collections began growing. These techniques of knowledge production are at the same time instruments of colonial power; the images that were produced were embedded into a bourgeois notion of culture and were crucial for the constitution of the master concepts of “culture” and “nature” which were connected to racist and sexist stereotypes. Since the beginning of colonialism and the nation-state, the construction of the community has always been connected to the construction of “the other.” These museums are archives and sediments of knowledge with images and techniques at their very core, linked to colonialism, modernization, capitalism and enlightenment. There is an internal joke being passed around between employees in the Museum of Natural History in Vienna: “We are working on the second largest graveyard in Austria.” Actually, it is more a morgue, with thousands of skulls and bones, in many cases, the remains of victims of the extermination politics during National Socialism. In the archive of the anthropological department, biologists and other researchers can find boxes with data which arose from racist measurements. A debate of conflict about the provenience of those objects is not taking place; rather those who are responsible avoid any comments concerning restitution claims. Being interested in the production of images and knowledge, one has to look at the museum as an institution that produces images and knowledge, language and displays, and establishes relations between (natural) science and artistic techniques. In fact, the politics of display often possess an authoritarian demand of display: “this is how it is,” establishing or re-establishing so called “cultural differences.” This practice of producing differences in its specific history has seldom been questioned until today, and we here are not only speaking of ethnographic museums, but also of institutions displaying art: the hype on “Chinese” or “Balkan” art – whatever that should mean – shows how closely those types of display are connected. The “auratisation” of objects, where pieces or works of art are staged in order to produce certain narratives, should be looked at very closely. Those spatial arrangements are in fact, the results of highly political decisions. We all know the dioramas that are so popular in museums of natural history and that do, through lighting and scenery, more than remind us of filmsettings taken from the film “Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade.” It is a simple operation: objects without names, “without histories” are arranged to produce an atmosphere of “everyday” aesthetics, to tell us: “This is real.” The violent history of many objects is hardly reflected in their display. The fascination of many natural history museum curators with objects possesses a certain logic: objects are something that remains, that are not as “elusive” as words, which represent “high culture.” Here, the same distinction between nature and culture is made again: nature, being intact and bare of every “western contamination,” is accredited especially to those, who are so essentially constructed through such processes, representing “the others” to those who are doing the defining. In this context, we can talk about the concept of “freezeing” (or “congealed”) that manages to maintain cultural artefacts in a state of preservation, desiring to keep them clean of any progress or external influence such as so called “technological development.” What are the consequences, especially for the museum, arising out of this analysis? Postcolonial thinkers carried them out for a long time as well. How can these observations mean even more for the future of museums and the politics of display?

A set of questions, at the minimum arises:
-Is the history or policy of the collections being visibly reflected, or by which means do we see attempts to hide it?
- How can politics of display get rid of binary logics of normality/abnormality, the internal/external or male/female?
- Which, and how many of these policies, quoting Gayatri Spivak, “don’t make the same mistakes”?
- How should one exhibit, how should one display, without making the same mistakes, without ethnicising and objectivising techniques of “othering”?
- How do current emancipatory perspectives, activist knowledge and reclaims go along with these demands?
- Which functions would the museum have, if the expropriated objects were given back?
- How should empty showcases be used?
- How should “the self”, and not “the other” be exhibited?

A new understanding of exhibiting is to be drawn, and concepts are to be laid down: new museums, where not the histories of cultural difference are told, but cultural histories that reflect the variability of popular and everyday culture.

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REARTIKULACIJA

Staš Kleindienst POLITIKA DEPOLITIZACIJE: NADZOR NAD PRODUKCIJO IN ŽIVLJENJEM

V pričujočem besedilu bom razpravljal o tem, kako so povezani področje socialnega, ki je podrejeno ekonomskemu režimu, in procesi depolitizacije v sodobni umetniški produkciji ter kako je ta povezava navsezadnje bistvena za izvajanje biopolitičnih mehanizmov upravljanja in nadzora v umetnosti in kulturi ter družbi nasploh. S tem mislim na vdor neoliberalnih vrednot (proste prodaje, ugodja in presežne vrednosti) v socialno-kulturne prostore; ta vdor je neločljivo povezan z depolitizacijo umetnosti in kulture, kar vodi v instrumentalizacijo sodobne umetniške produkcije in umetniškega življenja. V knjigi *Hatred of Democracy* Jacquesa Rancièrja, 2006, avtor jasno opiše relacijo med logiko potrošništva in političnim življenjem v konceptu demokracije: »Primerjava demokratičnih življensjskih načel je prevzela obliko dvojne vezi, ki jo je mogoče strniti takole: ali je demokratično življenje pomenilo množično participacijo ljudstva v razpravah o javnih zadevah, kar je slabo; ali pa se je zavzemalo za družbeno življenje, ki je svojo energijo usmerjalo v zadovoljstvo posameznika, kar je prav tako slabo. Skratka, dobra demokracija predvideva tako obliko vlade in družbenega življenja, ki je zmožno nadzirati dvojni presežek kolektivne dejavnosti in umik posameznika, ki je v demokratičnem življenju samoumeven.«¹ Ravnotežje, ki naj bi ga vzdrževale oblasti demokratičnih držav, se je v neoliberalni demokraciji jasno nagnilo v prid iskanju individualnega zadovoljstva, medtem ko sta kolektivna aktivnost ter politično zavedanje sistematično odstranjena iz družbenega življenja. Še več, ravno odmik od političnega življenja je bistven za razcvet biopolitike. Giorgio Agamben pravi: »Ljudje so iz konstitutivnega političnega telesa spremenjeni v populacijo: v demografsko biološko entiteto, ki je apolitična. To je entiteta, ki jo je treba ščititi in vzgajati.« In nadaljuje: »Če danes gledamo na to, ne moremo spregledati – v tej določitvi apolitične vloge ljudi – [...] njenega brezpogojnega biopolitičnega značaja.«²

¹ Jacques Rancièr, *Hatred of Democracy*, Verso, London – New York 2006, str. 8.

² Giorgio Agamben, »Movement«, http://www. chtodelat.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=162&Itemid=152

Če apliciramo to logiko na sistem sodobne umetnosti, ki je danes *de facto* udobnost *par excellence*, lahko zlahka izrišemo povezave med investicijami v sodobno umetnost in proizvajanjem profita, ki vodijo v instrumentalizacijo umetniške produkcije, kontrolirano kreativnost in še dlje v regulacijo načina življenja ter obnašanja umetnikov. Za primer si lahko ogledamo vedno bolj popularne nagradne natečaje, ki jih za mlade umetnike in študente umetniških šol razpisujejo velike korporacije. V kolikor se ni potrebno spuščati v analizo koristi, ki jih imajo od tega posamezni (nagrajeni) umetniki, se je potrebno vprašati, kaj imajo od tega korporacije in, še bolj pomembno, kakšna je njihova vloga v (pre)oblikovanju sistema sodobne umetnosti ter kaj to pomeni za naše razumevanje umetniških kreativnih procesov. V prvem primeru je logika jasna: nagrada za umetniško delo (ter za umetnika) namreč pomeni boljši izhodišni položaj za kotiranje na trgu z umetninami, kar nenazadnje pomeni dokaj varno naložbo za korporacijo, saj večina nagrajenih del pristane prav v njeni lasti. Se pravi, da korporacije z nagrajevanjem umetniških del dejansko delijo nagrade tudi (in predvsem) sebi. Seveda je vse skupaj predstavljeno kot skrb korporacije za razvoj umetnosti, kulture in družbe. Tako na primer ob letošnji najavi Henklove umetniške nagrade za centralno ter Vzhodno Evropo in centralno Azijo preberemo naslednji Henklov slogan: »Odgovornost do družbe kot gonilna sila.« Mimogrede se nagrada Henkel letos omejuje samo na risbo in celo določa tudi največje možne mere formatov poslanih del. Tukaj dobimo neposredno navezavo na tezo Subhabrate Bobbyja Banerjeeja o družbeni odgovornosti korporacij,³ kjer avtor predpostavlja, da je t. i. družbena odgovornost korporacij pogojena z interesi zunanjih delničarjev ter služi predvsem dodatnemu proizvajanju kapitala. V primeru umetniških nagrad so v retoriko družbene odgovornosti zaviti predvsem interesi korporacij po udeležbi v zelo dobičkonosnem trgovanju z umetninami ter kontrola korporacije nad umetniško produkcijo, kar posledično vodi do privatizacije pisanja tudi same zgodovine umetnosti. Saj so na koncu nagrajena prav tista dela, ki se kot po neki »instanтни logiki« enostavno in lahko umestijo v že zastavljeno interpretacijo o »pomenu dela in njegovi vlogi v družbi«. To pa je seveda zelo mamljivo za mlade umetnike, saj jim daje določen občutek socialne varnosti in občutek pripadnosti v relevantnih krogih sodobne umetnosti. Posledica tega pa je, da se umetniki namesto na diskurzivnost in kontekst osredotočajo na inovativne pristope k ustvarjalnosti v določenem mediju, iskanju sebi lastnih tematik, ki njihovo prakso individualizirajo in partikularizirajo, ter gradnji lastne identitete po logiki blagovnih znamk. Vse to pa sodobno umetnost ohranja na neškodljivi vrvici, preoblikovano v forme, ki jih kapitalistični svet zlahka kontrolira in kapitalizira. Umetniška produkcija je tako odrezana od svoje družbeno-politične funkcije in je kontekstualno izpraznjena, depolitizirana, iz samega kreativnega procesa pa je izključena vsaka emancipatorna težnja.

Tržna logika, ki stoji za kreativnim procesom, nujno pripelje do instrumentalizacije in univerzalizacije sodobne umetnosti ter vodi do pojava t. i. hiperkonceptualizma, ki akademsko-modernistični logiki nade-ne podobo konceptualnega. S pojmom hiperkonceptualizem mislim predvsem na sodobno kodifikacijo umetnosti, ki je zelo prisotna na Zahodu in kjer obstajajo jasna pravila, ki (prek besed, kot so *research* – raziskovanje in *subject-matter* – vsebina) regulirajo sodobno umetniško produkcijo. Posledica te kodifikacije je, da je umetniška produkcija popolnoma formalizirana, pozicijo (ali kontekst) zamenja poza (ali gesta), o političnosti in angažiranosti ni ne duha ne sluha, samemu umetniku pa je dodeljena družbena vloga (življenjski slog), ki jo mora vnesti igrati na velikem odru umetnosti. Ta dodeljena vloga vključuje tudi nomadski način življenja (rezidenčni programi, štipendije in podobno), ki pa je (čeprav do neke mere pomemben za izvoz lokalno-specifičnih praks) namenjen predvsem izravnavi različnih praks na primerljiv nivo; produkcijo posameznika pa se (paradoksalno – glede na to, da gre za kozmopolitansko retoriko) lokalizira skozi osebne trademark vsebine. Umetnikovo življenje tako dejansko postane predmet kontrole in upravljanja, sam umetnik pa postane nekakšen robot, ki se uči na lastnih »napakah«; če se namreč ne bo oddaljil od »emancipatoričnih in političnih« vsebin, bo kaznovan tako, da bo odrezan od finančne podpore in ne bo deležen vidnosti v javnem in umetniškem svetu. Tako se morajo prakse z morebitnim emancipatorničnim momentom že v startni fazi preoblikovati v ostalim praksam primerljive produkte, da sploh postanejo vidne oziroma finančno dotirane.

Vsekakor v sami osnovi investicije v sodobno umetniško produkcijo s strani korporacij ne bi smele biti problematične, saj po drugi strani omogočajo odskočno desko mladim ustvarjalcem. Problem nastane, ko korporacija vidi v teh investicijah dosti več kot samo pranje svoje vesti do družbe, ki jo drugače izkorišča, saj ravno skozi investicije v družbo preko umetnosti in kulture lahko regulira svojo davčno politiko, kar pa seveda vodi v zgoraj omenjeno instrumentalizacijo umetniške produkcije. Zato je danes ne le umetniška produkcija, pač pa tudi sama družbena odgovornost postala forma, prazna retorika, v katero je zapakiran izkoriščevalski značaj korporacij. Ta forma pa potrebuje tudi aktivno udeležbo umetnikov ter umetniško produkcijo, primerno za trženje. In če obstaja majhen procent umetniške produkcije, ki ima težnjo politično aktivirati prostor, za večino šteje zgolj tisto, kar je že leta 1975 ugotovila Marina Abramović, in sicer: »Umetnost mora biti lepa, umetnik mora biti lep.«

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³ Glej Subhabrata Bobby Banarejee, »Corporate Social Responsibility: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly«, v: *Critical Sociology*, 34(1), str. 51–79.

Staš Kleindienst DE-POLITICIZING POLITICS: CONTROL OVER PRODUCTION AND LIFE

In this text, I will discuss how the social sphere, which is subordinated to the economic regime, and the processes of de-politicization are intertwined with contemporary art production, as well as how this connection is essential for implementing biopolitical mechanisms of management and control in art and culture and society in general. By this, I mean the irruption of neoliberal values (free trade, commodities and surplus value) into the socio-cultural spaces; this irruption is intrinsically connected with the de-politicization of art and culture, resulting in the instrumentalisation of contemporary art production and art life. In his book *Hatred of Democracy* (2006), Jacques Rancière explicitly describes the relation between the logic of consumerism and political life intrinsic to the notion of democracy: “So, confronting democratic vitality took the form of a double bind that can be put succinctly: either democratic life signified a large amount of popular participation in discussing public affairs, and it was a bad thing; or it stood for a form of social life that turned energies toward individual satisfaction, and it was a bad thing. Hence, good democracy must be that form of government and social life capable of controlling the double excess of collective activity and individual withdrawal inherent to democratic life.” A balance that is allegedly being maintained by the forces in power in democratic states has (fundamental to Neoliberalism) clearly inclined in favour of searching for individual contentment while collective activity and political consciousness are systematically being removed from social life. Moreover, what is fundamental for the prosperity of biopolitics is exactly the deviation from political life. As Giorgio Agamben puts it: “The people are now turned from a constitutive political body into a population: a demographical biological entity, and as such apolitical. An entity to protect, to nurture.” And he adds: “Looking at it today we can’t help seeing – in this determination of the people as apolitical – the implicit recognition [...] of its biopolitical character.”²

If this logic is applied to the system of contemporary art (which is nowadays a commodity *par excellence*), connections can readily be drawn between investments in contemporary art and the production of profit resulting in the instrumentalisation of art production, controlled creativity and even more, in the regulation of the way of life and the behaviour of artists. A clear example of this is the increasing number of invitations to tender for prize-giving competitions for young artists and students of art schools organised by big corporations. I must emphasise here that I am not moralizing about earning money through awards, this income for the awarded artists cannot be overlooked, but we need to ask ourselves how do corporations benefit from it, and even more importantly, what is their role in (trans)forming the system of contemporary art and what does this mean for the understanding of the meaning of artistic creative processes. Firstly, the logic is clear: an awarded work of art (for artists) means a better point of departure for the artist as it is mentioned on the art market and of course, presents a secure investment for a corporation since the majority of awarded works of art are in the end owned by them. This means that by awarding works of art, corporations also (and above all) award themselves. However, everything is presented as the corporations’ care for the development of art, culture and society. So for example, in the wake of this year’s announcement of the Henkel Art Award for Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia we can read the following Henkel slogan: “Responsibility to society as the driving force.” Incidentally, this year’s Henkel Art Award is limited to drawings only and moreover they set

¹ Jacques Rancière, *Hatred of Democracy*, Verso 2006, p. 8.

² Giorgio Agamben, *Movement*, http://www.chtodelat.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=162&Itemid=152

down the largest possible formats of the submitted works of art! At this point a direct connection to the thesis of Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee on corporate social responsibility³ can be drawn, where the author presupposes that the so-called corporate social responsibility is conditioned by interests of external stakeholders and mainly serves the purpose of accumulating additional profit. In the case of art awards, the rhetoric of social responsibility involves above all interests of corporations in taking part in the very profitable trading of art works and control of corporations over art production, consequently resulting in the privatization of writings of the history of art. As the awarded works of art are precisely those which according to an “instant logic” can easily and simply be included into the already set interpretation of “the meaning of the work of art and its role in society.” However, this is of course very tempting for young artists as they are given a certain feeling of social security and of belonging to relevant circles of contemporary art. Consequently, instead of discursiveness and context, artists are more focused on innovative approaches, creativity in a specific medium, searching for personal themes, thus giving “a hand” to the construction of their own branded identity. Yet, all this keeps contemporary art on a harmless thread, and transforms it into forms that can be easily controlled and capitalized on by the capitalist world. Art production is therefore cut off from its socio-political function and contextually evacuated, depoliticized, while every emancipative aspiration is excluded from the creative process.

Within this context, I would like to draw attention to the phenomenon of so-called hyperconceptualism which attaches the image of the conceptual to academic-modernistic logic. By hyperconceptualism, I mean above all contemporary art that is very present in the West and where there are clear established rules which regulate contemporary art production (through words such as *research* and *subject matter*). As a result, the codification of art production is wholly formalised, position (or context) is replaced by attitude (or gesture), there are no signs at all of political engagement, while to the artist a social role (a lifestyle) is assigned, which he or she has to act out on the big artstage. The assigned role also encompasses a nomadic way of life (artists in residence, grants and the like), which in turn (even if it is important to some extent for the export of specific local practices) is meant above all to even up different practices to a comparable level; the individual production is (paradoxically – taking into account that it is all about cosmopolitan rhetoric) localised through personal trademark contents. Thus the life of an artist is subjected to control and management, making him/her into a robot learning from his/her own “mistakes”; if the artist is involved with “emancipatory and political” contents, he/she will be punished by cutting off the financial support and depriving him/her of visibility in the public and art world. It is therefore imposed onto practices with eventual emancipatory moment to transform already in their initial stage and to deliver products comparable to other accepted practices in order for them to become visible or financially supported at all.

Investments of corporations in contemporary art production should not be problematic, as young artists are thus offered a launching pad. The problem arises when there is more to these investments than just corporate bad consciousness as these corporations exploit society. Therefore they “return” or better regulate their tax policy with investing into society through art and culture; in most cases this leads to the already mentioned instrumentalisation of art production. Therefore, nowadays not only art production but also social responsibility has tuned into form, the empty rhetoric in which the exploitative nature of corporation is wrapped. This form necessitates the active participation of artists and art production that is suitable for trading. And if there is a small percentage of art production that aims to activate spaces in a political sense, for the majority of the production what really counts is what Marina Abramović already noticed in 1975, namely: “Art must be beautiful, the artist must be beautiful.”

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Translated from Slovenian by Tanja Passoni.

³ See Subhabrata Bobby Banarejee, “Corporate Social Responsibility: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly” in *Critical Sociology*, 34(1), pp. 51–79.

GLOBOKO GRLO/DEEP THROAT

Marina Gržinić KAKO UKREPATI? – Pogovor z Dmitryjem Vilenskim

Marina Gržinić: *Začela bom z nekoliko nenavadnim vprašanjem. Namreč, prosila bi te, da se predstaviš, in sicer opišeš kontekst in prostor, v okviru katerega deluješ, nam razkriješ svojo izobrazbo in umetniške ambicije? Bolj kot to, kdo je Dmitry Vilensky, me zanima kaj Dmitry Vilensky pričakuje od sebe kot umetnika in urednika časopisa Chto delat?*

Dmitry Vilensky: Sem avtodidaktični umetnik iz Petersburga. Star sem 44 let, kar pomeni, da sem polovico svojega življenja preživel v času, ko je obstajala Sovjetska zveza – ko se je začela perestrojka, sem bil star natanko 22. Pripadal sem krogu t. i. sovjetskih disidentov, ki so se uprli uradnim sovjetskim birokratskim oblastem. To pomeni, da smo razvili zelo specifično kulturo in prakso zaupnih krogov ter različne politične strategije množičnih preselitev in zarotništva (ki so bile tuje političnim strukturam...). Res nenavadno se zdi, da današnji čas zahteva prav strategije delovanja iz sovjetskih časov.

Kakšen je moj odnos do umetnosti? Upam, da je rešitev za ekonomizacijo kulture v umetnosti, ki ni osredotočena na proizvajanje objektov, pač pa na oblikovanje subjekta, ki mu kreativno delovanje pomeni sredstvo samoorganiziranja aktivističnih in umetniških pogleda na svet in orodje v boju za človekovo emancipacijo. Upam tudi, da moja umetnost vsaj delno prispeva k temu. Urejanje časopisa je del mojega delovanja, kjer se ta težnja kaže v najjasnejši obliki.

M.G.: *Kaj te je spodbudilo k izdajanju časopisa CHTO DELAT?*

D. V.: Projekt smo začeli leta 2003, ko so bile razmere bistveno drugačne od današnjih. Mislim, da je bil to prvi umetniški publicistični projekt v Rusiji, zasnovan kot mednarodna publikacija, katere namen je bil vzpostaviti prostor za kulturne in politične interpretacije. Ta projekt se je skliceval tudi na ponoven premislek o tem, kaj je politično, in sicer prek kolektivnega poskusa, ki je temeljil na različnih raziskovalnih metodah in uredniških praksah. Vsi smo si prizadevali poiskati rešitev, kako bi presegli ozki geto, kjer je umetnost fetišizirana kot tržno blago, in namesto tega razglasili idejo, da je umetnost pomembna komponenta družbenega in političnega boja. Zato smo zavestno zavrnili prostor, ki so ga ponujale nove komercialne galerije, ali umetniške projekte, ki jih je podpirala skorumpirana država in tako smo se držali različnih samoorganiziranih aktivističnih in umetniških pobud in t. i. mednarodnih umetniških institucij, ki poskušajo držati obljube o socialni demokraciji. Žal taka usmerjenost zelo otežuje obstoj naše skupine, ker je taka scena v Rusiji precej nerazvita in podvržena vse večjim pritiskom, da se kriminalizira in zatira s strani države. To je bila pravzaprav naša disidentska gesta proti komercialnim in državnim kulturnim korporacijam.

Težko bi rekel, zakaj sem ravnal tako ali drugače – mislim, da sem bil predvsem zelo razburjen in nisem prenesel odvrtnih oblik prevladujočega družbenega in kulturnega obnašanja. Nekateri ljudje se v umetniškem sistemu zelo dobro počutijo – drugi pa (žal je teh le peščica) pa vedo, da je najboljše zdravilo posmehovanje vse te množice na otvoritvah in teh zloženih obrazov trgovcev z umetninami, lastnikov galerij itd... In tisti, ki v takem družabnem ozračju čutijo, kako se jim posmehuješ, se ti oddolžijo s sovraštvom – tudi tako prav.

Rekel bi, da smo si kljub takim razmeram vendarle izborili lokalni ugled, ki je na nek način primerljiv z ugledom starih sovjetskih disidentov. Seveda pa naše zgodovinske okoliščine niso primerljive z obdobjem državnega socializma (bomo videli, kako se bodo zadeve spremenile in kako se bo Putinova avtoritativna politika razvila po volitvah in kolikšen nadzor bodo lahko imeli nad javno sfero), ampak obstaja več razlogov, ki upravičujejo to primerjavo. Zame prav tako pomembno je to, da si izborimo zadovoljiv ugled med ruskimi političnimi aktivisti, in sicer prek neposredne udeležbe v nekaj kampanjah in družbenih forumih, v progresivnih akademskih krogih (študije spolov, kulturne študije – želimo si pridobiti pozitiven odziv najvplivnejših liberalnih raziskovalcev) in v očeh preproste, a politično aktivne splošne javnosti in nekaj umetniških strokovnjakov, ki jih cenimo. Naj še dodam, da na vso moč in v stilu sovjetskih disidentov izkoriščamo našo mednarodno kredibilnost, da bi ustvarili pritisk na lokalne kulturne institucije, a žal zaenkrat brez večjih uspehov.

Kot sem že povedal, smo na mednarodni ravni uresničili več ciljev, kar je za začetek zelo spodbudno. S sodelavci z zahoda, ki imajo enak pristop do umetnosti in kulture kot mi, smo prvič vzpostavili pravo sodelovanje, kar je za nas edinstvena izkušnja izmenjave. Vključevanje v novo mednarodno povezovanje na področju umetnosti in aktivizma je zelo pomembno, a to privilegirano pozicijo bi raje sodil po tem, kako nam pridobljeno znanje iz tega sodelovanja uspe prenesti na lokalne kulturne razmere in nanje vplivati in

jih spremeniti. Želel bi, da bi lahko storili še več, ker je še mnogo stvari, ki potrebujejo kritiko – velikokrat pa tega ne zmoremo zaradi pomanjkanja kadra ali časa – ampak to ni nobeno opravičilo.

M. G.: *Iz katerih referenc – umetniških, zgodovinskih in političnih – si črpal pri zasnovi tega časopisa?*
D. V.: Kot veš, za umetnika s periferije kapitalizma ni dovolj, da dela umetnost. Pomembno je analizirati in interpretirati svoj lasten kontekst, iz katerega izhajaš, ter kulturno in politično ozadje za njim. Menim, da so zadnji tak poskus opravili sovjetski konceptualni umetniki v poznih sedemdesetih letih. Lahko bi rekli, da smo mi aktualizirali drugačno vrsto praks, ki jih poznamo iz mednarodne zgodovine umetnosti, ki jih poznamo kot *detour* (delal sem z avtorji stripov in grafičnimi oblikovalci časopisov), to je tradicija t.i. produktivizma in zgodovina živega časopisa (Zhivaya Gazeta), konceptualna politična umetnost, različni tipi revij, kultura tiskanja tipa *DIY* (»naredi si sam«), metode odtujitve in še bi lahko naštevali.

M. G.: *Kakaj je proizvodnja znanja danes še toliko bolj pomembna kot kdaj prej?*
D. V.: Ne bi rekel, da je »bolj pomembna kot kdaj prej«; znanje je bilo vedno pomembno, vendar je danes postavljeno v ospredje – zato lahko upravičeno govorimo o ekonomiji znanja kot gonilni sili sodobnega kapitalizma. Zame je najpomembnejše vprašanje: Kdo proizvaja znanje? Da rečemo, da gre tukaj za generalni intelekt ali »za zatirani bojujoči se družbeni razred«, ni dovolj, saj menim, da se znanje akumulira prek zapletenih dialektičnih odnosov med institucijami moči in tistimi, ki se jim zoperstavljajo. Ne verjamem, da se znanje lahko proizvaja prek omenjenih praks tipa »naredi si sam« (čeprav so te lahko pomembne za nekatere metode proizvodjanja znanja na splošno). Poleg tega je zelo pomembno poudariti, da je vprašanje proizvodnje znanja neločljivo povezano z njegovim širjenjem – saj najpomembnejše je, da je dostop do znanja omogočen vsem. Ni dovolj samo instrumentalizirati institucije moči in jih prisiliti, da razstavljajo naša dela, objavljajo naše knjige, podpirajo naše filme itd. Vprašanje je, KAKO lahko prek proizvodnje splošnega znanja spremenimo prevladujoče in njim podrejene strukture.

M. G.: *Kar nas še posebej zanima je specifični prostor – Rusija. Točneje Putinova Rusija? Rusija s svojim totalno totalitarnim obrazom, ki se le kot taka lahko ohrani? Kako bi s kulturnega, umetniškega in političnega stališča označil današnjo Rusijo?*
D. V.:To je veliko vprašanje – in da ne bom dolgovezil –, kar je najbolj zanimivo glede današnje Rusije je, kako Putin zmore usklajevati arhaične instrumente, ki zastrahujejo in zatirajo vse oblike kritičnega nasprotovanja (prek vojske, zaporov, bolnišnic, tajnih služb, lažnih konstrukcij o nasilni mobilizaciji ljudi itd.) z nadvse inovativnimi in sofisticiranimi metodami nadzora. Nekateri so mnenja, da taka kombinacija ni mogoča – pa vendar v Rusiji deluje. Zato beseda totalitarno nima nič opraviti z realnostjo. To bi lahko označili tudi kot post-totalitarno, vendar je med enim in drugim velika razlika. Kar manjka in je nepojmljivo v tej novi konfiguraciji »real politike«, je pristen proces demokratizacije, ki se sklicuje na civilno družbo. Še več, prav v tem se pokaže ključna razlika v delovanju zahodne in ruske družbe.

M. G.: *Katera so najpomembnejša teoretična, filozofska in politična besedila, iz katerih črpaš pri svojem delu, ki te spodbujajo in sploh omogočajo tvoje delovanje?*
D. V.: Težko bi rekel, name bolj vplivajo umetniška dela ali predstave in filmi kot sama literatura, kljub temu pa lahko naštejem nekaj imen. To so mnoge knjige Badiouja, Rancièrja, Virna (na temo množstva) in teksti, objavljeni na spletni strani transform.eipcp.net., ki se mi zdijo zanimivi in pomembni... In prav zdaj ponovno berem Deborda..., ki je vedno aktualen in pronicljiv, morda tudi zato, ker sem soudeležen v ustvarjanju skupinskega dela, novega umetniškega dela, ki temelji na njem... Poleg tega se mi zdi zelo nenavadno moje razumevanje pojma socialni realizem (in diskusije o njem), ki so se danes izkazale za še kako pomembne z več stališč....

M. G.: *Simbolni kapital je pomemben in, kot si jasno povedal, tvoje delovanje ni utopična želja, ampak neposredna materializacija nekega razmišljanja. A vendar, kje dobiš denar za izdajo časopisa? V Rusiji je verjetno to preprostej in ceneje kot na Zahodu? To vprašanje je z našega stališča zelo pomembno, saj je pravzaprav tudi Reartikulacija samorganizirani časopis. Koliko časa je po tvoje mogoče zdržati v takih pogojih, še zlasti, ker nam država ni odobrila sredstev za realizacijo projekta. Zaenkrat se za tiskanje lahko zanesemo samo na sredstva, ki nam jih nudijo naši prijatelji, podporniki ter donatorji? Kaj predstavlja skrajno mejo vse takih in podobnih projektov?*

D. V.: Seveda se boj odvija tukaj in zdaj, ampak kolikor sem razumel tvoje vprašanje, gre za to, da spoznaš svoj potencial in možnosti, ki omogočajo delovanje. Odločitev, da bomo delali časopis, je posledica dejstva, da lahko ta projekt vedno izpelješ tako, da se zaneš le na svoje lastne moči – stroški tiska so razmeroma sprejemljivi, če jih deliš med deset ljudi, delovna sila pa je vedno na voljo in seveda zastonj distribucija veliko pomaga pri doseganju dobre vidljivosti. Za nas je bila to edina možnost, da na lokalni ravni nekaj ustvarimo in tako prek prevajanja vzpostavimo povezavo z mednarodnim krogom enakomislečih. Seveda je zelo težko ohraniti vedno enako intenzivnost. Na nek način smo si izborili podporo časopisa s strani različnih ustanov. Zato gre za zelo specifično situacijo, saj časopis na ta način odpira poti kot posebno interpretativno sredstvo, ki se dobro ujema z našimi umetniškimi projekti – filmom, instalacijami in objekti – in je močno odvisen od sredstev, ki jih pridobimo od umetniških institucij. Če sem iskren, do sedaj še nismo uspeli objaviti niti ene številke, ki bi bila podprta s sredstvi, ki ne izhajajo iz umetniškega sistema. Kljub temu pa smo izdali nekaj publikacij brez podpore ali s podporo nemških študentskih združenj ali različnih anonimnih aktivistov ali kapitalističnih dobrotnikov. To veliko pove o vlogi umetnosti, o tem, da sproža menjavo med različnimi področji znanja.

Kje so omejitve? Omejitev je veliko – npr. ne objavljamo oglasov in več priložnosti je bilo, ko so ljudje želeli podariti denar, a so tudi zahtevali nekaj v zameno in tega ne moremo sprejeti. Menim, da so največje omejitve pomanjkanje mobilizacije znotraj časopisa samega. Zato bi bilo smiselno v projekt vključitičasne uredniške skupine. Tak nov sestav bi prinesel nove moči in ideje in kar je še bolj pomembno, nove oblike distribucije, ker se na ta način povezujejo različne mreže. Druga nevarnost je ta, da bi se organizirali kot nevladna organizacija v Rusiji, kmalu bi nas povsem zatrli, čeprav večinoma delujemo ilegalno in kot siva ekonomija, kar pa nam zagotavlja preživetje. Kot si najverjetneje že opazila, nismo uradno prijavljeni v razvid medijev, saj postajajo zarotniške oblike delovanja vse bolj pomembne danes, in to ne samo v Rusiji.

M. G.: *Medtem ko je civilna družba v Sloveniji povsem diskreditirana, govoriš ti o demokratičnih procesih, ki naj bi se vezali na rusko civilno družbo in jo razvijali. Kaj ti pomeni civilna družba in katere demokratične procese imaš pravzaprav v mislih?*
D. V.: Strinjam se, da je to resničen problem. Morda pa gre le za napačno interpretacijo tega termina. Termin »civilna družba« razumem bolj v Gramschijevem smislu. Zame je civilna družba tista, ki se je sposobna upreti oblastem in razviti emancipacijske prakse v dialektičnih pogajanjih in neposrednem boju z upravitelji moči. Civilne družbe v Rusiji ni, tudi v liberalni obliki ne, a moramo kljub temu nadaljevati z našim delom – paradoksalno rečeno –, kot da bi obstajala, in moramo to namišljeno družbo še naprej nagovarjati. To je nekakšen recept, enako kot pravimo, da je vsak človek umetnik in intelektualec – vztrajati moramo, da se družba spremeni tako, da bo te želje mogoče udejanjiti.

M. G.: *Iz tega, kar si povedal, se zdi, da tvoja radikalna angažiranost izhaja iz želje, da bi našel odgovor na vprašanje, kako ukrepati; menim namreč, da je med platformo Chto delat? in Reartikulacijo direktna povezava. Na drugi strani pa v Sloveniji prevladujoča teorija v veliki meri sledi logiki in zahtevi po tem, da se politično in aktivno ne angažiramo. V Sloveniji se predlaga, da je treba vztrajati pri čistem potencialu, ki ga lahko razvijemo doma, in naj se pri tem sploh ne menimo za družbena in politična vprašanja. Iz tega stališča gleda na nas kot na atavistične levičarske strukture, ki bodo prej ali slej že spoznale, kako prijetno je sedeti doma in ne početi ničesar. Kaj ti meniš o tem?*

D. V.: Seveda, razmere morda niso ravno najbolj optimistične v tem trenutku, pa vendarle omogočajo veliko prostora za delovanje. Kuhinja je vedno zelo udoben prostor, a hkrati tudi dolgočasen. Politično delovanje je vedno imelo svoj čar, ker je preprosto »bolj privlačno«. S tem mislim na stanje, ko si v boju, v nevarnosti, ko tvegaš izgubo ali zmago, ko verjameš, da tisto, kar rešuješ, je resnično, vsaj z zgodovinskega stališča. Prepričan sem, da ljudje ne morejo prenehati živeti političnega življenja. Ni važno, koliko novi načini vladanja pritiskajo na ljudi. Kot smo videli, tudi v najhujših političnih okoliščinah totalitarističnih režimov se je odpor ohranil. Poleg tega se strinjam z mnogimi filozofi glede dejstva, da pristno politično življenje je boj za svobodo, boj enega proti zatiralcu. S preprostimi besedami gre za »užitek biti komunist« in verjamem, da je to neke vrste splošna lastnost človeka ne glede na to, kako postranska je v danem trenutku. Vprašanje je samo to, ali to veselje občutiš ali ne...

Dmitry Vilensky je zaslovel kot organizator fotografskih razstav v St. Peterburgu v devetdesetih letih. Leta 1997 se je preselil v Nemčijo, leta 2003 pa je v St. Peterburgu s skupino sodelavcev ustanovil projekt *Chto Delat?*

Iz angleščine prevedla Tanja Passoni.

MAREC/MARCH 2008

Marina GržinićWHAT IS TO BE DONE? – A Conversation with Dmitry Vilensky

Marina Gržinić: *Let’s start with an unusual question, namely I would like you to describe yourself in terms of con-text, education, space and artistic ambitions. More than who Dmitry Vilensky is, what does Dmitry Vilensky want as an artist and editor of the journal Chto delat?*

Dmitry Vilensky: I am an auto-didactic artist, from Petersburg. I am 44 and it means that half of my life was spent during the Soviet era – I was exactly 22 when Perestroika began. I belonged to a circle of so-called Soviet dissidents who were involved in the process of resisting official soviet-bureaucratic power. This means that we developed a very specific culture and the practice of confidential circles and different political strategies of exodus and conspiracy (being opaque to the power structures...), and it is strange see that these skills acquired during the Soviet era are in demand again. My position on art? I hope that an antidote to the situation of economization of culture could be found in art that is concentrated not on producing objects, but on forming a subject for whom creative activity becomes a means of self-education, critical learning about the world and formation of tools for the struggle for human emancipation. I hope that my art makes a modest contribution to these tasks. Editing the newspaper is part of my activity where this tendency is revealed in its purest form.

M. G.: *What was the main trigger for beginning the publication of CHTO DELAT?*
D.V.: We started our project in 2003 when the situation was drastically different from the way it is now. I think it was the first art publication project in Russia that was conceived as an international publication, which would establish a place where cultural and political translation could occur. This project also appealed to a reconsid-eration of the idea of what is political through collective experimentation with different research methods and editorial practices. We were all concerned about how to overcome the narrow ghetto where art is fetishised as a commodity and proclaimed instead, the idea that art is an important component of the social and political struggle. So we consciously rejected the space offered by new commercial galleries or corrupted state com-missioned art projects and thus stayed within the terrain of different self-organized initiatives in activism and culture and so-called progressive international art institutions that are attempting to keep the promises of social democracy. Unfortunately, this orientation makes the existence of the group rather hard because here in Russia such a scene is quite undeveloped and prone to the growing pressure of criminalization and state repression. So this was our gesture of dissidence towards commercial and state run cultural corporations. It is difficult to say exactly why I did this or took that step – I think that I was rather angry and could not stand these disgusting forms of dominant social and cultural behaviours. Some people feel very comfortable inside the art world system – but some (unfortunately only a few) feel that they just scorn the vernissage crowds; glossy faces of dealers and gallery owners and so on... And those that enjoy such a convivial atmosphere feel your scorn and pay you back with hate – and that is fair enough. Therefore, in this situation I would say that we manage to gain a sort of local reputation in some way compa-rable with the reputation of old soviet dissidents. Of course our historical situation is still incomparable to the days of state socialism (we’ll see how it will change and how the new Putin authoritarian politics will develop after the elections and how far they manage to execute control over the entire public sphere). Nevertheless, there are many features that make such a comparison legitimate. What is also important for me is that we manage to gain a decent reputation among Russian political activists through direct participation in a few campaigns and social forums, in the progressive circles of academia (gender studies, cultural studies, sociology where we manage to win the positive attention of the most influential liberal scholars) and through a small, but politically engaged general public and a few art experts, whom we respect. In addition, we are doing our best in a tradition of soviet dissidents to use our international credibility to place pressure on local cultural institutions, unfortunately, not that successfully.

As I have already mentioned, internationally we have reached many goals that I have considered an inspiring task from the beginning. We have for the first time started genuine collaboration with many westerns who somehow share our approach to art and culture. Moreover, this is for us, I would say, a unique experience of exchange. So for us participation in a new international net-working in art and activism is very important, but still I would personally judge this privileged position by how we manage to redistribute the knowledge we gain in this collaboration to influence and change the local cultural situation. I wish we could do more as there are many things to be criticized – in many situations, we are losing some good opportunities because of the lack of mobilization and lack of time – but that is not an excuse...

M. G.: *What are the references in the background coming from art, history and politics that you reused to concep-tualize such a journal?*
D.V.: You know that for the artist, from the periphery of the capitalism, it is not enough just to do art. It is im-portant to analyze and translate the context of your life and cultural and political background. I think that here the last attempt done in this direction was undertaken by soviet conceptual artists in the late 1970s. So one can say that we have actualized a different set of practices known from international art history as a detour (I worked with comics and newspaper graphics), a tradition of productionism, and a history of *Zhivaya Gazeta* (Live Newspaper), conceptual political art, different zines and DIY printing culture, estrangement methods and so on...

M. G.: *Why is the production of knowledge today more important than ever?*
D.V.: I would not say “more than ever”, it was always important, but today the issue of knowledge comes to the fore – that is why it is legitimate to speak about the knowledge economy as a driving force of contemporary capitalism. For me the more relevant question is: who is producing knowledge? To say the “general intellect” or “oppressed struggling class” is too vague, because I think that knowledge is produced through the complexity of dialectic relations between institutions of power and counter-power. I do not believe that knowledge can be produced through DIY practices (but they can be important for some methods of knowledge production in general). In addition, it is important to note that the issue of knowledge production is inseparable from the issue of knowledge dissemination – and the provision of common access to knowledge is the most important thing. It is not enough to simply instrumentalise the institutions of power and push them to do our shows, publish our text, support our films etc., BUT the question is how we can change the structures of domination and subaltern through the production of common knowledge.

M. G.: *The question that is for many of us so interesting is the specific space of Russia. Putin’s Russia. The Russia that shows a totalitarian blockbuster face that can survive only as such? How would you define contemporary Russia culturally and artistically and today politically?*
D.V.: It is a big question, but to make a long story short, the most interesting thing about Putin’s Russia is how it manages to combine the archaic instruments which terrify and oppress all forms of critical opposition (via army, jails, hospitals, police, secret services, fake construction of aggressive popular mobilization and so on) with very innovative and sophisticated methods of control. There is a prejudice that such a combination can-not work well, but in Russia it does. That is why the term totalitarian has nothing to do with reality. You can call it post-totalitarian if you wish, but there is a big difference. One thing that is missing and unimaginable within this new configuration of “real politics” is a genuine democratic process that appeals to civil society. In addition, here we can find a crucial difference between how Western and Russian society operates.

M. G.: *What are for you the most important theoretical, philosophical and political texts, those few that provide you a background, stimulate your work and make you function?*
D.V.: Hard to say, I am more influenced by art works or shows, or films, than texts but there are some that I could mention if you will – many things by Badiou, Rancière, Virno on Multitude – and current things pub-lished on transform.eipcp.net. I find inspiring and important... And right now I will return back to Debord..... he is very refreshing and very profound, maybe because I am involved in a collective work making a new art piece based on his writings... Moreover, the weirdest thing is my reading of the concept of socialist realism (and discussion around it) which I discovered to be very relevant today in many ways....

M. G.: *Symbolic capital is important and referring to it, you state clearly that your engagement is not a Utopian wish but a direct materialization of a certain reflection, still where do you get the money to publish the magazine? On the other hand, it is much easier and cheaper to do this in Russia than in the West. We are personally interested in this answer or a conceptualization as Reartikulacija is a self-organized journal, and the question is, precisely because of money, how long would it be possible to resist under such conditions? The state did not grant us the money we ap-plied for to develop the project, only ourfriends, supporters and donors are those who support the publishing of the journal for now. What is the limit within all such similar projects?*
D. V.: Of course, the battle is taking place here and now but, as far as I understood your question, the matter is to recognize your own potentiality and possibilities of action. The decision to work with a newspaper is primarily motivated by the fact that you can always carry out this project by relying on your own forces – the print costs are rather conceivable if you share the expenses between 10 people and your labour power is

always readily available and of course, free distribution helps immensely in achieving good visibility. In our situation, it was the only solution for realising something locally and for linking this project through translation internationally to the circle of people close to us. However, of course you can hardly do it with the same intensity for years. Somehow, it has happened that we managed to negotiate support of the newspaper with different institutions. Therefore, our situation is rather special because the newspaper finds its way as a special means of interpretations that combines well with our art works – films, installations and objects and it very much depends on the funding that we gain through art institutions. Frankly to say, until now we did not manage to publish a single issue supported by sources outside the art world. Nevertheless, we did a few publications without any support or with the support of German student unions or several anonymous activists or capitalist donors. It also says a lot about the role of art as a trigger of exchange between different fields of knowledge.

The borders? You feel many limitations – for example, we do not publish any ads and there were a few cases when people were eager to give money, but they wanted something in return I, something we can't accept. I think that the most important limits are the internal lack of mobilization. That is why it would make sense to bring in temporary editorial groups. This new composition would give new energy and ideas and importantly, new forms of distribution because you combine different networks. Another danger is, just imagine if we established ourselves as an NGO in Russia, we would be definitely smashed by authorities very quickly although we are doing the majority illegally and in a shadow economy which helps us to survive. You might notice that we do not have any official registration for press media, the minimum principals of conspiracy are becoming more and more important, and not only in Russia.

M. G.: *Exist a mistrust of any kind of civil society in Slovenia, while, on the contrary, you ask for the democratic process in Russia to be turned towards and invested into the sphere of civil society. In which way do you define civil society and what kind of democratic process precisely do you have in mind?*

D.V.: That is a real problem – I agree. Nevertheless, I think that we are in danger of misunderstanding the term. I use a term “civil society” in a more Gramscian way. For me civil society is a society able to oppose the establishment power and develop emancipatory practices from below in dialectical negotiations and direct fights with administrators of power. Yes, civil society does not exist in Russia even not in a liberal form. However, we still have to continue our work, I would say very paradoxically, as if existed and we keep addressing this imaginary society. It is a kind of prescription in the same way we say that everyone is an artist, everyone is an intellectual – we should insist that society be transformed in such a way to implement these desires.

M. G.: *It is obvious from all that you have said so far that this radical engagement of yours is motivated by the desire to get an answer to what is to be done; I think we share a direct chto delat and reartikulacija platform. On the other hand in Slovenia, the sphere of dominant theory is greatly driven by the logic and claim that is better not to politically and actively engage at all. The proposal in Slovenia is to insist on a pure potentiality that we can cultivate at home, while being completely disinterested in the social and political. Therefore, we are seen from this point, as atavistic leftist structures that will sooner or later understand, how cosy it is to sit at home and opt to do anything. What is your position on these points?*

D.V.: Yes, the situation is not that optimistic at the moment, but still allows one a lot of space to operate. The kitchen is always a cosy place, but it is always a boring place. Political activity has always had an appeal because it is simply “sexier”. By this I mean the state when you are in a fight, in danger, when you take a risk of losing or winning, when you believe that what you are saying is true at least on a historic horizon. I am quite sure that people can't stop practicing political lives. It does not matter how much pressure the new modes of governing put on people. We saw that even under the most terrible political circumstances of totalitarian times, resistance continues. In addition, I agree with many philosophers regarding the point that genuine political life is a struggle for freedom, one against oppression. It is about the “joy of being communist” simply to say and I believe that it is a sort of generic feature of human beings and it does not matter how marginal it is at any given moment. The question is whether you feel this joy or not...

Dmitry Vilensky is known for his creative organization of photo exhibitions in the 1990s in St. Petersburg. In 1997, he departed for Germany, and in 2003 with a workgroup, he founded the collaborative project *Chto Delat?* in St. Petersburg.

HIPERKOMODIFIKACIJA/HYPERCOMMODIFICATION

Žolta kronika MANIFEST ŽOLTE KRONIKE

Žolta kronika je samonikla tvorba, ki si za predmet svojega izjavljanja jemlje reflektirano spremljanje aktualnih družbenih dogodkov. Skrupulozno kritično obravnavamo tudi vse s piarovsko strategijo sproducirane tako imenovane dogodke. Metoda, po kateri delamo, je strokovno-analitična in terenska, predvsem pa preverljiva (s pričami). Operiramo s strogo teoretskim intelektualnim diskurzom, vendar se zaradi svojega feminističnega stališča izražamo tudi z besedami, ki imajo v Slovenskem slovarju knjižnega jezika kvalifikator čustveno in ekspresivno. Uspešno napovedujemo spremembe v bližnji prihodnosti, naši delikatni detektorji zaznavajo tudi libidinalne investicije, vendar nismo »šlogarce«. Nismo kupljivi niti ne podlegamo koruptivnim manevrom. Sposobni smo lansirati tudi kakšno raco. Ker aktualno situacijo zaznavamo kot eno najnižjih točk stanja duha na Slovenskem, je zato naša osnovna funkcija dvigovanje podna!

Žolta kronika, non-stop 24-urnik
Pisarna: Družbenoaktualna avenija 5/20
Terasa: Podalpska domačijska razgledna točka, tretja miza levo
P.p. Kulturna pragmatika
E-mail: zoltakronika@gmail.com

Čipkarski virus ali antiintelektualizem na pohodu

Žolta kronika je v svojih oddajah že večkrat opozorila na nazadnjaško ruralno kulturno politiko, ki vlada na Slovenskem. Za gostovanje v Reartikulaciji bomo obravnavali eklatanten primer protokolarnih daril, s katerimi se Slovenija skuša promovirati ob predsedovanju EU. Da se uglasimo, naj uvodoma omenimo razstavo, ki jo je pred uradnim začetkom v Bruslju za radoveden evropski kader kot precedens na evropski ravni organizirala dr. Romana Cizej, s katero je poskrbela za pristno manifestacijo plebejske nekultiviranosti slovenske politike. O čem govorimo? Govorimo o inflaciji idrijskih čipk in tako imenovanem *čipkarskem virusu*, kot je fascinacijo s čipkami definirala Žolta kronika. Pred začetkom predsedovanja Slovenije Evropski uniji je Cizej kot cvetober »vrhunske« slovenske umetnosti v Bruselj povabila razstavo *Čevlji z idrijsko čipko/Sodobnost, vpeta v tradicijo* ter srednješolsko adaptacijo mjuzikla *Lepotica in zver*, ob katerem je po njenem prepričanju internacionalna javnost lahko uživala v blagozvočnosti slovenskega jezika. Žolti kroniki se to zdi popoln bankrot ideje – kako predstaviti slovensko umetnost. Že na tem precedensu Žolta kronika diagnosticira trend *Blut und Boden* ideologije (ideologije krvi in zemlje), ki jo furajo zaplankani politiki. Rečeno drugače, antiintelektualizem je na pohodu! S svojo nesvetovljanskostjo, nerazgledanostjo kot da pacajo podobo Slovenije, ko s tovrstnimi izbirami ignorirajo vrhunske dosežke sodobne slovenske umetnosti. Idrijska čipka pa se vleče kot jara kača tudi v protokolarnih darilih. Fascinacija ne mine. Sprašujemo se, ali je nujno, da se mora Slovenija v obdobju 2007/08 res predstvaljati z idrijskimi čipkami? Ekspanzionistična politika idrijske čipke se je razpasla po večini protokolarnih daril, ki so ob predsedovanju Slovenije EU na voljo tujim gostom, in to v dveh sklopih. V darilni vreči najdemo: kristalno skledo z motivom idrijske čipke, ročno klekljano čipko, steklenico s kovinsko klekljano čipko, svečo z motivom klekljane čipke, laneni namizni set s klekljano idrijsko čipko, kozarca z motivom klekljane čipke in stekleni obežilnik s kovinsko klekljano čipko.

Na podlagi pričujočih dejstev si podrobno poglejmo, kaj natančno je »čipkarski virus«. *Čipkarski virus* je manifestacija nepoznavanja sodobne slovenske umetnosti ter nerazumevanja in nedoraslosti kvalificiranja sodobnega umetniškega izraza. Priča o perversni pritlehnosti politične propagande. Virus izvira iz vztrajnega odiranja sodobne umetnosti v polje delovanja neinstitucionalne kulture in umetnosti. Kot tudi iz vztrajne nepriljudnosti na sodobnost in protežiranja domačijskosti. Slednja z nerefektiranim obujanjem ruralne idile na škodo kvalitete kvarno vpliva na naše počutje. Sodobna slovenska umetnost ni ekskurzija v neokrtno naravo, ampak aktivno in reflektirano soočenje z aktualnim političnim, kulturnim in globalnim dogajanjem. Ne gre za kupovanje glasov, za »taškanje« (»metanje pod preprogo«) in blaženje problemov. Ne nastaja iz samoljubja, ampak je kritični boj za spremembe in afirmacijo pogleda brez plašnic za vzpostavlanje odprte družbe. To ni raj pod Triglavom, ampak boj za uveljavitev umetniškega

izraza kot legitimnega sogovornika družbe. Biti umetnik ne pomeni vsakoletnega izpolnjevanja formularjev Ministrstva za kulturo RS in Mestne občine Ljubljana, kot to vidi vsakokratna oblast, ampak kontinuirano zagotavljanje možnosti za prezentacijo v sodobni umetnosti primernih prostorih, s kvalitetnim pristopom in možnostjo obravnavanja v vseh medijih.

Za vas sta z non-stop 24-urnikom za sodobno umetnost agitaliri Klavdi in Joli.

Žolta kronika A MANIFESTO OF THE YELLOW CHRONICLES (ŽOLTA KRONIKA)

The Yellow Chronicles is a self-formed creature, which takes as a matter of its enunciation a reflected position that follows and reports on important social events. We also take as a matter of our critical scrutiny all so-called events that are produced through a public relations (PR) strategy. The method we endorse is professional-analytical and conducted at the scene (fieldwork) and, above all is important that this method may be authenticated (by witnesses). We operate with a strictly theoretical intellectual discourse, but, due to our feminist viewpoints, they may be qualified by the Dictionary of Standard Slovenian as emotional and expressive.

We successfully predict changes in the near future and our delicate detectors also sense libidinal investments, however, we are not some “coffee cup fortune tellers.” We cannot be bribed neither do we succumb to corruptive manoeuvres, though we are also capable of launching a rumour or two. As we find the current state of affairs in Slovenia to be one of the lowest points of Slovenian state-of-mind is our main function now to lift the bottom!

The Yellow Chronicles, is a Non Stop Working project (active 24 hours a day)
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The *Lacework Virus* or the March of Anti-intellectualism

The Yellow Chronicles has warned against the reactionary bucolic cultural politics that dominates over Slovenia in many occasions. Our contribution for *Reartikulacija* will discuss the striking example of gift protocol with which the Slovene government tries to promote Slovenia while currently presiding over the European Union. Let us start by mentioning an exhibition in Brussels, which took place prior to Slovenia's turn for presidency and was organised by Dr. Romana Cizej. The event was hosted for the curious EU officials and was a precedent at the level of the European Union. Cizej provided a genuine manifestation of plebeian and uncultured Slovene politics. What are we talking about here? We are talking about the inflation of the Idrija lacework and about the so-called “lacework virus” as this fascination with lacework was defined by The Yellow Chronicles. Before Slovenia took over the EU presidency, Cizej as the “top-flight” of the most prominent Slovenian art in Brussels decided to display the exhibition *Shoes with Idrija Lacework/Contemporaneity Imbedded with Tradition* and a grammar school adaptation of the musical *Beauty and the Beast*, which, she believed, would enable the international public to enjoy the sweet-sounding Slovene language. The Yellow Chronicles perceive this as a total failure of the idea to present Slovene art, and diagnoses this precedent as a trend of the *Blut und Boden* (blood and soil) ideology conducted by obtuse politicians. In other words, this signifies the spread of ant-intellectualism! The politicians are smearing the image of Slovenia with their lack of cosmopolitanism, narrow-mindedness and backward attitude by making choices, which ignore topflight achievements of contemporary Slovene art. The Idrija lacework also unfailingly features in protocol gifts. The fascination is endless. Our question is, if it necessary for Slovenia to present itself with the Idrija lacework in the period 2007/08? The expansionist political strategy of the Idrija lacework has spread over the majority of protocol gifts, which Slovenia offers to distinguished foreign guests; and this is going in two batches. The contents of the gift bags are: a crystal bowl with the theme of the Idrija lacework, hand-made Idrija bobbin lace, a bottle with the theme of Idrija bobbin lace made of metal, a candle with the theme of bobbin lace, linen table mats with Idrija bobbin lace, two glasses with the bobbin lace theme, and a glass paperweight with a metal bobbin lace.

Let us, on the basis of this analysis, look in more detail at what exactly “the lacework virus” is. It is a manifestation of the ignorance of contemporary Slovene art, a lack of understanding and an inadequacy in qualifying the contemporary artistic expression. It testifies to the perverted baseness of political propaganda. The virus derives from the persistent pushing away of contemporary art into the sphere of non-institutional culture and art. It also derives from preserving non-accommodation to contemporaneity and from favouring the homeliness, which, due to the non-reflective awakening of the rural idyll at the expense of quality, has a deteriorative effect on our state of mind. Slovene contemporary art is not a field trip into the intact nature, but rather an active and reflected confrontation with the up-to-date political, cultural and global events. It is not about buying votes, silencing and soothing problems. Slovene contemporary art does not stem from self-centredness, but it is a critical struggle for change and affirmation of a view without blinkers in order to create an open society. It is not about a paradise below the Triglav Mountain, it is a struggle for the establishment of an artistic expression as a legitimate interlocutor of the society. Being an artist does not mean the yearly filling out of the applications to get funds by the Ministry of Culture of Slovenia and the City of Ljubljana as those in power perceive it, on the contrary it is a continuous fight to assure venues for presenting contemporary art in suitable spaces with quality and the possibility of discussion in all forms of media.

Your 24/7 agitators for contemporary art are Klavdi and Joli.

Translated from Slovenian by Jernej Možic.

DEKOLONIZACIJA/DECOLONISATION

Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee ŽIVI IN PUSTI UMRETI: KOLONIALNE SUVERENITETE IN MRTVI SVETovi NEKROKAPITALIZMA

Besedilo je bilo objavljeno na Borderlands ejournal, letn. 5, št. 1, maj 2006.

V tem besedilu razlagam pojem nekrokapitalizma skozi razpravo o sodobnih oblikah organizacijske akumulacije, ki vključujejo razlastitev in podreditev življenja moči smrti. Na podlagi Agambenovih (1998, 2005) in Mbembejevih (2003) teorij analiziram, kako so določene sodobne kapitalistične prakse prispevale k tej podreditvi življenja. Izpostavil sem nekatere ideološke ureditve nekrokapitalističnih praks in analiziral, kateri družbeni odnosi so zaradi teh praks prekinjeni in uničeni. Problematiziram tudi organizacijo in upravljanje globalnega nasilja ter raziščem pojav privatizirane vojske in njeno funkcijo v tako imenovani vojni proti terorju.

Trgovino je treba voditi in vzdrževati ter jo ščititi z lastnim orožjem. Trgovine ni mogoče vzdrževati brez vojne, kakor tudi vojne ne brez trgovine. Današnji čas zahteva, da splošno trgovino upravljate z mečem v lastnih rokah.

Jan Coen, generalni guverner nizozemske Vzhodnoindijske družbe, 1775.

1. Zgornji navedek je iz okrožnice, ki jo je Jan Coen napisal svojim uslužbencem potem, ko je bil imenovan za generalnega guvernerja nizozemske Vzhodnoindijske družbe. Coen daje napotke, kako naj se v zmagoslavnem času ustanovitve tedaj najverjetneje prve multinacionalne korporacije na svetu – v mislih imam razvpito Vzhodnoindijsko družbo – upravlja trgovina. V času evropskih kolonialnih osvajanj je ta družba osvajala trge, uničevala konkurenčnost, si zagotavljala poceni surovinske vire, sklepal strateška zavezištva, skratka, ravnala je natanko tako, kot nas o tem 200 let pozneje učijo učbeniki. Kolonialne osvajalne prakse Britanskega imperija v 19. stoletju so vključevale tako prisvajanje kapitala kakor tudi trajno uničenje proizvodnih zmogljivosti v kolonialnih deželah – »tehnološka premoč« britanske tekstilne industrije je denimo res posledica izumov, ampak hkrati tudi sistematičnega uničevanja lokalne industrije v Indiji in nenazadnje uvajanja novih strategij, ki so osvajalcem zagotavljale konkurenčnost: najboljšim bengalskim tkalcem so rezali prste, biharske kmete so prisili v pridelavo indigovca, trgovali so z afriškimi sužnji, ki so brezplačno delali na bombažnih poljih v ZDA (Dutt, 1970; Shiva, 2001: 34).

2. V tem besedilu raziskujem posledice upravljanja splošne trgovine »z mečem« v današnji globalni ekonomiji. Tovrstno upravljanje splošne trgovine poskušam razložiti na podlagi analize specifičnih kapitali-

stičnih praks oziroma tistega, kar na splošno imenujemo doktrina neoliberalizma. Natančneje: analiziram, kako v politični ekonomiji delujejo različne oblike moči – institucionalna, materialna in diskurzivna – ter nasilje in razlastitev, ki iz teh oblik izhajata. Na podlagi Agambenovih (1998; 2005) in Mbembejevih (2003) teorij razvijem pojem nekrokapitalizma, izhajajočega iz pojma nekropolitika, ki jo Achille Mbembe opredeli kot »sodobne oblike podreditve življenja moči smrti« (Mbembe, 2003: 39). Menim, da nekatere sodobne kapitalistične prakse prispevajo k »podreditvi življenja moči smrti« v različnih kontekstih, na primer pri upravljanju globalnega nasilja in pri vse večji uporabi privatizirane vojske v tako imenovani vojni proti terorju. Če je bil simbol nekdanje suverene oblasti meč, želim raziskati učinke trgovine z mečem in njene moči pri ustvarjanju živih in mrtvih svetov v sodobni politični ekonomiji. Katere so tiste sodobne kapitalistične prakse, ki si podrejšo življenje? Kakšno vlogo igrajo nekrokapitalistične prakse pri organizaciji in upravljanju globalnega nasilja? Katere ideološke ureditve ustrezajo nekrokapitalističnim praksam? Ob razvijanju pojma nekrokapitalizem bom poskušal odgovoriti na ta vprašanja.

Trgovina z mečem in nekrokapitalistične prakse

Ali se spomnite zgodbo o vaši neusmiljenosti brez primere?

O zločinih Vzhodnoindijske družbe v času, ko je bila na oblasti?

O času, ko ste oropali vsak voz,

medtem ko je indijsko bogastvo izginjalo v nič?

Vi, ki ste tkalcem sekali palce

in jame polnili s hladnimi trupli?

Indijska industrija je bila v senci smrti –

in kakšne grozovite smrti! V vaših rokah!

Josh Malihabadi, *Sinovom Vzhodnoindijske družbe*.

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3. Malihabadi, član skupnosti progresivnih piscev med vojno za neodvisnost Indije, je napisal to pesem kot sarkastičen odziv na poziv britanske vlade Indijcem, da se na začetku druge svetovne vojne udeležijo vojne proti Nemčiji (Mir in Mir, 2006). Britanija se je nemudoma odzvala, prepovedala je pesem in ukinila Malihabadijev časopis. »Senca smrti« se nanaša na sistematično uničenje indijske lokalne tekstilne industrije s strani Vzhodnoindijske družbe, ki si je hotela pridobiti trge za tovarne v Manchesteru. Vzhodnoindijska družba in Britanski imperij sta tako svoje bogastvo utemeljila na nasilju, pohabljanju, suženjstvu in smrti. V času trgovskega kapitalizma je na račun razvrednotenja človeških življenj naraščala vrednost kapitala. Tako je na primer leta 1757, ko so v London prispеле novice o francoskem porazu in zavzetju bengalske trgovske postaje Chandannagore s strani angleške Vzhodnoindijske družbe, na londonski borzi cena delnic slednje poskočila za 12 odstotkov (Singer, 2004). V 250 letih se ni veliko spremenilo: decembra 2004 je borzni tečaj družbe Armor Holdings, večnacionalne korporacije s sedežem v ZDA in enega mnogih zasebnih vojaških podizvajalcev v Iraku na Wall Streetu, dosegel najvišjo vrednost, potem ko je ameriška vlada naznanila, da bo podeljevala pogodbe za obnovo Iraka. V obeh primerih so vpleteni vojska, nasilje in jemanje življenj in v obeh primerih gre za specifične kapitalistične odnose, ki omogočajo akumulacijo profita, kar je bil primarni cilj s strani imperija pooblaščne korporacije, ki je bila dejavna v 18. stoletju in se je razvila v multinacionalno korporacijo 20. stoletja.

4. Naj pojasnim uporabljeno terminologijo: termina kolonializem in imperializem sem ponekod uporabil kot sinonima, drugod pa z različnim pomenom. Imperializem pojmem kot sklop teorij in praks, ki jih razvije vladajoče velenestvo središče, da bi prek njih vladalo oddaljenim ozemljem, in sicer s silo, političnimi sredstvi ali z gospodarsko, družbeno in kulturno odvisnostjo. Doyle (1986: 45) opredeli imperij kot »formalni ali neformalni odnos, v katerem ena država nadzoruje dejansko politično suverenost neke druge politične družbe. To lahko doseže s silo, političnim sodelovanjem, z gospodarsko, družbeno ali s kulturno odvisnostjo«. Kolonializem, ki je skorajda vedno posledica imperializma, vključuje ustanovitve kolonij na obrobnih ozemljih. V postkolonialni dobi s terminom kolonializem (ali neokolonializem) mislim na kontinuiteto evropskega kolonializma, ki je opustil tradicionalne mehanizme širjenja meja in nadzora nad ozemlji, ohranil pa je politični, ekonomski in kulturni nadzor. Termin kolonializem na primer uporabljam, da potrdim sokrivo kolonialnih odnosov v današnjih odnosih moči med območji prvega in tretjega sveta. Konec imperijev in neposredno kolonialno vladanje ne pomenita konca imperializma, saj je njegove sledi še danes zaslediti v »splošni kulturni sferi, v specifičnih političnih, ideoloških, gospodarskih in družbenih praksah« (Said, 1993: 8). Tradicionalna politika moči – vojaška moč, diplomacija in razvoj orožja – je vstopila v dobo »geoekonomije«, kjer zmagovalce in poražence globalne ekonomije določajo zasebne entitete, ki jih podpirajo države (Luttwak, 1999). Kot trdi Said (1993), akumulacija in obogatitev nista edina cilja imperializma ali kolonializma. Njuna ideološka podstat temelji na prepričanju, da ozemlja in ljudje dejansko »zahtevajo in prosijo za gospodstvo kakor tudi za z njim povezane oblike znanja«.

5. Da sta kapitalizem in smrt v medsebojni povezanosti, ni nič novega: v svoji prvi knjigi *Kapital* je Marx (1867: 926) zapisal: »Če je denar prišel na svet s prirojenim krvnim madežem na eni strani lica, potem je kapital podolgem in počez prežet s krvjo in umazanijo.« Zgodnje kapitalistične prakse novčenja delovne sile so temeljile na nasilju, ki je bilo pogosto zakonsko dovoljeno. Kmetom je bila npr. odvzeta zemlja, kar jih je prisililo v klateštvo, ki pa je bilo zakonsko prepovedano, zato so bili klateži »tepeni, ožigosani, zakonsko preganjani na naravnost groteskne načine, da bi se naučili discipline, ki jo je zahteval mezdni način dela« (Marx, 1867: 899). Grozodejstva kolonializma so poleg izkoriščanja delovne sile vključevala še rasno razločevanje – Marx denimo kolonialistične kapitalistične prakse v Afriki opiše kot prakse »iztrebljanja, zaslužnjevanja prvotnega prebivalstva in njihovega pokopavanja v rudnike [...] ter spreminjanja Afrike v prizorišče trgovinskega lova na temnopolte« (Marx, 1867: 915). V analizi Marxovih metafor, povezanih s smrtjo, krvjo in vampirji, Neocleous (2003) vleče vzporednice med kapitalom in smrtjo ter trdi, da gre pri Marxovi kritiki politične ekonomije za »politično ekonomijo mrtvih«. Na različnih mestih v knjigi *Kapital* Marx obravnava kapital kot »mrtvo delo« in ga postavlja nasproti »živemu delu«. V tem odnosu vlada kapitalistično pravilo, ki propagira »neodvisnost pogojev dela nad delavci [...], prevlado stvari nad človekom, mrtvega dela nad živim« (Marx, 1867: 989).

6. Toda namesto da smrt zreduciramo zgolj na razlikovanje med različnimi oblikami dela bodisi v kolonialističnem ali velenestnem kontekstu, je treba nekrokapitalizem razumeti kot prakso, ki operira na podlagi vzpostavitve kolonialne suverenosti, in kot način, kako se suverenost vzpostavlja v zdajšnji politični ekonomiji, kjer je prav zaradi izrednega stanja omogočena izpeljava poslov s smrtjo. Prav zato se je treba vprašati, kako kolonialna suverenost ustvarja izredna stanja, ki spodbujajo nekrokapitalistične prakse.

7. Agamben se opre na Schmittovo definicijo suverena kot »tistega, ki odloča o izrednem stanju« (1998: 17), in trdi, da prek izrednega stanja suvereni »ustvarja in zagotavlja pogoje, ki šele omogočajo veljavnost zakona«. Odstopanje od pravila ali ustvarjanje precedenčne situacije je dejansko »že vključeno v normalno delovanje zakona prav zato, ker mu ta situacija ne pripada«. Ne pripadati nekemu redu stvari, dejansko pomeni pripadati mu le kot izjema. Zato je »izjema tisto, kar ne more biti vključeno v celoto, ki ji pripada, in ne more pripadati celoti, iz katere je vselej že izključeno« (Agamben, 1998: 25). Če citiram Agambena (2005: 51): »V vsakem primeru izredno stanje določa prag, kjer so meje med logiko in prakso zabrisane in kjer čisto nasilje brez razuma uresničuje izrekanje brez vsake prave reference. Osnovna naloga teorije izrednega stanja ni le, da pojasni, ali ima ta pravno osnovo ali ne, pač pa da določi pomen, kraj in načine njenega razmerja do zakona.«

8. Izredno stanje omogoča izvajanje nasilja v tem nekrčljivem prostoru, kjer je zakon začasno razveljavljen. V tem suverenem prostoru je nasilje drugačno od nasilja, ki ga za vzdrževanje zakona izvaja država: nasilje v izrednem stanju ohranja zakon tako, da tega začasno ukine. Suverena moč in njena sposobnost, da razglasi izredno stanje, je pravzaprav vez med nasiljem in zakonom, ki hkrati vzpostavljata in razveljavljata pravno državo v procesu določanja življenja, kar Benjamin (1978) imenuje golo življenje. Pojem golo življenje je odločitev o tem, kaj je življenje, ali, kot trdi Agamben, gre za suvereno odločitev – za izredno stanje. Golo življenje se razlikuje od političnega ali kulturnega življenja. Suverena moč pri določitvi izrednega stanja izključuje golo življenje iz političnega, kar se kaže v tem, da postane proizvodnja golega življenja imperativ politike. Prav to izredno stanje, ki je suverena moč in definira, kar Agamben poimenuje »odnos prepovedi ali zanemarjanja«, ustvarja golo življenje, ki je lahko vključeno v politično le na osnovi svoje izključitve, ki se dogaja s suvereno prepovedjo ali zanemarjanjem.

9. Na podlagi pojmov iz antične rimske zakonodaje Agamben (1998: 27) razvije pojem *homo sacer* ali sve-ti človek – »[človek], ki se ga lahko ubije, a ne more biti žrtvovan«. V starem rimskem pravu je *homo sacer* označeval ljudi, katerih smrt bogovom ni predstavljala nobene vrednosti, zato se jih ni smelo žrtvovati, ampak le ubiti, ne da bi bil storilec za to kaznovan, saj so bila njihova življenja brez družbene vrednosti. *Homo sacer* je zasedal prostor tako zunaj (in zato tudi znotraj) božjega in pravnega zakona; sveti človek je bil objekt in ne subjekt suverene moči, bil je »nemi nosilec golega življenja, oropan jezika in političnega življenja, ki ga omogoča prav jezik« (Gregory, 2004: 63).

10. Agamben pokaže, kako suverena moč vpliva na proizvodnjo golega življenja v različnih kontekstih: v koncentracijskih taboriščih, poskusi nacističnih zdravnikov na internirancih, v trenutnih razpravah o evtanaziji, razpravah o človekovih pravicah in pravicah beguncev. Suverena odločitev o vzpostavitvi izrednega stanja pomeni moč odločanja o vrednosti življenja, torej o tem, da se življenje lahko ubije, ne da bi to veljalo za kaznivo dejanje. Usmrtitev umsko in fizično nezmožnih ljudi med nacističnim režimom se je

upravičevalo, češ da gre za prekinitev življenja »brez vrednosti«, življenja, »ki ga ni vredno živeti«. Suveren je torej tisti, ki odloča o vrednosti življenja in »ima moč, da odloči, kdaj življenje izgubi politični pomen« (Agamben, 1998: 142). Četudi življenje v deklaraciji o človekovih pravicah velja za sveto, pa je v resnici le predmet politične odločitve, izpostavljeno biomoči (Foucault, 1980). V kontekstu vojne proti terorju, ki je del neoliberalne ekonomije, se izvajanje biomoči kaže v tipu suverene oblasti, ki močno vpliva na tiste, katerih življenja so odvisna od vojne proti terorju, kakor tudi na tiste, katerih življenja se konstituirajo kot golo življenje v ekonomiji vojne proti terorju.

11. Sicer pa o suvereni moči in biomoči ni dovolj govoriti le v kontekstu neoliberalne ekonomije, še zlasti ko gre za vojno proti terorju. V neoliberalni ekonomiji kolonija predstavlja večji potencial za ustvarjanje profita, saj prav ta prostor, kot trdi Mbembe (2003: 14), predstavlja trajno izredno stanje, kjer je suverenost uporaba moči izven zakona, kjer je »mir v resnici prevzel podobo vojne brez konca« in kjer se nasilje lahko izvaja v imenu civilizacije. Toda te oblike nekropolitične moči, ki jo Mbembe razbira v kontekstu zasedbe Palestine, ustvarjajo dobesedno »mrtve svetove, nove in edinstvene oblike družbenega obstoja, kjer je širša populacija izpostavljena takim življenjskim pogojem, v katerih so tam živeči ljudje pravzaprav živeči mrtveci« (Mbembe, 2003: 40). Država, v kateri se vzdržuje nenehno vojno stanje, je natanko tisti prostor, ki omogoča ustvarjanje profita bodisi na podlagi izkoriščanja tamkajšnjih virov bodisi zaradi zasebne vojske ali pa prek izvajalskih pogodb za obnovo uničenega ozemlja.

Suverena oblast izvaja nekromoč nad mrtvimi svetovi, kar pomeni, da ima dobesedno pravico ubijati ali pravico »civilizirati«, kar naj bi bila »dobronamerna« oblika moči, ki zahteva uničenje neke kulture, da lahko »ljudi reši pred samimi seboj« (Mbembe, 2003: 22). To prizadevanje rešiti ljudi pred samimi seboj je seveda retorika, ki jo uporablja ameriška vlada tako v vojni proti terorju kot v vojni v Iraku.

12. Poskušajmo zdaj nekropolitiko razumeti v ekonomskem kontekstu. Montag (2005: 11) trdi, da ko se nekropolitika začne ukvarjati s produkcijo smrti ali podrejanjem življenja moči smrti, tedaj govorimo o nekroekonomiji – o prostoru, kjer te »pustijo umreti ali te potisnejo v smrt«. Montag raziskuje odnos trga do življenja in smrti ob branju knjig *Wealth of Nations* in *Theory of Moral Sentiments* Adama Smitha. Po Montagovi interpretaciji Smitha je »groza smrti tista, ki zastruplja srečo [...], ki medtem ko prizadene in razžali posameznika, brani in ščiti družbo« (citat iz Montag, 2005: 12). Če bi družbeno življenje temeljilo zgolj na nebrzdanih lastnih interesih, potem bi strah pred kaznijo ali smrtjo, ki ga vsiljuje pravni sistem, nadziral prekomerni interes posameznikov; v nasprotnem primeru bi ljudje preprosto kradli, napadali in ubijali za materialno bogastvo. Potemtakem, kot trdi Smith, je univerzalnost življenja pogojena s partikularnostjo smrti, s proizvajanjem življenja na račun smrti, pri čemer prepletanje političnega in ekonomskega ustvarja potrebo po uveljavitvi pravice do ubijanja. Trg kot »konkretna oblika univerzalnega« postane tako »prava oblika univerzalnosti življenja«, ki v določenih trenutkih zahteva, da se »pusti umreti«. Ali če povzamemo Montagovo teoretično postavko: »Smrt ustvarja pogoje za življenje; z nekakšno nevidno roko smrt vzpostavlja trg na takšen način, da ta lahko podpira življenje. Smrt partikularnega je nujna za proizvajanje univerzalnega življenja. Trg reducira in racionalizira življenja: ne samo, da dovoljuje smrt, ampak zahteva, da jo suverena moč kakor tudi tisti, ki utrpijo smrt, dovolijo. Z drugimi besedami, od slednjih zahteva in jih poziva, da si dovolijo umreti. Poleg figure *homo sacer*, ki se jo lahko brez kazni ubije, imamo še eno figuro, katere smrt je nedvomno manj spektakularna od smrti prve in ni deležna spominske ali žalne slovesnosti: to je figura, ki se počasi ali hitro ubije za dobro razumnosti in ravnovesja trga, ne da bi bil storilec za to kaznovan« (Montag, 2005: 15). Montag razvije teorijo o nekroekonomiji, kjer država postane glavni povzročitelj nasilja: v tem scenariju lahko država prisili v smrt »tiste, ki si ne dovolijo umreti« (Montag, 2005: 15). Montagov pojem nekroekonomije – kot se zdi – prek logike trga univerzalizira pogoje revščine. V nadaljevanju pa se bom bolj osredotočil na ustvarjanje mrtvih svetov v kolonialnih kontekstih prek zarote med državami in korporacijami.

13. Če države in korporacije v kolonialnih kontekstih delujejo tandemsko in pri tem ustvarjajo izredna stanja in izvajajo nekromoč, ki jim omogoča ustvarjanje dobička iz mrtvih svetov, ki jih vzpostavljajo, potem nekroekonomija ne upošteva specifičnosti kolonialnih kapitalističnih praks. V tem pogledu bi lahko dejali, da je nekrokapitalizem proizvod nekropolitike in nekroekonomije kot praksi akumulacije, ki ju specifični ekonomski akterji – npr. multinacionalne korporacije – izvajajo v kolonialnih kontekstih in ki vključujeta razlastitev, smrt, mučenje, samomore, suženjstvo, uničenje življenjskih pogojev in splošno upravljanje nasilja. Gre za novo obliko imperializma, ki se je naučil »bolje upravljati«. Kolonialna suverenost se lahko vzpostavi tudi v območjih metropole, kjer lahko nekrokapitalizem operira v izrednih stanjih: primeri takih izrednih stanj so centri za begunce v Avstraliji (Perera, 2002) in cele regije v (post- ali neo-) kolonialnih deželah Srednjega Vzhoda ali Afrike.

Kolonialni nekrokapitalizem

14. Temeljna lastnost nekrokapitalizma je *akumulacija na podlagi razlastitve in ustvarjanja mrtvih svetov* v kolonialnem kontekstu. Zgodovinski kontekst sodobnih praks akumulacije na podlagi razlastitve, nasilja in smrti sega v zgodnja leta evropskega kolonializma. Za razliko od stare ideologije, ki je svoj imperij širila pod pretvezo civiliziranja, je ideologija novega imperija, ki je odražala potrebo po kolonialni modernosti, ponudila ekonomska pojma napredka in razvoja, ta pa sta privedla do oblike kapitalističnega imperializma. Vojaška moč, ki je običajno služila za širjenje ozemlja in trgovsko konkurenco, je sedaj prevzela bolj dvoumno vlogo brez določenega cilja (Wood, 2003). Kolonialna ekspanzija, še zlasti s strani Velike Britanije, se je upravičevala z uporabo zasebne lastnine, ko se je na primer »korist« kmetijske proizvodnje primerjala z »izgubo« pri lovu in nabiralništvu. Premoč zasebne lastnine nad politično suverenostjo je bila prepoznavni znak kapitalističnega imperializma pri univerzalizaciji pojmov vrednosti. John Locke je denimo trdil, da je bila »nerazvita« Amerika pripravljena na kolonizacijo, ker en ar zemlje v Ameriki, ki je bil enako rodoviten kot en ar zemlje v Angliji in tudi enake »dejanske vrednosti«, v resnici ni bil »vreden niti 1/1000 ara zemlje v Angliji, pa čeprav bi upoštevali ves dobiček, ki bi ga *Indijanec* dobil, če bi bila zemlja ocenjena in prodana tukaj« (citat iz Wood, 2003: 143, poudarjeno tudi v originalu).

15. Imperij je s svojim razvojem v popolno ekonomsko hegemonijo postal več kot le vojaško osvajanje ozemelj. Imperializem je postal »gospodarski sistem zunanjih investicij, prodlr je na trg in prevzel nadzor nad njim in nad viri surovin« (Williams, 1976: 159). Preobrazba evropskega kolonializma v novi »imperializem brez kolonij« je terjala tudi prisilne ukrepe in surovo nasilje, ki ga je pogosto spremljal tajni dogovor s postkolonialističnimi političnimi elitami v nekdanjih kolonialnih deželah, kjer so lokalne države predstavljale lokacije moči za kapitalistično akumulacijo. Namesto da bi pomenila »smrt nacionalne države«, je globalizacija kot oblika kapitalističnega imperializma odvisna od sistema več držav, ki so zahtevale novo doktrino »ekstraekonomskega, še zlasti pa vojaškega nasilja« (Wood, 2003: 151). Sposobnost uporabiti ekstraekonomsko nasilno moč spominja na »operacijo Neskončna vojna«, tj. na »vojno stanje«, kakor ga opredeli Hobbes, ki trdi, da »ne gre za stanje dejanskega bojevanja, ampak le za znano predpostavko, saj ni zagotovil, da bi vseskozi verjeli v nasprotno«. Potemtakem »neskončni imperij, ki ne pozna ne meja ne ozemelj, zahteva neskončno vojno stanje. Nevidni imperij pa zahteva neskončno vojno in novo vojno doktrino, ki bi to upravičila« (citat iz Wood, 2003: 161).

16. Ustvarjanje novih izrednih stanj je orožje, ki služi ideološkemu arzenalu imperija, kjer je vsiljevanje ekonomskih odnosov na prvem mestu, pa četudi je za to treba uporabiti grobo silo. Pravica do vladanja se upravičuje »s pravico ali celo dolžnostjo, da se ustvari menjalna vrednost« (Wood, 2003: 157). Ekonomska premoč, ki trgom omogoča nadzorovanje večine imperialističnega dela, daje kolonialnim državam še večje pristojnosti in moč. Če si imperializem razlagamo kot konstelacijo gospodarskih odnosov, postane podrobnejša analiza razpona odnosov (kot so odnosi med nacionalnimi državami, mednarodnimi institucijami in korporacijami) pomembna naloga, s katero razkrijemo imperializem, ki je prisoten v sedanjih institucionalnih procesih in strukturah. Upravljanje z mednarodnim finančnim kapitalom v kontekstu imperializma postane pomembno v svoji hegemonični institucionalizaciji prek Mednarodnega denarnega sklada, Svetovne banke in Svetovne trgovinske organizacije. Torej so konflikti med severnimi in južnimi deželami v mnogih mednarodnih trgovinskih forumih kakor tudi protesti kmetov in delavcev v revnih državah sveta zaradi pravic do lastnine in virov običajno primerno označeni kot antiimperialistični boji.

17. Nekrokapitalistično zavzetje družbenega vključuje nove načine vladanja, ki se utemeljujejo na pravih korporacijskega racionalizma in se uporabljajo pri upravljanju nasilja, družbenega konflikta in množstva. Noben konflikt, ki se postavlja po robu najvišjim zahtevam kapitalistične racionalnosti – gospodarski rasti, povečanju profita, produktivnosti, učinkovitosti in podobnega – ni sprejemljiv. Korporacijska racionalnost neizogibno zavrne, prevzame ali marginalizira interese, ki bi utegnili ogroziti njene koristi. Prav ta racionalnost omogoča državi kot celoti in ekonomiji, ki delujeta vzajemno, da prodreta v civilno družbo in javno sfero v večjem obsegu, kar ima za posledico tehnokratske imperATIVE, ki ne le da diktirajo način dela, ampak tudi »izobraževanje, pogoje bivanja, zdravstveno oskrbo, kulturno ponudbo, prehrambeno industrijo in celo medsosedske odnose« (Boggs, 1986: 28). Z delovanjem diskurzivne in institucionalne moči se ta sistem zaveznitstva med trgov in državo postavlja nad družbo in njene tekmujoče družbene dejavnike, medtem ko prikriva svojo ključno vlogo v procesu akumulacije. Pred več kot sedemdesetimi leti sta Berle in Means (1932: 357) napovedala naslednje: »V prihodnosti bodo ekonomske organizacije, ki jih danes poznamo kot korporacije, ne le izenačene z državo, ampak jo bodo mogoče celo izpodrinile in se uveljavile kot dominantna oblika družbene organizacije.« Ta prerokba nas je začela preganjati v času neoliberalizma, kjer je kolonizacija družbenega s pomočjo ekonomije postala hegemonična. Kot poudar-

ja Harvey (2005), poskusi reorganiziranja družbene sfere v prvem kapitalističnem svetu so odvisni od naraščajočih militarizmov doma in v tujini. Ti so najpogostejše odvisni od starejših oblik moči, ki so temeljile na rasnem razločevanju.

18. Nove ekonomske doktrine terjajo tudi nove vojaške doktrine. »Širjenje demokracije in kapitalizma«, ki sta temelja ameriške zunanje politike, vključuje tudi operacijo Neskončna vojna, »novo imperialno hegemonijo, ki usmerja globalno ekonomijo, s katero upravlja več držav, in ki zahteva vojno brez konca« (Wood, 2003: 71). Neskončna vojna ne pomeni nujno tudi neskončnega bojevanja: prisilni mehanizmi kapitala zahtevajo, da se zagotavljajo neskončne možnosti za vojno. Če za trenutek odmislimo problem združljivosti demokracije in kapitalizma, bi lahko trdili, da je ameriška zunanja politika »širjenja demokracije in kapitalizma« nova oblika imperializma. Medtem ko ameriška zunanja politika zadnjih sedemdeset let »širi demokratične vrednote«, je resnica pravzaprav ta, da zunanjepolitične odločitve propagirajo tržno znamko ameriške liberalne demokracije, ki skuša ustvariti globalni sistem, »temelječ na potrebah privatnega kapitala, vključno z zaščito zasebne lastnine in prostega dostopa na trga« (Hertz, 2001: 78). »Neskončna vojna« ima presunljivo genealogijo na zahodu. Woodrow Wilson je leta 1907 zapisal: »Ker se trgovina ne meni za nacionalne meje in proizvajalec želi imeti svet le kot tržišče, mu mora slediti tudi narod s svojo zastavo in porušiti je treba vrata vseh držav, ki se temu upirajo. Koncesije, ki si jih zagotovijo finančniki, bodo morale biti zaščitene s strani državnih ministrov, pa čeprav to lahko pomeni izvajanje nasilja nad nasprotujočo suvereno oblastjo. Kolonije je treba osvojiti ali na novo ustvariti, da se bo lahko izkoristilo vsak uporaben kotiček tega sveta [...]. Seme vojne v današnjem svetu temelji na industrijski in trgovinski tekmovalnosti« (citat iz Katz, 2006). Deklaracijo Woodrowa Wilsona, da »je treba svet narediti varen za demokracijo«, si je treba razlagati v luči neke vrste tržnega fundamentalizma in nasilja, ki določata parametre demokracije. Ameriški tip liberalne demokracije, kjer so multinacionalne korporacije nosilci demokratičnih vrednot na ozemlja tretjega sveta, je povsem zmožen delovati v avtoritarnih režimih – pravzaprav je to celo zaželeno, če le-ti dovolijo tržno ekonomijo. Demokratična pojma, kot sta pravica do zasebne lastnine in pravna država, sta nedotakljiva, za razliko od drugih aspektov demokracije, kot so »množična participacija, aktivna civilna družba, regularne svobodne in pravične volitve, ki so le izbirne možnosti in v resnici ničvredne« (Hertz, 2001: 80).

19. Kadar neprimerne oblike demokracije ogrozijo kapitalizem ameriškega tipa, kot se je izkazalo v prime-ru demokratično izvoljenega venezuelskega predsednika Huga Chaveza, se lahko ustvari izredno stanje, da se upravičijo vojaški prevrati (še danes ni povsem znan obseg ameriške politične in vojaške vpletenosti v poskus odstranitve Chaveza, saj je zunanje ministrstvo dokumente označilo kot zaupne, češ da gre za zadeve nacionalne varnosti) ali politični umori, ki jih podpira »verski radijski evangelist« Pat Robertson. Na nacionalni televiziji je Robertson zahteval Chavezovo usmrtitev, da bi njegovo deželo rešil pred »komunizmom in muslimanskim ekstremizmom« (povezava z »muslimanskim ekstremizmom« v Venezueli se zdi precej nenavadna, še zlasti, ker je v Venezueli manj kot 0,5 odstotkov muslimanskega prebivalstva). V eni izmed oddaj je Robertson povedal: »Imamo možnost, da ga odstranimo, in napočil je čas, da to tudi storimo. Ne potrebujemo nove vojne za 200 milijard dolarjev, da se znebimo še enega nasilnega dikta-torja. Bistveno lažje je najeti nekaj tajnih agentov, ki bodo opravili ta posel. Predvsem pa je to ceneje, kot začeti še eno vojno [...], in menim, da zaradi tega ne bomo ob naftne pošiljke« (*USA Today*, 2005).

20. Medtem ko je ameriška vlada izrazila odklonilno stališče do Robertsonove izjave (ameriški obrambni minister Donald Rumsfeld je medijem jasno povedal: »Mi takih stvari ne počnemo«), pa ta vseeno pou-darja odnos med nafto (Venezuela je peta največja izvoznica nafte v svetu, ZDA pa odkupi 60 odstotkov njene celotne proizvodnje) in kapitalistično akumulacijo, ki poteka skozi razlastitve in smrti preko politič-nih umorov in vojn. In da bo odnos med trgi in vojno še jasnejši: predsednik Bush je v poskusu, da bi izrazil svojo zaskrbljenost glede sunkovitega upada turizma in letalskih potovanj po napadih 11. septembra, letalskim uslužbencem povedal, da »je ena prednostnih nalog te vojne potujočim povedati: Vkrcajte se« (citat iz Gregory, 2004). Da bi se ameriški turisti »vkrcali«, da bi uživali na počitnicah, spodbujali turistično tržišče in ohranili službe v letalskem poslu, morajo nekateri umreti kot *homo sacer* v izrednem stanju izven nacionalnega in mednarodnega prava.

21. Če je bila trgovina z mečem očitno aktivno delujoča v času imperija, pa se v postkolonialnem času nasilje nadaljuje na bolj zastrt način, največkrat s soudeležbo političnih elit nekdanjih kolonij. Ongova (2005) razvije pojem »dozorela oblast«, s katerim opiše, kako so nekatere države Jugovzhodne Azije, po-znane kot »azijski tigri«, vstopile na globalni trg s pomočjo vladnih političnih strategij in vojaške represije. Njene raziskave o globalizaciji v Indoneziji in Maleziji so pokazale, da se je interakcija med državami in transnacionalnim kapitalom odražala v pristranskem ravnanju države s populacijo, ki je že tako rasno, etnično, spolno, razredno in regionalno fragmentirana, kakor tudi v rekonfiguraciji moči in oblasti v rokah transnacionalnih korporacij, ki delujejo v posebnih izvoznih brezcarinskih conah. Neoliberalni obrat v teh regijah sledi drugačni logiki, kjer se igra med trgov in državo kaže na različnih ravneh suverenosti: nekatera področja ekonomije so pod močnim državnim vplivom, drugim pa vladata trg in tuj kapital. Dr-žavna suverenost je razpršena, ker globalni trgi in kapital skupaj z vlado ustvarjata izredna stanja, kjer se izvajajo nasilje in umori. Državna represija proti uporni populaciji in separatističnim gibanjem je pogosto pod vplivom tržnih sil: kot trdi Ongova (2005), ozemlja so očiščena upornikov (»izobčenih državljanov«), da se pridobijo koncesije za predelovanje lesa, gradnjo naftovodov, rudnikov in jezov. Na ta način nekro-kapitalizem ustvarja izredna stanja, kjer »so demokratične pravice ujetе v politično sfero«, medtem ko se na drugih področjih dalje izvajajo oblike gospodstva, izkoriščanja in nasilja (Wood, 2003: 80).

Podizvajalci vojne proti terorju: korporativni bojevniki in privatizirana vojaška industrija

22. V nadaljevanju bom analiziral, zakaj lahko najemanje podizvajalcev v vojni proti terorju beremo kot nekrokapitalistično prakso. Nobeno tržno blago ne pozna tako dolge in krvave zgodovine, ki vključu-je razlastitve, kolonialna osvajanja, vojaške prevrate, vojne, korupcijo, globalno politiko in moč, kot to velja za nafto. Ta že od začetka 19. stoletja predstavlja enega največjih svetovnih poslov. V letu 2006 je bilo na svetovnem seznamu petnajstih največjih korporacij Fortune 500 šest naftnih družb, ki so med prvimi zares multinacionalnimi korporacijami moderne dobe. Korporacijske strategije naftnih družb so nerazrešljivo povezane z nacionalnimi strategijami vlad kakor tudi z globalno politiko in močjo. Nafta je namreč eden glavnih krivcev za grozodejstva, ki se dogajajo na Srednjem Vzhodu, saj je bilo tamkajšnje ozemlje že v tridesetih letih dvajsetega stoletja razdrobljeno v nacionalne države za potrebe kolonialnih in imperialističnih sil, danes pa zaradi »vojne proti terorju« v Iraku in drugod vse bolj spominja na trajno izredno stanje.

23. Imperialna moč, vojaška oblast, ekonomski interesi in kapital so vsi vpleteni v vojno proti terorju. Če-prav nafta morda ni bila edini vzrok za zasedbo Iraka, pa nikakor ni naključje, da sta bili pri pohabljanju in plenjenju v Bagdadu v prvih dneh zasedbe tega ozemlja edini dve stavbi, ki ju je varovala ameriška vojska, ministrstvo za notranje zadeve in ministrstvo za nafto. Pretok kapitala znotraj in zunaj Iraka pušča sledi smrti in uničenja, ki jim sledi obnova. Ena od mnogih ključnih odločitev, sprejetih v povojnem Iraku na več zasedanjih med ameriškimi in britanskimi državnimi funkcionarji ter nestabilno iraško začasno »vlado«, je bila vzpostavitev »iraškega nacionalnega kongresa«, ki je privatiziral iraško državno industrijo in obno-vitvene pogodbe dodelil večinoma ameriškim in britanskim korporacijam (Gregory, 2004). Medtem ko je v celotni državi razglašeno izredno stanje, je kolonialna kartografija na novo razdelila Bagdad v cone. V »zeleni coni«, kjer ima sedežčasna upravna koalicija, vlada izredno stanje znotraj izrednega stanja – to je »ameriški Bagdad«, kot ga je v intervjuju za *Washington Post* poimenoval neki prevajalec, ki je zaposlen v zeleni coni: »Počutim se, kot da nikoli ne bi zapustil Amerike. Tukaj strežejo arašidovo maslo, jastoga in sladoled. Mobilni telefon ima omrežno kodo 914 (*White Plains*, New York). Na televiziji vrtnjo oddajo *Monday Night Football* in ljudje govorijo angleško« (citat iz Gregory, 2004: 247).

24. Povsem drugačna sta življenje in smrt ljudi, ki jim ni bilo usojeno živeti v zeleni coni, ampak v obmo-čjih, ki so pod njeno upravo. Ponovna kolonialna razdelitev Bagdada v cone glede na stopnjo varnosti ima različne učinke na tam živeče ljudi. Kljub porastu števila mrtvih in živih mrtvecev v Iraku se strahovita igra štetja trupel še kar nadaljuje: med pisanjem tega besedila je bilo v Iraku ubitih 2742 koalicijskih vo-jakov – od tega je bilo 2526 ameriških. Število iraških civilnih žrtev tega konflikta pa ni tako natančno: po ocenah več agencij naj bi se število gibalo med 38.475 in 42.889 (Iraški popis žrtev, 2006). Ko je general Tommy Franks dal razvpito izjavo »Mi ne štejemo trupel«, je seveda mislil, da štejejo le trupla, ki kaj veljajo. Franksova izjava je potrditev tistega, kar Pugliese (2006) opisuje kot »nasilne asimetrije, ki delujejo pri različnem vrednotenju človeških življenj«. Sklicujoč se na internetno stran, kjer je podana statistika žrtev v Iraku, Pugliese (2006) to stanje ostro problematizira: »Medtem ko so imena newyorških žrtev teroristične-ga napada 11. septembra 2001 od prvega do zadnjega zabeležena na spominski plošči, so iraške civilne žrtve prepuščene elektronski napravi za štetje trupel, ki beleži le število anonimnih žrtev [...]. Kaj se dogaja v tem spektralnem kibernetičnem prostoru, označenem s številčnico od minimuma do maksimuma? Kaj pomenijo te razlike v številkah? Kdo zaseda ta mrakobni prostor, zaznamovan zčasno ustavljenim ze-vom mrtvih in tistih, ki to niso? V tem brezobličnem prostoru so iraški mrtveci hkrati nemrtveci, ali bolje rečeno, izgubljene duše, ki jim je odvzeta vsaka, tudi najmanjša možnost obstoja.«

25. Poleg iraških civilistov je še ena kategorija ljudi, ki se ne uvršča v to, kar Pugliese (2006) imenuje »nekrološki tabelarni mehanizem« – število ubitih zasebnih pogodbenikov. Najemanje podizvajalcev je ključna strategija, ki se uporablja v vojni proti terorju. Trenutno je v Iraku približno 140.000 ameriških

vojakov. Druga največja vojaška skupina, ki so jo najela zasebna vojaška podjetja, šteje 21.250 vojakov; v primerjavi z 8500 člani britanskih čet, ki je drugi najštevilčnejši nacionalni kontingent (Singer, 2004). Zasebni pogodbeniki upravljajo zapore v Gvantanamskem zalivu in Iraku. Haliburton, Bechtel in drugi večji ameriški pogodbeniki so dobili pogodbe vredne več milijonov dolarjev za zagotavljanje varnosti na tem območju in za njegovo obnovo. Ti v zameno (največkrat nelegalno) pripeljejo na tisoče delavcev s Filipinov, iz Nepala, Pakistana, Indije in s Šrilanke, da namesto ameriških delavcev opravljajo »najnizko-tnejša opravila«, kot je to umazano in nevarno delo poimenoval neki ameriški nadzornik (Phinney, 2005). Ubityh je bilo na stotine »državljanov tretjega sveta«, pri tem pa Pentagon vodi natančno evidenco o številu ubitih ameriških vojakov, število žrtev tretjega sveta ali civilnih žrtev pa ostaja neznano. Delovni pogoji, v katere so potisnjeni delavci, so izkoriščevalski, saj delodajalci zmanjšujejo stroške tako, da nudijo le najosnovnejše delovne pogoje. Delavci tretjega sveta ne prejemajo plačila za nadure in niso deležni enakih ugodnosti kot ameriški delavci. Najosnovnejše obroke morajo uživati na prostem pri 60 stopinjah Celzija, medtem ko ameriški delavci skupaj z vojaki uživajo v kulinarčnih dobrotah v klimatiziranih men-zah. Rasna mednarodna delitev dela je dobičkonosna strategija korporacij, ki najemajo tuje podizvajalce v vojni proti terorju in skrbijo za obnovo Iraka. Nekrokapitalistična praksa je utelešena v telesih živečih in mrtvih državljanov tretjega sveta, ki niso upoštevani ne v statističnem popisu žrtev ne v poročilih mno-žičnih medijev o vojnih žrtvah v Iraku. Njihovo delo prinaša koristi imperialistični suvereni oblasti, njihova smrt pa ne šteje nič več kot smrt iraških civilistov, ki prav tako umirajo za ceno nekrokapitalizma (ali pa, po besedah Pentagona, so samo »stranska škoda«).

26. V zadnjih letih naraščata tako trend najemanja tujih podizvajalcev za vojno kot tudi število zasebnih vojaških podjetij na globalni ravni (Singer, 2004). Privatizirana vojaška podjetja so poslovne korporacije, ki nudijo različne vojaške storitve, vključno z bojnimi operacijami, strateškim načrtovanjem, varovanjem zasebnega premoženja, podporo in usposabljanjem. Gre za globalno industrijo, ki zajema vse kontinente razen Antarktike. V zadnjih letih so bila ta podjetja dejavna v Angoli, Demokratični Republiki Kongo, Etio-piji, Sudanu, Alžiriji, na Slonokoščeni obali, v Keniji, Ugandi, Liberiji, Kamerunu, Nigeriji, Ekvatorialni Gvi-neji, Kongu-Brazzaville, Senegalu, Somaliji, Namibiji, Sierr Leone, Zambiji, na Hrvaškem, v Bosni, Albaniji, Makedoniji, na Kosovem, v Rusiji, Azerbajdžanu, Armeniji, Kazahstanu, Čečeniji, Georgiji, Savdski Arabiji, Kuvajtu in drugih zalivskih državah, Papui Novi Gvineji, na Filipinih, v Indoneziji, na Haitih, v Kolumbiji in številnih latinskoameriških državah (Singer, 2004). Medtem ko so te regije prizorišče operacij omenjenih podjetij, pa se njihov glavni sedež – kar sploh ne preseneča – nahaja v velemestnih središčih, kot so Lon-don, Pariz, Berlin in New York.

27. Današnje nacionalne države so svojo moč ustvarile na podlagi izkoriščanja »zasebnega nasilnega trga« (Singer, 2004: 20). Zaupni odnos med kolonialnimi oblastmi in najetimi zasebnimi korporacijami ni bistveno drugačen od današnjih privatiziranih vojaških korporacij in imperialnih oblasti. Vzhodnoin-dijska družba je v splošnem slovarju iz leta 1751 na primer opisana takole: »Eden od razlogov, da je ni-zozemska Vzhodnoindijska družba postala tako uspešna, najbogatejša in najvplivnejša od vseh znanih družb, je ta, da je povsem samozadostna ter kar prevzeta s suverenostjo in z gospodstvom. Po mili volji in z lastno avtoriteto vzpostavlja mir in neti vojne, upravlja pravičnost, ustvarja kolonije, gradi utrdbe, mobilizira vojsko, vzdržuje številne vojske in garnizije, oskrbuje mornarice in na ta račun bogatı« (citat iz Singer, 2004: 34). Suverenost, ki je bila s kolonialnimi listinami podeljena korporacijam, se je preusmerila v zasebno sfero v obliki privatizacije suverenosti na ozemljih, kjer so danes dejavna privatizirana vojaška podjetja. Pravica privatiziranih vojaških podjetij do odločanja o življenju in smrti, »varovanja« zasebnega premoženja in prisvajanja rudnikov (kot se to dogaja v različnih afriških državah) je danes že vključena v obliko sodobnega korporacijskega združenja. Glede na vrsto dejavnosti, ki jih opravljajo privatizirane vojaške sile, bi moralo biti njihovo dejansko delovanje bolj transparentno. Singer (2004) ocenjuje, da ima industrija 100 milijard dolarjev letnega prometa, ki naj bi se do leta 2010 podvojil. Privatizirane vojaške sile ponudijo svoje storitve le najvišjemu ponudniku: nacionalnim državam, drugim multinacionalnim korporacijam, mednarodnim organizacijam in nevladnim organizacijam. To bi utegnilo imeti naravnost smešne posledice: privatizirana vojaška sila bi bila najeta za vojaško operacijo na določenem ozemlju, kjer bi bilo treba uničiti »sovražnika«, spet drugič pa bi jo lahko najel drug ponudnik, da bi na istem ozemlju »ščitila« ljudi, ki jih je pred tem pobijala. Prav to se je zgodilo v Angoli (Singer, 2004). Nekaj industrijskih lobijev poskuša celo privatizirati sistem mirovnih operacij Združenih narodov in se pri tem sklicujejo na neoliberalno mantro, češ da bodo storitve tako hitrejše, cenejše in učinkovitejše kot v javnem sektorju. Privatizacija vojne in miru je danes postala stvar poslovnih odločitev: korporacije bodo pri izbiri strategije vselej upoštevale donosnost. Joseph Heller je bil resnično daljnoviden, ko je pisal knjigo *Catch 22*, v kateri major Milo Minderbinder pove: »Iskreno povedano, zares bi rad videl, da bi se država povsem umaknila iz vojne in vse skupaj prepustila zasebni industriji.«

28. Zasebni pogodbeniki so bili prav tako vpleteni v mučenje ujetnikov v iraškem zaporu Abu Ghraib. Tako najeti izvajalci del kot tudi ameriški vojaki so bili obtoženi udeležенosti pri mučenju, poleg tega pa je v ZDA veliko civilnih tožb zoper zasebne pogodbenike in vlado v zvezi z zlorabo pripornikov (McKelvey, 2005). Če država lahko muči in ubija, ker ji suverena moč omogoča, da ustvarja izredno stanje, kakšne bodo posledice kaznovanja zasebnih korporacij za nasilje, ki ga izvajajo? Moja teza je, da izredno stanje, ki se ustvari z vojno proti terorju, pomeni privatizacijo suverenosti, ki pa je pogoj za razvoj nekrokapita-lizma.

29. Organizacija in upravljanje nasilja na globalni ravni brišeta razlike med javnimi in zasebnimi ponu-dniki varnosti. Država je glavna podpornica in zaščitnica nekrokapitalističnih praks, vendar pa so različne ameriške multinacionalne korporacije vojno proti terorju strateško uporabile sebi v prid: vlada naj bi jim zmanjšala davke v okviru t. i. spodbujevalnega paketa ukrepov, hkrati pa naj bi s tem paketom omejila zakonske možnosti za tuje državljanе, ki želijo na ameriška sodišča vložiti tožbe proti multinacionalnim korporacijam zaradi kršenja človekovih pravic.

»Vključevanje« javnih sil – kot je policija – s strani zasebnih varnostih podjetij pri varovanju tujega kapitala ustvarja nova izredna stanja, kjer se lahko nemoteno izvaja nasilje, ki ostaja nekaznovano.

Zaključek

30. Če se vrnem na vprašanje, ki sem ga zastavil na začetku tega besedila: teorija o nekrokapitalizmu od nas zahteva, da smo pozorni na specifične kolonialne kapitalistične prakse, ki življenje podrejajo moči smrti. To so prakse, ki upravljajo in organizirajo globalno nasilje prek privatizacije oblasti in ustvarjanja izrednih razmer, kjer se kapital akumulira z razlastitvijo in smrtjo. Debord (1995) je kapitalizem opisal kot »akumulacijo spektaklov« in ne le kot »akumulacijo podob«; kot »družbeni odnos med ljudmi, ki ga te po-dobe omogočajo s svojo posredovalno vlogo«. Družba spektakla predstavlja podobo sveta, kjer so oblike države in ekonomije prepletene in kjer ima ekonomija status absolutne in neodgovorne suverenosti nad celotnim družbenim življenjem [...], kjer se v vse lahko podvomi, razen v sam spektakel, ki kot tak ničesar ne pove, le to, da »kar se prikazuje, je dobro, in kar je dobro, je vidno« (Agamben, 1993: 79). Potreben je kritično-teoretični pristop, ki se bo zmožen spopasti z nekrokapitalističnimi praksami. Ideologija neoli-beralnega tržnega fundamentalizma je tako razširjena, da je postala ravnodušna do empiričnih protido-kazov, medtem ko vez med državo in korporacijami ne pušča prostora za »cono brez vojne«. Potrebne so nove teoretične perspektive, ki bodo zmožne na novo premisliti odnos med ekonomijo, politiko in družbo in ki bodo ponudile alternativo nekrokapitalističnim praksam. Mogoče nam vprašanja afriškega romanopisca Ayija Kweija Armaha ponujajo odgovor na to, kako se takoj na začetku soočiti s temi izzivi: Kako to, da smo postali le ogledalo našega lastnega propada? Koga si želimo, da bi premišljeval o smrti naših ljudi? Komu na čast naj prepevamo o naši agoniji? S kakšnimi upanji? Da bodo tisti, ki nas poskušajo uničiti, naš propad pomirljivo obžalovali ob pogledu na lasten uspeh? (Ayi Kwei Armah, *Two Thousand Seasons*, str. xiii.)

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Iz angleščine prevedla Tanja Passoni.

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Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee LIVE AND LET DIE: COLONIAL SOVEREIGNTIES AND THE DEATH WORLDS OF NECROCAPITALISM

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In this paper I develop the concept of necrocapitalism by discussing contemporary forms of organizational accumulation that involve dispossession and the subjugation of life to the power of death. Drawing on the works of Agamben (1998, 2005) and Mbembe (2003) I discuss how some contemporary capitalist practices contribute to this subjugation of life. I discuss some ideological formations of necrocapitalist practices and examine what kind of social relations are disrupted and destroyed as a result of these practices. I discuss the organization and management of global violence and explore the rise of the privatized military and its use in the so-called war on terror.

Trade must be driven and maintained under the protection and favor of your own weapon.

Trade cannot be maintained without war, nor war without trade. The times now require

you to manage your general commerce with your sword in your hands.

Jan Coen, Governor General, Dutch East Indies Company, 1775.

1. The above quote is from a memo Jan Coen wrote to his staff after being appointed as Governor General for the Dutch East Indies Company. Coen offers a prescription on how to manage trade during the glory days of what was probably the world's first multinational corporation - I refer of course to the infamous East India Company. In an era of European colonial expansion, the company was engaged in conquering markets, eliminating competition, securing cheap sources of raw material supply, building strategic alliances: in short everything management textbooks tell us to do 200 years later. Colonial expansionist practices of the British empire in the 1800s involved both capital appropriation and permanent destruction of manufacturing capacities in the colonies - the "technological superiority" of the British textile industry for example, was established as much by invention as by a systematic destruction of India's indigenous industry including some innovative competitive strategies that involved cutting off the thumbs of master weavers in Bengal, the forced cultivation of indigo by Bihar's peasants as well as the slave trade from Africa that supplied cotton plantations in the US with free labor (Dutt, 1970; Shiva, 2001: 34).

2. In this paper I explore the implications of "managing general commerce with a sword" in today's global economy. In attempting to understand the management of general commerce I refer to specific capitalist practices in what is commonly referred to as the doctrine of neoliberalism. In describing the sword of commerce I examine how different forms of power - institutional, material, and discursive - operate in the political economy and the violence and dispossession that results. Drawing on the works of Agamben (1998; 2005) and Mbembe (2003) I develop the notion of necrocapitalism based on Achille Mbembe's concept of necropolitics which he defined as "contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death" (Mbembe, 2003: 39). I argue that some contemporary capitalist practices contribute to "the subjugation of life to the power of death" in a variety of contexts, for example in the management of global violence and the increasing use of privatized military forces in the so-called war on terror. If the symbol of past sovereignty was the sword, I want to examine the effects of the sword of commerce and its power to create life worlds and death worlds in the contemporary political economy. What practices in contemporary capitalism result in the subjugation of life? What roles do necrocapitalist practices play in the organization and management of global violence? What are the ideological formations of necrocapitalist practices? These are some questions that I will explore in developing the notion of necrocapitalism.

The Sword of Commerce and the Practice of Necrocapitalism

Do you even remember the tales of your unparalleled cruelty?

Of the Company's criminal days in power?

When you went about looting every caravan

While the wealth of India wandered bare headed

You, who used to cut off the thumbs of weavers,

And fill holes in the earth with cold corpses?

The industry of India was under the shadow of death

And what a wretched death! At your hands!

Josh Malihabadi *"To the Sons of the East India Company."*

3. Malihabadi, a member of the collective of progressive writers during India's independence struggle wrote this poem as a sarcastic response to the British government's call for Indians to join the war against Germany at the onset of World War II (Mir & Mir, 2006). The British promptly responded by banning the poem and shutting down Malihabadi's newspaper. The "shadow of death" refers to the East India Company's systematic destruction of India's indigenous textile industry in order to provide captive markets for the mills of Manchester. Violence, mutilation, slavery and death were the conditions of wealth creation for Company and Empire. The depreciation of human life was a condition of capital appreciation during the days of mercantile capitalism. For instance, in 1757 when news of the defeat of the French and the capture of the fort of Chandannagore in the province of Bengal by the English East India reached London, the company's stock price rose 12% in the London stock exchange (Singer, 2004). One could argue little has changed in nearly 250 years: in December 2004, the share price of Armor Holdings, a U.S.-based multinational corporation and one of many private military subcontractors in Iraq reached an all time high in Wall Street after the U.S. government announced reconstruction contracts in Iraq. Both cases involve military power, violence and the taking of life. Both cases also involve specific capitalist relations in terms of accumulation for profit to what was a chartered corporation of the 1700s and its evolution to the multinational corporation of the 1900s.

4. A clarification about some of the terminology used in the paper: at different places I have used the terms colonialism and imperialism, sometimes interchangeably at other times differentially. I understand imperialism as theories and practices developed by a dominant metropolitan center to rule distant territories, either by force, political means or by economic, social and cultural dependence. Doyle (1986: 45) defines empire as "a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social or cultural dependence." Colonialism, which is almost always a consequence of imperialism, involves the establishment of settlements on outlying territories. In the postcolonial era I use the term colonialism (or neocolonialism) to describe continuities of European colonialism without the traditional mechanism of expanding frontiers and territorial control but with elements of political, economic and cultural control. For instance, I use the term colonialism to acknowledge the complicity of colonial relations in contemporary power relations between First and Third World regions. The end of empires and direct colonial rule did not mean the end of imperialism and its traces can be observed in "the general cultural sphere... in specific political, ideological, economic and social practice" (Said, 1993: 8). The traditional politics of power, i.e., military strength, diplomacy and weapons development have evolved into an age of "geo-economics" where winners and losers in the global economy are created by state-assisted private entities (Luttwak, 1999). However, as Said (1993) argues, accumulation and acquisition are not the only actions of imperialism or colonialism. Their ideological formations assume that certain territories and people actually "require and beseech domination, as well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination."

5. The nexus between capitalism and death is not new: In Volume I of *Capital*, Marx (1867: 926) wrote: "If money comes into the world with a congenital blood stain on one cheek, then capital comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt." Early capitalist practices of recruiting labor involved violence, often sanctioned by law. The legislation against "vagabondage" for example transformed peasants who were driven off the land into vagabonds to be "whipped, branded, tortured by laws grotesquely terrible, into the discipline necessary for the wage system (Marx, 1867: 899). The brutal horrors of colonialism added a racial dimension to the exploitation of labor - for example Marx describes the colonial capitalist practices in Africa as "extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population... and the turning of African into a warren for the commercial hunting of black skins" (Marx, 1867: 915). In his analysis of death, blood and vampire metaphors in Marx's work, Neocleous (2003) draws parallels between capital and death arguing that Marx's critique of political economy is ultimately a "political economy of the dead." At various points in *Capital* Marx refers to capital as "dead labor" in opposition to "living labor" where capitalist rule is the "independent conditions of labor over the worker... the rule of things over man, of dead labor over living" (Marx, 1867: 989).

6. However, rather than reduce death to distinctions between labor whether in a colonial or a metropolitan context, it is necessary to understand necrocapitalism as a practice that operates through the establishment of colonial sovereignty, and the manner in which this sovereignty is established in the current political economy where the business of death can take place through states of exception. In this sense, it is necessary to read the manner in which colonial sovereignty operates to create states of exception conducive to the operation of necrocapitalist practices.

7. Drawing on Carl Schmitt's definition of sovereignty as one "who decides on the state of exception," Agamben (1998: 17) argues that through the state of exception, the sovereign "creates and guarantees the situation that the law needs for its own validity." The exception to a rule, or what is outside a normal case is actually

"included in the normal case precisely because it does not belong to it." Therefore non-belonging to a class of things really means belonging to it by exception. Thus, "an exception is what cannot be included in the whole of which it is a member and cannot be a member of the whole in which it is always already excluded" (Agamben, 1998: 25). To quote Agamben (2005: 51), In every case the state of exception marks a threshold at which logic and praxis blur with each other and a pure violence without logos claims to realize an enunciation without any real reference. The essential task of a theory of the state of exception is not simply to clarify whether it has a juridical nature or not, but to define the meaning, place, and modes of its relation to the law.

8. The state of exception allows for the enactment of violence in this irreducible space where law is in a state of suspended animation. Violence in this sovereign space is different from State violence which is exercised in maintaining the law: violence in the state of exception preserves the law by suspending it. Sovereign power and its ability to declare a state of exception is the link between violence and law that both establishes and suspends the rule of law in constituting the living, what Benjamin (1978) calls "bare life." The concept of bare life is ultimately a decision as to what constitutes life which, as Agamben argues, is a sovereign decision - a state of exception. Bare life is distinguished from politically or culturally constituted life. Sovereign power in determining the state of exception thus excludes bare life from political life while making the production of bare life an imperative of politics. It is this state of exception, a sovereign power that defines what Agamben calls "the relation of ban or abandonment," that produces bare life which can only be included in the political by virtue of its exclusion through a sovereign abandonment or ban.

9. Drawing on concepts from ancient Roman law, Agamben (1998: 27) develops the notion of *homo sacer* or sacred man - "one who may be killed but not sacrificed." In ancient Roman law, *homo sacer* referred to people whose deaths were of no value to the gods and thus could not be sacrificed but could be killed with impunity because their lives were deemed be of no value to society. *Homo sacer* occupied a space both outside (and hence inside) divine law and juridical law; they were objects of sovereign power but excluded from being its subjects; "mute bearers of bare life deprived of language and the political life that language makes possible" (Gregory, 2004: 63).

10. Agamben shows how sovereign power operates in the production of bare life in a variety of contexts: concentration camps, "human guinea pigs" used by Nazi doctors, current debates on euthanasia, debates on human rights and refugee rights. A sovereign decision to apply a state of exception invokes a power to decide the value of life, which would allow a life to be killed without the charge of homicide. The killings of mentally and physically handicapped people during the Nazi regime was justified as ending a "life devoid of value," a life "unworthy to be lived." Sovereignty thus becomes a decision on the value of life, "a power to decide the point at which life ceases to be politically relevant" (Agamben, 1998: 142). Life is no more sovereign as enshrined in the declaration of "human" rights but becomes instead a political decision, an exercise of biopower (Foucault, 1980). In the context of the "war on terror" operating in a neoliberal economy, the exercise of biopower results in the creation of a type of sovereignty that has profound implications for those whose livelihoods depend on the war on terror as well as those whose lives become constituted as "bare life" in the economy of the war on terror.

11. However, it is not enough to situate sovereignty and biopower in the context of a neoliberal economy especially in the case of the war on terror. In a neoliberal economy, the colony represents a greater potential for profit especially as it is this space that, as Mbembe (2003: 14) suggests, represents a permanent state of exception where sovereignty is the exercise of power outside the law, where "peace was more likely to take on the face of a war without end" and where violence could operate in the name of civilization. But these forms of necropolitical power, as Mbembe reads it in the context of the occupation of Palestine, literally create "*death worlds*, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of the *living dead*" (Mbembe, 2003: 40). The state of endless war is precisely the space where profits accrue whether it is through the extraction of resources or the use of privatized militaries or through contracts for reconstruction. Sovereignty over death worlds results in the application of necropower either literally as the right to kill or the right to "civilize," a supposedly "benevolent" form of power that requires the destruction of a culture in order to "save the people from themselves" (Mbembe, 2003:22). This attempt to save the people from themselves has, of course, been the rhetoric used by the U.S. government in the war on terror and the war in Iraq.

12. Situating necropolitics in the context of economy, Montag (2005: 11) argues that if necropolitics is interested in the production of death or subjugating life to the power of death then it is possible to speak of a necroeconomics - a space of "letting die or exposing to death." Montag explores the relation of the market to life and death in his reading of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* and *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. In Montag's reading of Smith, it is "the dread of death, the great poison to the happiness...which while it afflicts and mortifies the individual, guards and protects the society" (cited in Montag, 2005: 12). If social life was driven solely by unrestrained self-interest then the fear of punishment or death through juridical systems kept the pursuit of excessive self-interest in check, otherwise people would simply rob, injure and kill for material wealth. Thus, for Smith the universality of life is contingent on the particularity of death, the production of life on the production of death where the intersection of the political and the economic makes it necessary to exercise the right to kill. The market then, as a "concrete form of the universal" becomes the "very form of universality as life" and requires at certain moments to "let die." Or as Montag theorizes it: "Death establishes the conditions of life; death as by an invisible hand restores the market to what it must be to support life. The allowing of death of the particular is necessary to the production of life of the universal. The market reduces and rations life; it not only allows death, it demands death be allowed by the sovereign power, as well as by those who suffer it. In other words, it demands and required the latter allow themselves to die. Thus alongside the figure of homo sacer, the one who may be killed with impunity, is another figure, one whose death is no doubt less spectacular than the first and is the object of no memorial or commemoration: he who with impunity may be allowed to die, slowly or quickly, in the name of the rationality and equilibrium of the market" (Montag, 2005: 15). Montag, therefore, theorizes a necroeconomics where the state becomes the legitimate purveyor of violence: in this scenario, the state can compel by force "those who refuse to allow themselves to die" (Montag, 2005: 15). However, Montag's concept of necroeconomics appears to universalize conditions of poverty through the logic of the market. My concern however, is the creation of death worlds in colonial contexts through the collusion between states and corporations.

13. If states and corporations work in tandem with each other in colonial contexts, creating states of exception and exercising necropower to profit from the death worlds that they establish, then necroeconomics fails to consider the specificities of colonial capitalist practices. In this sense, I would argue that necrocapitalism emerges from the intersection of necropolitics and necroeconomics, as practices of accumulation in colonial contexts by specific economic actors - multinational corporations for example - that involve dispossession, death, torture, suicide, slavery, destruction of livelihoods and the general management of violence. It is a new form of imperialism, an imperialism that has learned to "manage things better," Colonial sovereignty can be established even in metropolitan sites where necrocapitalism may operate in states of exception: refugee detention centres in Australia are examples of these states of exception (Perera, 2002). However, in the colonies (either "post" or "neo"), entire regions in the Middle East or Africa may be designated as states of exception.

Colonial Necrocapitalism

14. The fundamental feature of necrocapitalism is *accumulation by dispossession and the creation of death worlds* in the colonial contexts . The historical context of contemporary practices of accumulation by dispossession, violence and death is situated in the early years of European colonialism. The ideology of the new empire reflected the needs of colonial modernities where older justifications of empire through civilization were reconfigured by economic conceptions of progress and development resulting in a form of capitalist imperialism. Military power, traditionally deployed for territorial expansion and commercial rivalry now assumed a more ambiguous purpose often requiring no specific aim (Wood, 2003). Colonial expansion, especially by the British, was justified using capitalist notions of private property, for example when comparing the "value" of agricultural production with the "waste" of hunting and gathering. The dominance of private property over political sovereignty was a hallmark of capitalist imperialism in universalizing notions of value - John Locke for example argued an "unimproved" America was open to colonization because an acre of land in America, while being as fertile as an acre of land in England and with the same "intrinsic value" was "not worth 1/1000 of the English acre, if we calculate all the Profit an *Indian* received from it were it valued and sold here" (cited in Wood, 2003: 143, original emphasis).

15. Empire thus became more than military conquest in its evolution to a form of purely economic hegemony. Imperialism became an "economic system of external investment and the penetration and control of markets and sources of raw materials" (Williams, 1976: 159). The transformation of European colonialism to a new "imperialism without colonies" also required coercive power and brute force often with the collusion of post-colonial political elites in the former colonies where local states emerged as sites of power for capitalist accumulation. Thus, rather than marking the "death of the nation state," globalization as capitalist imperialism is dependent on a system of multiple states which required a new doctrine of "extra-economic, and especially military, coercion" (Wood, 2003: 151). The ability to deploy extra-economic coercive power is analogous to "Operation Infinite War," a Hobbesian "state of war" which to quote Hobbes "consisteth not in actual fighting,

but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.” Thus, “an endless empire which has no boundaries, even no territory, requires war without end. An invisible empire requires infinite war, and a new doctrine of war to justify it” (cited in Wood, 2003: 161).

16. The creation of new spaces of exceptions is a weapon for the ideological arsenal of empire where the imposition of an economic relationship becomes paramount, using brute force if required. Thus, the right to rule is justified “by the right, indeed the obligation, to produce exchange value” (Wood, 2003: 157). Economic domination where markets manage much of the imperial work extends the powers and reach of colonial states. Thus, if imperialism is to be viewed as a fundamental set of economic relations, then examining the range of relations (such as the relationship between nation states, international institutions and corporations) becomes an important task in order to uncover the presence of imperialism in current institutional structures and processes. Placed in the context of imperialism, the operation of international finance capital becomes significant in its hegemonic institutionalization through the IMF, World Bank and WTO. Therefore, conflicts between North-South countries in various international trade forums as well as protests by peasants and workers in the poorer countries of the world over property and resource rights are often aptly framed as anti-imperialist struggles.

17. The necrocapitalistic capture of the social implies new modes of governmentality that are informed by the norms of corporate rationality and deployed in managing violence, social conflict and the multitudes. No conflict is tolerable that challenges the supreme requirements of capitalist rationalization - economic growth, profit maximization, productivity, efficiency and the like. Inevitably, corporate rationality overrules, co-opts or marginalizes interests that could threaten corporate advantage. The same rationality enables the polity-economy nexus to penetrate civil society and the public sphere in more comprehensive ways resulting in technocratic imperatives dictating not only the functioning of the workplace but also “education, housing, health care, cultural consumption, food production, and even neighborhood life” (Boggs, 1986: 28). Through the dynamics of discursive and institutional power, this market-state system positions itself “above” society and its competing social forces while obscuring its key role in the accumulation process. More than seventy years ago Berle and Means (1932: 357) prophesied: “The future may see the economic organization now typified by the corporation, not only on an equal plane with the state, but possible even superseding it as the dominant form of social organization.” This prophecy has come to haunt us in the current neoliberal era where the colonization of the social by the economic has become hegemonic. Also, as Harvey (2005) points out attempts to reorganize the social in first world contexts depend on increasing militarisms at home and abroad. Such militarisms have often depended on older racialized forms of power.

18. New economic doctrines require new military doctrines as well. “Spreading democracy and capitalism” the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy also involves Operation Infinite War, a “new imperial hegemony, commanding a global economy administered by multiple states, requiring war without end” (Wood, 2003: 71). War without end does not necessarily mean endless fighting: the coercive mechanisms of capital require an endless possibility of war. Leaving aside the problem of conflating democracy with capitalism for the moment, one could argue that U.S. foreign policy of “spreading democracy and capitalism” is a new form of imperialism. While the rhetoric behind U.S. foreign policy over the last 70 years is to “spread democratic values,” the reality is that foreign policy decisions promote a brand of American liberal democracy that seeks to create a global system “based on the needs of private capital including the protection of private property and open access to markets” (Hertz, 2001: 78). “War without end” has an impressive genealogy in the west. Woodrow Wilson wrote in 1907: “Since trade ignores national boundaries and the manufacturer insists on having the world as a market, the flag of his nation must follow him, and the doors of the nations which are closed against him must be battered down. Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process. Colonies must be obtained or planted, in order that no useful corner of the world may be overlooked...The seed of war in the modern world is industrial and commercial rivalry” (cited in Katz, 2006). Thus, Woodrow Wilson’s declaration that the “world must be made safe for democracy” must therefore be seen in light of the kind of market fundamentalism and violence that defines the parameters of democracy. American style liberal democracy where multinational corporations become the carriers of democratic values to Third World regions is perfectly capable of functioning in authoritarian regimes—in fact these regimes are preferred, as long as a market economy is allowed. Democratic notions of private property rights and the rule of law are sacrosanct but other aspects of democracy such as “mass participation, an active civil society, regular free and fair elections are optional and in fact expendable” (Hertz, 2001: 80).

19. And when inconvenient democracies threaten American style capitalism as was the case with the democratically elected President of Venezuela Hugo Chavez, a state of exception can always be created to justify a military backed *coup* (the extent of U.S. political and military involvement in the military *coup* to oust Chavez is still not clear as documents remain classified by the State department because of reasons of “national security”) or political assassination as advocated by “religious broadcaster” Pat Robertson. Appearing on national television, Robertson called for the assassination of Chavez to stop his country from becoming “a launching pad for communist infiltration and Muslim extremism” (the charge of “Muslim extremism” in Venezuela is bizarre to say the least given that less than 0.5% of the country’s population is Muslim). In his broadcast Robertson said: “We have the ability to take him out, and I think the time has come that we exercise that ability. We don’t need another \$200 billion war to get rid of one strong-arm dictator. It’s a whole lot easier to have some of the covert operatives do the job and then get it over with. It’s a whole lot cheaper than starting a war ... and I don’t think any oil shipments will stop” (USA Today, 2005).

20. While the U.S. government distanced itself from Robertson’s remark (U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told newsmedia with a straight face “We don’t do that sort of thing”), Robertson’s statement underscores the relationship between oil (Venezuela is the fifth largest exporter of oil in the world and the U.S. buys nearly 60% of its production), and capitalist accumulation by dispossession and death through political assassination and war. And to further clarify the relationship between markets and war, President Bush, in an attempt to address concerns about the dramatic decline in tourism and air travel in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, told airline employees that “one of the great goals of this war is to tell the traveling public: Get on board” (cited in Gregory, 2004). Thus, for the American tourist to “get on board” to enjoy a holiday, stimulate the tourism market and save airline jobs it becomes necessary for some people to die, as *homo sacer*, in a state of exception outside national and international law.

21. If the sword of commerce was most visibly active in the days of empire its activity in the postcolonial era continued the violence in a more covert manner, often with the complicity of the political elites of the former colonies. Ong (2005) develops the notion of “graduated sovereignty” to describe how some countries in South East Asia, notably the so-called “Asian tigers” embraced the global market with a combination of governmental political strategies and military repression. Her research on globalization in Indonesia and Malaysia showed that the interaction between states and transnational capital resulted in a differential state treatment of the population already fragmented by race, ethnicity, gender, class and region as well as a reconfiguration of power and authority in the hands of transnational corporations operating in special export processing zones. The neoliberal turn in these regions follows a different trajectory where the interplay of market versus state results in differing levels of sovereignty: some areas of the economy have a very strong state presence and in other areas, markets and foreign capital rule. State sovereignty is dispersed because global markets and capital with the collusion of governments create states of exception where coercion, violence and killings occur. State repression against rebel populations and separatist movements is often influenced by market forces: as Ong (2005) argues territories are cleared of rebels (“outlawed citizens”) to make way for logging concessions, petroleum pipelines, mines and dams. Thus, necrocapitalism creates states of exceptions where “democratic rights are confined to a political sphere” while continuing forms of domination, exploitation and violence in other domains (Wood, 2003: 80).

Outsourcing the “War on Terror”: Corporate Warriors and the Privatized Military Industry

22. I would now like to examine how the outsourcing of the war on terror can be read as a necrocapitalist practice. Perhaps no other commodity has such a long and bloody history involving dispossession, colonial conquest, military coups, wars, corruption, global politics and power as oil. Starting from the end of the 19th century oil has consistently been one of the biggest businesses in the world. In 2006, six of the 15 largest corporations in the Fortune 500 Global list were oil companies. One of the first truly multinational corporations of the modern era, corporate strategies of oil companies are inextricably linked with national strategies of governments as well as global politics and power. Oil has played a key role in the tragedy unfolding in the Middle East today, beginning from the carving up of the region into nation states to satisfy the needs of colonial and imperial powers in the 1930s to the so called “war on terror” in Iraq and elsewhere that is increasingly resembling a permanent state of exception.

23. Imperial power, military might, economic interests and capital all converge in the so-called war on terror: while it may be true that the oil may not have been the sole reason for the invasion of Iraq, it is no accident that in the mayhem and looting in Baghdad that followed the first few days of the invasion, the only two buildings guarded by American troops were the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Oil. Flows of capital in and out of Iraq leave a trail of death and destruction followed by reconstruction: one of several key decisions in the innumerable meetings in post war Iraq between American and British officials and the shaky

interim “government” of Iraq had to do with the establishment of “Iraq Inc.” involving the privatization of Iraq’s state industries and the allocation of reconstruction contracts to mainly American and British corporations. (Gregory, 2004). While the entire country is declared a state of exception colonial cartographies have redrawn Baghdad into zones. The “Green Zone” where the Coalition Provisional Authority is based is a state of exception within a state of exception - “America’s Baghdad” as an interpreter worker in the Green Zone described it an interview with the *Washington Post*: “Its like I never left America. They serve peanut butter, lobster and ice cream. The cell phones have a 914 area code (White Plains, New York). The television sets show Monday Night Football. The people speak English” (cited in Gregory, 2004: 247).

24. Life and death for people unfortunate enough to live outside the Green Zone yet governed by its operations is very different. Colonial cartographies in rezoning Baghdad based on levels of security have differential effects on human bodies that occupy these zones. As both the number of dead and the living dead grow in Iraq the macabre game of body counts continues: at the time of writing 2742 coalition soldiers have been killed in Iraq - of these 2526 are U.S. soldiers. Numbers of Iraqi civilians killed as a result of the conflict are not as precise: various agencies put the total number of civilian dead between a minimum of 38475 and a maximum of 42889 (Iraqi Body Count, 2006). When General Tommy Franks famously said “We don’t do body counts” he of course meant that they only do the bodies that count. Frank’s statement is indicative of what Pugliese (2006) describes as the “violent asymmetries that operate in the differential valuation of human lives”. Referring to the website that documents the number of Iraqi dead, Pugliese (2006) argues powerfully: “Where the 9/11 New York dead will be individuated at Ground Zero through the inscription of all their names on a memorial wall, the Iraqi civilian dead are dispatched to this electronic morgue as so many anonymous numerals....What occurs in that spectral cyberspace marked by the bar between the Minimum and Maximum? What flickers and wavers between this discrepancy of numbers? Who inhabits this macabre space marked by the suspensive hiatus of the dead and the undead? In this indeterminate space are to be found the Iraqi dead who are also undead, lost souls denied even the most minimal conditions of signification.”

25. Apart from Iraqi civilians there is yet another category of people that falls outside what Pugliese (2006) describes as the “necrological tabulating machine” - the number of private contractors killed. Outsourcing is a key strategy used in the so-called war on terror. There are currently over 140,000 American troops in Iraq. The next highest group of soldiers are hired by privatized military firms (PMFs) and number 21,250 compared to 8500 British troops which is the second largest national contingent (Singer, 2004). Private contractors operate prisons in Guantanamo Bay and Iraq. Haliburton, Bechtel and other major U.S. hired contractors have received million dollar contracts to provide security services and work on reconstruction projects. These contractors in turn bring in thousands of workers (often illegally) from the Philippines, Nepal, Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka to do what one American supervisor calls “grunt jobs,” meaning dirty and dangerous work that American employees are not willing to do (Phinney, 2005). Hundreds of these “Third Country Nationals” (TCNs) have been killed and while the Pentagon keeps an exact body count of American soldiers killed, they do not keep records of TCN deaths or civilian deaths. Working conditions are also described as being abusive with contractors doing their best to minimized costs by providing minimal service: TCNs do not get overtime or other benefits like American employees, they eat their very basic meals outdoors in 140 degree temperatures while their American counterparts enjoy culinary delights in air conditioned mess halls along with U.S. soldiers. A racialized international division of labor is a profitable strategy for corporations involved in outsourcing the war on terror and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The practice of necrocapitalism is embodied in these bodies of the living and dead Third Country Nationals by their invisibility in statistics of body counts or media coverage of soldiers in Iraq. Their labor profits imperial sovereignties yet their deaths are as disposable as the deaths of Iraqi civilians who are also evidence of the costs of necrocapitalism (or “collateral damage” in Pentagonspeak).

26. Recent years have seen an increasing trend in the outsourcing of war and the global rise of the privatized military industry (Singer, 2004). Privatized military firms (PMFs) are business corporations that offer a variety of military related services including combat operations, strategic planning, asset protection, support and training. It is a global industry operating in every continent except Antarctica. Countries in which PMFs have operated in the recent past include Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan, Algeria, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Uganda, Liberia, Cameroon, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville, Senegal, Somalia, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Croatia, Bosnia, Albania, Macedonia, Kosova, Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Chechnia, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, several other Gulf states, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Haiti, Colombia, and several Latin American countries (Singer, 2004). While these regions mark the theatre of operations for PMFs, their corporate head offices are, not surprisingly, based in metropolitan centers of London, Paris, Berlin and New York.

27. Modern nation states have drawn from the “private violence market” to build their public power (Singer, 2004: 20). The intimate relationship between colonial powers and their chartered private corporations is not qualitatively different from modern privatized military corporations and imperial powers of today. For instance, the East India Company was described in the Universal Dictionary in 1751 in this manner: “One of the reasons why the Dutch East India Company flourishes, and is become the richest and most powerful of all others we know of, is its being absolute, and invested with a kind of sovereignty and domination. It makes peace and war at pleasure, and by its own authority, administers justice to all, settles colonies, builds fortification, levies troops, maintains numerous armies and garrisons, fits our fleets, and coins money” (cited in Singer, 2004: 34). The sovereignty that colonial charters bestowed on corporations has shifted to the private realm, resulting in a privatization of sovereignty in territories where PMFs operate today. Their right to take life or let live, “protect” assets and claim mineral rights (as is the case in several African states) is today enshrined in the form of the modern business corporation. Given the nature of their business, there is a lack of transparency about the actual operations of PMFs. Singer (2004) estimates that the industry has an annual revenue of \$100 billion, which is expected to double by 2010. PMFs sell their services to the highest bidder: nation states, other multinational corporations, international organizations and non-governmental organizations. This can have some ironic consequences: a PMF can be hired for military combat operations in a particular region that involved killing the “enemy” and can subsequently be hired by another bidder at another time in the same region to “protect” the people they were engaged in killing earlier. This has happened in Angola (Singer, 2004). Some industry lobbyists are even attempting to privatize UN peacekeeping systems invoking the same neoliberal mantra of delivering services, faster, cheaper and more efficiently than the public sector. The privatization of war and the privatization of peace are now business decisions: corporations will choose either strategy based on its profitability. Joseph Heller must have been prescient when he wrote *Catch 22*, where Major Milo Minderbinder remarked: “Frankly, I’d like to see the government get out of war altogether and leave the whole feud to private industry”.

28. Private contractors have also been implicated in the torture of prisoners that took place at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Employees of contractors have been accused of participating in torture along with U.S. soldiers and there are numerous civil suits on detainee abuse filed in the U.S. against private contractors as well as the government (McKelvey, 2005). If the state can torture and kill because of its sovereign ability to create a state of exception status, what implications arise from the sanctioned violence used by private corporations? I argue that a state of exception created by the war on terror results in a privatization of sovereignty, which is an enabling condition of necrocapitalism.

29. The global organization and management of violence blurs the distinction between public and private providers of security. The state of course is a key funder of and protector of necrocapitalist practices. But the war on terror has been used strategically by several U.S. multinational corporations to obtain generous tax breaks from their government as part of a “stimulus package” which in turn is attempting to restrict the legal avenues for foreign citizens to sue multinational corporations for human rights abuses in U.S. courts. The “integration” of public forces such as the police by private security firms for the protection of foreign capital results in the creation of new states of exception where violence can be used with impunity.

Conclusion

30. To return to the questions I posed at the beginning of the paper: a theory of necrocapitalism requires us to pay attention to the specific colonial capitalist practices that result in the subjugation of life to the power of death. These are the practices that manage and organize global violence by privatizing sovereignty and creating states of exception that enable accumulation by dispossession and death. Debord (1995) described capitalism as an accumulation of spectacles, not just an accumulation of images, but a “social relation among people, mediated by images.” The society of the spectacle represents an image of the world in which the forms of the state and the economy are interwoven and “where the economy achieves the status of absolute and irresponsible sovereignty over all social life.... where everything can be called into question except the spectacle itself which as such says nothing but “what appears is good, what is good appears” (Agamben, 1993: 79). A critical theoretical approach must necessarily create a space for challenging necrocapitalist practices. The ideology of neoliberal market fundamentalism is so prevalent that it has almost become immune to empirical disconfirmation where the nexus of governments and corporations leave no room for a no-war zone. New theoretical perspectives are required to rethink the relationship between the economy, the polity and society as alternatives to necrocapitalist practices. Perhaps the questions asked by the African novelist Ayi Kwei Armah provide us with a fitting beginning to these challenges: “How have we come to be mere mirrors to annihilation? For whom do we aspire to reflect our people’s death? For whose entertainment shall we sing

our agony? In what hopes? That the destroyers aspiring to extinguish us, will suffer conciliatory remorse at the sight of their own fantastic success?” (Ayi Kwei Armah, *Two Thousand Seasons*, p. xiii).

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Sebastjan Leban

RAZVREDNOTENJE ŽIVLJENJA – Pogovor s Subhabratom Bobbyjem Banerjeejem

Sebastjan Leban: *V vašem besedilu* Živi in pusti umreti: kolonialne suverenitete in mrtvi svetovi nekro-kapitalizma *obravnavate prakse nekrokapitalizma, kolonializma, vojne proti terorju, vlogo privatiziranih vojaških sil v sodobnem kolonializmu ter kolonizacijo, ki jo sodobna neoliberalna kapitalistična praksa še vedno izvaja prek političnega, kulturnega in ekonomskega nadzora. Iz vaše analize lahko razberemo, da se izkoriščanje in razlastitev, ki sta se začela že v času prvih kolonialnih osvajanj v 15. in 16. stoletju, nista pravzaprav nikoli zares končala in da smo danes priča ne samo nadaljevanju kolonializma, ampak celo novim oblikam razvoja le-tega.*

Ali lahko rečemo, da sla po moči in nadzoru ni značilna samo za kapital (moč nadvlade nad življenjem in smrtjo – poistovetenje z Bogom), ampak da je z zgodovinskega stališča kolonializem v neposredni povezavi z zahodno krščansko doktrino?

Bobby Banerjee: Da, gledano z zgodovinskega stališča, je kolonialistična »civilizacijska« misija potekala hkrati s »pokristjanjevanjem«. Zanimivo se mi zdi zlasti vprašanje, ali sodobne oblike kolonializma poganja misionarska vnema in če je temu tako, kako se to kaže? Medtem ko Zahod mnoge režime tretjega sveta obtožuje verskega fundamentalizma, pa je denimo t. i. (raz)ločevanje vere in politike v ZDA vprašljivo, ne glede ali gre za notranjo ali zunanjo politiko. Verska desnica je bila vedno močna poltična sila v ZDA, in kot se zdi, se njen vpliv ne zmanjšuje. »Sekularizem« v sodobnih liberalnih demokracijah je premikajoča se tarča, medtem ko želi zahod zasidrati druge kulture kot »pasti religioznega fundamentalizma«.

S. L.: *V svojem tekstu se opirate na Mbembejevo definicijo nekropolitike in na Agambenov pojem homo sacer ter kot primer sodobnega izrednega stanja navajate Bagdad.*

Kakšno je vaše mnenje o tem, da je ameriška administracija kmalu po drugi svetovni vojni ugotovila, da lahko samo prek izvajanja »vojne brez konca« pridobi in ohrani vodilno vlogo v svetu, in s tem akumulira kapital na podlagi razvrednotenja življenja (to je bila tudi logika trgovskega kapitalizma)?

B. B.: Prav to sem želel izpostaviti v svojem tekstu. »Vojaška industrijska mašinerija« iz petdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja se je organizirala v bolj zapletene mreže, ki so manj transparentne in težje določljive. Če se grobo izrazim, je Clintonova administracija v ZDA na eni strani usmerila svojo ekonomijo v vojno, Busheva administracija pa je po drugi strani v ta proces vključila vojsko, s katero je podprla svoja ekonomska zavojevanja.

Ne želim, da bi bil moj argument v slogu marksističnega esencializma, po katerem naj bi se ves kapital po definiciji ustvarjal na podlagi razvrednotenja življenja. Nasprotno, v svojem besedilu trdim, da se v določenih kontekstih dovoljuje razvrednotenje življenja, in sicer preko ustvarjanja neoliberalnih izrednih stanj. Ta niso zakonsko urejena, kakor tudi ne prakse, ki jih izvajajo ZDA in zahodne države v t. i. vojni proti terorju.

S. L.: *V intervjuju z naslovom* What is Postcolonial Thinking *(Kaj je postkolonialno mišljenje)* Achille Mbembe trdi, »da našo dobo zaznamuje globalizacija, ki pravzaprav pomeni širjenje trgovine, v primežu katere so domači vsi naravni viri, človeška proizvodnja, z eno besedo življenje v vsej svoji celosti«. Prav tako trdi, da so 'plantaže', 'tovarne' in 'kolonije' glavni laboratoriji, kjer so se izvajali poskusi, ki so pripeljali do sveta, ki se mu napoveduje avtoritarna usoda, kakršni smo priča danes. Ali bi lahko sodobna izredna stanja, kot jih vi definirate, označili za četrti primer teh istih laboratorijev, ki jih opisuje Mbembe?

B. B.: Vsekakor. Vendar moramo ponovno teoretizirati in si predstavljati, kako se lahko iz teh novih laboratorijev razvijejo nove oblike odpora. Politična ekonomija, ki je nekoč vladala na plantažah in v kolonijah, ima danes več obrazov. V svoji odlični analizi neoliberalih izrednih stanj (in izjem v neoliberalizmu) Aihwe Ong podpira Mbembejev argument.

S. L.: *Med odporom v Franciji leta 2005 je bilo prav tako uvedeno izredno stanje. Dejstvo je, da je za razumevanje tega odpora ključna prav francoska kolonialna zgodovina. Ali lahko rečemo, da so ti upori samo začetek dogodkov, ki se bodo v naslednjih letih odvijali v Evropi?*

B. B.: Odpor je star toliko kot zatiranje in vseskozi prevzema in bo še prevzemal različne oblike – nasilne, nenasilne, pasivne, aktivne. Kot nas je poučil Foucault, kjer je oblast, je tudi odpor. Vzrokov za civilne nemire ne moremo razvrstiti v ločene predalčke družbenega, ekonomskega, okoljskega, kulturnega ali političnega zatiranja. Globalne klimatske spremembe so en tak primer – kadar so pogoji za preživetje milijonov ljudi resnično nevzdržni, njihov odpor vznikne iz gole potrebe po preživetju.

S. L.: *V svoji zadnji knjigi* Corporate Social Responsibility: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly *(Korporacijska družbena odgovornost: dobri, grdi in zli)* kritično analizirate sodobni diskurz korporacijske družbene odgovornosti, trajnostnega razvoja in korporacijskega državljanstva. Hkrati potegnete genealoško nit razvoja korpo-

racijskih struktur, pojasnite, kako jih je podpirala država in so bile sprva namenjene družbeni koristi. Kot vemo, se je to korenito spremenilo. Kako gledate na te spremembe?

B. B.: Meja med trgom, državo in civilno družbo v današnji neoliberalni ekonomiji ni točno začrtana in se nenehno spreminja. Država ščiti svoje državljane tako, da vpeljuje in vzdržuje ekonomijo. Suverenost države in njenih državljanov sta premikajoči se tarči, ki ju Aihwa Ong poimenuje »stopnjevana suverenost«. Ta je odvisna od specifičnih oblik države in moči trga. Mnoge teorije o globalizaciji so problematične, ker ustvarjajo lažen vtis, da sta globalizacija in teritorialna država ločeni. V resnici ne gre za dva ločena pojava, pač pa za zapa, ki oba temeljita na sistemu držav. Če gledamo na globalizacijo s tega stališča, vidimo, da zanjo ni značilno izginjanje nacionalne države, ampak nasprotno, da ima teritorialna država pravzaprav središčno vlogo pri oblikovanju globaliziranega sveta. Strukturna vztrajnost omogoča organizacijo prostora in nadzor njegovih omrežij. Država nadzira in koordinira pretok kapitala in blaga ter služi kot družbena struktura, ki je nenehno vpletena v proizvodnjo matric globalnih družbenih odnosov. Zadnji dve stoletji sta pripeljali do popolne racionalizacije državnega načina proizvodnje, kjer je država kot enota središčna vsem globalnim omrežjem, pretokom in praksam upravljanja prostora. V tem smislu je globalizacija oznaka za definitivno hegemonijo načina proizvodnje države. Nacionalna država je potemtakem temeljni strukturni element globalizacije, ki je v ozadju multinacionalnih korporacij, oblikovanja globalnega finančnega sistema, pri uvedbi politik, ki določajo mobilnost dela in pri oblikovanju multidržavnih ustanov, kot so ZN, mednarodni denarni sklad IMF, Svetovna banka, NAFTA in STO.

S. L.: *Kot se zdi, imamo danes opraviti s korporacijskimi sistemi moči, ki so se skozi stoletja razvili s pomočjo države, in sicer iz lokalnih v mednarodne sisteme moči, ti pa so s proizvodjanjem smrti razvili svojo lastno strategijo nadzorovanja človeških življenj. Kakšne so po vašem mnenju alternative takim sistemom moči?*

B. B.: Alternative obstoječim sistemom moči so drugi sistemi moči. Edino, kar lahko pričakujemo in upamo, je, da bodo ti manj represivni od trenutnega sistema! Globalno upravljanje ekonomskih institucij, ki odločajo o naših življenjih, je sicer potrebno, vendar zaradi načina strukturacije teh institucij ni mogoče reformirati. Samo če jih uničimo in zgradimo nove na globalni, regionalni, nacionalni, mednarodni ravni, lahko upamo, da bomo človeškemu kapitalu ponovno vrnili človekovo dostojanstvo.

S. L.: *Ali lahko družbene samoorganizacijske strukture na lokalni, nacionalni in mednarodni ravni nudijo alternativo korporacijskim strukturam? Ali so lahko po vašem mnenju take strukture kos obstoječim sistemom moči?*

B. B.: Ne vem točno, kaj misliš z besedo »samoorganizacijske strukture«. Če se s tem nanašáš na družbena gibanja, kot so npr. Svetovni socialni forum ali številna socialna in okoljska gibanja po svetu, je moj odgovor pritrdilen. Alternative obstoječemu sistemu je treba vedno analizirati, čeprav lahko obstaja nevarnost, da te vključijo v sistem, da si prisiljen na kooptiranje, pogajanja in na sklepanje kompromisov. Ali se lahko ta gibanja realno zoperstavijo obstoječim sistemom moči, je seveda ključno vprašanje in izziv za vse aktiviste. Vsekakor jih ni mogoče »vključiti« v obstoječi sistem. Moč ni dana, potrebno si jo je izboriti, kar trenutne strukture in diskurzivni mehanizmi oblasti močno otežujejo. Če sem nekoliko ciničen, naj dodam, da le okoljska katastrofa večjih razsežnosti lahko prinese korenite spremembe na strukturni ravni. In ta nikakor ni daleč!

Iz angleščine prevedla Tanja Passoni.

Sebastjan Leban

DEPRÉCIATING LIFE – A Conversation with Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee

Sebastjan Leban: *In your text* Live and Let Die: Colonial Sovereignties and the Death Worlds of necrocapitalism *you discuss the practices of necrocapitalism, coloniality, War on Terror, the role of PMFs in the contemporary colonialization and how the contemporary neoliberal capitalist practice through political, cultural and economic control continues to exercise colonialism. From your analyses, it could be drawn that since the establishment of the first colonies in the 15th and 16th century exploitation and dispossession have never really ended and that we are today witnessing not only the continuation of colonialism but as well new forms of its development. Can we say that the lust for power and control is not only inherent to capital (power of sovereignty over the lives and deaths – identification with God), but that from a historical point of view, colonialism is in an intrinsic relation with western Christian doctrine as well?*

Bobby Banerjee: Yes, historically colonialism’s “civilizing” mission has gone hand in hand with its “christianizing” mission. The interesting question is if contemporary forms of colonialism are inflected with missionary zeal and if so how does it operate? While the West is fond of accusing many Third World regimes of religious fundamentalism the so-called separation of religion from politics is not at all clear in both domestic and foreign policies of the US for example. The religious right has always been a potent political force in that country and shows no signs of losing its influence. “Secularism” in modern liberal democracies is a moving target whereas western discourses tend to “fix” other cultures in their representation of the “evils of religious fundamentalism.”

S. L.: *In your text you draw on Mbembe’s definition of necropolitics and Agamben’s notion of homo sacer, and you mention Baghdad as an example of the contemporary state of exception. What is your opinion about the fact that the American administration soon after World War II came to realize that only through the logic of “war without end” America could obtain and maintain the leading role in the world and thus accumulate capital which is dependent on the depreciation of life (as it was the logic used by the mercantile capitalism)?*

B. B.: Yes, that is the main point I was trying to make in my paper. The “military industry complex” of the 1950s has morphed into more complicated networks that are less transparent and less accountable. To make a crude distinction, if the Clinton administration in the US deployed economics as war then the Bush administration added the military to support its economic conquests. I don’t want to make an essentialist Marxian argument that all capital is by definition created by depreciating life – rather as I argue in the paper life is allowed to depreciate in certain contexts by creating neoliberal states of exception. And these states of exception are not confined by the rule of law just as the practices employed by the US and other western governments in the so-called war on terror.

S. L.: *In an interview entitled* What is Postcolonial Thinking, *Achille Mbembe states “that our epoch is marked by globalization, that is the generalized expansion of trade and its grip on the totality of natural resources, of human production, in a word of living in its entirety.” He also argues that “the ‘plantation,’ the ‘factory’ and the ‘colony’ were the principal laboratories in which experiments were conducted into the authoritarian destiny of the world that we see today.” Are not the contemporary states of exception, as you define them, the fourth example of that same laboratories described by Mbembe?*

B. B.: Yes, they are. Although we need to retheorize and reimagine how resistance can emerge from these new laboratories. The political economy that governed the plantation and the colony has changed in so many ways – Aihwa Ong’s excellent analysis of the neoliberal states of exception (and exceptions to neoliberalism) supports Mbembe’s argument.

S. L.: *During the riots in 2005, a state of exception was established in France. It is a matter of fact that the key to understanding these riots is the French colonialist history.*

Can we say that the riots of 2005 are just the beginning of a series of similar events that will occur in Europe in the near future?

B. B.: Resistance is as old as oppression and has taken and will continue to take many forms – violent, non-violent, passive, active. As Foucault has taught us where there is power there is resistance, Causes of civil unrest cannot be categorized into discrete boxes of social, economic, environmental cultural, or political repression. Global climate change is a case in point – when the homes and livelihoods of millions of people literally go under, their “rioting; is really a matter of survival.”

S. L: *In your new book* Corporate Social Responsibility: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly *you critically analyse the contemporary discourses of corporate social responsibility, sustainability and corporate citizenship. You draw the genealogical line of the development of corporative structures, how these were supported by the state and how they were initially supposed to be beneficiary to all society. We know that this has changed fundamentally. What can you tell about it?*

B. B.: The boundaries between market, state and civil society in today’s neoliberal economy are constantly shifting and in a state of flux. The state protects its citizens by introducing and maintaining economy into the polity. Sovereignty of state and citizens is a moving target – what Aihwa Ong calls “graduated sovereignty” depending on particular configurations of state and market power. Many theories of globalization are problematic because they construct a false opposition between globalization and the territorial State. The

globalization of capital and labor and the structure of territorial states are not oppositional but are predicated on a system of states. Globalization in such a reading is characterized not by the vanishing nation state but on the contrary, by the central implication of the territorial state in the production of a globalized world. It is the structured permanence that provides the organization of space, and the control of its networks. The State controls the flows and stocks, assuring their coordination and serves as a social architecture that is constantly engaged in the production of matrices of global social relations. The past two centuries have culminated in the rationalization of the State mode of production where the state as a unit is central to a whole array of global networks and flows and practices of managing space. In this reading, globalization is the marker for the final hegemonic triumph of the State mode of production. The nation state then is a fundamental building block of globalization, in the working of multinational corporations, in the setting-up of a global financial system, in the institution of policies that determine the mobility of labour, and in the creation of the multi-state institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, NAFTA and WTO.

S. L.: *Obviously, today we have to deal with the corporative power that has developed through the centuries from local systems of power with the cooperation of the state, into international systems of power that through the production of death have established their own strategy of exercising control over human lives? In this perspective, what are the alternatives to such systems of power?*

B. B.: Alternatives to current systems of power involve other systems of power. One would expect and hope these will be less repressive than the current system! Global governance of economic institutions that run our lives is required but because of the way these institutions are structured it is not possible to reform them. Only by destroying them and building new ones globally, locally, regionally, nationally, internationally can we hope to recover human dignity from human capital.

S. L.: *Could the social self-organizational structures on the local, national and international levels be seen as an alternative to the corporative structures? Do you think such structures could possibly challenge the existing systems of power?*

B. B.: Im not sure what you mean by “self-organizational structures”. If you mean social movements like the World Social Forum or the thousand of social and environmental movements across the world then the answer is yes: alternatives to the current system must always be examined even with the dangers of cooptation, negotiation, and compromise. Whether these movements can challenge existing systems of power is of course the key question and challenge facing all activists. They certainly cannot be “empowered” in the current system. Power cannot be given it must be taken and the current structures and discursive mechanisms of power make it quite difficult. Perhaps, and this is me being cynical, it will take a major environmental catastrophe for dramatic structural changes to occur. And we aren't too far away from that!

REARTIKULACIJA

Sebastjan Leban UVOZ/IZVOZ: LOGIKA PREZIRA V SODOBNEM NEOLIBERALNEM IMPERIALIZMU

Ena izmed najbolj prodajanih zgodb zadnjega leta, ki smo jo lahko slišali tudi ob vnovični ratifikaciji Lizbonske pogodbe v slovenskem parlamentu, je zgodba o pomembnosti in privilegiju Slovenije ob predse-dovanju Evropske uniji ter njeni vključitvi v schengensko območje. Na ta dva dogodka je pripeta dikcija o uspehu, ponosu, demokraciji, svobodi, ki naj bi jih Slovenija v zadnjih 17. letih dosegla. Dejansko stanje pa se kaže v popolnoma drugačni luči. V Sloveniji naj bi trenutno bilo okrog 200.000 ljudi, ki živijo na pragu revščine. Vrši se privatizacija šolstva, v ozadju katere se nahajajo interesi RKC, katere cilj je poleg izvrševa-nja ideološke hegemonije tudi ustvarjanje in dodatna krepitev izbrane slovenske elite. Že tako oslablje-nemu nižjemu sloju se s tem jemlje vsaka možnost razvoja in odreka ena izmed osnovnih pravic, medtem ko se privilegiranemu višjemu sloju s tem ponovno vrača ekskluzivna pravica do izobraževanja in omogoča nadaljnja krepitev že tako močnih monopolnih struktur. Enakim procesom smo priča na drugih področjih, kjer se prek javnih razpisov in javnih naročil razporejajo državna sredstva točno določenim skupinam in subjektom, preko katerih se kasneje izvaja nadzor na posameznem področju. Tak način nadzora je jasno zaznaven tudi v ozadju na novo sprejetega NPK 2008–11, ki drastično zaostruje in otežuje že tako preker-ne razmere na področju kulture. Kot pravi Marina Gržinić, NPK 2008–11 je »strategija promocije nekaterih kulturnih praks in določenih zvrsti umetnosti ali prohibicije nekaterih kulturnih praks in določenih zvrsti umetnosti. Je gola politika, ki pa se na zunaj predstavlja kot seznam kulturnih *vrednot*« (Gržinić, 2008).

Druga zмотa iz serije »zgodb o uspehu« Slovenije je prepričanje slovenske vlade, da se Slovenija lahko povzpne v sam vrh Evropske unije in da se lahko postavi ob bok članicam, ki tvorijo jedro moči EU in so znane kot velike kolonialne sile v evropski zgodovini. Take primerjave seveda ne upoštevajo evropske kolonialne zgodovine in ne vključujejo analiz, ki pričajo o tem, da se kolonializem *velikih* držav stare in nove Evrope dejansko sploh ni prekinil, ampak da se prek različnih kanalov kontinuirano nadaljuje. Bobby Banerjee v svojem tekstu *Live and Let Die: Colonial Sovereignties and the Death World of Necrocapitalism* (Živi in pusti umreti: kolonialne suverenitete in mrtvi svetovi nekrokapitalizma) trdi, da gre pri kontinuiteti evropskega kolonializma za opuščanje tradicionalnih mehanizmov širjenja meja in nadzora nad ozemlji, ohranja pa se politični, ekonomski in kulturni nadzor nad njimi (Banerjee, 2006). Procese akumulacije ka-pitala, ustvarjanja monopolnih struktur in eksploatacije, značilne za nizozemsko Vzhodnoindijsko družbo v 18. stoletju in trgovino z mečem, preko katere se je ustvarjala in vzdrževala kolonialistična hegemonija, so danes prevzele velike svetovne multikorporacije in sistemi moči, ki se nahajajo v ozadju ekspanzije ameriškega in evropskega Imperija. Ta s privatiziranimi vojaškimi silami (npr. v Iraku) izvaja (neo)koloniali-stično hegemonijo tako, *da življenje podreja moči smrti*, kar Bobby Banerjee poimenuje kot logiko delova-nja nekrokapitalizma (Banerjee, 2006). Skratka, trgovina z mečem se danes izvaja skozi procese osvajanja, rušenja in obnavljanja zasedenih območij, uvajanja izrednih stanj in vzdrževanja gospodarske, kulturne in družbene odvisnosti. Dejstvo je, da se tudi v ozadju procesa širitve EU nahaja imperialistična logika osvajanja novih teritorijev, čeprav s pomembno razliko – osvajanje novih teritorijev temelji na pridobitvi splošnega družbenega konsenza s strani bodoče pridružitvene članice. Osvajanje se izvršuje tudi z me-hanizmi propagande; vsaka izmed novih članic prejme ob vstopu v EU paket navodil o načinu izvajanja svobode in demokracije. Zato ne preseneča, da se za pridobitev neoliberalnega pojmovanja svobode in demokracije izvajajo procesi potvarjanja zgodovinskih dejstev; to poteka skozi različne zgodbe o težkih dneh prečkanja meje in o diktaturi prejšnjega režima, ki nam je zapovedoval, kaj naj počnemo, koga naj volimo, kako naj razmišljamo. Skratka, sedanja vladna garnitura nam zagotavlja, da nam za razliko od preteklosti v sedanji naši deželi demokracije in svobode ZDA in EU ne zapovedujeta, kaj, kje, kdaj in zakaj naj nekaj naredimo.

Zgodba je še dodatno podprta z velikimi patriotskimi besedami o občutku dolžnosti, hvaležnosti in spoštovanju, ki naj bi ga gojili in izkazovali do EU ter ZDA, saj sta nam prav ti omogočili samostojnost, prinesli demokracijo in pokazali pravi pomen besede *svoboda*. Uspešna zgodba o civiliziranju bivše komunistične dežele, ki naj bi temeljila na podmeni nesvobode, kjer naj bi bivši komunistični režim izvajal ideološko nasilje in kratil človekove pravice, je seveda sprevračanje dejstev v neoliberalno propagando o svobodi in demokraciji, ki jo s seboj prinaša proces širjenja Unije. Zato se je treba vprašati, kakšna je pravzaprav real-na pozicija Slovenije v tej veliki družini navidez enakopravnih držav in kako resno lahko gledamo na gro-žnje slovenske vlade ob nedavnem konfliktu s Hrvaško v zvezi s hrvaško deklaracijo ekološke in ribolovne cone, kjer je slovenska zunanja diplomacija reševala spor s Hrvaško z dikcijo tipa »če ERC ne prekličete, vas v Evropo ne bomo spustili«. Hrvaška je marca 2008 na zahtevo EU deklaracijo preklicala, saj je EU izjavila, da se bo proces vključevanja Hrvaške v Evropsko unijo nadaljeval samo, če bo ta ravnala v skladu z EU. Vprašanje, ki se dodatno zastavlja, je, kakšna je bila pri tem vloga Slovenije? Simbolna pozicija gospodar-ja, v katero se je Slovenija v tem primeru postavila, je zgolj fiktivne narave, saj je ne le realno, pač pa tudi simbolno mesto odločanja o procesih vstopa in širjenja EU privilegij *velikih* evropskih gospodarjev. Iz tega sledi, da je vloga Slovenije pri odločanju o novi Evropi zanemarljiva, da sta sistem moči, ki stoji v ozadju ekspanzije novega evropskega Imperija, in dikcija o objubljeni deželi enakopravnosti, bratstva in eno-tnosti ter o sobivanju evropskih narodov v veliki Evropski federaciji, ki jo prav ta sistem moči uporablja, le promocijski material, s katerim sodobni imperializem jedra EU (starih članic) izpeljuje svojo ekspanzijo.

Kakšno je torej realno stanje procesov oblikovanja Imperija EU in kaj se dogaja na skrajnih zunanjih mejah tega na novo formirajočega se Imperija? V svojem tekstu *Alien in Transition as a Reflection of Capitalist Totalitarianism* (Tujec v tranziciji kot odraz kapitalističnega totalitarizma) Šefik Šeki Tatlić analizira vlogo tujca, aliena v prvem kapitalističem svetu. Kot navaja Tatlić, »se mora tujec, alien, ki je izključeno golo življenje, rekodirati in spreobrniti ne le tako, da bo suverenost države na njem utrjevala svoj položaj, ampak da bo

tudi kapitalistična suverenost ponovno potrdila svojo nepotešljivo lakomnost po osvajanju novih oze-melj« (Tatlić, 2008: 8). Tako strukturirano nasilje nad tujcem izhaja iz logike prezira, ki ga prvi kapitalistični svet kontinuirano vzdržuje. Logika prezira temelji na istih stereotipnih vzorcih kot ksenofobija, fašizem, rasizem, skratka, na istih vzorcih kot vse oblike nestrpnosti do tistih, ki so drugačni, ki so tujci. Razumeva-nje logike prezira je ključ za razumevanje procesov, na katerih temelji ideja o EU in strategija njene širitve. Toliko bolj nerazumljivo je zato dejstvo, zakaj se prezir do tujca/tujega/drugačnega povečuje, ko pa bi moralo biti ravno obratno, saj sam proces širitve predvideva vključitev novih tujih članic v veliko evropsko družino. Edina jasna razlaga za to je, da je v ozadju ekspanzije novega velikega Imperija, klerofašistična ideologija, ki belo raso in kulturo povzdiguje nad ostalimi, ji daje privilegirano pozicijo, vlogo gospodarja, ki lahko odloča o življenju in smrti. Seveda je celotna zgodba ekspanzije klerofašističnega Imperija le nadaljevanje tega, kar Mignolo definira kot štiri hkratne momente, in sicer krščanstvo, civilizacijska misija, razvoj in globalni trg, ki smo jim priča v zadnjih petstotih letih sodobnega svetovnega sistema (Mignolo, 2000: 279).

Delovanje logike prezira lahko zasledimo tudi v filmu *Import-Export* režiserja Ulricha Seidla. Film pripo-veduje dve zgodbi, ki potekata paralelno; zgodbo o avstrijskem varnostnem uslužbencu Paulu, ki se v iskanju zaposlitve iz Avstrije *preseli* na vzhod, in zgodbo o ukrajinski medicinski sestri Olgi, ki iz Ukrajine *imigrira* v Avstrijo. Olga je s strani zglednih in družbeno sprejemljivih prebivalcev EU deležna prezira, ker je svetlolasa vzhodnjakinja, na katero se nemudoma pripne podoba tujke, in ko gre za Ukrajinko, še pro-stitutke. Stigmatizacija in razčlovečenje, ki iz tega sledita, sta neizogibni posledici prav hegemoničnega odnosa prvega kapitalističnega sveta v odnosu do tujca, imigranta ali pribežnika. Tujki se na ta način omogoči bivanje v EU, ampak le kot drugorazredni državljanki, tisti, ki je prišla z vzhoda, tisti, za katero po evropskih družbenih normativih veljajo drugačna pravila svobode in demokracije. Še posebej postane Olgina zgodba aktualna glede na nedavno širitev schengenske meje, ki naj bi prinesla dokončno pravo demokracijo in svobodo gibanja znotraj Evrope tudi slovenskim državljanom. Tista prava meja, ki še ve-dno ostaja in ki jo še dolgo ne bodo noben zakon, predlog ali pogodba izbrisali, je tista meja, ki jo prvi kapitalistični svet kontinuirano vzdržuje in izvaja in na kateri sloni logika prezira. To je simbolna meja med prvorazrednimi in drugorazrednimi državljani EU. Zaradi te meje bosta vzhodnjak/inja vedno percipirana kot nekaj zloveščega, slabo namernega in manjvrednega. Prav ta simbolna meja omogoča realno udeja-njanje logike prezira tudi v odnosu do pribežnika, ki v EU skuša vstopiti ilegalno. Vstop zanj je prepove-dan, razen če ta ne prihaja iz nekih elitnih krogov ali pa ga zaradi različnih (proizvodnih ali ekonomskih) razlogov potrebuje prvi kapitalistični svet.

Varovanje svobode in demokracije ima seveda svojo ceno, ki pa je ne plačujejo prvorazredni državljani EU, ampak vsi tisti, ki vanjo skušajo vstopiti ilegalno. Če za primer vzamemo leta 2005 ustanovljeno Agencijo za upravljanje in operativno sodelovanje na zunanjih mejah držav članic EU – *Frontex*, lahko ugotovimo, da se za zgodbo o uspehu in življenju nahaja popolnoma diametralno nasprotna realnost o smrti, pogubi in železnih ograjah, s katerimi Evropska unija skrbi, da na svojih skrajno zunanjih mejah ne bo prišlo do nedovoljenih vstopov v njeno območje. Od kar je bila ustanovljena agencija *Frontex*, naj bi se število uto-pljenih in umrlih pribežnikov drastično povečalo, saj so ti prisiljeni prepotovati veliko večje razdalje, da se izognejo režimom nadzora, ki jih *Frontex* izvaja. *Frontex* se propagira kot organ, ki zagotavlja svobodo, varnost in pravico (*libertas, securitas, justitia*), v resnici pa ni nič drugega kot institucionalizirana preven-tivna agencija za nadzor, ki ima isto funkcijo kot pes čuvaj, le da se *Frontex* ne nahaja znotraj ograje (razen njenega simbolnega štaba), kjer varuje svojo posest, ampak funkcijo nadzora in varovanja opravlja izven/na drugi strani ograje. Nič drugačne niso razmere na meji med Španijo in Marokom (Ceuta in Melilla), kjer je EU postavila železno ograjo, da bi se zavarovala pred ilegalnim prestopom meje. Kakor opisuje Corinna Milborn, je v Ceuti in Melilli šest metrov visoka železna ograja iz jeklene bodoče žice, vsakih 40 metrov je postavljen opazovalni stolp, nameščeni so usmerjeni mikrofoni, reflektorji, sistemi za sprožanje solzilca. Območje nadzoruje več kot 1200 čuvajev, katerih naloga je preprečiti pribežnikom vstop v območje EU. Problematika takšnega izvajanja nadzora in varovanja je precej bolj kompleksna, če jo gledamo s stališča, da je na zunanji meji EU vzpostavljeno izredno stanje, ki bi ga lahko primerjali z izrednim stanjem v Bagdadu, o katerem piše Bobby Banerjee. Gre namreč za t. i. *Zeleno območje*, kjer vlada izredno stanje znotraj izrednega stanja. V tem delu *ameriškega Bagdada* življenje poteka tako, kot da se vojna v Iraku nikoli ne bi zgodila. Ljudje, ki prebivajo v zeleni coni in imajo dovoljenje za gibanje znotraj nje, uživajo v vseh udob-nostih, ki jih ponuja sodobni neoliberalni kapitalistični sistem. Iz tega sledi, da je pravljica o svobodi in demokraciji rezervirana le za prvorazredne državljane prvega kapitalističnega sveta in da je v svetu neoli-beralnega nekrokapitalizma svoboda privilegij, rezerviran za tiste, ki nekrokapitalizem tudi izvajajo.

Tako smo prišli do zanimive situacije, kjer države in prebivalci znotraj območja EU uživajo v pravljici o svo-bodi in demokraciji. Takoj izven tega območja pa je zgodba popolnoma drugačna. Vsakemu ni dovoljeno vstopiti v ta *raj svobode in demokracije*, ampak je celo kot v primeru agencije *Frontex* bolje, da se kakšen izmed pribežnikov utopi. Edino, kar realno šteje, je, da se življenje znotraj ograje ohranja ter da se vzdržu-jeta mit in sen o svobodi in demokraciji, ki ju neoliberalni kapitalistični režim nenehno *uvaža in izvaža*.

Viri: Marina Gržinić, »Procesi getoizacije«, iz teksta M. Gržinić, S. Kleindienst, S. Leban, *Sodobna umetnost in kultura na Slovenskem: procesi geotizacije, pavperizacije in apolitičnosti*, objavljeno na www.reartikulacija.org, 2008. Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee, »Live and Let Die: Colonial Sovereignties and the Death World of Necrocapitalism«, v: *Borderlands* ejou-rnal 2006, letn. 5, št.1, 2006. Šefik Šeki Tatlić, »Alien in Transition as a Reflection of Capitalist Totalitarianism«, v: *Reartikulacija*, št.3, Ljubljana 2008. Walter D. Mignolo, »Globalization, Mundialization: Civilizing Processes and the Relocation of Languages and Knowledges«, v: *Local Histories/Global Designs Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges and Border Thinking*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 2000. http://www.goethe.de/ges/pok/prj/mig/mgr/en2358674.htm http://no-racism.net/article/2207/http://no-racism.net/article/2401/ http://www.frontex.europa.eu/structure/training/

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Sebastjan Leban IMPORT/EXPORT: THE LOGIC OF CONTEMPT IN CONTEMPORARY NEOLIBERAL IMPERIALISM

One of the most recurrent selling stories of the year in Slovenia which was also spread by the Slovenian Parlia-ment on the eve of the re-ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is the story that Slovenia holding the presidency of the EU and being part of the Schengen area proves the importance and privileged position of Slovenia in the EU. The story tells how success, pride, democracy and freedom have been achieved by Slovenia in the last 17 years. In fact, this is not at all the case. In Slovenia, there are allegedly 200,000 people living on the poverty line. We are facing privatization of schools driven by the interests of the Roman Catholic Church, which aims not only to implement ideological hegemony but also to create and further reinforce the chosen Slovenian elite. The already weakened lower class is thus deprived of the possibility of development and of one of the most essential rights, while the privileged higher class is again given the exclusive right to education, with which it will be able to further empower the already strong monopolist structures. The same processes can be identi-fied in other areas where through open calls and public procurements state funds are allocated to specific groups and subjects through which control of individual areas is then carried out. Such control is clearly be-ing exercised in the context of the recently accepted draft resolution on the National Programme for Culture 2008-2011 (NPK 2008-2011) which drastically exacerbates and aggravates the already precarious situation in the cultural field. As argued by Marina Gržinić, the NPK 2008-2011 is a “strategy of promoting some cultural and artistic practices on the one hand and a strategy of prohibiting some cultural and artistic practices on the other. It is bare politics that outwardly presents itself as cultural *values*” (Gržinić, 2008).

The second mistake from the series of Slovenian “stories of success” is the belief held by the Slovenian govern-ment that Slovenia can actually rise to the top of the EU and become one of the states forming the core of EU power, i.e. the family of great colonizers seen as such within the context of European history. What is omitted from such comparisons is the fact that to enter European colonial history, to become one of the old colonial powers that also formed the old EU core is impossible; analyses testify that the colonialism of *old* states of the old Europe actually never ended, rather it is being continued through different channels. In his text “Live and let die: colonial sovereignties and the death worlds of necrocapitalism,” Bobby Banerjee argues that the conti-nuities of European colonialism involve giving up traditional mechanisms of expanding frontiers and territo-rial control and maintaining elements of political, economic and cultural control (Banerjee, 2006). The process of accumulation of capital, creation of monopolist structures and exploitation, typical of the 18th century Dutch East India Company and the sword of commerce by way of which colonialist hegemony was created

and maintained, are today taken over by global multikorporations and power systems behind the expansion of the American and European Empire. Through privatized military forces (e.g. in Iraq) the Empire implements (neo)colonialist hegemony by *subjugating life to the power of death*, which is defined by Bobby Banerjee as the logic of necrocapitalism (Banerjee, 2006). In short, the sword of commerce is today being implemented through processes of conquering, demolition and restoration of occupied territories, establishment of states of exception and maintaining of economic, cultural and social dependence. It is a fact that behind the EU process too there is the imperialistic logic of conquering new territories although with a significant difference – the conquering of new territories is based on the acquisition of the general social consensus by the EU applicant states. Conquering is also carried out through mechanisms of propaganda; upon joining the EU, each new member state is given a packet of instructions on how to implement freedom and democracy. It is therefore no surprise that in order to obtain the neoliberal notion of freedom and democracy, processes of misrepresentation of historic facts are being carried out; these processes are taking place through different stories about the days when crossing borders was difficult and the former dictatorial regime told us what to do, who to vote and how to think. In short, the current government is trying to persuade us that in contrast to the past, our land of democracy and freedom today is not being told what, where and why we shall or shall not act in this or that way by the USA and the EU.

The story is being further supported by big words about the feeling of responsibility, gratitude and respect that we should cultivate and pay to the EU and the USA, since they gave us the opportunity to gain independence, brought us democracy and showed the true meaning of the word *freedom*. The story of the successful civilization of the former communist state presumed to rest on the hypothesis of nonfreedom, where the communist regime was accused of ideological violence and violation of human rights, is merely using facts for neoliberal propaganda about freedom and democracy brought about by the process of EU expansion. It is therefore necessary to ask what Slovenia's current position in this large family of apparently equal states is, and how influential the Slovenian government's threats in the recent conflict with Croatia regarding Croatia's declaration of the ecological and fishing zone (ERC) really were if we consider that Slovenian foreign diplomacy was involved in the settlement of dispute with Croatia by stating that "if ERC is not suspended, we [Slovenia] will not support your [Croatia's] integration into the EU."The declaration was suspended by Croatia in March 2008 following EU demands that it does so; the EU declared that only by complying with its demands can Croatia continue with the process of joining the EU. Another question that arises is what was Slovenia's role in this process? The symbolic role of the sovereign assumed by Slovenia in this case is merely fictitious since not only the real but also the symbolic power to decide on accession processes and enlargement of the EU is a privilege reserved to the big EU rulers. Therefore, Slovenia has to constantly modify its rhetoric and synchronize itself with the system of power behind the expansion of the new European Empire. The promised land of equal rights, brotherhood and unity as well as the co-existence of European nations in a large European Federation, are to be seen just as promotional material with which the contemporary imperialism of the EU core (old member states) is exercising its expansion.

So what is the actual state of the processes creating an EU Empire and what is going on at the external borders of the newly forming Empire? In his text "Alien in Transition as a Reflection of Capitalist Totalitarianism," Šefik Šeki Tatlić analyses the role of an immigrant, an alien in the First Capitalist World. According to Tatlić, "an alien as a bare life that has not been included, must be recoded, converted into a differential that should serve as a position through which, not only the sovereignty of a state will reaffirm itself, but through which the sovereignty of capital will reconfirm itself as an incessantly hungry matrix in search of new boundaries to be conquered" (Tatlić, 2008: 8). Thus the violence exercised over the immigrant stems from the logic of contempt being continuously maintained by the First Capitalist World. The logic of contempt rests on the same stereotypes as xenophobia, fascism, racism. In short, it rests upon the same matrix as all the other forms of intolerance towards those who are different and are therefore aliens. Grasping the logic of contempt is the key to grasping the processes on which the idea of the EU and the strategy of its enlargement is based. All the more incomprehensible is the question why contempt towards the stranger/alien/Other is rising as the very opposite should be the case, since the process of enlargement presupposes the inclusion of new member states in the large European family. The only clear explanation for this is that behind the expansion of the new large Empire lies a clerofascist ideology, which praises the white race and culture over the others, giving it a privileged position and the role of a sovereign who can decide about life and death. Of course the whole story of the expansion of the clerofascist Empire is just the continuation of what is defined by Mignolo as the four co-existing moments; namely, Christianity, civilisation mission, development and global market we have been witnessing for the last 500 years of the modern world system (Mignolo, 2000: 279).

The function of the logic of contempt can also be traced in the film *Import-Export* by director Ulrich Seidl. The film tells two parallel stories; the story of an Austrian security officer Paul who, in search of a new job, *moves* from Austria to the East, and the story of the Ukrainian nurse Olga who *immigrates* to Austria. Olga is disdained by the model and socially acceptable EU citizens because she is a blonde Easterner to which the image of an alien is immediately attached, and in the case of a Ukrainian, even the image of a prostitute. The stigmatisation and dehumanisation that follow are an unavoidable consequence of the hegemonic relation of the First Capitalist World with respect to the alien, the immigrant and the refugee. The foreigner is therefore given the opportunity to live in the EU, but only as a second-class citizen, the one who came from the east and for whom, according to European social norms, different rules of freedom and democracy apply. The story about Olga is all the more topical with respect to the recent enlargement of the Schengen border which is supposed to bring the definitive real democracy and freedom of movement within Europe also to Slovenians. Nevertheless, the real border that is still there and which no law, draft or treaty will ever manage to abrogate, is the border that is being continuously maintained and implemented by the First Capitalist World and upon which rests the logic of contempt. This is the symbolic border between first- and second-class EU citizens. Due to this border, the Easterner will always be perceived as something sinister, evil-minded and inferior. This symbolic border enables the materialization of the logic of contempt also in relation to the refugee trying to enter the EU illegally. If they are not part of an elite or are needed because of various (production or economic) reasons by the First Capitalist World, these refugees are denied entry to the EU.

The protection of freedom and democracy bears a price, which is, however, not being paid by first-class EU citizens but by all those who try to enter the EU illegally. If we take the example of the EU External Borders Agency – *Frontex*, which was founded in 2005, we can conclude that behind the story of success and life there is a diametrically opposed reality about death, ruin and iron fences through which the European Union prevents the illicit crossing of borders. Ever since *Frontex* was established, the number of people that drowned and died on the way is reported to have increased drastically as they are forced to travel longer distances in order to avoid the control executed by *Frontex*. *Frontex* presents itself as an organ assuring freedom, security and rights (*libertas, securitas, iustitia*), whereas in fact it is nothing but an institutionalized preventive control agency with the same function as a watchdog except that *Frontex* is not located inside the fence (save its symbolic headquarter) from where it protects its property, but it carries out control and security from outside – on the other side of the fence. The situation is no different on the Spain-Morocco border (Ceuta and Melilla) where the EU has erected an iron fence intended to secure the border against illegal crossing. As described by Corinna Milborn, in Ceuta and Melilla there is a six-metre high iron fence made of steel and barbed wire, every 40 metres there is a watchtower, directional microphones, spotlights, a teargas system. The area is protected by more than 1,200 border guards whose role it is to prevent refugees from entering the EU. The problems of such border control and protection are far more complex if we consider that on the outer border of the EU we are witnesses to the state of exception which can be compared to the state of exception in Baghdad, as described by Bobby Banerjee. Namely, the so called *Green zone* is a state of exception within a state of exception. In this area of *American Baghdad*, life goes on as if war in Iraq never really happened. People living there are free to move inside the zone, they enjoy all the comforts offered by the contemporary neoliberal capitalist system. As a result, the fairy tale about freedom and democracy is reserved only for the first-class citizens of the First Capitalist World, and in the world of neoliberal necrocapitalism, freedom is a privilege reserved for those who execute necrocapitalism.

We are thus facing an interesting situation where states and their inhabitants within the EU enjoy the fairy tale about freedom and democracy, while just outside this area the complete opposite is the case. Not everyone is permitted to enter this *heaven of freedom and democracy*, rather, it is better to let some of the refugees drown, as is the case with Frontex. What really counts is to preserve life within the fence, and maintain the myth and dream of freedom and democracy which are being constantly *imported* and *exported* by the neoliberal capitalist regime.

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LEZBIČNI BAR/LESBIAN BAR

Nataša Velikonja EVROPA JE DOLGOČASNA

by Tanja Passoni

Evropa je dolgočasna. Dolgočasna je v svoji samozadostnosti, med svojimi zaprtimi mejami, je ječa virtualnega izobilja in kreditnega standarda, po kateri se vlačimo migranti brez azilov, lezbijke brez ljubimk, intelektualci brez medijev, brezdomci brez tovarišev. Dolgočasna je v svojem belem prepričanju, da je boljša od drugih, da je zibelka izobraženosti, kulturnosti in literarnosti. Dolgočasna je v svoji večni ekstazi, s temi svojimi debelimi poljubi, zdrobljenem steklu na naših ustnicah. Dolgočasna je s to svojo večno integracijo, ki jo požirate kot mlado žrtevno telo, medtem ko se skozi njene oči vrtijo slike sovraštva, pomorov in genocidov. Dolgočasna je v tej svoji ritualni pozabi, v tej svoji ritualni želji, ki ne preneha nikdar.

by Tanja Passoni

Evropa nekoč ni bila dolgočasna, zdaj pa je dolgočasna. Dolgočasni so evropski trgi in evropske vasi. Evropski trgi in vasi so pravzaprav vedno bili dolgočasni, vsaj od trenutka, ko so se znebili Rabelaisa in Hoffmana, ampak še posebej so dolgočasni zdaj, ko so vsi po vrsti postali male kopije luksemburškega Schengena, tega vznesenega epicentra evropske provincialnosti. Ne moreš pobegniti, kajti dolgočasna so tudi evropska mesta, kvazizgodovinske realitete, razstave restavriranih baročnih fasad in renesančnih angelčkov, mesta, polna stojnic z glinenimi svinjami, amuleti evropskega upanja in sreče, na katerih so vtisnjeni nacionalni grbi. Evropska mesta so ultimativna popotniška pustolovščina, turisti se po njih sprehajajo v planinskih gozdarjih in gorniških nahrbtnikih, nenehno so v pogonu, žvečijo tiste trde pečene mandlje in se venomer ozirajo nekam navzgor po evropskih zidovih. Evropa se je odrekla svoji tradiciji, svojim arkadam, svojim kavarnam, odrekla se je Simone de Beauvoir in Jeanu-Paulu Sartru. Odrekla se je svojim ulicam in jih spremenila v korporativne promenade s korporativnimi izložbami in korporativnimi bistroji. V teh na vso moč razsvetljenih mlečnih bistrojih z neudobnimi kovinsko-platnenimi sedali lahko sediš zgolj vzravnano, kot bi bil na hitrem, petminutnem *briefingu* in je tvoja vloga zgolj sprejemanje navodil. Dolgočasna je vsa ta evropska prostorska, mentalna in telesna higiena, ki je iz ljudi izgnala užitek, užitek postanka, užitek pogovora, užitek ležernosti. Evropa je ravnokar prišla iz 20. stoletja in vse, kar je uspela prinesiti iz njega, so tehnike malih bogov: pregledovanje, zavračanje, izključevanje, cenzura, represija, nadzor, nasilje. Evropsko umetnost kupuje kapital, ki hoče svoj mir, zato Evropa 21. stoletja ne potrebuje dadaizma, relativnosti, nesinhronosti, atonalnosti. Da bi v Evropi 21. stoletja našel umetnost, ki je zanimiva, moraš prebroditi vse te goste plasti dolgočasnega korporativnega visokonakladnega šunda ali pa jo ustvariti sam – ampak potem je nikar ne prodaj kapitalu, kajti v tem primeru boš do konca življenja obtičal v dolgočasju, zašel boš v kulturniške ustanove, kupil si boš bel usnjen kavč in v svoji detoksikčni kletki, ki ji praviš dom, boš s plazemskega ekrana buljil v korporativne pevke, ki posnemajo glas Billie Holiday, in krog bo sklenjen, tvoj in naš. Takšen, kot boš postal, bi Billie Holiday utopili v žlici vode. In Edith Piaf tudi, evropski medkulturni dialog gor ali dol. Ni dolgočasna le evropska umetnost, dolgočasna je tudi evropska znanost, vse bolj je objektivistična in etnografska, iz 21. stoletja je strumno skočila mimo Freudovega 20. in naravnost v 19., producira zbornike o izbrisanih in migrantih, kjer niti en avtor ni izbrisan ali migrant, nasprotno, prav vsi avtorji so dobro umešeni in prav vsi imajo ustrezna dokazila. Producira zbornike o seksualnih navadah homoseksualcev, ki ga urejajo strejti, pa tudi kakšen homoseksualec ustreznih seksualnih navad, da ne bi *slučajno* prišlo do odstopanj. Vsa evropska znanost je katastrofalno dolgočasna, kajti onkraj ponderiranih predvidevanj, to je, onkraj univerze ne priznava ničesar. Edina kritika, ki jo evropska znanost zmore, so evropske resolucije, ki jih je spisal bruseljski evrobiro, in edina alternativna, ki jo premore, so takisto evropske resolucije. Kaj je, fantje in dekleta, imate kakšno idejo? Dolgočasna sta tisti Blair in tista njegova *tretja pot*, ki sta nategnila milijone ljudi z obetom boljšega življenja, jim nato najprej zjebala šolanje in zdravje in službe, jih nato poslala še v vojno in se na koncu za uspeh te milenijske prevare oddolžila najbolj dolgočasni od vseh ustanov evropske zgodovine, katoliški cerkvi. »*Nothing has changed, has it?*« reče desetletje po Hitlerju in njegovih kameradih Lucia Atherton, preživela Judinja, v filmu *The Night Porter* Liliane Cavani, bolj resničnem od vseh evropskih Resnic. Dolgočasno je ljudstvo, ki se je odreklo revolucionarnemu komunizmu in ga zamenjalo za revolucionarni kapitalizem, to večno obubožano, večno ponižano ljudstvo in njegovi ponovno odobreni, rastoči nacistični volilni odstotki. Dolgočasna je evropska konsenzualnost, ki vodi do njih, na eni strani je svoboda, na drugi nasilje, med njimi pa pogajanja, in tako dobimo vseevropsko družbo minimalne svobode in maksimalnega nasilja. Evropejci pa še kar naprej Evropejci.

by Tanja Passoni

Evropa ima središčno perspektivo, vse združi, vse uravnoteži, vse enotno sprejme v krog izpod svojih dvanajstih zlatih zvezd Kraljice Device. Znotraj Evrope radikalno ni več meja, to veste vsi, kajti to je edina novica zadnjih let, ni več ne obrobij ne robov ne praznin, vsi ljudje so državljani, ki se zavedajo pravic in dolžnosti in zdaj lahko terjajo, kar hočejo. Hočejo petnajstletni kredit, še bolje petindvajsetletni. Nočejo smrdljivega tobaka, ker kar naenkrat ne morejo več dihati. Hočejo voliti, recimo Sarkozyja. Nočejo drhali. Del dobre stare drhali je torej iz strahu poniknil, homoseksualci so postali heteroseksualci, ampak heteroseksualci niso postali homoseksualci, kar je dolgočasno. Dolgočasne so lezbijke, ki jim v evropski nekadilski psihozi gredo po glavi le še otroci. Končno je evropski seksualni politiki uspelo, da jim vstopi v trebuhe, kar prej ni uspelo ne evropskim grmadam ne evropskim rožnatim ne evropskim črnim trikotnikom. Družabnega življenja gejev in lezbijk v Evropi ni več. Tisti gejevski kvarti z gejevskimi restavracijami, kjer gejevske kravate bašejo vase tiste razkuzene fluorescentno zelene solatne liste in se s svojimi antidrhalličnimi državljskimi telesi oddolžujejo Sarkozyju in podobnim za analni seks, so dolgočasni. Vse, kar se tiče homoseksualnosti, je dandanes pravzaprav dolgočasno. Tej popolni Evropi predseduje v prvi polovici leta 2008 Slovenija, kar je drobna konceptualna napaka, kajti v Sloveniji ni gejevskih kvartov, kjer bi ti lahko bilo dolgčas, nasprotno, v Sloveniji ni niti enega samega lezbičnega bara, kar venomer ponavljam, pa me nihče ne sliši. Resda pred ljubljanskim klubom *K4*, kjer se geji in lezbijke enkrat tedensko poljubljajo in plešejo, zdaj po novem prežijo nanje Evropejci in jih pretepajo, kar pa je evropsko. Mimogrede, *krščanstvo* bi se absolutno in nujno moralo znajti v evropski ustavi – tako, kot se je *prost pretok kapitala* – kajti ta krovna moralna dediščina v *tej listini*, v *tej uri evropske Resnice* prav zares ne sme izostati, sicer se spet najdemo v diabloličnem 20. stoletju, polnem potlačitev in zanikanj. Prav to bi lahko bil specifično slovenski prispevek k evropski celovitosti.

Vedno je bilo tako. Ampak jaz živim zdaj in tej mašineriji se upiram, kot vem in znam. Kolektivnega uporniškega podzemlja, ki bi trajalo dlje od noči, ni. Prinašalci novega prej ali slej zdrsijo v stara območja družbenega prestiža. Dovolj sem stara, vidim jih, zdržijo nekaj let, potem mrknejo in ko jih spet zagledam, stojijo pred kamerami, stojijo na pódijih, sedijo na tistih neudobnih kovinsko-platnenih sedalih na hitrem *briefingu*, vse bolj metuzalemske amfibije, in še sami več ne vedo, komu sploh govorijo. Mislim, da bom še naprej iskala po predmestjih nelegalne kadilske luknje, se v njih drenjala in lezbarila, kadila in pila ob biljardnih mizah in rock'n'rollu ter s svojimi prijatelji razpravljala o njihovem in mojem vsakdanu, kolikor časa bo potrebno. Iz česa takega vselej kaj nastane.

by Tanja Passoni

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23

Nataša Velikonja
EUROPE IS BORING

Europe is boring. Boring for its self-sufficiency, among its own boundaries; Europe is a jail of virtual affluence and credit standard in which migrants without asylum, lesbians without lovers, intellectuals without mass media, and the homeless without comrades are wandering around. Europe is boring for its "white" conviction that it is better than the others, as it is supposedly the cradle of education, culture and literature. It is boring in its perpetual ecstasy with its fat kisses and broken glass on our lips. It is boring with its perpetual integration, which is being swallowed as a sacrificed young body, while images of hatred, slaughter and genocide are whirling in its eyes. Europe is boring because of its ritualized oblivion and ritualized machines of desire that never stop their craving.

However, Europe was not boring in the past, it is boring today. European squares and villages are boring. Actually, they have always been boring, at least from the moment they got rid of Rabelais and Hoffman, but they are even more boring now as one by one they are transformed into small duplicates of Luxemburg's Schengen, of this ravished epicenter of European provinciality. Since European cities are boring too, there is no way out of these quasi-historical entities, exhibitions of renovated baroque facades and renaissance little angels, cities full of stands with china pigs and amulets of European hope and happiness with national state emblems imprinted on it. European cities are the ultimate traveler's adventure with tourists in mountain shoes and ruck-sacks strolling around without taking even one break, chewing hard roasted almonds and always looking up at the European walls. Europe has renounced its tradition, its arcades, coffeehouses; it has renounced Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre. It has renounced its streets and turned them into corporative promenades with corporative shop-windows and corporative small restaurants. Here in these fully lighted milky restaurants equipped with uncomfortable seats made of metal and linen on which one can only sit in an upright position; seated as if you were in a short briefing session and your role was only to receive orders. European space, with its mental and bodily hygiene is boring; it deprives people of pleasure, the pleasure of rest, conversation and ease. Europe has just stepped out of the 20th century, and all that it has managed to bring with it are the techniques of little gods: checking, rejection, exclusion, censorship, repression, control, violence. European art is being bought by capital desiring to remain undisturbed; this is why 21st century Europe does not need Dadaism, the theory of relativity, disharmony and atonality. To find interesting art in 21st century Europe, one must wade through all these thick layers of boring corporative high print run pulp fiction or else create it themselves – but then you should never sell it off to capital, since then you will become stuck in monotony forever, you will start to visit cultural institutions, buy a white leather sofa, and in your detoxicated cage that you name home you will stare at a plasma screen that shows corporative singers who imitate Billie Holiday's voice; the circle (yours and ours) would in such a way be completed. In this changing process, you will become the kind of person who could drown Billie Holiday in a teaspoon of water. And same goes for Edith Piaf, regardless of whether we are dwelling in the European intercultural dialogue. Not only European art is boring, but also European science, which is becoming more and more objective and ethnographic. European science has jumped resolutely from the 21st century directly into the 19th century (bypassing Freud's 20th century); it produces a collection of scientific papers on the erased and migrants, with not a single author being from one or the other; on the contrary all the authors are well positioned, with diplomas in their pockets. European science produces miscellany about the sexual habits of homosexuals, edited by straights as well as homosexuals from time to time, but only those that know what the accepted sexual habits are, in order to prevent eventual deviations. All European science is terribly boring, since it does not acknowledge anything that goes beyond pondered expectations, i. e. beyond the university. The only critical view European science is capable of holding are European resolutions drawn up by the Euro bureaus based in Brussels, and the only alternative it can offer are again European resolutions. Hey, boys and girls do you have any idea at all? Boring is Blair and his Third Way that "fucked up" millions of people with fake promises of a better life. Blair first destroyed the

POZICIONIRANJE/POSITIONING
NSK DRŽAVA V ČASU / NSK STATE IN TIME

Število prošenj za NSK potni list se je začelo leta 2006 iz meseca v mesec vztrajno večati predvsem zaradi prosilcev iz Nigerije; v začetku leta 2007 smo tako prejeli tudi do 100 prošenj tedensko za izdajo potnih listov Nigerijcem. Ker sta število in struktura prosilcev začeli očitno odstopati od prošenj, ki smo jih prejeli do navedenega obdobja, je bilo očitno, da pri vsem tem ne gre za običajne vzroke. Zato smo se odločili, da se s prosilci podrobneje seznanimo. Ker je kar nekaj sicer iz Ibadana izhajajočih prosilcev kot svoje prebivališče navedlo naslov v Londonu, nam je to omogočilo dovolj hitri odziv. V času od 5. do 7. maja 2007 je Irwin v Londonu odprl začasno pisarno, kjer je z na novo sprejetimi državljani NSK države v času, v sodelovanju z vizualnim antropologom Esben Hansenom in antropologinjo Julie Boticello, opravilo vrsto pogovorov.

Since 2006, the number of applications for the NSK passport has been rising persistently from month to month mostly due to applicants from Nigeria; the numbers of applications reached 100 applications per week in the beginning of 2007. Since the number and the profile of the applicants were obviously different from the average, we decided to take a closer look into the matter. Many applicants of Ibadan origins indicated as the place of residence their London address, this allowed us to react quickly enough. From 5-7 May 2007, Irwin opened a temporary office in London where in collaboration with the visual anthropologists Esben Hansen and Julie Boticello, held a series of discussions with the newly accepted citizens of the NSK state in time.
foto/photo: Haris Hararis

Veleposlaništvo NSK v Moskvi / predavanja in pogovori, 1992.
NSK Embassy Moscow / lectures and discussions, 1992.
foto/photo: Jože Suhadolnik



British schooling, health and job systems, later sending the citizens of Britain to war, who were expected to in the end, after his millennium fraud, be thankful to one of the most boring of all institutions of European history, the Catholic Church. "Nothing has changed, has it?" stated Lucia Atherton, a surviving Jew, in the film of Liliana Cavani The Night Porter (that takes place around the mid 1950s, a decade after the era of WW II Hitler and his comrades) and this sentence is far more truthful than all the European Truths. Boring are the people that have given up revolutionary communism in exchange for revolutionary capitalism. These are perpetually impoverished, perpetually humiliated people who nevertheless repeatedly vote for the "Nazis" to whom they firmly attribute growing percentages of votes in elections. Boring is the European consensual politics that leads toward this pro-Nazi trend with freedom on the one side and violence on the other, and in between them, negotiations; this is the formula of a pan European society of minimal freedom and maximum violence. But Europeans remain Europeans.

Europe holds a centered perspective, it unites, balances, accepts everything within the circle under the twelve golden stars of the Queen Virgin. The only news we have heard in the last few years (and we all know this) are that there are fundamentally no boundaries inside Europe, no outskirts, no margins and no voids; all these people are EU citizens who are well aware of their rights and responsibilities and can now claim whatever they like. They want a 15-year loan, or better a 25-year loan. They refuse the stench of tobacco, because all of a sudden they can not breathe anymore. They want to vote, for Sarkozy for example. They reject the lumpen-proletariat. Many of the good old lumpenproletariat disappeared out of fear; homosexuals have turned into heterosexuals, but heterosexuals have not turned into homosexuals, which is boring. Boring are the lesbians, who in this anti smoking pan European psychosis can only think about how to get (a) child(ren). The European sexual policy has finally managed to enter the "uterus" of the lesbians, something that could not be managed in the past by either the European Pink or by the European Black. The Social life of gays and lesbians in Europe has ceased to exist. The gay quarters with gay restaurants, where gay "managers" stuff themselves with those disinfected fluorescent lettuce leaves and who in such a way, with their anti-lumpenproleterian state bodies, repay Sarkozy and the like for their anal sex, are boring. Eventually, everything concerning homosexuality today is ultimately boring. In the first half of 2008, Slovenia will is the Presidency of this perfect Europe, which nevertheless seems to be a tiny conceptual mistake as there are no gay quarters in Slovenia where one might get bored. On the contrary, there is not even one lesbian bar in Slovenia, and I keep on saying it, but in vain. Today the "Slovenians" that are Europeans are waiting in front of the only place in Ljubljana – the club K4 in the centre of Ljubljana, where it is still possible for gays and lesbians (but only once a week) to kiss each other and dance – waiting to beat them, and this is regarded as being European. By the way, Christianity should absolutely and necessarily enter the European Constitution – as is the case of the free movement of capital. It is the moral overreaching heritage on which the act of Europe is based and it presents the Europe lesson of truth; otherwise we will find ourselves again in the diabolic 20th century, full of oppressions and repressions. This could be in fact the very special Slovenian contribution to European integrity.

It has always been so. But I live now, and I resist this machinery as best I can. There is no collective underground resistance that would last longer than a night. The bearers of the new, sooner or later want to slip into the old good social realm of prestige. I am old enough to follow their stories. First they resist for a while, later just vanishing only to reappear in front of the cameras and take the speaker's platform, seated on those uncomfortable seats made of metal and linen while participating in a fast briefing session. They are changing more and more into Methuselah's amphibians, and without noticing, in the end they no longer know who they are speaking to. I think I will keep on looking for illegal holes in the outskirts of the city where it is possible to smoke cigarettes, flirt and fuck with lesbians, smoke and drink at billiard tables, listen to rock'n'roll and discuss daily matters with friends as long as it takes. Something (good) always comes out of it.

Nataša Velikonja is a sociologist, poetess and lesbian activist. She lives and works in Ljubljana.
Translated from Slovenian by Tanja Passoni.



General Agim Çeku med podelitvijo diplomatskega potnega lista NSK ob otvoritvi skupinske razstave v Galerise Kombetare te Kosoves, Priština, 12. december 2003 (iz arhiva EXIT, Peja). General Agim Çeku is receiving NSK diplomantic passport during the opening of the group exhibition in Galerise Kombetare te Kosoves, Prishtine, December 12, 2003 (from the archive of EXIT, Peja).

